Browsing by Author "Badmas, Abdulhameed Yusuf"

According to most classical Muslim legal theorists (uṣuliyyun), religion, life, intellect, progeny, and property constitute the five necessary universals (Kulliyyat Ḍaruriyyah) for the protection of which the Shariʻah rules and commands have been enacted throughout the different spheres of Islamic legislation. However, the limitation of the Shariʻah necessary higher goals to these five values has been questioned and objected by an increasing number of scholars and writers, especially in modern times, including both formally trained jurists and intellectuals from different academic backgrounds. Two main positions have emerged from the ongoing intellectual debate on the issue that has gained much momentum over the last four to five decades. On the one side, there are those who defend the classical and medieval view that holds the Kulliyyāt Ḍaruriyyah to be limited to the abovementioned five higher goals. On the other side, there are those who advocate a revisionist view maintaining the open-endedness-cum-expansion of the Sharīʻah necessary universals and their non-limitation to a specific number to the effect of including new necessary and universal values. The present study examines arguments and views of both the exponents and opponents as to the limitation of the Shariʻah necessary universals to a specific number as held by most of the earlier legal theorists. It critically probes the underlying premises upon which both groups have based their positions. In line with the criteria on which past legal theorists based their view of limiting the necessary universals of the Sharīʻah to the established five values, the study looks into the proposed new universals to assess their merit. Findings of the study have revealed that the limitation of the necessary universals to the five values mentioned above is intimately connected with the ḥadd punishments which the Lawgiver has instituted to ensure their protection against violation, which consequently shows their overwhelming importance. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that all the proposed new necessary universals are either complements (mukammilat) or means (wasaʼil) which serve to enhance the realization of the classically established five necessary universals of the Sharīʻah. Thus, rather than debating on whether or not the necessary universals of the Shariʻah are limited to a specific set, it would be more appropriate that researches be shifted to these two important aspects, namely complements and means. Correct understanding and exploring how they can serve to promote each of the five necessary universal objectives of the Shariʻah will lead to their practical realization in concrete terms.