This thesis proposes to study the views of the most significant positions held by Islamists in the contemporary Arab world on dissent and opposition. In other words, the thesis ventures to investigate the question whether there is any reason to believe that the Muslim world would be any better off in terms of freedom under Islamic rule than it is now. In writing this thesis I have departed from the currently prevalent conviction that one of the root causes of the presently encompassing predicament of the Ummah is its failure to manage social conflict and deal successfully with dissent. My aim has been to identify positions, arguments, trends, and the main features of contemporary Islamic discourse on opposition, dissent and political pluralism. To accomplish that task I have used the comparative historical approach with elements of the normative approach. Among the findings of the study is the confirmation of the assumption we started with. If ambiguity is the main feature of the Islamic historical heritage on the issue of opposition, then the rapid evolution towards its validation and diversity, if not contradiction and inconsistency, are the main characteristics of the contemporary Islamic discourse on opposition. On the one hand we identified positive evidence including: `freedom of religion` (lai ikrah fi al-din), the commitment to independent judgment and reasoning (ijtihad), the principle of diversity and disagreement (ikhtilaf), mutual consultation (shura), the concept of public interest (maslahah), and some maxims of Islamic law. On the other hand we identified negative evidence in the form of moral restrictions, legal norms regarding apostasy, blasphemy, rebellion,pledge of allegiance, giving of advice, and the unity of Muslims. Three well established Islamic concepts, namely .Hisbah, sovereignty of God and fitnah are often legitimately invoked as positive and negative evidence simultaneously. The difficult and painful process of reinterpreting the ambivalent sources and heritage is taking place in conditions of unenviable realities at home, foreign pressure and intervention from outside, and continued uncertainty about outcome. Most contemporary Islamic thinkers and movements look with favor upon pluralism under the roof of the shariah. I named them `shariatocrats.` An ever diminishing group of `Islamic authoritarians` believe that theological absolutism should be paralleled by political authoritarianism embedded in a single party and an unquestionable single leader. A completely opposite perspective is favored by `Islamic pluralists/liberals` who, though rejecting agnosticism, secularism, moral relativism and religious indifference strongly believe that diversity of opinion and beliefs was primordially vested by God in Man and should accordingly be welcomed not merely allowed to exist. There is also a growing understanding among this group that freedom from the state like that from colonizers does not come free of charge; that it is seldom, if ever awarded, and that it has to be won. Only a few appear to support the establishment of a `pious tyranny.` However, wavering between pluralism and shariatocracy is common. It is fair to say that the gap between Western and Islamic positions on opposition is somewhat exaggerated and that Western liberals often demand from Islamists what they themselves are not ready to concede or undertake. We found sufficient evidence to believe that provided the right conditions - such as genuine democratization of Muslim states are maintained - Islamic thought will develop further in the direction of a vigorous Islamic pluralism/liberalism.