

**METHODOLOGIES OF IMPLEMENTING ISLAM IN
PAKISTAN BY JAMAT-E-ISLAMI AND JAMIAT
ULAMA-E-ISLAM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

BY

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**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Thought and
Civilization**

**International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization
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DECEMBER 2024

ABSTRACT

The rise of Islamic political movements in Pakistan has been central to the country's ideological and political discourse since its inception. This study conducts a comparative analysis of the methodologies employed by two prominent religious-political parties, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), in their efforts to implement an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Despite sharing a common goal, these parties' approaches diverge significantly, raising questions about the effectiveness and feasibility of their strategies in translating Islamic principles into governance. The implementation of an Islamic system in Pakistan has been a long-standing aspiration, marked by numerous rhetorical commitments and legislative efforts. However, a comprehensive practical approach at the ground level remains elusive. This research examines the strengths, weaknesses, and implications of each party's approach to implementing Shari'ah law, focusing on their ideological foundations, political engagement, and social mobilisation strategies. This study employs qualitative methodology, utilising a comparative framework to evaluate party manifestos, key speeches, and historical records. It uses both English and Urdu language sources, quoting original Urdu texts alongside English translations when necessary. The research objectives are multifaceted. First, it analyses the Islamic political system and its applicability in modern Pakistan. Second, it examines the Islamic articles of Pakistan's constitution with Jinnah's vision. Third, it compares the pragmatic efforts of both the JI and JUI towards implementing an Islamic system. Finally, it evaluates the organisational structures of these parties and assesses their specific methodologies for realising Islamic governance in Pakistan. The findings reveal that both the JI and JUI have undergone ideological transformations and political strategy changes in their pursuit of implementing an Islamic system. The JI has attempted to synthesise Islamic politics with democratic norms, challenging the perception of Islamists as inherently anti-democratic. Conversely, the JUI-F has shown adaptability to regional and international political changes, distinguishing itself from more radical Deobandi groups. While these parties have increased their influence in parliament, their electoral popularity remains limited. The study concludes by highlighting the complexity of implementing Islamic governance in a modern state, emphasising the need for a cohesive and pragmatic approach that addresses both ideological purity and political realities. This research contributes to the broader discourse on Islamic political movements and their role in shaping governance in Pakistan. It offers insights into the challenges and opportunities for religious-political movements in influencing the country's legal, political, and social landscape, while also suggesting potential pathways for realising an Islamic system within the Pakistani context.

Keywords: Islamic governance in Pakistan, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) methodologies, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) strategies, Comparative analysis, Shari'ah implementation.

خلاصة البحث

لقد كان صعود الحركات السياسية الإسلامية في باكستان محورياً في الخطاب الإيديولوجي والسياسي في البلاد منذ نشأتها. وتُجري هذه الدراسة تحليلاً مقارناً للمنهجيات التي تستخدمها حزبان دينيان سياسيان بارزان، جماعة إسلامي وجماعة علماء الإسلام، في جهودهما الرامية إلى تنفيذ نظام إسلامي للحكم في باكستان. وعلى الرغم من تقاسمهما هدفاً مشتركاً، فإن النهجين لهذين الحزبين يختلفان بشكل كبير، مما يثير تساؤلات حول فعالية وجدوى استراتيجياتهما في ترجمة المبادئ الإسلامية إلى حكم. لقد كان تنفيذ نظام إسلامي في باكستان طموحاً قديماً، تميز بالعديد من الالتزامات الخطابية والجهود التشريعية. ومع ذلك، لا يزال النهج العملي الشامل على المستوى الأرضي بعيد المنال. يبحث هذا البحث في نقاط القوة والضعف والآثار المترتبة على نهج كل حزب في تنفيذ قانون الشريعة الإسلامية، مع التركيز على أسسهما الإيديولوجية، والمشاركة السياسية، واستراتيجيات التعبئة الاجتماعية. وتعتمد هذه الدراسة على منهجية نوعية، حيث تستخدم إطاراً مقارناً لتقييم برامج الأحزاب، والخطابات الرئيسية، والسجلات التاريخية. كما تستخدم مصادر باللغتين الإنجليزية والأردية، مع الاستشهاد بالنصوص الأردية الأصلية إلى جانب الترجمات الإنجليزية عند الضرورة. وكانت أهداف البحث متعددة الأوجه. أولاً، تحلل الدراسة النظام السياسي الإسلامي وإمكانية تطبيقه في باكستان الحديثة. ثانياً، تدرس المواد الإسلامية في دستور باكستان مع رؤية جناح. ثالثاً، تقارن الدراسة الجهود العملية لكل من الجماعة الإسلامية وجماعة علماء الإسلام نحو تنفيذ نظام إسلامي. أخيراً، تقيم الدراسة الهياكل التنظيمية لهذه الأحزاب وتقيم منهجياتها المحددة لتحقيق الحكم الإسلامي في باكستان. تكشف النتائج أن كل من الجماعة الإسلامية وجماعة علماء الإسلام خضعا لتحويلات أيديولوجية وتغييرات في الاستراتيجيات السياسية في سعيهما إلى تنفيذ نظام إسلامي. حاولت الجماعة الإسلامية التوفيق بين السياسة الإسلامية والمعايير الديمقراطية، وتحدي تصور

الإسلاميين باعتبارهم مناهضين للديمقراطية بطبيعتهم. وعلى النقيض من ذلك، أظهرت جماعة علماء المسلمين الباكستانية قدرة على التكيف مع التغيرات السياسية الإقليمية والدولية، مما يميزها عن الجماعات الديوبندية الأكثر تطرفاً. وفي حين زادت هذه الأحزاب من نفوذها في البرلمان، فإن شعبيتها الانتخابية لا تزال محدودة. وتختتم الدراسة بتسليط الضوء على تعقيد تنفيذ الحكم الإسلامي في الدولة الحديثة، مع التأكيد على الحاجة إلى نهج متماسك وعملي يعالج كل من النقاء الإيديولوجي والحقائق السياسية. يساهم هذا البحث في الخطاب الأوسع نطاقاً حول الحركات السياسية الإسلامية ودورها في تشكيل الحكم في باكستان. وهو يقدم رؤى حول التحديات والفرص التي تواجه الحركات الدينية السياسية في التأثير على المشهد القانوني والسياسي والاجتماعي في البلاد، في حين يقترح أيضاً مسارات محتملة لتحقيق نظام إسلامي في السياق الباكستاني.



APPROVAL PAGE

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as a whole for any other degrees at IIUM or other institutions.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, my heartfelt gratitude goes to Allah (swt), the most glorious, merciful, and eternal, who bestowed upon me the strength to conquer all challenges and gave me the knowledge and ability to conduct this research and to complete this study successfully.

This research would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of many people, since I received a great deal of guidance and motivation while writing this thesis.

My sincerest respect and gratitude go to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Thameem Ushama, who is a great resource with determination. He has been an excellent lecturer, mentor, and thesis supervisor, providing sound advice and encouragement as well as adequate guidance with a unique blend of insight. I am pleased to have spent some quality time working with him.

I would like to give special thanks to my scholarship provider, My Kulliyah “Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization” (ISTAC), for being a valuable sponsor of my studies. The financial support of ISTAC for educational pursuits of students like me has a huge benefit, since it would be difficult to pursue my studies otherwise.

My greatest appreciation goes to all the staff members of ISTAC office for their time and help despite their busy schedules. I specially owe my gratitude to Brother Azmy who coordinated me all the time and provided continuous support in obtaining the essential help, especially in the hard times of COVID-19 pandemic.

I am also grateful to all my course instructors, Professor Dr. Muhammad Pauzi bin Abd. Latif, Professor Dato' Dr. Awang Sariyan, and Professor Wan Ali Wan Mamet for their advice and encouragement. Also, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Imtiyaz Yusuf, who was a constant source of inspiration for me in my research period.

Furthermore, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to some of my fellow students in ISTAC, like Br. Mohammad Eisa Ruhullah, who always supported me in many phases of my academic journey in IIUM, and Br. Masud and Br. Sabbir from Bangladesh, who have always been encouraging and supporting me in my research.

My deepest gratitude goes to my respected parents and my beloved wife for their everlasting support. Their prayers and sacrifices for me, have brighten up my life and help me to accomplish my goals.

Also, I would like to thank my Pakistani friends who gave me full support and guidance throughout my research time, especially Br. Bilal Hussain from IKOL, IIUM who always helped me to carry out my research smoothly.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter establishes the theoretical framework for the study by delineating key concepts, including Islamic state, and examining the status of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It provides a critical analysis of the political landscape, focusing specifically on the two principal religious-political parties, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). The chapter articulates the problem statement and underscores the significance of the study, emphasising the necessity of understanding the diverse approaches these parties employ in their endeavours to implement Islamic governance in Pakistan. Furthermore, it presents the research questions and objectives, followed by a comprehensive literature review that situates the research within the broader context of existing scholarship. The chapter also addresses the research scope and limitations, clarifying the parameters of the study. Finally, it concludes with a detailed exposition of the research methodology, highlighting the comparative and analytical approach that will inform the investigation, thereby laying a solid foundation for the subsequent analysis.

1.1.1 What is an Islamic State?

An Islamic state is one that is governed in accordance to Islamic law. Throughout the Islamic world, it has been used as a phrase to refer to a wide range of historical polities and political ideologies. It is an English version of the Arabic word "*dawlah Islāmiyah*," which refers to a modern notion associated with political Islam (Islamism). The State of Medina, established by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). and the Righteous Caliphates, which lasted through his successors and the Umayyads, is a prominent example of pre-Islamic states.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), Mohammed Omar (circa 1960–2013), Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, (1903–1979), Israr Ahmed (1932–2010), Sayyed Qutub (1906–1966), and Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), were among the intellectuals

who devised and promoted the concept of the contemporary Islamic state. In modern views of the Islamic state, the application of Islamic law is essential, just as it was in earlier Islamic political conceptions. Nonetheless, most modern theories also draw on concepts that were novel at the time they were developed.

Islam is a comprehensive way of life that denotes a person's willing submission to Allah (swt) and obedience to His commandments. While Islam emphasizes the reformation of an individual's life, it also lays down the best principles of its social aspects to guide him in all spheres of his life.

The system of politics and governance of Islam is different from the current democratic system which is prevalent in the world, and it is completely free from its defects and corruption. In the Islamic system of life, while worship is important, the rights of the people, society, and ethics are also highly ranked. Just as Islam has its own system of economy and economic principles, it has its own system of politics and government. The requirements of both are fulfilled by each other.

As Māwardī says in his book:

When the religion becomes weak, the government also becomes weak and when the government supporting the religion ends, the religion also becomes weak, and its traces begin to fade.¹

Islam has never neglected the importance of the state in its entire history. All Prophets struggled to subjugate the collective power of the time to Islam. The main idea of their call was that the power should be pure only for Allah (swt) the Almighty and polytheism should be eliminated in all its forms. Studying the Qur'ān shows that Prophet Yūsuf, Prophet Mūsa, Prophet Dāwūd, and the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) also established a regular Islamic state and ran it in a standard Sharī'ah form. There is no concept of separation between religion and politics in Islamic thought and because of this, Muslims always struggled to establish their state on Islamic principles which is the demand of their religion and belief. Just as morality and good character have been encouraged in the Holy Qur'ān and Prophetic Hadith, there are also clear orders about society, civilization, and politics.

¹ Abū al-Ḥassan al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyah*, (United Kingdom: TA-Ha Publishers, 1996), 5.

1.1.2 Islamic Republic of Pakistan

The struggle to achieve an Islamic state in the Indian subcontinent had been going on for a long time. During this time (8th century to 1858), people of different nationalities came and ruled here, out of which the Muslims who came from the surrounding areas have ruled this region for about a thousand years. Later, when the British rule was established in the region by ending the Muslim rule, the demand of the Muslims for their own separate state began to gain strength and after a long struggle, the Muslims were able to establish their own separate state where they could establish their government according to the Islamic principles. So, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is among the states in the history of the world to be formed in the name of Islam.

Pakistan came into existence under a particular ideology which came to be known as the two-nation theory. By 1939, the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, came to believe in a Muslim homeland on the Indian subcontinent.

In Muhammad Ali Jinnah's own words:

We (Muslims) are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life.²

According to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Hindus and Muslims were not able to live together. Therefore, Jinnah's vision was that Muslims should have an independent state where they can practice their religion feely and live peacefully. The entire Pakistan movement was fought under this theory, which is the basis of Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah advocated this theory in several speeches during the movement and on the establishment of Pakistan, he made it clear that the system of the Qur'ān and Sunnah would be implemented in Pakistan.³

At the same time, to fulfil his promise, Jinnah took initial steps to prepare the Islamic constitution, under which the Nawab of Mamdut was appointed as the first Chief Minister of South Punjab, who then established an institution named "*Iḥyā' e Millat e Islāmiyah*" for this purpose in October 1947. Allamah Asad, who was a well-known leading scholar in the Islamic world and had significant services in this regard

² Liaquat Ali Khan, "*Pakistan: The Heart of Asia*", (India: Read Books, 2008), 67.

³ Ibid., 72.

in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, was hired for this institution. It was the first institution of its kind in the entire Islamic world that was created for this purpose. All well-known scholars of the country were satisfied with this institution and expressed their confidence and commitment to its mission. Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi, a well-known religious scholar, was also associated with the institution.⁴

For this important and historic process, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, met Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi and agreed to establish the initial structure of Islamic constitutional principles and legislative framework for Pakistan. While discussing the formation of Islamic laws, but in the meantime, India worsened the situation in Kashmir. Considering the requirements of national security, a planned series of speeches had to be postponed. Allamah Asad also agreed with the position of the prime minister in these critical events, but the scholars and religious parties continued this campaign of creating an Islamic constitution and Islamic laws and emphasized its importance to maintain the sentiments of the people. Therefore, the series of speeches continued and due to their efforts, an important and historic resolution was passed in this regard.

This resolution, passed in 1949, became known in the history of Pakistan as “*Qarardad-e-Maqāṣid*” (Resolution of Objectives) was a document of fundamental importance for the implementation and formulation of Islamic laws in the future. Jamat-e-Islami also published its famous 8-point outline of the Islamic constitution in the struggle for the implementation of Islamic laws. After that, in 1952, during the time of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, the report of the basic principles was presented in the Constitutional Assembly.⁵

Many parties have contributed to the struggle of implementing Islamic system in Pakistan, among them Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam are the foremost.

⁴ Iftikhar Haidar Malik, *The History of Pakistan: The Greenwoods Histories of Modern Nations*, (New York: Greenwood, 2008), 33.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 37.

1.1.3 Jamat-E-Islami

Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan as one of the oldest Islamist movements in the Muslim world was inspired by Mawdūdī's (1903-1979) ideology of revivalism through the establishment of an Islamic state. The JI is distinct among contemporary Islamic movements in that it has strong democratic traditions right from its inception in 1941. It has a written constitution to govern its organization and has always operated within the framework of the country's constitution. It seeks to bring about societal transformation through appealing to the intellect, organizing communities, and rallying masses around its program just like any other political parties in the world. It believes that Islam provides a universal and dynamic vision of life that is valid and relevant for human welfare in all times and places.⁶

1.1.4 Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

After the Armed Struggle of 1857 all the Ulama of India founded the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in 1919 to guide the Muslims after the independence of India from British imperialism and to continue the political struggle instead of the armed struggle for the independence of India. The Muslim League did not agree with the partition of India formula, so in 1945 Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani founded the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, which was striving for independence from the British as well as a separate state for the Muslims of India. In 1947, India gained independence from the British and the Muslims of India acquired a separate state in the form of Pakistan. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam has been an important and the largest political party in Pakistan since its inception in 1947 and has been playing a positive role in the country's politics.

1.1.4.1 From JUI to JUI-F and JUI-S

During the 1980s, the JUI supported some of General Zia ul Haqq's policies, including his anti-Soviet Jihād in Afghanistan. Additionally, official patronage and financial support for madrassas during the Zia years allowed the JUI to build thousands of madrassas, especially in the NWFP (North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber

⁶ Syed Abū al-A'ālā Mawdūdī, *Jamat-e-Islami ka maqsad, tarikh aur laihah-e-amal*, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1958), 23.

Pakhtunkhwa or KPK), which were instrumental in the formation of the Ṭālibān. At the same time the JUI was distrustful of Zia's close ties to the Jamat-e-Islami and joined the anti-Zia and PPP-led Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).⁷

Following the death of Mufti Mehmood Ahmed in 1980s, this dual relationship with Zia's regime eventually led to a split in the party which came to be divided into the JUI-F, headed by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and the JUI-S headed by Sami ul Haqq , who supported Zia and was a member in his parliament, the *Majlis-e-Shūrā*.⁸

1.1.4.2 Reconstitution of JUI-F as JUI

However, after the assassination of JUI-S chief Maulana Sami ul Haqq in 2018, activities of his faction gradually died down. This lead Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman to plead before the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to get his JUI-F faction renamed as JUI in March 2019.⁹

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The implementation of Islamic governance in Pakistan has been a central focus for various Islamic political movements, particularly Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). Despite sharing the overarching goal of establishing an Islamic state, these two parties differ significantly in their methodologies, political strategies, and interpretations of Islamic law. Jamat-e-Islami, with its ideological foundation laid by Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, emphasizes a gradual, democratic, and intellectual approach, while Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, rooted in Deobandi tradition, advocates for a more direct, ulama-led approach to implementing Sharī‘ah.

This divergence raises critical questions about the efficacy, practicality, and sustainability of these differing methodologies in the complex socio-political context of Pakistan. With the rise of political Islam and its influence on governance, it becomes

⁷ International Crisis Group, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*, Report no. 216 (2011), <https://bit.ly/IslamicPartiesPakistan> accessed December 16, 2020.

⁸ "Renaming party: ECP accepts application of JUI-F," Business Recorder <https://www.brecorder.com/news/580713> , accessed March 17, 2021.

⁹ Special Correspondent, "Election Commission Accepts JUI(F) Plea to Get Renamed as JUI," *Daily Jang*, (March 17, 2020), <https://archive.jang.com.pk/03-17-2020/Pindi/page6.asp> accessed May 11, 2022.

imperative to understand how these strategies have shaped the country's religious, political, and legal frameworks. The absence of a cohesive and unified approach to Islamic governance creates challenges in achieving the desired Islamic system, leading to political fragmentation, social tension, and varying degrees of public acceptance.

Thus, the core problem this study addresses is the lack of a comparative analysis of the methodologies employed by JI and JUI, which is crucial for understanding the broader implications of their political ideologies on the implementation of Islam in Pakistan. By analysing their strategies, ideological foundations, and practical outcomes, this study aims to provide insights into the effectiveness and limitations of these approaches and their impact on Pakistan's political and social fabric.

1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study holds considerable significance in both the academic and practical realms, particularly in the context of political Islam and its role in shaping governance in Muslim-majority countries. Pakistan, as a nation founded on Islamic principles, has witnessed the continuous interplay between religion and politics, with Islamic political parties like Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) playing prominent roles. Despite their common goal of establishing an Islamic state, these parties differ widely in their ideological frameworks and methodologies. Understanding the significance of these differences is crucial for several reasons:

1. Contribution to Political Science and Islamic Studies

This research contributes to the fields of political science, Islamic studies, and comparative politics by providing a detailed analysis of two influential Islamic political movements. It highlights how ideological interpretations shape political strategies and governance models in Islamic parties. The study enriches the discourse on the intersection of religion and politics in modern states and deepens our understanding of Islamic political theory in practice.

2. Policy Implications for Islamic Governance

By comparing the methodologies of the JI and JUI, this study provides insights into the feasibility of implementing Islamic governance in modern states, particularly in the context of a diverse and pluralistic society like Pakistan. The findings of this study will be valuable for policymakers, political leaders, and religious scholars who seek to balance religious ideals with the practical demands of governance. It can inform future attempts at integrating Islamic law with democratic institutions and civil society.

3. Guidance for Islamic Political Movements

The study offers lessons on Islamic political movements to other Muslim-majority countries. By critically examining the successes, limitations, and challenges faced by the JI and JUI, it helps Islamic political actors in other contexts understand the potential consequences of different approaches to implementing Islamic systems. This comparative analysis can serve as a guide for refining strategies in other regions where Islamic parties are vying for political influence.

4. Impact on Pakistan's Socio-Political Landscape

As Pakistan continues to grapple with its identity as an Islamic republic, understanding the approaches of the JI and JUI can shed light on the broader societal impacts of their political engagement. This research explores how each party's approach to Islamic governance influences the legal, social, and cultural fabric of the nation, thus providing valuable insights into the future trajectory of political Islam in Pakistan.

5. Bridging the Gap between Ideals and Realities

The study highlights the complexities Islamic parties face in translating religious ideals into practical political solutions. By comparing the JI's emphasis on democratic processes to the JUI's traditionalist and ulama-led approach, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each methodology in navigating the challenges of modern governance, helping bridge the gap between ideological aspirations and political realities.

In sum, this research is a significant academic contribution to the understanding of Islamic political movements and their role in shaping governance in contemporary Muslim societies, with particular focus on Pakistan's political and social landscape.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study compares the modalities of the implementation of Islam in Pakistan by these two parties and their practical efforts in this regard. The following are questions that came to mind after the initial research on this subject.

1. What is the basic ideology of Islamic Political System?
2. According to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, what kind of system should be implemented in Pakistan?
3. What efforts have been made so far for the implementation of the Islamic system in Pakistan by Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam?
4. What is the history, constitution, manifesto, and basic administrative structure of Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam?
5. What are the methodologies of Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam to implement Islam in Pakistan?

1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The research purposes are as follows:

1. To analyse the Islamic Political System.
2. To study the Islamic articles of Pakistan's constitution (in the context of Jinnah's views).
3. To compare the pragmatic efforts of religio-political parties for the implementation of Islamic system in Pakistan.
4. To compare Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam history, constitutions, manifestos, and basic administrative structures.
5. To examine the methodologies of Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in

implementing Islam in Pakistan.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

Books on the political system of Islam and Islamic governance have begun to be written from the very beginning of Islam when Islamic scholars derived the basic principles of good governance from the Qur'ān and Hadith and formed the structure of an Islamic political system for the Ummah. Similarly, the struggle for the implementation of the Islamic political system in Pakistan and its various aspects have been researched all over the world since the founding of Pakistan. In the context of this current study, if we look at it in more detail, the efforts of the two major religious political parties of Pakistan to implement the Islamic system in the country have also been made the focus of research. The details of both aspects of previous research are as follows:

Leading among them is Ibn e Taymiyyah who has shed light on this subject with valuable details in his book “*Al-Siyāsah al-Shar‘iyah*”.¹⁰ It has translations in multi-languages. This book has made it very clear that all those spheres of human life which belong to administration and politics will only be useful by adhering to the system presented by Islam which can create beauty in the society and establish stability in political and administrative system of the state.

Ibn Khaldūn was the most prominent medieval Muslim scholar famed for his theory and philosophy of history and insights into the rise and fall of civilizations. He was a genius Muslim figure who possessed extensive experience in politics and government that he successfully translated them into his writing as reference for others. He discussed his theory of good governance in his monumental work, *al-Muqaddimah*.¹¹ Obviously, there are undoubtedly direct connections between good governance, good leadership, economic prosperity, and civilization excellence. In one way or another, as a Muslim who conducted studies pertaining to civilization, politics and human society, Ibn Khaldūn himself could not escape from touching the instrumental aspects of religions from being discussed. In his theory, Ibn Khaldūn has highlighted suggestions and solutions in his “*Muqaddimah*” based upon his Islamic

¹⁰ Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyah fī Iṣlāh al-ra‘ī wa al-ra‘iyah*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1992).

¹¹ Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldūn*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015).

worldviews.

Another renowned scholar of Modern Muslim world, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, is also very interested in the different aspects of political system in Islam. He has written excellent books on this topic, most notably “*Al-Dīn al-Siyāsah*”¹² and “*Min Fiqh al-Da‘wah fi al-Islām*”¹³. In the light of these books, his view of democracy can be said to rest on its epistemological foundation in understanding the concept of an Islamic state. According to him, an Islamic state is basically a civil state as are most other countries. Similarly, he states that Islamic political thought does not recognize the term religious state as a form of theocracy known to the West in the dark ages. So, it can be understood that for al-Qaradāwī, the concept of an Islamic state is different from the concept of a theocratic state.

A book “*Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law*”¹⁴ by Patrick Bannerman contains deep discussion about Islam and politics in the context of some Muslim countries including Pakistan. The author argues that one result of this interest has been the development of a view of Islam as monolithic and implacable. He takes a broad view of the intellectual and cultural history of Islam, emphasizing the extraordinary diversity of Islamic societies and the ways in which the ideal is often pragmatically adapted to reality. In this wider social and historical context, the nature of Islamic revival is then reassessed.

A British writer, Anatol Lieven, tries to portray Pakistan in his famous book titled “*Pakistan: A Hard Country*”¹⁵ according to his experience. In this book, he has presented a study of different aspects of every sector of Pakistan in the context of its political system with very critical point of view. Since the author himself is a war and political analyst, he has presented the major incidents in Pakistan from its inception to the last decade, and that there is chaos everywhere and every sector is riddled with corruption. He states that the political and social system in Pakistan has become ineffective and requires a complete restructuring. Still, Lieven overturns many prejudices and gives general readers plenty of fresh concepts with which to think about

¹² Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Religion and Politics: Foundations and Responses to Doubts*, (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq Publishing and Distribution, 2007).

¹³ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Jurisprudence of Da‘wah in Islam*, (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq Publishing and Distribution, 2007).

¹⁴ Patrick Bannerman, *Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law*, (London: Routledge, 2002).

¹⁵ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, (London: Penguin Books, 2011).

a routinely misrepresented country.

A former Pakistani ambassador to the USA, Mr. Hussain Haqqani, is a seasoned journalist and former review correspondent who spent many years reporting on Asia, including covering the war in Afghanistan. He highlights three interlinked problems in his renowned book *“Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military”*¹⁶ that have affected Pakistan’s internal politics since the country’s birth. The first one is the state’s use of religion and religious groups for political gain. Secondly, the inability of the government to control religious fervour after unleashing it, and the last one is the military’s failure to address the cause of this chaos, dealing only with the symptoms. He explains that the relationship between Pakistan’s military and Islamic rulers is not one of opposing forces, but rather of symbiotic shapers of domestic and international policy.

*“Pakistan: A New History”*¹⁷ is a book by Ian Talbot. His study centres on Pakistan's many failures like the collapse of stable governance, the drop in positive political and economic development, and, most of all, the unrealized goal of securing a separate Muslim state. His book unequivocally affirms the country's potential for a positive reawakening. These failures were not preordained, Talbot argues, and such a fatalistic reading does not respect the complexity of historical events, individual actors, and the state's own rich resources. While he acknowledges grave crises still lie ahead for Pakistan, Talbot's sensitive historical approach makes it clear that favourable opportunities remain for Pakistan, in which the state has a chance to reclaim its priorities and institutions and reestablish political and economic sustainability.

Another book is by Pirzada Sayyid titled *“The Politics of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan.”*¹⁸ He discusses in this book the claim by the ulama that they stand for an Islamic system of government based on the pattern of the Caliphate. This book attempts to analyse this claim by comparing the performance of the religious parties, particularly the JUI with socialist and centrist parties in national politics.

A study by Fida ul Rehman is *“JUI-F- Pakistan: From Political Conservatism*

¹⁶ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie endowment, 2010).

¹⁷ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2012).

¹⁸ Sayyid Pirzada, *The Politics of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2000).

to Modernity (A Case Study from 2002-2007)”¹⁹ has been published in the journal “Democratic Transitions in the Muslim World”. In this study, the discussion comprises the gradual reformation of JUI-F in a specific time frame.

A book by Humaira Iqtidar named “*Secularizing Islamists?*”²⁰ provides an in-depth analysis of two Islamist parties in Pakistan, the highly influential Jamat-e-Islami and the more militant Jamat-al-Da’wa. Basing her findings on thirteen months of ethnographic work with the two parties in Lahore, Humaira Iqtidar proposes that these Islamists are involuntarily facilitating secularization within Muslim societies, even as they vehemently oppose secularism.

An article by Mudassar Nazir titled “*Islamic political parties and the nature of politics in Pakistan*”²¹ seeks to analyse the responses of one influential Pakistani Islamic party, Jamat-e-Islami (JI), as a leading voice of protest. It provides evidence that engagement with War on Terror has reactivated JI and has become a political commodity for Islamists in Pakistan, feeding hopes that they will play a larger role in future governments in the country.

Another most relevant research is a book by Marin Lau, titled “*The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan*”.²² He discusses that the role of the judiciary in the Islamization of Pakistan’s legal system has not received much attention by legal scholars. Starting in 1947, it examines the way Pakistani judges have dealt with the controversial issue of Islam in the past 50 years. The book’s focus on reported case-law offers a new perspective on the Islamization of Pakistan’s legal system in which Islam emerges as more than just a challenge to Western conceptions of human rights.

A famous writer, Yoshihiro Nakanishi, raises some serious questions in his book named “*Political Fragmentation and Islamic Politics in Pakistan*”²³ Where he reports about how Islamism influence politics in the world today. Does Islamism turn Muslim people into extremists who seek to create an Islamic state that strictly adheres to

¹⁹ Fida ul Rehman, *JUI-F Pakistan: From Political Conservatism to Modernity (A Case Study from 2002-2007)*, (Peshawar: University of Peshawar, 2010).

²⁰ Humaira Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists? Jamat-e-Islami and Jamat-ud-Da’wa in Urban Pakistan*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

²¹ Mudassar Nazir, “Islamic Political Parties and the Nature of Politics in Pakistan.” *Journal of Political Studies* 20, no. 1 (2013): 85-102.

²² Marin Lau, “The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan.” *Journal of Islamic Law and Culture* 15, no. 2 (2010): 123-145.

²³ Yoshihiro Nakanishi, “Political Fragmentation and Islamic Politics in Pakistan.” *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 3, no. 1 (2017): 22-38.

Shari‘ah? Or is Islam compatible with the modern nation state system and democracy? These questions about the relationship between Islam and politics have been the topic of recent political discussions in Muslim countries. This study aims to contribute to the development of the discussion by looking at the case of Pakistan, which provides us with an intriguing example of political fragmentation caused by Islamic dissent.

“*The Islamic State in the Post-Modern World*”²⁴ is a study of the political development of Pakistan. This study consists of three parts Whereby the first addresses the concept of the 'state' as it has evolved historically. The approach is comparative and involves a brief review of Islamic political theory. The second section focuses on the creation of Pakistan as an experiment in bridging the gulf between the demands of the modern state and the philosophical-spiritual attraction of the Islamic model. In addition to constitutional issues, the discussion also includes political forms, i.e., the machinery of daily government and the appropriateness of democratic methods, elections, legislative process, and political parties, to achieve Islamic ends. The third part considers international issues from the beginning of the twenty-first century especially the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite its 'partnership' role with the US in the war on terror, Pakistan has been consistently marginalized. Pakistan's problems are exacerbated by the conflict over Kashmir, a vestigial remnant of Pakistan's continuous, and largely unsuccessful, efforts at self-identification.

1.7 RESEARCH GAP

Despite extensive research on the individual roles of Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) in Pakistan's political landscape, there is a noticeable gap in comparative analyses of their methodologies for implementing Islamic principles. Existing studies predominantly focus on the ideological foundations and historical contexts of these parties, but they often overlook the practical, strategic approaches each party employs. Moreover, the literature tends to be outdated, failing to account for recent political and social developments that have influenced these methodologies.

Additionally, while there is considerable discussion on the theoretical impact of JI and JUI's activities, there is a lack of empirical studies evaluating the real-world

²⁴ Andrew Falk, *The Islamic State in the Post-Modern World*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

outcomes of their efforts on Pakistani society and governance. This study aims to fill these gaps by providing a detailed, up-to-date comparative analysis of the methodologies of Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, assessing both their strategies and their tangible impacts on the implementation of Islamic principles in Pakistan.

1.8 RESEARCH DELIMITATIONS

The scope of my research is to analyse the modalities of Pakistan's two major political and religious parties in their efforts to implement the Islamic system in Pakistan since its establishment.

1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY


In this research, a comparative methodology has been employed to examine the methodologies of various Islamic political parties, specifically focusing on Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam. This approach facilitates a nuanced understanding of the differences and similarities in their ideological frameworks, political strategies, and practical applications within Pakistan's political landscape. The comparative methodology involves systematically comparing these entities to identify patterns and disparities, utilising primary documents, party manifestos, public statements, and scholarly analyses. By categorising materials into thematic areas such as governance, social justice, and economic policies, insights have been drawn regarding how each party interprets and implements Islamic principles in their political practices.

Complementing this, the analytical approach critically assesses the effectiveness and implications of each party's strategies, employing tools such as SWOT analysis to evaluate the outcomes of their political actions and public reception. Additionally, recognising the significance of Urdu literature, original texts have been incorporated, when necessary, with English translations provided to preserve cultural nuances. The translation of Qur'ānic verses has utilised some of the translations ensuring accuracy and adherence to classical interpretations. Ultimately, by integrating these methodologies, this research aims to provide a comprehensive examination of the methodologies of Islamic political parties in Pakistan, contributing valuable insights

into the dynamics between ideology and practice in the context of political Islam.

1.10 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this introductory chapter has established a robust foundation for the study by thoroughly defining key concepts, including the "Islamic state," the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan," and the roles of prominent political entities such as Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam. Furthermore, the chapter articulates the research questions and objectives, elucidating the significance of the study and detailing the employed methodology. This comprehensive understanding serves to facilitate a critical examination of the Islamic political system and the corresponding Islamic political values, as well as their relevance to the contemporary state framework, particularly within the context of Pakistan.



CHAPTER TWO

ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the Islamic political system, exploring its fundamental principles, historical foundations, and contemporary relevance. Beginning with the intrinsic relationship between Islam and politics, the chapter delves into core Islamic political values, including monotheism, prophethood, and the concept of caliphate. It examines the constitutional principles of Islam and highlights key features of the State of Madinah as a model Islamic polity. The discussion extends to Islamic constitutional values, the concept of an Islamic welfare state, and the objectives of Islamic law (*Maqāṣid al Sharī'ah*) in relation to governance. Additionally, the chapter compares Islamic political ideals with the basic features of liberal Western democracy, addressing the ongoing debate surrounding the potential Islamisation of democratic systems. Finally, it outlines a modern structure for an Islamic political system, drawing from various sources, including the Qur'ān, historical precedents, political theories, contemporary movements, and the perspectives of different Islamic schools of thought. Through this exploration, the chapter aims to provide a nuanced understanding of Islamic political thought and its potential applications in modern contexts.

2.2 ISLAM AND POLITICS

Islam is a system of life, and it has been guiding human beings in every aspect, whether it is related to worship or business, economics, or sociology, or whether it is related to political science. It shows the way in every aspect. So, the correct definition of politics is as follows:

Politics in Islam refers to the action by which people are brought closer to reform and away from temptation and corruption.¹

¹ Nazih Ayubi, Nader Hashemi and Emran Qureshi, "Islamic State". *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11.

According to Islam, the meaning of politics is that the ruler must decide on matters between his people with justice, to free the society from oppression, to enjoy what is good and to refrain from what is evil (to prevent evil and to encourage good), to prohibit bribery, etc. In the present era, politicians have given such a negative identity to politics and have made it so far removed from its original purpose that when a person hears the term politics, he imagines such a bad politician or a corrupt political system in his mind, which is based on lies, breach of promises, accusations, and deceit. Furthermore, the politicians are those whose hands are blood-stained, who manipulate humanity for their own interests, who create riots in the name of caste, and religion, who use their power to do injustice, and who use money illegally.

After such observations on politics, the question arises in a person's mind as to what is the relationship between Islam and politics, and why will Islam allow it? But the fact is that Islam has nothing to do with such dirty politics. Islam and politics are inseparable from one another because Islam has not only guided the individual life of man but also has a deep influence in the collective life of mankind.

2.3 ISLAMIC POLITICAL VALUES

The political system and its important aspect of the life of the Prophet (pbuh) started from Madinah. Considering the polytheists of Madinah, its surrounding areas, and other Arab tribes, a constitution which was called the Madinah Charter was prepared. The Prophet (pbuh) established such a unique system of politics to the world. He established brotherhood, justice, equality, and rights. Jews, for example, were given religious freedom. Murderers were punished and justice was provided to the oppressed. He not only created a clear system of state related to foreign affairs, trade, justice, health, industry, education, and human rights, but also taught the world how to run the government. After that, the Caliphs of Islam followed him in their time as the system of government was further organized. Even animals were given rights in the Islamic system of that time.

So, a balanced Islamic political system reflects the values that are generally held by most people living in a society. To identify such values in an Islamic society, it is important to consult the fundamental beliefs of Islam. In the context of the above

discussion, the political system of Islam is based on three principles as follows:

1. Monotheism / Tawḥīd (التوحيد)
2. Prophethood / Nubuwwah (النبوة)
3. Caliphate (الخلافة)

2.3.1 Monotheism / Tawḥīd (التوحيد)

Tawḥīd (التوحيد) comes from the root word "و-ح-د" (w-ḥ-d), which means "oneness" or "to make one". In classical Arabic lexicons like *Lisān al-Arab*,² Tawḥīd refers to the act of asserting the oneness of something. In Islamic theology, it specifically refers to the belief in the absolute oneness of Allah, which is the foundational concept of Islamic creed (*Aqīdah*). This encompasses *Tawḥīd al-Rubūbiyyah* (Oneness of Lordship), *Tawḥīd al-Ulūhiyyah* (Oneness of Worship), and *Tawḥīd al-Asma' wa al-Ṣifāt* (Oneness of Allah's Names and Attributes). Allah (swt) has the right to command and forbid, and the exclusive right to be worshipped and obeyed without any association or partnership. Our existence, physical powers, organs and nervous systems, none of them is created by us. All of these are given by Allah, and it is the power of Allah to exercise His authority and determine the limits of His authority. He does not have any children, nor was He born from anyone. As Allah (swt) says:

Say, the truth is that Allah is one. Allah is besought of all, needing none. He neither begot anyone, nor was he begotten. And equal to Him has never been anyone.³

Tawḥīd means that the rights of Allah should be kept exclusively for Him. As Allah (swt) says in the Qur'ān:

Say, "Who gives you sustenance from the heavens and the earth? Or, who controls the (powers of) hearing and seeing? And who brings forth the living from the dead, and brings forth the dead from the living? And who

² Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al- 'arab*, (Beirut: Dār al-Qādir, 1990), Vol:3, 234.

³ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ*: 1-3.

manages everything?" They will say, "Allah." Then, (you) say, "Would you not, then, fear Allah (by desisting from holding others as Allah)?⁴

Tawhīd means Allah (swt) should be considered as one in all acts of worship. Those that are verbal, functional, and physical, or are related to financial and emotional concerns should be performed just for Him No one should be made His partner. As the Qur'ān says:

Say, my prayer, my offering, my life and my death are for Allah, the Lord of all the worlds.⁵

2.3.2 Prophethood / Nubuwwah (النبوة)

The Nubuwwah (النبوة) derives from the root word "ن-ب-أ" (n-b-a), meaning "to inform" or "news." It relates to the act of conveying important news or information. According to lexicographers like in *Tāj al-'urūs*,⁶ nubuwwah refers to the office or state of being a prophet (Nabi). In Islamic theology, nubuwwah refers to the divine selection of certain individuals (Prophets) to receive revelations from Allah and convey His message to humanity. They inform their Ummah about religion and its commands and prohibitions. They give good tidings of reward in this world and the hereafter to those who believe and do good deeds. They warn the unbelievers who do bad deeds of the punishment of Hell. The following is stated in the Qur'ān:

And We send not the messengers except as bringers of good tidings and Warners. So, whoever believes and reforms there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve.⁷

Prophets are distinguished people of Allah (swt). A person cannot become a prophet by hard work, effort and demand. Prophethood is a gift of Allah, and the prophets are the leaders of humanity. Allah commanded in the Holy Qur'ān to accept them as models, to follow in their footsteps and to imitate them because they are at the highest level of worship of Allah. He says:

⁴ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Yūnus*: 31.

⁵ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-An'ām*: 162.

⁶ Muhammad Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-'urūs min jawāhir al-qāmūs*. (Kuwait: Ministry of Information, 1965), Vol: 8, 322.

⁷ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-An'ām*: 48.

Those are the people whom Allah has guided. So, it is their guidance that you should follow.⁸

In another part of the Qur'ān, Allah (swt) says:

Surely there is a beautiful example for you in the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, for anyone who has hope in Allah and the Last Day and engages in the praise of Allah frequently.⁹

Describing the attributes of believers of the Prophet, Allah (swt) says:

Those who obey Allah, and the Messenger are with those whom Allah has blessed, namely, the prophets, the *Ṣiddiqīn*, the *Shuhadā'* and the righteous. And excellent are they as companions.¹⁰

Through the Prophet we have received three things which are “The Book” (Holy Qur'ān), “Sunnah” and “Sharī‘ah.”

2.3.2.1 The Book: (The Qur'ān)

The Qur'ān is the sanctified and central book of the religion of Islam, regarding which the followers of Islam believe that it is the word of God and therefore it is a highly respected book. It was revealed to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) through revelations.

As the verses of the Qur'ān were revealed to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), he would listen to them and explain the meaning of these verses to his companions. Some of the Companions would have memorized these verses on the spot and saved some by writing them down.¹¹

Muslims believe that the Qur'ān is safe from all kinds of distortions and has not been altered to this day. The true meaning of the book has not changed despite being printed in millions world-wide. Its recitation is worship.

Also, among other heavenly books, this is the ultimate and final book. It confirms the messages of preceding heavenly books, and no other divine books will be revealed after it. In view of the eloquence of the Qur'ān, it has been given the highest

⁸ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-An'ām*: 90.

⁹ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Aḥzāb*: 21.

¹⁰ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Nisā'*: 69.

¹¹ Suha Taji-Farouki, *Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur'ān*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), 19.

position among all Arabic books in terms of lexical and religious aspects.¹² In the book, Allah (swt) has stated His law:

They are those whom We have given the Book and wisdom and prophethood. So, if these people disbelieve this (concept of Prophethood), then (be not grieved, because) We have deputed for (believing in) it a people who do not reject it.¹³

2.3.2.2 Sunnah

The sayings and actions of the Messenger of Allah and confirming something silently is called Sunnah. Sunnah is also one of the main principles of Islam. That is why it is said that following the Sunnah is obligatory and opposing it is forbidden, as stated in numerous verses of the Holy Qur'ān in which there is no room for doubt. So now, whoever denies the Sunnah, it is as if he denies definite proofs and opposes the consensus of the Ummah. Some of these verses are as follows:

Allah (swt) says:

Say (O Prophet): “If you really love Allah, then follow me, and Allah shall love you and forgive you your sins. Allah is Most-Forgiving, Very-Merciful.”¹⁴

Allah (swt) says in another place in the Qur'ān:

So, never by your Lord! Never shall they become believers, unless they make you the judge in the disputes that arise between them, then find no discomfort in their hearts against what you have decided and surrender to it in total submission.¹⁵

These verses have provided the decree that anyone who claims to love Allah but does not follow the path of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), is a liar in his claim of love for God. This applies to one who does not follow the Shari'ah and the Prophet's religion in all his words and actions.

¹² Anwar G. Chejne, *The Arabic Language: Its Role in History*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 34.

¹³ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-An'ām*: 89.

¹⁴ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Āl- 'Imrān*: 31.

¹⁵ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Nisā'*: 65.

2.3.2.3 *Sharī'ah*

The Islamic term “Sharī'ah” refers to the combination of Islamic laws mentioned in the Holy Qur'ān and the Sunnah. This is the basic constitution on which the Islamic state is based. It refers to the commands, the prohibitions, and the halal and haram that Allah has made clear to the people. If a person obeys the Sharī'ah and considers what is halal as halal and what is forbidden as haram, then he has succeeded in upholding Islamic law. Whereas the one who opposes the divine law, earns himself the displeasure, wrath, and punishment of Allah. As in the Qur'ān, Allah (swt) says:

Then We have put you on a certain way of the Matter (the religion); so, follow it, and do not follow the desires of those who do not know.¹⁶

2.3.3 Caliphate (الخلافة)

Khilāfah (الخلافة) comes from the root word "خ-ل-ف" (kh-l-f), meaning "to succeed" or "to follow after." The word Khilāfah is used in Arabic for representation. From the Islamic point of view, the real status of man in the world is that he is the vicegerent of Allah on earth, that is, he uses the powers given, in the current context, to him for his country.¹⁷ Allah (swt) says:

They say: ‘Do we too have anything (i.e., Authority) in this matter?’ Say: ‘The whole matter is in the Hand of Allah.’ They have concealed in their hearts things which they let not be disclosed to you, say: ‘Had we any say in this matter we would not have been slain here.’¹⁸

The administration of an Islamic State will be entrusted to an *Amīr* who should be considered equal to the president of a republic. In the election of the *Amīr*, all adult men and women who recognize the principles of the constitution shall have the right to vote. Selection will be based on who knows the spirit of Islam, his Islamic character, piety, and trustworthiness, as well as the extent to which he has the trust of most of the people of the society. Then a *Majlis-e-Shūrā* will be formed to help him. It will be necessary for the *Amīr* to govern the country with the advice of the members of the

¹⁶ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Jāthiyah*: 18.

¹⁷ Munir Baalbaki, *Al-Mawrid Al-Qarīb, Arabic-English Dictionary* (Beirut: Educa Books / Dar El Ilm Lilmalayin, 2017), 124.

¹⁸ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Āl-'Imrān*: 154.

Shūrā. An *Amīr* can rule if he has the confidence of the people. The common man has a right to the service of the *Amīr* and his government. Legislation in the Islamic State will be within the limits set by the Sharī‘ah.

The clear commands of Allah (swt) and the Prophet are to be obeyed. No legislature can change them. The sub-committee of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* will consist of scholars who have knowledge of Sharī‘ah. In Islam, the court is not subordinate to the administrative government. It is directly representative of Allah, and it is accountable to Him. The judge will administer impartial justice in accordance with the law of the court, even if the head of government himself is a plaintiff or defendant. He must be like an ordinary citizen.

Any dispute between individuals and the state, or between the government and the people, or between the legislature or the government, or between different branches and components of the government, will be decided in the light of the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet.

2.4 ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

There has been discussion on whether Islamic constitutions will ever be democratic in the Muslim world as well as the West. Some claim that the constitutions will necessarily hinder a country from achieving democracy or from upholding liberal rights since Sharī‘ah principles are fundamentally incompatible with democratic values. Some people, however, insist that these worries are unfounded. Both sides oversimplify the situation and leave out an important detail. People, in practically every country in the Muslim world, continue to have disputes on who has the authority to interpret Sharī‘ah and what Sharī‘ah demands. As a result, its inclusion does not automatically result in a certain outcome. It relies on its interpreters whether “*Sharī‘ah Guarantee Clauses*” support democracy and human rights or not.

A renowned historian, Ibn Khaldun, is called the father of Sociology. In his "*Muqaddimah Tarikh*", where he has discussed history, economics, geography, science and other sciences and arts, he has also shed light on the Islamic State and the Khilāfah. He says in his book that "*Islamic state refers to a state that is established in the succession of the Prophet (pbuh) to enforce the Sharī‘ah and protect worldly affairs.*"

*Indeed, the Caliphate is based on Islamic law (Sharī'ah) in safeguarding both religious and worldly affairs.”*¹⁹

The idea of a secular state that is found today in the Western world and other parts of the world is acceptable to all other religions. This is because these religions are not a complete code of life, but a set of precepts and acts of worship and morals. They have virtually nothing to do with most areas of life, from trade and economics to government. That is why when the followers of these faiths interfere with their religion, the situation, such as those in European countries, Burma, and India, becomes dire.

But the case of Islam is completely different. The question of the duality of government and religion does not arise here. The paths of religion and life are not separate. Judicial law and Sharī'ah are two names for the same entity. Islam is the only religion which, on the one hand, has embraced the Sharī'ah and on the other hand, has embraced life and its beauty in front of the world of humanity.

Islam does not regard the laws relating to worldly affairs as merely an administrative expediency and advice that you can adopt if you want but leave out if they do not suit you. Rather, according to Islamic teachings, the rule of an Islamic state and the implementation of Sharī'ah law is one of the most important responsibilities and duties of a believer.

For example, the Sharī'ah demands that a Muslim government enforce two laws. Allah (swt) says in the Qur'ān:

As for a man or a woman who commits theft, cut off the hands of both to punish them for what they earned, a deterrent punishment from Allah. Allah is Mighty, Wise.²⁰

This verse indicates the punishment of theft. The second law is stated in another part of the Qur'ān where Allah (swt) says:

The fornicating woman and the fornicating man, flog each one of them with one hundred stripes. No pity for them should prevail upon you in the matter of Allah's religion, if you really believe in Allah and the Last Day; and a group of believers must witness their punishment.²¹

This verse shows the punishment of fornication. So, it is very clear from the above

¹⁹ Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldūn*, 87.

²⁰ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Mā'idā*: 38.

²¹ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Nūr*: 2.

verses that the demand for the implementation of these Sharī'ah rules is to be met with such urgency and emphasis. But even if there are alternative punishments for thefts and fornication, we should determine our judicial position in the light of the following verse of the Qur'ān:

Those who do not judge according to what Allah has sent down are the disbelievers.²²

Similarly, if a Muslim does not keep his individual trade or government free from interest, the Qur'ān addresses him in the following words:

But if you do not (give it up), then listen to the declaration of war from Allah and His Messenger.²³

Therefore, those who are adamant that even in a country with a 95% Muslim majority, we can perform all our duties in the shadow of scholasticism without enforcing Sharī'ah law, and this is the "secret of the well-being" of Muslims, the implication is that they are probably ignorant of many Qur'ānic injunctions and facts.

According to Islam, the supreme authority is Allah (swt). The ruler of the time serves as a Caliph, vicegerent, or viceroy who is bound to obey all commands of Allah. While operating within the limits of Sharī'ah, they may strive for progress and improvement in worldly affairs. The *Khalifah*, empowered by Allah and the Prophet (pbuh), should serve as a faithful intermediary and interpreter between the people and Allah (swt). The ultimate authority rests with Allah and His Messenger. Divine knowledge and its implementation are the essential prerequisites for assuming the position of vicegerent.

On the other hand, Western democracy has declared that the source of power comes from the people only. Islam does not deny democratic sentiments at all, but in the words of the Quaid-e-Azam, "Muslims, even in their own religion, are averse to democratic practices." The only valid interpretation of this is that the person in power has the support of the people. Unlike Western democracy, however, the ideology of "*al-Hukm u lil-Allah*" also works here.

According to Mehmood Ahmad Ghazi, democratic principles are viewed

²² Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Mā'idah*: 44.

²³ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Baqarah*: 279.

differently in Islamic jurisprudence. He explains that when "51 out of 100 people support or oppose the law, then its implementation or end is inevitable. While in the eyes of Islam the truth is the truth even if the whole world opposes it and falsehood is false in any case even though its intention is to spread the word in every street."²⁴ This perspective emphasizes that in Islamic thought, truth and righteousness are not determined by majority opinion but by divine guidance.

Islam does not believe in so-called bias. Whether it is a majority or a minority, their legitimate demands will be considered, but there is no room for the demands of the majority to be given the status of law as compared to Allah's commandments. The Qur'ān comments on this method as follows:

Had the truth followed their desires, the heavens and the earth and all those therein would have fallen in total disorder. However, We have brought to them their advice, but it is their advice that they are averse to.²⁵

Allah (swt) sent the Prophet (pbuh) as the ultimate source of guidance for mankind. The birth of the Prophet (pbuh) and the Ba'ath was the beginning of a new era and the determination of a new dimension to history. That is why after the advent of the Prophet (pbuh) humanity entered a whole new era, one in which there are precedents for the promotion, establishment and stability of consciousness, awareness, civilization, culture, and higher human values that not only did not exist before his arrival but also concept missing. When the Prophet (pbuh) met the pilgrims coming from outside on Hajj in Makkah, as well as those from Madinah and convey his invitation to them, the benefit of this two-year preaching was very impactful. The chiefs of the major tribes accepted Islam and swore allegiance to the Prophet (pbuh) and returned to Madinah and conveyed his message to others until the majority of Madinah became Muslims. When life was difficult for the Prophet (pbuh) in Makkah, Allah (swt) ordered him to emigrate to Madinah, and one of the Prophet's (pbuh) top priorities was the formation of a constitutional state and the unanimous adoption of its constitution.

He started the preparation of the constitution of the new state in the early days of the establishment of Madinah, so the wars that took place before he was in Madinah, especially the Battle of *Bu'āth*, forced the people of Madinah to think that they should

²⁴ Mehmood Ahmad Ghazi, *Muḥāzīrāt e Sharī'at*, (Lahore: al-Faisal Nashiraan wa Tajiran e Kutub, 2009), 187.

²⁵ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Mu'minūn*: 71.

have to take some steps to end the constant bloodshed and murder.

After the migration of the Prophet (pbuh) to Madinah, the possibility became very clear that Madinah would emerge from the state of lawlessness and become an organized society. The Prophet (pbuh), through his prophetic and Allah (swt) given advice, took such steps from the very beginning which paved the way for the adoption of a unified constitution. The most significant and far-reaching result of the Prophet's effective strategy was the agreements he made with the infidels of Makkah and other Arab tribes, including the Jews and Christians. The enemy was the secular units with which he made various new alliance agreements at different times, but two alliance agreements proved to be historic and decisive in terms of specific results. Among them are the Charter of Madinah and the treaty of *Hudaybiyyah*. It is important to note here that these alliances were not based on religious grounds but on social grounds. The Prophet (pbuh) presented a common religious value, i.e., Faith in Allah, to bring the people of divine books closer psychologically and to take them into confidence. The Qur'ān describes this claim of the Prophet (pbuh) as follows:

Say: 'O People of the Book, come to a word which is common between us and you.'²⁶

It is a historical fact that in those days the economy of Madinah depended entirely on the usury of the Jews, but the Prophet (pbuh) did not tell the emigrants to start their own businesses by borrowing money from the Jews with interest. It was impossible to create a society based on economic justice in this way, but the Prophet (pbuh) told the Ansar of Madinah to help their brothers and then introduced the system of good loans. When the members of the society practically started building the economy through cooperation on interest-free loans, the Prophet (pbuh) abolished usury by declaring it to be completely forbidden.

2.5 IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE STATE OF MADINAH

The Islamic state, which the Prophet (pbuh) established with the support of Allah (swt), was an ideological state. It is important to mention a few of its many features here. This state was founded on an agreement which was first made between a man and the

²⁶ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Āl-Imrān*: 64.

inhabitants of a city, and they willingly proposed to him to be the head and be responsible of all affairs and pledged allegiance to him. This state was established purely on the consent and agreement of the people. Another feature of this state was its written constitution. It was a purely constitutional state in which the rights and duties of its citizens were clearly defined and distributed. The first written constitution in the world probably came into existence through the establishment of state of Madinah.²⁷

It was a principled and ideological state because it was not based on any commonality of race, region, language, tribe or economic and political interests, but it came into being to protect and enforce certain principles. One of its characteristics was that it was a state based on a comprehensive concept that regulated all areas of human life and directed them towards the service of the Lord. It covered all aspects of human life from the rights of Allah (swt) to the rights of human beings.²⁸

This state was established for the first time in the world based on the beautiful combination of religion and politics. The Prophet was the head of this state. He was the commander of the armies, and he was the imam of prayers. He was the supervisor of workers, and he was responsible for imparting divine teachings. This amalgamation of offices of the mosque and the court with constitutional assembly abolished the division of human life and transformed it into a beautiful and balanced unity from which many burdens of man were relieved.

It was a democratic and consultative state in which all matters were decided by consultation. Since the divine order was that all matters should be decided by consultation, so according to this principle, peace and war, as well as internal and external affairs were decided by everyone's consultation and all policies were formulated by mutual consultation. Freedom of thought, human equality, collective justice and democracy, according to the spirit of these words, they were fully organized. The manifesto of freedom from all kinds of slavery was the revolutionary slogan that expressed the basic ideology of this state. It was based on human equality and brotherhood. Even the head of state was not above the law.

It was a welfare and people-serving state which was responsible for the service

²⁷ A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 123.

²⁸ W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Mecca* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 156.

to humanity and the protection of its subjects. Its head declared that the debt of the debtor who dies is the responsibility of the state, and the legacy left behind belongs to his heirs. The provision of employment guarantee and financial support was the responsibility of the state.

This state was accountable to Allah (swt) in its collective affairs and all its policies and legislation were determined according to Allah's revealed instructions. The individuals of this state were devoted to the fact that they were answerable to Allah and under this feeling there was mental and emotional harmony among the inhabitants of the entire state. In fact, it was not an irresponsible state, but its status was that of an agency accountable to Allah, who represented Him. That is why it was defined as a Caliphate.

The concept of sovereignty of this state was different from all the states of the world. Its sovereignty was neither of the people, nor of the head of state, nor of any family, nor of any institution, but his sovereignty was directly related to Allah (swt). He was its real and permanent Supreme Ruler, who is eternally living and knowing, who is always the watcher and guardian of His servants, and who is the sole ruler of His creatures, all others are His subjects. This theory made a revolutionary change in the theory of sovereignty of states. This established absolute equality and selfless justice which was not possible in any previous era and in any society.

The state had a permanent book of instructions which was the law itself and the source of law and was considered as the final authority in every dispute. For this type of state, the book of guidance was called the Qur'ān, and every single word of it was spoken by the supreme ruler and was unchangeable. It was the permanent guidebook, fundamental law and constitution of the state.

The Islamic state had several key objectives. Primarily to suppress those who rebelled against Allah (swt) and to counter the enemies of Islam. Its mission was to bring all rebellious people, states, institutions, and groups under the service of Allah and to establish Islam as the final religion on earth. Reaching the edges of the known civilization was its prime objective. Through these aims, the state represented a universal call for revolution and stood as a constant challenge to anti-Islamic powers and those disobedient to Allah.

It should be borne in mind that one of the main objectives of the Prophet (pbuh) was the establishment of an ideal Islamic welfare society and for this, it was necessary to have enforcement. So, the first Islamic welfare state with these characteristics was established in the form of the state of Madinah. The Qur'ān defines the purpose of the Islamic state as:

(These men of Truth) are those who, if We establish their rule in the earth, will establish (systems of) Prayer, (organize and control) paying of Zakat (the Alms-due), enjoin righteousness (and piousness in the whole society) and forbid (people from) evil. And the result of all the endeavours is in the control of Allah.²⁹

According to this verse, the Prophet (pbuh) performed his duties in the state of Madinah and its inhabitants. With the establishment of the state of Madinah, the aim of the Prophet (pbuh) was to gain the pleasure of Allah (swt) and the welfare of the people. This government was based on religious unity instead of family prejudice and racial consciousness. The style of governing this unique state was also very different from that of ordinary rulers. Numerous examples of his foresight as the administrator of the state show the true greatness of the Prophet (pbuh).

2.5.1 Legal Equality

The state of Medina was the first state in the world in which the law was applicable to all people. Until the creation and establishment of the state of Madinah, no state had even claimed that all were equal. Even in recent times, all states have made only claims of equality but having the same law for all is practically non-existent. For example, headscarves are allowed for Christian nuns, but the same law does not allow head coverings for Muslim women. Likewise, financial and diplomatic laws for whites are completely different for black and brown people.

On the other hand, the state of Madinah was a state in which according to the requirements of justice, the decision of a Muslim Qāḍī (Chief Justice) was bail for the Jew and beheading for the Muslim. The Prophet (pbuh) himself was once asked for leniency in the law for a criminal, he said:

Many communities ruined itself in the past as they only punished the poor

²⁹ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Ḥajj*: 41.

and ignored the offences of the exalted. By Allah, if Muhammad's (My) daughter Fatimah would have committed theft, her hand would have been severed.³⁰

The Prophet (pbuh) who lived among the Muslims in the last days of his life said, *"If I have ever wronged anyone, let him take revenge on me because everyone is equal in the eyes of the law."*³¹

2.5.2 Education System

In the Islamic state, the education system has been given great importance. The Prophet (pbuh) had sent Musab bin Umair (R.A.) as a teacher to Madinah even before the Hijrah and after the Hijrah, the Masjid of the Prophet (pbuh) was given the status of a regular school. A platform was set up for the teaching and accommodation of non-local students. Since writing was not the norm in Arabia, Abdullah bin Sa'īd bin al-'Āṣ (R.A.) and 'Ubādah bin Ṣāmit (R.A.) were assigned to teach writing in the Prophet's Mosque. Different languages were taught to the Companions, and martial arts education was made necessary for every young man. Women also arranged to provide medical treatments whereby one of the Companions had pitched a tent in the al-Masjid an-Nabawī itself where wounded were bandaged. In return, Muslims will have to be taught to read and write.³²

2.5.3 Accountability Process

Although there was no permanent department of accountability in the time of the Prophet (pbuh), he used to perform this duty himself. He also supervised trade affairs and the state of trade in Arabia experience great reformation. After coming to Madinah, the Prophet (pbuh) issued reforms. He used to implement reforms for all people and punish those who did not do so. There was no regular prison at the time of the Prophet (pbuh) so the only thing that was thought was that the culprit should not be allowed to

³⁰ Muhammad bin Ismā'īl al-Bukhārī, *Al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ lil Bukharī, Kitāb al-Ḥudūd*, (Lahore: Maktaba Raḥmāniyah, 1998), 255.

³¹ Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *al-Waṭan wa'l-Muwāṭana fi Daw' al-Uṣūl al-'Aqdiyya wal-Maqāṣid al-Sharī'iyya*. (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq 2008), 176.

³² Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Non-Muslims in the Islamic Society*, (Indianapolis, American Trust Publication, 1985), 221.

meet people and maintain social relations for some time.

2.5.4 The Rights of Minorities in the State of Madinah

The Prophet (pbuh) gave the minorities the same place in society as the basic citizens of society. He made the protection of lives, property, honour, and even religious rights of minorities a part of the constitution because it has become an important question in the context of the Islamic State. The Prophet also explained the rights of the minorities in the Islamic State. He said:

Beware, if anyone wrongs a contracting man (Dhimmi), or diminishes his right, or forces him to work beyond his capacity, or takes from him anything without his consent, I shall plead for him on the Day of Judgment.³³

2.5.5 Real Equality Between Rich and Poor

The implementation of the Qur'ān and the laws of the Qur'ān and Sunnah in the state of Madinah was a great blessing for humanity. This ideal state is a role model for the cure of the sufferings of humanity until the Day of Judgment. A just law for the poor, big and small, restored respect for humanity.

Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī, a well-known historian, has written an interesting incident in the biography of the Companions of the Prophet.

In the battle of Badr, the Prophet (pbuh) lined up the Companions. He saw Sawād bin Ghāziyah coming out of the line. There was a piece of wood. The Prophet (pbuh) ordered him to stand upright in the line and hit him on the stomach with the stick. Sawad said: O Messenger of Allah, Allah has sent you with truth and justice. You have harmed me. Give me your retribution (*Qiṣāṣ*). The Prophet (pbuh) offered him the stick and said: "Take revenge." Sawad said, "My belly is bare, and your belly is Covered." Prophet uncovered it. Sawad went forward, threw the piece of wood, and kissed the blessed belly of the Prophet (pbuh) and then hugged him. The Prophet (pbuh) asked, 'What have you done?' He replied, "O Messenger of Allah, as you can see, the time of battle is upon us. If something happens to me, I wanted my last moment with you to be like

³³ Abū Dāwūd Sulaymān Bin al-Ash'ath, *Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Kitāb al-Adab, Bāb fī Husn al-Khulq*, (Huston: Dar-us-Salam Publications, 2011), 231.

this." And seeing the sincere action, he prayed for them.³⁴

2.5.6 Economic Policy

Islam, like any other spheres of life, has stated the policy of economy in a very clear manner. Allah (swt) said:

And whatever (materials of Fay') Allah restored to His Messenger taking out from the people of (the towns captured without war in addition to those of *Quraidha*, Nadir, Fadak, Khaybar and 'Uraina) belong to Allah and His Messenger and (the Messenger's) near relatives (i.e. Banū Hāshim and Banū 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib) and the orphans, the needy and the wayfarer (of society at large). This distribution system is to ensure that (the whole wealth) may not circulate (only) among the rich of you (but should circulate among all the classes of society). And whatever the Messenger awards you, take that and whatever he forbids you, abstain (from that) and keep fearing Allah (i.e., never scoff at the Messenger's distribution and award). Surely Allah is Severe to punish.³⁵

The circulation of wealth and reaching out to the people is the backbone of the economy. The Prophet (pbuh) had said that the economic policy of the Islamic state is to take money from the rich and give it to the poor. Similarly, usury, bribery, gambling, embezzlement, hoarding and other immoral sources of income were strictly prohibited. There is no shortage of these things in the Islamic economy. Government officials could not receive gifts while in office. These gifts were collected in the treasury. The Prophet (pbuh) introduced the principle of distribution of wealth between the rich and the poor, based on which the idea of a prosperous state developed in Madinah.

2.5.7 Preservation of Islamic Culture and Honor

The culture of the Islamic state of Madinah was completely free from obscenity, nudity, and dancing. Mixed parties of men and women and all forms of melody, drinking, and intoxication were haram and punishable offenses. It was not a crime to drink alcohol, but it was haram to make alcohol, to sell it, to load it, and to give it as a gift to a non-Muslim. According to the Qur'ān and Sunnah, unmarried adulterers must be flogged hundreds of times for adultery and fornication, and the stoning of married men and

³⁴ Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī, *Uṣd al-Ghābah fī Ma'rifat al-Ṣaḥābah*, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1994), Vol:3, 143.

³⁵ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Ḥashr*: 7.

women for committing adultery must be continued. Women were ordered to wear veils and men and women were made to restrain their gaze. These rules have been revealed in the Qur'ān:

O Prophet! Say to your wives, your daughters, and the women of believers that (while going out) they should draw their veils as coverings over them. It is more likely that this way they may be recognized (as pious, free women) and may not be hurt (considered by mistake as roving slave girls). And Allah is Most Forgiving, Ever Merciful.³⁶

2.5.8 Idea of the Rights of Immigrants

The Prophet (pbuh) taught that human beings are noble creatures deserving of honour, and He explained the rights of both humans and animals. Following these teachings, Umar (RA) demonstrated great responsibility when he said: *"If any dog dies of starvation on the banks of the Tigris, I will be held accountable for it."* Similarly, it is well known that Umar (RA) declared: *"If a mule stumbles on an uneven road in our territory and gets injured while carrying goods, I will be held accountable for not maintaining the road."* This sense of responsibility shaped the Islamic state of Madinah into an advanced welfare state. Under this administration, a dedicated department was established to build and maintain the roads.³⁷

2.6 DOCTRINE OF THE ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE

What is the Islamic concept of the state? What word has Islam used for the state? Islam has not used the terms politics or state or government for a political organization based on its principles but has chosen the term *Khilāfah* or *Imāmat*. It is important to know these terms. The term *Khilāfah* is used to refer to a separate state based on Islamic principles, and *Imāmat* refers to a government that criticizes the intentions of the *Khilāfah* and implements its plans. In other words, there will be differences between them. The difference between the state and the government is the same difference between the *Imāmat* and the Caliphate. This shows that in Islam, the state is not just a

³⁶ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Hujrāt*: 59.

³⁷ Abū Na'im, *Hilyat al-Awliyā'*, (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmīyah, 2016), Vol:1, 97.

state but a Caliphate.³⁸

The purpose of the Islamic government is not only to ensure that all citizens of the country are governed in an orderly manner, that economic resources are provided to the people, that law and order is established and that the country's borders are protected. Rather, the purpose of establishing an Islamic state is to promote good and prevent evil. Allah (swt) says:

(These men of Truth) are those who, if We establish their rule in the earth, will establish (systems of) Prayer, (organize and control) paying of Zakat (the Alms-due), enjoin righteousness (and piety in the whole society) and forbid (people from) evil. And the result of all the endeavours is in the control of Allah.³⁹

According to this verse, Allah (swt) has clarified that the Islamic state is neither secular nor based on a limited religious concept. The Islamic state has strong Faith in Allah. With the observance and implementation of the system of worship, its most important task is to promote goodness in society and eradicate evil. The Islamic government provides an environment in which it is easier for everyone to live according to halal ways and more difficult to adopt haram behaviours. No citizen can eradicate evil with force and weapons, it must be imbued from within the jurisdiction and become part of the duties of the state.

The state itself eliminates evil by the enforcement of law. If the government gives up this work, then it is the responsibility of the entire Ummah to make a collective effort to promote goodness and eradicate evil. The Muslim Ummah has been declared a benefactor of humanity by Allah. Its duty is to enjoy what is good and forbid what is evil. Amr bi' al-Maruf, that is, enjoining good and forbidding evil, is the identity and distinction of the Muslim Ummah, Allah (swt) says:

They cannot do you any harm beyond offending; and if they fight you, they will turn their backs upon you; then they will not be helped (as well).⁴⁰

If the entire Ummah becomes a victim of negligence, as has happened in the Islamic civilizational decline, then Allah has instructed that there should be some

³⁸ Syed Qutub, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1953), 138.

³⁹ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Hajj*: 41.

⁴⁰ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Āl- 'Imrān*: 110.

sincere servants who will take up the task. As Allah (swt) says in the Qur'ān:

And from amongst you there must be a community comprising the people who would invite mankind towards piety, bid righteousness and forbid evil and they are the successful people.⁴¹

After its inception, the Islamic State of Madinah, in accordance with the Qur'ānic injunction, along with the system of Salat and Zakat, under its entire legal system, also established the commandment of good and prohibition of evil. In a society where evil deeds, cruelty, abuse, obscenity, nudity, immorality, alcoholism, gambling, usury, and looting had been rampant, society changed radically. Every good deed was promoted there, and every evil had died. Usury, robbery, drinking, and obscenity gradually ceased to exist, while chastity and goodness were being promoted everywhere. The devotion of a believer to the civil government of the Prophet (pbuh) required that he adapted all spheres of life to the system brought by the Prophet (pbuh). The heaviest responsibility laid with the ruling classes and those in charge of the government.⁴²

Allah (swt) says in his Holy Book:

O Dāwūd (David)! Verily We have made you (Our) vicegerent on earth. So, judge between the people (or rule) with Truth and Justice.⁴³

The main purpose of the government in this Islamic system of politics is to implement the divine commandments, to establish justice, to prevent oppression, to promote good, and to eradicate evil.

2.7 ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

2.7.1 Islamic *Shūrā* System

Shūrā is a crucial part of the Islamic form of government. It allows people to participate in decision-making processes. It helps create a society that engages actively with leaders. Consultation is vital in building a solid relationship between the leader and the people and therefore the latter ensure that the leader does not go astray or regress into an authoritarian government. The Almighty Allah (swt) encouraged the Prophet

⁴¹ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Āl- 'Imrān*: 104.

⁴² Aḥmad Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Mawā'iz wa al-I'tibār*, (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Miṣriya, 1997), 213.

⁴³ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Ṣād*: 26.

Muhammad (pbuh) to use Shūrā as mentioned in the Holy Qur'ān, those that hear their Lord and establish regular Prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation; who spend out of what we bestow on them for Sustenance.⁴⁴

There are several examples of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) taking counsel from his companions and following those opinions. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) held many councils of war before going into battle. At one point, he believed that the Muslims ought to fight if the enemy entered Madinah. However, his companions opined that they ought to leave and meet the military away from the city. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) accepted the latter opinion albeit they lost.⁴⁵

In the next battle, the Muslims decided to remain in Madinah. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) again consulted his people regarding the simplest means to protect themselves against the enemy. Many suggestions were put forward, including one which required the building of a deep trench. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) agreed to the presented option and actively participated in its construction. This time, they won.

The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) used both consultations and consensus when making decisions. However, the opinion of the majority was not always accepted if it conflicted with the tenets of the religion or went against the general advantage of the people. At the same time, when the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) acted consistently with the commands of the Almighty Allah, he did not heed opposing viewpoints. As an example, when a seemingly disadvantageous treaty was signed with the Meccans, his people vehemently opposed it. However, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) persisted with the choice and eventually his companions realized that the treaty was working in their favour. This means that a key principle in Shūrā is that it must not contradict or override the Qur'ān and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), referred to as Sunnah. It is now the right time to re-establish Shūrā, a cornerstone teaching of Islam that was once inherently implemented in governance from the time of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and his close companions.

Man is faced with many issues in life in which he becomes hesitant. He has his eyes on both do's and don'ts, yet he cannot decide on his own his next course of action.

⁴⁴ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Shūrā*: 38.

⁴⁵ A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad*, 169.

Which direction of work is good and what kind of guidance are there for him? In this situation of conflict, the Sharī'ah has directed that instead of making decisions on one's own and relying on one's own intellect and wisdom, one should seek the opinion of the relevant work experts, visionaries, and sympathizers. After the contemplations, whichever side the heart is inclined towards, relying on Allah, and adopting it, it is interpreted as "advice or consultation".

Adopting a counselling system is essential in living a righteous, successful, and peaceful life. Undoubtedly, counselling is a source of goodness, prosperity, progress, and descent of mercy. There is no harm or shame in it. The Prophet (pbuh) said:

That is, no human being is ever useless and helpless by advice, nor can he ever attain any good by giving up advice.⁴⁶

On one occasion, the Prophet (pbuh) said:

He who did *Istikhārah* did not fail, and he who took suggestion was not ashamed.⁴⁷

The wisdom in this is that when a person does something based on his own opinion, and if he fails in it, many tongues start to curse, a series of reproaches ensue and then he feels great humiliation. But if something is pursued after consultation, it usually does not fail. Allah (swt) opens the way to goodness with the blessings of advice, and if due to destiny the work done under the advice could not be successful, others will share the responsibility, and it will not lead to despair. Even so, making the right decision is still beyond the reach of the average person because it does not just involve his intellect, rather, it includes the opinions and intellects of various philosophers and experts. Who should be blamed and who is to blame cannot guarantee his correctness of opinion, therefore, a major benefit in counselling is rebuke and criticism. Salvation from Tawhīd is also mentioned, whereby al-Māwardī says in view of the same usefulness of advice:

Opinion is like a dark night, its sides are dark, and the darkness of night does not disappear without morning. Mixing the torch of people's opinion with your lamp will increase the light of your lamp." Understands one aspect; But as in the night, even though the near thing is realized.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Muhammad bin Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmi' li aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, (Denmark: Dewan Press, 2018), Vol: 4, 161.

⁴⁷ Imām Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad al-Ṭabarānī, *Al-Maujam al-Awsaṭ*, (Beirut: DKI, 1999), 323.

⁴⁸ Abū al-Ḥassan 'Alī al-Māwardī, *Adab al-Dunyā wa al-dīn*, (Riyadh: Dar ibn Jawzi, 2013), Vol: 1, 227.

But an object in a distance is not visible, just as not all aspects of truth are illuminated by one's own opinion alone, they remain equally exposed. But when the darkness of night disappears in the morning, all things east and west, south and north are illuminated, just as when the opinion of others is mixed with one's own, it is as if with a lamp whose light is a little farther away spreads out thousands of candles give light and with the enlightenment of the world, the brightness of a lamp also increases and all the small and big things around it become visible.

The participants in a consultation give their opinions in the light of the experiences gained through hard work, therefore the counsellor gets important and valuable things for free, which he is not sure to get even if he wants to get it himself. That is why Luqman al- Hakim, while advising his son said: *“the experienced person gives you the opinion that he got at a very high price, that is, he got it after a lot of hard work and patience and you blow it up for free. That's it.”*⁴⁹

The statement of ‘Alī was very comprehensive:

Advice is guidance, and anyone who is happy with his opinion is in danger.⁵⁰

In short, counselling is a very important matter, and guidance and goodness are associated with it. If the system of consultation remains, corruption and misguidance will not find its way and there will be an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity. That is why the Prophet (pbuh) said: *“When your rulers are the best among you, your wealthy are generous, and your affairs are decided by mutual consultation, then the surface of the earth is better for you than its interior. But when your rulers are the worst among you, your wealthy are miserly, and your affairs are not decided by consultation, then the interior of the earth is better for you than its surface.”*⁵¹

Those who observe the conditions of the world will recognize that religious and national institutions which incorporate consultation in their systems tend to be more stable and sustainable, managing both their internal affairs and external relations effectively. There are institutions that are free from external strife. But when an

⁴⁹ Mufti Muhammad Shafi Usmani, *Islam mein Mashwra ki Ahmiyat*, (Karachi: Maktaba Jāmi‘a Dār ul ‘ulūm, 1998), 61-63.

⁵⁰ Mustafa Ahmad Al-Zarqā, *al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-‘ām*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1968), Vol: 4, 28.

⁵¹ Muhammad ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-ma‘ānī fī tafsīr al-qur‘ān al-‘aẓīm wa al-sab‘a al-mathānī*, (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1987), Vol: 7, 531.

institution or a government is run on a family or hereditary system where the father is the first ruler, then the son is considered eligible only due to this hereditary basis then it should be remembered that this government cannot last long. A thousand kinds of problems can arise there and a whole city can be engulfed in strife and chaos, as was the custom in the pre-Islamic era, where every house, family, and tribe were divided into separate cells. There was a flood of sedition and disorder, which was not stopped and people lost grip of stability and sustainability. Crimes like adultery, alcoholism, robbery, looting, murder, and robbery had long come into existence, but Islam abolished these crimes and established a consultative system, where many parties were consulted in various ways. It was considered a special attribute of Muslims. Allah (swt) says:

And those who submit to the Command of their Lord, and establish Prayer, and their decisions are made through consultations, and spend in Our Way out of the provision which We have given them.⁵²

But now the question is where and in what matters should the advice be given? In this regard, it should be remembered that there is no need for consultation in matters in which the Sharī'ah decides whether it is obligatory, forbidden, or abominable. Rather, it is not permissible for a person to advise whether to offer prayers or not, to pay Zakat or not, or whether to perform Hajj or not. These things are not advisable because for each one of them there is a definite command from Allah (swt). It is necessary to do them in all circumstances, and in the same way, things that are forbidden by the Sharī'ah such as adultery, drinking, and robbery, do not need advice as they must be avoided anyway. However, there are procedures can involve consultations, such as the different ways to go for Hajj, where some routes are peaceful, and some are dangerous. So, for this occasion the opinion of experienced people can be identified. In the case of a sick person who is hesitant on whether he is allowed to perform tayammum in this condition, he can consult doctors or experienced people about it Where there is no clarity in rules and issues about the Qur'ān and Hadith, the sayings of the Companions, or the books of the Salaf, and they are related to the modern and new age whose, it is not only permissible to consult them, on the contrary, it is obligatory to ask the masters of jurisprudence and religious scholars about them and to know the Sharī'ah rules. Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) narrates that:

I asked the Prophet (pbuh) that if there comes to us after you a matter

⁵² Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat Fuṣṣilat*: 38.

which has not been explicitly revealed in the Qur'ān and you have any instruction about it. What do we do if we haven't heard? The Prophet (pbuh) said: Gather the worshiping jurists from among your people for such work and judge by their advice, do not judge by the opinion of anyone alone.⁵³

In addition to religious matters, advice should also be sought out in matters of economic, social, individual and collective life, where there is no definite Shari'ah allocations intellectually and habitually, nor is it certain to be beneficial. Like eating bread or drinking water when you are hungry and thirsty, there is no need to consult and ask anyone if one is hungry or not. Under normal circumstances, this question is foolish. At the time of attempt to recover from an illness or finding the means and methods or in adopting one of the different foods and herbs, if there is a possibility of danger on someone, it would be appreciated or necessary to consult. Also, keep in mind that Allah (swt) has given advice and encouragement. But out of His public mercy He did not confine man except in certain places so that no matter could be settled without consultation. Sometimes important matters arise, and an experienced man knows how to manage and solve them. When one consults a person of intellect and wisdom, and if their advice clearly points to only one possible course of action, then proceeding with that action without further consultation is acceptable, particularly when the nature and benefits of the matter are evident. According to the magnitude and importance of the dangers, strengths, and weaknesses, there will be a difference in the order of commendations. However, in matters in which neither side of issue is legally, rationally, mystically, and habitually definite, and in which there is a possibility of risks and benefits in different aspects, and the results are ambiguous and hidden, consultations should be made a routine. Apart from following the Sunnah, consultations have multiple benefits in general and the Scholars are aware of these.

2.7.2 Justice

Muslims must observe justice among themselves and between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is important to emphasize that justice is particularly stressed as a value in the political sphere. Generally, when permissible actions lead to injustice, they become

⁵³ Mufti Muhammad Shafi Usmani, *M'ārif al-Al-Qur'ān*, (Karachi: Maktaba M'ārif al-Qur'ān, 1995), Vol: 2, 220.

impermissible. The obligation to be just is not limited to rulers but covers all citizens in all aspects of life. To ensure the rights of every class and every individual in society, and not to discriminate based on race, regionalism, provincialism, linguistics, and caste is called justice. The literal meaning of justice is to divide something, to halve something, to decide, to give the right, to put something in its rightful place, to give the rightful owner his full right and to adopt moderation in individual and collective affairs. Justice also means to avoid deviation, and the antithesis of justice is "oppression and abuse." Justice is of great importance in an Islamic society.⁵⁴

2.7.3 Liberty

Freedom is a political and moral principle or right, which identifies the conditions under which human beings can subject themselves, behave as they please, and take personal responsibility for their actions. There are different conceptions of liberty, which describe the individual in a different way than society, including some of the existence of life in a "social contract" or "natural state" and some of which make the active exercise of freedom and rights inseparable to liberty.

The Islamic principle, "There is no compulsion in religion," is proof of the freedom of speech in Islam. Another proof is that Muslims are obliged to exile themselves to protect their faith, when their rulers subjugate them with oppression. Political freedom is a branch of human liberty. Voicing one's opinion is an obligation rather than a privilege.⁵⁵

2.7.4 Equality

The tragedy of human history has been that while a class has been claiming divine rights and man has been misled by absolute poverty, he has also stumbled into the delusion that caste and superiority are inferior to human beings. The third requirement of monotheism is that all human beings in the world are equal whereby no one is high (in

⁵⁴ Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, *A Spatial Model of Political Competition and Proportional Representation*, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas, (Springer: Social Choice and Welfare 14, 1997), 96.

⁵⁵ Abdul Rashid Moten, *Political Science: An Islamic Perspective*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 78.

position), and no one is low. These are the divisions of Brahman and Shudra; these are the philosophies carved by the pride of man based on colour and race; these are the carved elements of man's narrow mind and heart. The revolutionary concept of monotheism at the societal level is described by the Qur'ān, as Allah (swt) says:

The whole human race is the offspring of one and the same pair (Adam and Eve).⁵⁶

All these divisions are not only wrong but also causing mischief. Because the Creator of all is one Allah and all human beings are the offspring of Adam and Eve, so, who is high and who is low? The Prophet (pbuh) made a public announcement in his Farewell Hajj:

O people! Know that your Lord is One and your father is one. Know that no Arab has any superiority over a non-Arab and no non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab. No white man has any superiority over a black man and no black man has any superiority over a white man. The only virtue is piety.⁵⁷

If there is any virtue, it is because of piety and high character, and that will be the case in the Hereafter. All human beings have perfect social equality in this world. This social equality is also related to monotheism. Since Allah (swt) is the Creator of all human beings, all have become equal. If there was a small Allah as the creator of one and a big Allah the creator of another, there would be turmoil in the world. The Hindus have the notion that the Brahman is born from the head of Ishwar and the Shudra is born from his feet. Monotheism is that the one Allah (swt) is the creator of all, and all human beings are the offspring of the same human couple:

O, people! We created you from a male and a female, and (divided) you into (large) peoples and tribes, so that you might recognize one another. Surely the most honourable among you in the sight of Allah is he who fears Allah most. Certainly, Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware.⁵⁸

The purpose of Islam is the revolutionary ideology of Tawhīd. Its call consists of the Qur'ān. Therefore, Da'wah, remembrance, warning, and purification will all be done through the Qur'ān. For all these work, "warning of the Hereafter" is very important. But this warning of the Hereafter is in fact the cornerstone for the

⁵⁶ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Nisā'* :1

⁵⁷ Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal, *Musnad Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal*, (Beirut: Muassasah Al-Risālah 2001), Vol: 2, 147.

⁵⁸ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Hujrāt* :13.

construction of the individual high character of man, on which the character of a believing servant will grow. Without believing in the Hereafter, in the day of reckoning, in rewards and punishments, it is impossible to build the Sira (prophetic biography/way of life) that is required by Allah (swt). Yes, perpetual remembrance is divine. All these things are, in fact, for the construction of the individual character of man, however, these are the three essentials and consequences of the revolutionary doctrine of monotheism which have been stated above. So, for the Islamic revolution, the importance of these things must be made clear, prominent and highlighted. If they are ignored and the emphasis is only on prayer, fasting, etc., then in fact the revolutionary process will not begin. There will be some religious and moral reform work, some good people will become Muslims, and some other good work will be done, no doubt, but the revolutionary process will not begin.

2.7.5 Rulers' Accountability

The people have the right to make their rulers accountable, based on their obligation to enjoin what is good and to forbid what is bad, as well as their right to Shūrā. This is supported by several Qur'ānic verses and Prophetic narrations and one of the narrations decree obedience to rulers if they obey Allah (swt) and abstention from their obedience when they disobey Allah. Both the first and second caliphs demanded that they would be corrected by the people should they err. Such demand was not just rhetoric but a solid obligation that should be applied in the heart, by tongue, and then by action. Scholars of several schools of thought agree to impeach and depose rulers who violates the rules of Sharī'ah. The Algerian Scholar Abdul Hameed Bin Badiss formulated some rules about Muslim rulers:

1. No one should assume the office of the ruler without the consent of the people.
2. Once appointed by the people, no office bearer should be held above the people.
3. Since people are the source of all authority and are entitled to appoint and impeach their rulers, they have the right to control them.
4. The people have the right to discuss policies with their rulers and to force them to accept the people's opinion rather than their own.

5. The state must present to the people its plan and policies to discuss and approve. Once approved, they become mandatory.
6. People have the right to choose the ruling laws as this represents their right to sovereignty.
7. People are equal under the law.
8. Both the people and their rulers must get used to the perception that they are partners in ruling the country, and each has its own role to play.⁵⁹

2.8 MAQĀṢID AL SHARĪ‘AH AND ISLAMIC STATE

Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah or the objectives of Sharī‘ah sum up the Islamic values in all aspects of life. Because of their central importance in Fiqh, the relevant political values will be abstracted from each.

2.8.1 Protection of Din

As mentioned above, Tawḥīd is the central creed and the supreme source of all values. Protection of faith implies that all state powers must not act contrary to Tawḥīd, or the values drawn therefrom. The following values can therefore be highlighted:

1. Rulers are the servants of the people. They should not raise themselves to a higher rank or seek to be adored by the public.
2. Rulers must avoid treatments through any means that would endow them with a divine image.
3. Rulers must practice Islamic teachings individually and socially, to set an example of obedience and piety to Allah (swt).⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, *Islamic Way of Life*. (Riyadh: Cooperative Office for Call and Guidance, 1990), 113.

⁶⁰ Ahmed bin Mohammed al-Khalil, *Shares and bonds and their provisions in Islamic jurisprudence*, (Saudi Arabia: Dār ibn Al-Jawzī, 2008), 165.

2.8.2 Protection of Life

1. Protection of human life as well as human rights must reign supreme.
2. Rulers are directly responsible for protecting human life.
3. Capital punishment must be safeguarded with strict and multilayered reviews.

2.8.3 Protection of Progeny

1. Human rights start with humans before their conception. This includes the right to be born in a peaceful society, having a better way of living and other necessities of livelihoods.
2. The state must take full responsibility for providing health and education to its future generations.
3. When citizens establish waqf to provide education and health services, it must be done under socially accepted standards, approved by society.
4. The government must observe caution in exploiting natural resources, applying taxation, and managing finance in the interest of future generations.

2.8.4 Protection of Intellect

1. Leading members of the three branches of government must possess the highest level of intellectual excellence that would enable them to better serve their society.
2. Efforts must be exerted to eradicate illiteracy in all forms, and to encourage citizens to develop their intellectual faculties.

2.8.5 Protection of Property

1. Private property must be protected.
2. The rights to own homes, productive assets, and develop one's human capital must be fulfilled.

3. Markets must be organized as competitive outlets where well-informed citizens can freely exchange.
4. Production and exchange of lawful commodities must be facilitated by a suitable infrastructure and a legal system that protects people's right.
5. Economic and financial transactions must be carried out without Ribā' (Interest) *Ghaban* (cheating), and *Gharar* (risk trading).⁶¹

2.9 THE BASIC FEATURES AND PRINCIPLES OF LIBERAL WESTERN DEMOCRACY

Before discussing the Islamization of liberal democracy and the philosophy of Islamic democracy, it is appropriate to mention the basic principles of liberal Western democracy so that it is easy to analyse which of its are Islamized in the Islamic world. How did the system of democracy become compatible with Islamic teachings and the aims of Sharī'ah?

2.9.1 Sovereignty of the People

The basic and fundamental member of liberal Western democracy is the concept of total sovereignty of the people, which enables the people of any state to make laws of their choice, elect their representatives and run their country's system according to their wishes.

2.9.2 Concept of Public Representatives

In liberal Western democracies, public representation is in the form of a parliament. Since it is impossible for every member of the state to participate in the affairs of the state, the method adopted is that the people will elect their representatives based on majority. In the case of a Parliament, its members will perform the duty of public representation.⁶²

⁶¹ Muhammad Shirazi, *The Islamic System of Government*, (London: Fountain Books, 1969), 66.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 98.

2.9.3 Unlimited Powers of Parliament

In a liberal Western democracy, since the parliament represents all the members of the state, it is the supreme and powerful body of the country and all kinds of legislation, change, and reform in the country are vested in the members of parliament. They are authorized to make all kinds of decisions and legislations based on majority.

2.9.4 Supremacy and Sanctity of the Constitution

In a liberal Western democracy, the people's representatives formulate a set of laws called the constitution of a country. This constitution is approved based on the majority of the people's representatives. The constitution has the status of utmost sanctity and greatness and no individual of the country, be it the president or the common man, can speak against the constitution. Neither can the customs of the country against the constitution in all disputes, controversies, and differences of the country, the constitution has the authority and decisive status.⁶³

2.9.5 Notion of Adult Suffrage and Political Equality

In a liberal Western democracy, every adult in the country is eligible to vote, whether educated or ignorant, male or female, rural or urban. Such a democracy puts equal value and importance on the votes of all the people of the country. The vote of any individual in the country does not take precedence over the vote of another individual. Also, every individual of the country can become a candidate and a member of parliament. In some countries, special education is a condition of eligibility, but this is the spirit of democracy and its philosophy. Every individual of the country has the basic right to be a member of parliament. In a democracy, it is called political equality.⁶⁴

2.9.6 Conception of Pluralism

In liberal Western democracies, whether voting or legislation in parliament, all

⁶³ Muhammad Shirazi, *The Islamic System of Government*, (London: Fountain Books, 1969), 102.

⁶⁴ Bruno Biais and Enrico Perotti, "Machiavellian privatization," *American Economic Review*, Vol: 92, Issue no. 1, 2002, 240.

decisions are made by a majority, and the majority decision is final. Turning away from the decision is not considered a deviation from the foundations of democracy, nor in any democratic system. One has the power to overturn a majority decision.⁶⁵

2.9.7 Doctrine of Political Parties and the Opposition

In a democracy, the people of the country even as individuals can strive to become members of parliament and form a party based on linguistic, regional, class ideology and other commonalities. There is no limit to political party affiliation. After an election, the party with majority support of the people gets the right to form a government and take over the running of a country, while other parties become the opposition and thus the political parties of the country are divided into the ruling party and the opposition. The real idea of the opposition is that it will continue to play the role of a pressure group for those in power so that they refrain from doing things that are harmful to the nation at the expense of the government and its authority. Opposition in India heats up a market of propaganda, mistrust, and anti-government rumours and comments. Also, political parties there cause the people of the country to suffer a perpetual division. In some developed democracies having a two-party system, it is common for one party to be in power and the other to play the role of the opposition.⁶⁶

2.9.8 Equality and Freedom

Gender, political, and religious equality, as well as complete freedom of expression are among the basic principles of democracy. In the eyes of the state, all people are considered equal. Everyone has the right to practice his religion and to preach and propagate it. Everyone has equal political rights. In short, the philosophy of democracy states that the state is divided between individuals by religion, gender, or any other factors. The reason will not make any difference.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 133.

⁶⁶ Timothy Besley, "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," *The quarterly journal of economics*, Vol: 112, Issue no. 1, 1997, 85.

⁶⁷ Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 133.

2.9.9 Separation of Religion and State - Liberalism and Secularism

The whole edifice of liberal Western democracy is based on secularism. The simple and straightforward meaning of secularism is that no matter what the religion is, it will not interfere and influence state affairs. Religion is a private matter of individuals. All state affairs will be completely irrelevant to religion. State laws will not be based on religion.⁶⁸

2.9.10 Distribution of Power and Tenure of Government

In a liberal Western democracy powers are divided. The governance of the country is entrusted to the administration. Legislation is the responsibility of the parliamentary body, and it is the job of the courts to make decisions and interpret the constitution. These three bodies are equal, and each has its own jurisdiction. No one rules over the other. In addition, the term of a government is fixed in a democracy. Re-elections are held every four or five years, and because of these elections, a new government is formed.⁶⁹

2.10 DEBATE ON THE ISLAMIZATION OF LIBERAL WESTERN DEMOCRACY

To discuss the Islamization of liberal Western democracy, it is necessary to examine how much contradiction and how much harmony are there between the basic principles of liberal Western democracy and Islamic philosophy of governance. What are the common principles for both? Obviously, if there is more harmony between both phenomena, it will be easier to harmonize this system with Islamic philosophy. However, it remains to be seen how much this system of government is compatible with the goals of Sharī'ah after the democratization. Moreover, can the "Islamic form" of liberal democracy achieve those goals? But if all or most of the principles of democracy conflict with Islamic teachings, then partially modifying them will not make liberal democracy Islamic. It would not be correct to label it Islamic, because a principle that

⁶⁸ Omid Safi, *Progressive Muslims: on justice, gender, and pluralism*, (Oxford: One world Publications, 2003), 64.

⁶⁹ Zubaidah Rahim Lily, "Discursive Contest between Liberal and Literal Islam in Southeast Asia", *Policy and Society*, 2006, Vol: 25, Issue no: 4, 77.

is a mixture of Islamic and non-Islamic features is called non-Islamic as a whole.⁷⁰

If the above-mentioned basic principles of liberal Western democracy are examined in the light of Sharī'ah, then some amendments have happened in some Islamic countries which adopted democracy as a system, especially in Pakistan.

An analysis from Islamic perspective for instance, on the principle of total sovereignty of the people, which is the basic rule of western democracy, has a massive conflict with Islamic principles. The divine texts indicate the total sovereignty of Allah (swt) and the supremacy of His commandments in all respects. Therefore, the legislation in the Islamic state will be in accordance with the will of Allah and the manifestation of Allah's will in the world is only the religion of Islam. Therefore, when Islamizing liberal Western democracy, the notion of partial and total sovereignty of the people must be uprooted. The amendment should be made in such a way that the ruler should be the representative of Allah and His Messenger instead of being the representative of the people. They should keep observing the obeying of Allah (swt) and His Messenger's commands instead of the wishes of the people.⁷¹

The following is a comparative review of more principles of these two phenomena:

2.10.1 Parliament has Unlimited Legislative Powers

This principle also contradicts the Sharī'ah and is contrary to Islamic teachings. Experts in Islamic sciences like jurists and scholars can legislate within certain limits according to the current circumstances. Therefore, when democracy is going to be Islamized, the unlimited powers of the parliament must be examined. In addition, since the parliament is the legislature, the conditions for its eligibility will be the same as those for discussion in jurisprudential issues and divine texts. According to Islamic teachings, it is obligatory for people who are supposed to be leaders of the public to know and follow the Sharī'ah. In short, in an Islamic democracy, two things must be decided about parliament:

⁷⁰ Zubaidah Rahim Lily, "Discursive Contest between Liberal and Literal Islam in Southeast Asia", *Policy and Society*, 78.

⁷¹ Aslan Reza, *The Philosopher as the Heir of the Prophets: Averroes's Islamic Rationalism*, (New York: Random House Academic Resources, 2005), 103.

- To set the limits of the powers of parliament.
- To impose certain conditions for becoming a member of parliament.

2.10.2 Supremacy and Sanctity of the Constitution in all its Forms

The principle of supremacy, sanctity, and total sovereignty of the constitution is also contrary to Sharī‘ah. According to the Qur’ān and Hadith, the upper hand belongs to Sharī‘ah in every case, and the religion of Islam revealed by Allah (swt) alone. Every principle, law, and constitution that contradicts the Sharī‘ah has no value compared to Islam, even if all the people of the country make it a law unanimously. Therefore, in the process of the Islamization of democracy, it will have to be transformed into a fully Islamic form and even after that a system will have to be created according to which the constitution will be considered sacred and respectable if it contains Sharī‘ah clauses. If any clause is against the Sharī‘ah, it will be considered null and void and it will not require any recommendation or a two-thirds majority of the parliament to declare it so.

The presented invalidation of the second part of this principle also clearly indicates that the opinion or the advice of every man is not the same. Is the opinion of the learned and the ignorant equal? This principle of equality is also against the Sharī‘ah. The Holy Qur’ān says:

Say, can those who know and those who do not know become equal?⁷²

So, in the light of this verse of Qur’ān and the above analysis, this rule should be re-considered during Islamizing processes of Western democracy. According to Islamic teachings, mutual consultation is essential in choosing the right man. However, almost all thinkers writing on Islamic politics agree that only intellectuals should be consulted rather than influential religious and secular members of the society. The main reason is that such people are respected in the eyes of the people and their words and opinions are valued. There is room for debate as to what are the possible ways for the parties to settle.

However, in society, intelligent people are almost always distinguished and determined. With a little training, they can become more prominent. There is no dispute

⁷² Al-Qur’ān, *Sūrat al-Zumur*: 41.

that the Amīr of a nation will be chosen by the intelligent people there and the rest of the Ummah will pledge allegiance to the chosen Amīr.

Māwardī writes in *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyah*:

If he responds by pledging allegiance to it, and they contract with his allegiance to the Imām, then all the Ummah must enter his allegiance and submit to his obedience.⁷³

So, Imām al-Nawawī writes in his Interpretation to Sahih Muslim:

They were unanimously agreed that the Khilāfah was concluded by succession, and that it was concluded by the contract of the concerned people if the Caliph did not appoint him.⁷⁴

Along with the explanations of the jurists, the method of choosing the Caliphs also supports this because the Caliphate of the four Caliphs was established with the allegiance of worthy and intellectual people of that time, then the rest of the Ummah pledged. The election of those Caliphs did not consider the opinions of any person from all the rest of the empire except the leading intellectuals of that time. Also, at that time no one in the whole Islamic world objected to the elections. This process from the times of the Caliphs and the Companions indicates that the choice of an Amīr is not the right of every person, but a group of intellects and wise men of the Ummah will choose the Caliph in the light of Islamic teachings.

Some contemporary thinkers have taken the view that it is the duty of the intellectuals to nominate a person for the position of Khilāfah based on their own understanding and not through consultations. This theory, however, is merely a theory. The method of selection of the four Caliphs of Islam and the explanations of the jurists do not support the theory. If this is indeed the case, why is allegiance called obedience? Also, the statements of Māwardī and other thinkers clearly indicate that the *Khilāfah*'s position is established by the swearing of allegiance from the worthy and the intellectual people of the Ummah.

The main reason for the above-mentioned ideology adopted by some contemporary thinkers who have written on Islamic politics is that giving the right to conduct consultations/Shūrā only to the selected people and depriving the rest of the

⁷³ Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyah*, 8.

⁷⁴ Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, (Toledo: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), 115.

Ummah is a kind of tyranny. This method is a form of enslavement and subjugation of the people. Although Islam gives complete freedom in legitimate expression of opinions to every individual, such doubts about the consultative process are merely theoretical. Sometimes, qualified people are not elected because most people are unable to recognize the right people and understand true leadership abilities in them. Also, the opinion of the intelligent people of society is generally considered to be the opinion of the whole society. How does it fall into the category of tyranny when people who cannot understand the issues of every province and every region are participating in the elections? If this is tyranny, then this form of tyranny is also found in liberal Western democracies wherein a parliamentary system the election of the prime minister is decided by members of parliament and the people of the country do not directly participate in this election.

2.11 A MODERN STRUCTURE OF AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

The origins of Islam as a movement are to be found within the life and times of Prophet Muhammad and his successors. In 622 CE, in recognition of his claims to prophethood, Muhammad was invited to rule the town of Madinah. At the time, the local Arab tribes of *Banū Aws* and *Khazraj* dominated the town and were in constant conflict. Muhammad (pbuh) and his followers thus moved to Madinah, where he drafted the Madinah Charter. This document made Muhammad the ruler and it recognized him as the Prophet of Allah. The laws Muhammad established during his rule supported the Qur'ān and the actions and words of Muhammad were considered by Muslims to be Sharī'ah. Those in Islamic movements seek to determine this until the present day. Muhammad gained a widespread following and a military unit, and his rule expanded first to the town of Mecca then spread through the Arabian Peninsula through a mixture of diplomacy and military conquests.⁷⁵

Today many Islamist or Islamic democratic parties exist in almost every democracy with a Muslim majority. Many militant Islamic groups are also working in several parts of world. The controversial term "Islamic fundamentalism" has also been

⁷⁵ Muhammad ibn Jarīr Ṭabrī, *The History of al- Ṭabrī*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, n.d.), 333.

coined by some non-Muslims to explain the political and non-secular philosophies of some militant Islamic groups. Both of those terms (Islamic democracy and Islamic fundamentalism) lump together groups of varying histories, ideologies, and contexts.

2.11.1 Qur'ān

While the Qur'ān does not linger over politics, it does mention the concepts of the oppressed (*Mustad'afīn*), emigration (*Hijra*), the Muslim community (Ummah), and fighting in the way of Allah (swt) (*Jihād*), which will have political implications.⁷⁶ A variety of verses mention *Mustad'afīn*, which may be translated as "those deemed weak", "the underdogs", or "the oppressed", how they were trampled on by people like the pharaoh, how Allah wished them to be treated justly, and the way they ought to emigrate from the land where they were oppressed in. Abraham was an "emigrant to my Lord". War against unbelievers (*Kuffār*) is commanded and divine aid promised, although some verse(s) state this might be when unbelievers start the war, and treaties may end the war. The Qur'ān also devotes some verses to the right division of spoils captured in war among the victors. War against internal enemies or "hypocrites" (*Munāfiq*) is additionally commanded. Some commands did not extend past the lifetime of the prophets like ones that refer to quarrels about Allah (swt) and His prophets. or to not shout at or raise your voice when communicating with the Prophet. Limiting the Qur'ān's political teaching is the incontrovertible fact that the Qur'ān does not mention "any formal and continuing structure of authority", only orders to obey the Prophet, which its themes were of limited use when the success of Islam meant governance of "a vast territory populated mainly by peasants and dominated by cities and states", alien to nomadic desert life.⁷⁷

2.11.2 Islamic State of Madinah

The Constitution of Madinah was drafted by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). It constituted a proper agreement between Muhammad and every one of the many tribes and families

⁷⁶ Sadakat Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'ah Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia to the Streets of the Modern Muslim World*, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2013), 120.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 121.

of *Yathrab* (later referred to as Madinah), including Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Pagans.⁷⁸ This constitution formed the idea of the primary Islamic state. The document was drafted with the specific concern of ending the bitter intertribal fighting between the clans of the *Aus* and *Khazraj* within Madinah. The constitution instituted a variety of rights and responsibilities for the Muslim, Jewish, Christian, and pagan communities of Madinah bringing them within the fold of one community, the Ummah.⁷⁹

The precise dating of the Constitution of Madinah remains debated, but scholars generally agree that it had been written shortly after the Hijra (622). It effectively established the primary Islamic state. The Constitution established the safety of the community, religious freedoms, the role of Madinah as a haram or sacred place (barring all violence and weapons), the safety of girls, stable tribal relations within Madinah, a legal system for supporting the community in time of conflict, parameters for exogenous political alliances, a system for granting protection of people, a judiciary for resolving disputes, and also the regulations for the paying of blood money.⁸⁰

2.11.3 Islamic Political Theories

Musleh and Brouwers identify three major perspectives on democracy among prominent Muslims thinkers who have sought to develop modern, distinctly Islamic theories of socio-political organization conforming to Islamic values and law:⁸¹

The rejectionist Islamic view, elaborated by Sayyid Qutub and Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, condemns imitation of foreign ideas, drawing a distinction between Western democracy and the Islamic doctrine of *Shūrā* (consultation between the ruler and the ruled). This attitude, which stressed the comprehensive implementation of Sharī‘ah, was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s among various movements seeking to determine an Islamic state, but its popularity has diminished in recent years.

The moderate Islamic view stresses the concepts of *Maṣlaḥa* (public interest), ‘*Adl* (justice), and *Shūrā*. Islamic leaders are upholding justice if they promote public

⁷⁸ Sadakat Kadri, *Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari‘ah Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia to the Streets of the Modern Muslim World*, 127.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁸⁰ Ann K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, (London: Routledge, 2004), 144.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

interest, as defined through *Shūrā*. In this view, *Shūrā* provides the idea for representative government institutions that are almost like Western democracy but reflect Islamic instead of Western liberal values. Hasan al-Turabi, Rashid al-Ghannouchi, and Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī have advocated different perspectives of this view.

The liberal Islamic view is influenced by Muhammad Abduh's emphasis on the role of reason in understanding religion. It stresses democratic principles supported pluralism and freedom of thought. Authors like Fahmi Huwaidi and Tariq al-Bishrī have constructed Islamic justifications for full citizenship of non-Muslims in an Islamic state by drawing on early Islamic texts. Others, like Muhammad Akhron and Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, have justified pluralism and freedom through non-literalist approaches to textual interpretation. Abdelkarim Soroush has argued for a "religious democracy" that supports religious thought that is democratic, tolerant, and just. Islamic liberals argue for the need of constant re-examination of spiritual understanding, which may only be wiped out in a democratic context.

2.11.4 Contemporary Movements

Some common political issues in Islamic movements include:

Sunni Traditionalism, which accepts traditional commentaries on the Qur'ān, Hadith literature, sunnah, and "takes as its fundamentals imitation (Taqīd), that is, refusal to innovate", follows one among the four legal schools or *Mazāhib* (*Shafa'i*, *Mālikī*, *Ḥanaḩī*, *Ḥanbalī*), and should include Sufism. An example of Sufi traditionalism is that the Barelvi school in Pakistan⁸²

Fundamentalist reformism or revivalism, which criticizes the Islamic scholastic tradition, the commentaries, popular religious practices like visitation to and veneration of the shrines and tombs of Muslim saints, perceived deviations, superstition and aims to return to the founding scriptures of Islam. This fundamentalist reformism generally developed in response to a perceived external threat (for example, the influence of Hinduism on Islam). 18th-century examples of fundamentalist Muslim reformers are Shah Waliullah Dehlawi in British India and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab within the

⁸² Olivier Roy, *Failure of Political Islam*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 30.

Arabian Peninsula, the latter being the founding father of the Islamic doctrine and movement referred to as Wahhabism. Salafism and Wahhabism worldwide, the Deobandi school in South Asia (mainly Pakistan and Afghanistan), Ahl-i Hadith and Tablighi Jamat in India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan are modern samples of fundamentalist reformism and revivalism.⁸³

Islamism, or political Islam, embraces a return to Sharī'ah or Western terms such as revolution, ideology, politics, democracy, a more liberal attitude toward issues such as jihād and women's rights, or a shift toward modern issues. Among the contemporary parties with all these ideas are Jamat-e-Islami, Muslim Brotherhood, Iranian Islamic Revolution, Masoumi Party, United Malaysia National Organization, Pan Malaysian Islamic Party and Justice and Development Party (Turkey).

2.11.5 Sunni and Shī'ah Differences

According to Vali Nasr, political tendencies of Sunni and Shī'ah Islamic ideology differ, with Sunni Islamic revivalism "in Pakistan and far off Arab world" being "far from politically revolutionary", while Shī'ah political Islam is strongly influenced by Ruhollah Khomeini and his talk about the oppression of the poor and the sophistication of war. Sunni revivalism "is rooted in conservative religious impulses and therefore the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values." Khomeini's version of Islamism engaged the poor and spoke of the sophistication of war.⁸⁴

This cleavage between fundamentalism as revivalism and fundamentalism as revolution was deep and for an extended time coincided closely with the sectarian divide between the Sunnis and the Shī'ah. "The former, the Muslim world's traditional haves, are concerned more with conservative religiosity and therefore the Shī'ah who are the longtime outsiders, are more drawn to radical dreaming and scheming."⁸⁵

To conclude this topic, although various levels of activities have their place

⁸³ John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 123.

⁸⁴ Vali Nasr, *Shia Revival: A Threat or an Opportunity*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 148.

⁸⁵ Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Shia Revival: How conflicts within Islam will shape the future," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol: 60, No. 2, IRAN: Sixtieth Anniversary Issue 1947-2007 (SPRING/SUMMER 2007), 201-207.

during the collective political struggle, the most important thing to make the process of change and struggle fruitful, and to make reform sustainable is the continuous educational and training process, involving direct study of the Holy Quran. Other features include direct connections with the Prophet's life, strictly arranging worship and the rights of the Almighty's servants, spending for the sake of Allah, and sticking strictly to one's principles. If there is immorality in the society, then stand against it, if there is an economic exploitation, then stand up against it, if justice is not being done, then struggle for its establishment, standing before Allah (swt) at night and asking for help. The first condition is to try to obtain halal sustenance during the day and to use every moment of life only for the sake of Allah.

2.12 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a comprehensive analysis of the Islamic political system, encompassing its foundational principles, historical precedents, and contemporary relevance. It has examined the core Islamic values and constitutional tenets that underpin Islamic governance, with particular emphasis on the State of Madinah as an exemplar of these principles in practice. The discourse has extended to a comparative analysis of Islamic political ideals vis-à-vis Western democratic concepts, exploring potential areas of synthesis and divergence. Furthermore, the chapter has investigated the adaptability of Islamic governance paradigms to modern sociopolitical contexts. Building upon this theoretical framework, the subsequent chapter will undertake a detailed case study of Pakistan. This analysis will scrutinise Pakistan's constitutionally enshrined Islamic identity and the ideological vision of its founding fathers.

CHAPTER THREE

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, ITS RELIGIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT ISLAM

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter comprehensively examines the dynamic relationship between Islamic principles, constitutional frameworks, and political dynamics within the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The analysis begins by exploring the historical context that led to the establishment of Pakistan, including the ideological vision of its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the subsequent evolution of the country's Islamic identity. The chapter then delves into a rigorous analysis of Pakistan's constitution, scrutinizing its Islamic features and the ongoing scholarly debate surrounding its religious character. Building upon this foundation, the discussion shifts to the pivotal role of religious political parties in shaping Pakistan's governance landscape. The chapter first provides a conceptual overview of political party systems, before focusing specifically on the major Islamic parties operating within Pakistan. The country's ideological foundations, strategies for implementing Islamic principles, and the formation of religio-political alliances are analysed in detail. Additionally, the chapter examines the changing scenario of Islamic politics in the post-Zia era and the controversial use of religion for political purposes.

3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is an independent Islamic country located in the defensively important part of South Asia, Northwest Central Asia and West Asia. With a population of 24 crore, it is the fifth most populous country in the world. With 881,913 square kilometres (340,509 square miles), it is the 33rd largest country in the world. It is bounded on the south by 1,046 km (650 miles) of coastline that joins the Arabian Sea. Pakistan is bordered by India to the east, China to the northeast, and Afghanistan and Iran to the west. The Wakhan Corridor separates Pakistan from Tajikistan in the north,

while the country's maritime borders also coincide with those of Oman.¹

The areas of present-day Pakistan are among the oldest in the world where Mohenjo-Daro and Indus Civilization Mehrgarh Taxila had ancient civilizations and other archaeological sites, such as the Kandahar civilization are under study. The region has also been ruled by ancient Rajput, Iranian, Greek, Arab, Buddhist, Sikh, Mughal, Han White, and Turkish invaders. It has been an important part of various empires such as the Chandra Gupta Maurya, the Achaemenid Empire, the Umayyad Caliphate of the Arabs, the Mughal Empire, the Durrani Empire, the Sikh Empire, and the British Raj. Thereafter, the Tahrik-e-Pakistan, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah politically succeeded and on August 14th, 1947, an independent and sovereign Islamic state was established in two parts of India, the East and the West. Pakistan adopted its first law in 1956. In 1971, during a civil war, the eastern part of the country seceded and became a new country, Bangladesh.²

Pakistan is governed by a federal parliamentary democracy. It has five provinces and some federally administered territories. This country is a region of different nations linguistically, nationally, and geographically. Pakistan is a major power in the world, as its military is the sixth largest in the world. It is the only country with nuclear power in the Islamic world and the second in South Asia. Its economy is the 27th largest in the world.

Pakistan's history is full of military dictatorships, political instability, and conflicts with neighbouring countries. The country is a leading member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States, SAARC, the developing world, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Among the names of lands and countries which include the suffix "-stan", the word Pakistan is the newest and Kurdistan the oldest. Pakistan means the land of pure souls.³

In 711, during the reign of the Umayyad Caliph Walid bin Abdul Malik, Muhammad bin Qassim conquered a significant part of the subcontinent (present-day

¹ Sonia Sikka, *Living with Religious Diversity*. (India: Routledge, 2018), 52.

² Christophe Affrelet, *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*, (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 224

³ Shafique Ali Khan, *The Lahore Resolution: Arguments for and Against History and Criticism*. (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1988), 48.

Pakistan and India) and thus the subcontinent (present-day Pakistan) became part of the largest Arab state in the world. The capital was Damascus, the language was Arabic, and the religion was Islam. The region is politically, religiously, and culturally connected to the Arab world. The conquest had a profound effect on the history of the subcontinent and South Asia.⁴

3.2.1 Background to the Establishment of Pakistan

During the Indian independence movement, a question arose as to what would be the formula for the division of power between the Muslims and the Hindus after the departure of the British. The Hindus were reluctant to answer this question. They were showing that first, the British should be expelled from India through a joint struggle, then, the division of power would be settled amicably. The Hindus were four times greater in number than the Muslims. As a result, the Muslims were freed from the slavery of the British but enslaved by the Hindus. During this time, some unfavourable/critical situations arose in which no practical answer to the question could be found. The victory of the British in First World War made the conditions conducive to the joint struggle of the Hindus and the Muslims. They were eager to avenge the colonists who ruled over them, and this was ingrained in their hearts. During this time, the Ottoman Caliphate also came to an end. The Hindus and the Muslims were fighting for survival, but the conspiracies of the Hindus came to light later where the movements of Shiddhi Tahrik, Sangathan, etc. were started to convert the Muslims into apostates.

The period from 1924 to 1936 was a difficult one for the Muslims. During this time, the ulama were divided into two groups. One group still thought that Muslims and Hindus should fight together against the British, and after the departure of the East India Company, Hindus' issue will be settled because Muslims have ruled over them for hundreds of years. Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani and his companions, who were supporters of the Congress, supported this opinion. Another group, however, believed that East India Company's exit from India without any agreement with Hindus would be like the Muslims coming out of British slavery only to end up facing Hindu slavery.

⁴ Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture and Civilization in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 229.

In this group, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Mufti Shafi Usmani, and other ulama of different sects opposed the Congress and sided with the Muslim League to achieve a separate state for Muslims.⁵

Before 1947, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were British colonies and were known as the subcontinent. During the Indian independence movement (from the British), the Muslims of India demanded a separate country for themselves. "What does Pakistan mean by *lā ilāha illa-llāh*"? was the popular slogan of the movement. The Tahrīk-e-Pakistan came into being under this demand and the movement was led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. As a result, Pakistan came into being on August 14th, 1947.⁶

3.2.2 Difficult Time after the Formation

During the partition of the Indo-Pak subcontinent, the British left some traces which led to two wars between Pakistan and India in 1948 and 1965 over the Kashmir issue. In addition, since all the rivers flowing to Pakistani Punjab flow through Indian-administered Kashmir, Pakistan had to sign the Indus Basin Treaty with India in 1960, under which Pakistan withdrew from the eastern rivers, Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi. Pakistan had the right to have the Indus, Chenab, and Jehlum.

From 1947 to 1948, Pakistan faced great financial difficulties because India did not pay the amount due to Pakistan. In addition to this, a few factories came to Pakistan in the name of industrial structure. Consequently, Pakistan was surrounded by many internal and external problems.

Initially, Pakistan adopted a constitution in 1956 in becoming an Islamic republic. After the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, the Assembly was formed in 1972 based on the 1970 elections. A committee was formed from the cross section of different political parties. The purpose of this committee was to draft a new constitution in the country on which all political parties could agree. One of the differences within the committee was whether the country should have a system of parliamentary power or a presidential system. In addition, there were different views on the issue of

⁵ Pippa Virdee, *Pakistan: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 3.

⁶ Nicholas Tarling, *The Cambridge history of Southeast Asia*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 603.

provincial autonomy. The Constitutional Committee spent eight months preparing its report and finally, on April 10th, 1973, it submitted its report on the Constitution. It was passed in the Federal Assembly with a majority of 135 affirmative votes and on August 14th, 1973, the Constitution of Pakistan came into force.⁷

Since the formation of Pakistan, various political parties of the country have given vital importance to Islamic System in their manifestos to maintain its Islamic identity and protect the ideological foundations of Islam. But in practice, they have not been able to show much in this regard and the dream of implementing the Islamic system in this country has yet to come true since its inception. There are many reasons for this, including external factors, as well as domestic politics and the liberal-minded class that exists in a high number of basic and strong positions in Pakistan's legislature.⁸

3.3 QUAID-E-AZAM MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH AND THE IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN

Quaid-e-Azam is the founder of Pakistan. He assumed the presidency of the Muslim League in 1959, and it was under his leadership that Lord Mountbatten finally transferred power from the British government to the Constitution of Pakistan on August 9th, 1947.

To understand the purpose of establishing Pakistan, it is important to know the purpose Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave this country to the Muslims. Was it intended to create a separate country for Muslims only, from which they can get their political and economic benefits, or was it intended to create a land for Muslims in which the religion of Islam and the laws of Allah (swt) are implemented, so that the rest of the world can realize the blessings of the system of government given by Allah?

⁷ Shafique Ali Khan, *The Lahore Resolution: Arguments for and Against History and Criticism*, 56.

⁸ Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating A New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India*: (London: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 142.

3.3.1 Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan

For some years now, Jinnah's vision of Pakistan has been a source of controversy and conflict. Much of this has, however, tried to cut Jinnah to fit a predetermined image. A close look at Jinnah's public life, encompassing some forty-four years (1904-48), helps determine the core values he was committed to throughout his political career.⁹

This thesis examines how Jinnah's politics evolved through main phases, which, though distinct, yet merged into the next, without sudden shifts. It analyses how his liberalism underwent an apparent paradigmatic shift from 1937 onwards and led to him advocating the charismatic goal of Pakistan, and to elucidate it primarily in Islamic terms. Finally, the Islamic strain in his post-independence pronouncements and his August 11th 1947, address is discussed, and an attempt is made to reconcile it with his other pronouncements.

3.3.2 Jinnah as Liberal

In the first phase of his public life (1904-20), three main influences shaped Jinnah's personality and politics:

Nineteenth century British liberalism, first absorbed during his four-years' (1892-96) stay in England as a student of law, the cosmopolitan atmosphere and mercantile background of metropolitan Bombay where he had established himself as an extremely successful barrister since the turn of the century, and his close professional and personal contact with the Parsis, who, though only a tiny community, provided an example of how initiative, enterprise, and hard work could overcome numerical inferiority, racial prejudice, and communal barriers.

These formative influences seemed to have prompted Jinnah to join the Indian National Congress. Fashioned after liberal principles and cast in their mould, the Congress was at that time pledged to take India on the road to self-government through constitutional means. Soon enough, he rose high in its echelons, high enough to be its 'spokesman' for its representation to the Secretary of State on the reform of the Indian Council in May 1914. Jinnah believed in moderation, gradualism, ordered progress,

⁹ Peter R. Blood, *Pakistan: A Country Study*, 41.

evolutionary politics, democratic norms, and above all, in constitutionalism. When the Congress sought to abandon these liberal principles in 1920 and opted for revolution and extra constitutional methods, he walked out of the Congress for good.¹⁰

The constitutionalist in Jinnah led to him having a similar experience with the Home Rule League (HRL). He had collaborated with it since it was founded by Annie Besant and joined it in a show of solidarity when Besant was interned in 1917. In October 1920, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi upon being elected HRL President on Jinnah's proposals, went about changing its constitution and its aims and objectives and renaming it Swarajya Sabha rather unilaterally. Gandhi ruled out Jinnah's objections that the constitution could not be changed unless supported by a three-fourths majority, and without proper notice. Jinnah, along with nineteen other members resigned, charging that the "changes in the constitution were made by adopting a procedure contrary to the rules and regulations of the (HR) League."

Throughout this period, in fact since 1897, Jinnah was active in Anjuman-e-Islam, Muslim Bombay's foremost religio-political body. In 1906 Jinnah opposed the demand for separate electorates, but before long his opposition thawed when he realized that the demand had "the mandate of the community". In 1910 he was elected to the Imperial Council on a reserved Muslim seat. From then on, he came in close contact with Nadwah, Aligarh, and the All India Muslim League (AIML), and he was chosen by the AIML to sponsor a bill on *Waqf 'ala al-Aulād* (an endowment for the family of the donor), a problem of deep concern to Muslims since the time of Syed Ahmad Khan. Though not yet a formal member of the League, Jinnah was yet able to get the League committed to the twin ideals of self-government and Hindu-Muslim unity during the next three years, thus bringing the AIML on par with the Congress in terms of its objectives.¹¹

Jinnah joined the AIML formally in October 1913 and became its President in 1916. He utilized his pivotal position to get the Congress and the League act in concert and work out common solutions to problems confronting the country. One result of his efforts was the Congress-League, Lucknow Pact of 1916, which settled the

¹⁰ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 251.

¹¹ Amos J. Peaslee and Dorothy Xydis, *International Governmental Organizations* (Leiden: Niehoff, 1974), 266.

controversial electorate issue, at least for the time being, and paved the way towards an entente cordiale between Hindus and Muslims. Another result was the holding of Congress and League annual sessions at the same time and the same place for seven years (1915-21).¹²

There were three dominant strands in the first phase (1904-1920) of Jinnah's political career. These were a firm belief in a united Indian nationhood, with Hindus and Muslim sharing in the future Indian dispensation; a sense that Indian freedom could come through Hindu-Muslim unity; and a need for unity in Muslim ranks through strengthening the Muslim League. These strands continued in the second phase (1920-37) as well; but with the years their position came to be reversed in his scale of priorities as the Congress's ultimate objectives underwent a radical change under the influence of Hindu extremists. Jinnah's efforts for Muslim unity became increasingly pronounced with the years, becoming a passion to him towards the closing of the second phase.

For Jinnah, while national freedom for both Hindus and Muslims continued to be the supreme goal, the means adopted to achieve it underwent a dramatic change. If it could not be achieved through Hindu Muslim unity, it must be done through Hindu-Muslim separation; if it could not be secured through a composite Hindu-Muslim nationalism, it must be done through separate Hindu and Muslim nationalisms; if not through a united India, it must be through partition. In either case, the ultimate objective was to ensure political power for Muslims.

3.3.3 Jinnah's Transformation

The period after 1937 marked a paradigmatic shift. Jinnah became identified in the Muslim mind with the concept of the charismatic community, the concept which answered their psychic need for endowing and sanctifying their sense of community with a sense of power. Increasingly he became the embodiment of a Muslim national consensus, which explains why and how he had become their Quaid-e-Azam, even before the launching of the Pakistan demand in March 1940.¹³

¹² Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan*, 255.

¹³ Akbar S. Ahmed, "Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity", *American Journal of Islam and Society*, Vol:3, Issue:15, 1997, 149–153.

This shift was squarely reflected in his thinking, posture, platform, political discourse, and of course, his appearance. For his public rallies Jinnah replaced his finely creased English Saville Row suits with the traditional dress like achkan (traditional shirt), tight pyjama, and a karakul cap. He still believed in democracy, but now felt parliamentary democracy of the Westminster type was unsuitable for India because of the existence of a permanent majority and a permanent minority, which he defined in specific terms.

Minorities means a combination of things. It may be that a minority has a different religion from other citizens of a country. Their language, race, and culture may be different, and the combination of all these various elements - religion, culture, race, language, arts, music, and so forth makes the minority a separate entity in the State, and that separate entity as an entity wants safeguards.¹⁴

Extending this elucidation, he occasionally called Muslims 'a nation', stressing their distinct religion, culture, language, and civilization, and calling on them to "live or die as a nation". He even called the League flag 'the flag of Islam', arguing that "you cannot separate the Muslim League from Islam".

Jinnah also travelled across the other end of the political and ideological spectrum in other ways. Previously he had disdained mass politics, now he opted for it. Previously he had objected to Gandhi's injection of religion into politics, now he was not averse to couch his appeals in Islamic terms and galvanize the Muslim masses by appealing to them in a cultural matrix they were familiar with. Previously he had called himself an Indian first and last, now he opted for an Islamic identity. Previously he had strived long and hard for a national consensus, now all his efforts were directed towards a Muslim consensus. Jinnah, the erstwhile "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity" became the fiercest advocate of Hindu-Muslim separation.¹⁵

Jinnah had a political basis for this paradigmatic shift, through which Muslims and Islam came to occupy the centre of his discourse. For one thing, how else could Muslims, scattered as they were unevenly throughout the subcontinent, sharing with their non-Muslim neighbour's local customs, ethos, languages, and problems and

¹⁴ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan*. 260.

¹⁵ Nicholas Tarling, *The Cambridge history of Southeast Asia*, 603.

subjected to local conditions (whether political, social, or economic) become a 'nation' except through their affiliation with Islam? For another, since Pakistan was to be established in the Muslim majority provinces, why else should the Muslims in the minority provinces struggle for Pakistan, except for their deep concern for the fate and future of Islam in India? Above all, what linked them irretrievably with their fellow Muslims in the majority areas except this concern?

In an address to Gaya Muslim League Conference in January 1938, Jinnah began mapping out his new world view. He said:

When we say 'This flag is the flag of Islam' they think we are introducing religion into politics - a fact of which we are proud. Islam gives us a complete code. It is not only religion, but it contains laws, philosophy, and politics, in fact, it contains everything that matters to a man from morning to night. When we talk of Islam, we take it as an all-embracing word. We do not mean any ill. The foundation of our Islamic code is that we stand for liberty, equality, and fraternity.¹⁶

Jinnah then used this to argue the case for Pakistan at two levels. First, he invoked the universally recognized principle of self-determination, but it was invoked not on the familiar territorial basis, but for the Muslim nation alone. As he stipulated in his marathon talks with Gandhi in September 1944, the constituency for the plebiscite to decide upon the Pakistan demand would comprise only the Muslims, and not the entire population of the areas concerned. Second, he spelled out his reasons for reaching out towards the 'Pakistan' goal in his Lahore (1940) address in more or less ideological terms, arguing that "Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are different and distinct social orders", that "the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature" and "to two different civilizations", that they "derive their inspiration from different sources of history" (with) different epics, different heroes, and different episodes." "We wish our people", he declared, "to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social, and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people."¹⁷

Jinnah developed this into a definition of Muslim nationhood that was most cogent, the most closely argued, and the most firmly based in international law since

¹⁶ Nicholas Tarling, *The Cambridge history of Southeast Asia*, 605.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 607.

the time of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. He wrote to Gandhi on September 17th, 1944, "*with our distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitude and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life.*"

He returned to this more extensively in his iconic message in September 1945, saying:

Everyone, except those who are ignorant, knows that the Qur'ān is the general code of the Muslims. A religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal, penal code, it regulates everything from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life; from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of each individual; from morality to crime, from punishment here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet has enjoined on us that every Muslim should possess a copy of the Qur'ān and be his own priest. Therefore, Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets and doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating the whole Muslim society, every department of life, collectively and individually.¹⁸

3.3.4 Jinnah's Realization

After independence, as head of the state he had founded, Jinnah talked in the same strain. He talked of securing liberty, fraternity and equality as enjoined upon us by Islam. He believed in Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of manhood to raise Pakistan on the strong foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism which emphasized equality and brotherhood of man. He Said once: "*The foundations of our democracy based on true Islamic ideals and principles and the onward march of renaissance of Islamic culture and ideals.*" He called upon the mammoth Lahore audience to build up "Pakistan as a bulwark of Islam" to "live up to their traditions and add to it another chapter of glory", adding, "*If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Qur'ān, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours.*"¹⁹

¹⁸ R. J. Moore, *Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand, Modern Asian Studies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Vol: 17, 56.

¹⁹ Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking with the Past*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 35–36.

As for the specific institutions of the new state, he exhorted the armed forces to uphold the high traditions of Islam and our National Banner and commended the State Bank research organization to evolve banking practices compatible with Islamic ideals of social and economic life and to work its destiny in their own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice.

Jinnah's broadcast to the people of the United States is in a similar vein:

I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam. Today, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1300 years ago. Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of men, justice and fair play to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non- Muslims Hindus, Christians, and Parsis but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.²⁰

In this broadcast, Jinnah as the constitutionalist, he refused to forestall the shape of the constitution in order not to fetter the Pakistan Constituent Assembly from taking decisions it deemed fit. While he laid a good deal of stress on Islamic ideals and principles, he ruled out theocracy, saying "*Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds.*"²¹

Technically speaking, theocracy means a government by ordained priests, who wield authority as being specially appointed by those who claim to derive their rights from their sacerdotal position. Unlike Catholicism, there is no established church in Islam, (in fact, it decries such a church). Moreover, since Islam admits of no priest craft, since it discountenances a sacerdotal class as the bearer of an infallible authority, and since it concedes the right of *ijtihad* to "men of common sense", the concept of theocracy is foreign to Islam. Hence, during the debate on the Objectives Resolution, Mian Iftikhar ul Din refuted the Congress members fears about the sovereignty clause. Thus, neither

²⁰ Dilip Hiro, *The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan*, (Louisville: Nation Books Publisher, 2015), 216.

²¹ Anthony Hyman, Muhammed Ghayour and Naresh Kaushik, *Pakistan, Zia and After* (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1988), 61.

Iqbal, nor Jinnah, nor any of the independence leaders including Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, stood for a theocratic state.

Of all Jinnah's pronouncements, it is his August 11th address that has received the greatest attention since the birth of Pakistan, and spawned a good deal of controversy. Although he said that "*I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me.*" it is considered a policy statement. He said:

If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. We must learn a lesson from this our experience. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste, or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal Faith of everyone, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.²²

In dissecting this statement, there is, however, little that could lend itself to disputation. There are no problems with the dictum that everyone, no matter what community he belongs to, would be entitled to full-fledged citizenship, with equal rights, privileges and obligations, that there would no discrimination between one community and another, and that all of them would be citizens and equal citizens of one state. These principles Jinnah had reiterated time and again during the struggle period, though not in the same words.

It is, however, not usually recognized that political equality in general terms (because absolutism was the rule at the time of the advent of Islam) and equality before law in more specific terms are attributes Islam had recognized long before the world discovered them as secular values. They were exemplified in the *Mīthāq-e-Madīnah*, the pact between the Prophet (pbuh) and *Aus* and *Khazraj*, in his letter to Abu al Ḥars,

²² Khurshid Iqbal, *The Right to Development in International Law: The Case of Pakistan*. (London: Routledge, 2009), 179.

the Christian priest and the accredited representative of the Christians of Najran, and in the conduct of the *Khulafā' al-Rāshidīn*. This covenant, comprising 47 clauses, lays down, among others, that the Quraishī Muslims, the Midinettes, and the Jews of *Banū Auf* form one community apart from other people, that the Jews shall practise their religion and the Muslims their own, that they shall help each other against one who fights with the people of the covenant. How could these disparate tribes that have been characterized by differing religious affiliations form one political community unless their entitlement to equal rights, privileges, and obligations are conceded in the first place? A community postulates such entitlement, and it may be conjectured that Jinnah believed that Islam concedes equal citizenship to one and all, without reference to creed, colour, or race.²³

Finally, one crucial question is that if it is still contended that Jinnah had envisaged a 'secular' state, does one pronouncement prevail over a plethora of pronouncements made before and after the establishment of Pakistan? Does one morsel make a dinner? Does one swallow make a summer? A close study all of Jinnah's pronouncements during 1934-48, and most of his pronouncement during the pre-1934 period shows that the word 'secular' (signifying an ideology) does not find a mention in any of them. Even when confronted with the question, he evaded it as the following extracts from his 17 July 1947 press conference indicates:

Question: Will Pakistan be a secular or theocratic state?

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: You are asking me a question that is absurd. I do not know what a theocratic state means.

A correspondent suggested that a theocratic state meant a state where only people of a particular religion, for example, Muslims, could be full citizens and non-Muslims would not be full citizens. Mr. M. A. Jinnah: "Then it seems to me that what I have already said is like throwing water on duck's back (laughter). When you talk of democracy, I am afraid you have not studied Islam. We learned democracy thirteen centuries ago."²⁴

It is well to recall the ideological environment of the period in which the pronouncements we are trying to dissect, analyse, and interpret today were made. It was

²³ Dilip Hiro, *The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan*, 219.

²⁴ Akbar S. Ahmed, "Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity", *American Journal of Islam and Society*, 150.

already a bipolar world, smitten by the gathering cold war. The great ideological divide had warped simple and long familiar words such as freedom, liberty, equality, democracy, state, sovereignty, justice, and tyranny with ideological overtones. Hence these concepts had to be qualified to mean what they stand for. Hence when Jinnah talked of the concept of a democratic type embodying the essential principles of Islam, he was giving notice that he did not mean the standard Western type or the Soviet brand of people's democracy, but a sort of 'Islamic democracy' which, while retaining the institutional appurtenances of a democratic structure, is congruent with Muslims' ethos, aspirations, and code of morality. As Mian Iftikhar Uddin argued, "no one need object to the word 'Islamic.' If we can use the words, 'Roman Law' or the 'British Parliamentary system' and so many other terms without shame or stint, then why not 'Islamic'?"²⁵

Jinnah was the most Westernized political leader in all the annals of Indian Islam, no other Muslim political leader could match him in terms of modernity and a modern outlook. He was completely at home with the milieu in cosmopolitan Bombay and metropolitan London. He also married a Parsi girl, so unconventional for a Muslim leader at that time, though after getting her converted to Islam. During his career, Jinnah met an exceedingly large number of non-Muslim leading personalities and a host of British officials, more than any other Muslim leader and had interacted with them for some four decades before he underwent a paradigmatic shift. Jinnah was also a man who minced no words, stood no humbug, and called a spade a spade. He held political rhetoric in high disdain, he preferred political wilderness to playing to the gallery. Such a man could not possibly have gone in for an Islamic orientated discourse unless he felt that the Islamic values, he was commending were at home with the values underlying modernity, that Islam was in consonance with progress and modernity. During the debate on Islam and secularism, this is a point that has lain ignored.²⁶

3.3.5 Jinnah's Speeches and Writings

Some of Muhammad Ali Jinnah's speeches and writings below can give an idea of his thoughts and ideas regarding the establishment of Pakistan. On January 6, 1938, in

²⁵ Khurshid Iqbal, *The Right to Development in International Law: The Case of Pakistan*. 189.

²⁶ Akbar S. Ahmed, "Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity", *American Journal of Islam and Society*, 151.

Calcutta, he addressed a letter of thanks to the "Momin Ansar Jamat" which was reported as follows:

I left London and took the difficult path of life because I thought that the political future of the Muslims in India and the Islam of which they were proud to be members was in jeopardy because they are lacking good and strong leadership in India. After much thought and with the experience of my life, I have concluded that if India and all its people and groups are not united on one platform, slavery and subjugation will be their destiny. Behind the voice of the Muslims, there must be a strong organization, otherwise, their voice will not be heard in any part of the world. When Prophet (pbuh) started preaching his religion, he was a minority in the whole world, but with the help of Qur'ān, he challenged the whole universe and in a very short time, he created the greatest revolution in the world. If Muslims get that power of faith, organization, discipline, and self-sacrifice, they do not need to fear the hostile forces of the whole world. They must shake off their comfort zone and defeated mindsets and their despair must be overcome so that they regain their power of faith and rebuild their history in India.²⁷

In a speech broadcast on All India Radio on Eid in Bombay, he said:

In the Qur'ān, man is indeed called the caliph of Allah. If this definition of man has any meaning, it imposes on us as followers of the Qur'ān the duty to treat others as Allah treats His creatures.²⁸

Addressing a public meeting in Ahmedabad on December 7th, 1940, Muhammad Ali Jinnah said:

The Formation of Pakistan is the fastest way for both the majority nations to achieve their independence. Muslims should not be afraid that Hindu-majority provinces will crush them. We must face our fate in the minority, but Muslim-majority provinces should be liberated so that they can live their lives in independent Islamic state where they can form their own government according to the Islamic rules.²⁹

On March 5th, 1941, Jinnah in his address at the Muslim University Union Aligarh said:

Pakistan is not only an achievable destination but also the only destination if you want to save Islam from complete destruction in this country. Our destination is far away but we must take it.³⁰

On April 3rd, 1943, he said in his message to NWFP Muslim Students

²⁷ Iqbal Ahmad Siddiqui, *Quaid-e-Azam: Speeches and Statements*, (Lahore: Bazm e Iqbal, 2016), 89.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 93.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 124.

Federation:

The greatest message for our guidance and insight is in the Qur'ān. All we must do is recognize ourselves and the great attributes, virtues and strengths that we possess.³¹

Addressing the annual meeting of the Muslim League in Karachi on December 7th, 1943, He said:

The thing that has kept Muslims united is Islam which is the foundation of this nation and Qur'ān is the foundation of our Faith. I hope that as we move forward, we will have more and more unity because we believe in one Allah (swt), one prophet, one book, one Qibla, and one nation.³²

In his speech at the luncheon of Sir Zia-u-Din Ahmed in Aligarh on March 3rd, 1944, Quaid-e-Azam, while describing the history of the ideology of Pakistan, said:

Pakistan began long before Muslims established their rule in India, the day first non-Muslims in India converted to Islam. As soon as a Hindu converted to Islam, he was rejected not only religiously but also socially, culturally, and economically. As far as Muslims were concerned, Islam imposed an obligation on him to change his identity and individuality. Do not integrate into a foreign society. From time immemorial, Hindus have remained Hindus and Muslims have remained Muslims, and they did not integrate their personalities. This is the actual base of Pakistan's formation.³³

Similarly, in a gathering of top military officers from Europe and the United States, he was asked who was the main founder of Pakistan? Mr. Jinnah's answer was "every Muslim".³⁴

Addressing the Planning Committee of the Muslim League in New Delhi on November 9th, 1945, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah said:

It is not our goal to become richer and richer and to accelerate the process of concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. The standard of living of the people is generally high and I expect your committee to pay full attention to this important question. Our vision should be Islamic, not capitalist. The interests of the people as a whole and their welfare should always be kept in mind.³⁵

On September 8, 1907, the Quaid-e-Azam addressed the Muslims of India on

³¹ Iqbal Ahmad Siddiqui, *Quaid-e-Azam: Speeches and Statements*, 129.

³² Muhammad Ali Jinnah, *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches: As Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-1948*. (Lahore: Sang e Meel Publications, 2004), 77.

³³ *Ibid.*, 89.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 136.

Eid and said:

Every Muslim knows that the Qur'ānic injunctions are not limited to religious and moral matters. According to Edward Gibbon, from the Atlantic to the Ganges, the Qur'ān is recognized as a fundamental rule, not only in terms of theology but also in terms of civil and criminal rules and laws that govern the actions and property of mankind, but it covers the unchanging laws of Allah (swt) as well. Everyone knows that Holy Qur'ān is the general code of life of Muslims. It is a religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial and criminal code. Rituals are not only related to religion but also to daily life, from the salvation of the soul to physical health, from the rights of worshipers to the rights of the individual, from morals to crimes, which our Prophet (pbuh) made obligatory that every Muslim should have a copy of the Holy Qur'ān so that he can guide himself. Therefore, Islam is not limited to the practice of spiritual beliefs, ideologies, and customs. It is a complete code of conduct and covers the whole of Muslim society. It continues in every sphere of life as well as individually.³⁶

Addressing a gathering of women in Lahore on January 5th, 1946, Jinnah said:

We want Muslim rule in Baluchistan, Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sindh, Bengal and Assam, where Muslims are the majority," he said. The name and symbol of Islam will be erased.³⁷

So, Jinnah's greatest enemy never said that he used to say all these things just to arouse the sentiments of the Muslims and get temporary support from them, otherwise he was a supporter of creating a welfare state. In his speeches after the establishment of Pakistan, he repeatedly said that "*Pakistan is a manifestation of the unity of the Muslim nation and its status must be maintained, and that we Muslims have believe in one Allah (swt), one book the Holy Qur'ān and the Prophet. Therefore, we must remain united as a nation.*"³⁸

He himself believed in this and wanted Muslims to keep in mind that Islam is nor about spiritual issues and beliefs only, neither it is limited to religious rites and ceremonies but is a complete system that governs the entire Muslim society and every sphere of its life, both individually and collectively.

The result of Jinnah's thoughts and ideas are that he had a strong insight about

³⁶ Muhammad Ali Jinnah, *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches: As Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-1948*. 144.

³⁷ Ghazala Butt, "Jinnah's Concept of An Ideal Muslim Women," *Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research*, 2011, Vol: 8, 74.

³⁸ Muhammad Ali Jinnah, *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches: As Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-1948*. 77.

the vision and mission of the establishment of the Islamic system in Pakistan. None of his speeches or statements seem to support the opposite position. Further, the role of eminent scholars in Tahrīk-e-Pakistan is the guarantor of the ideology of Pakistan.

3.4 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FORMATION OF PAKISTAN

The Muslims of the Indian subcontinent established Pakistan to lay the foundation for a modern, developed, and civilized Islamic society that reflects the universal teachings of Islam in modern times. Pakistani society had to prove that humanity still needs Islam today and a modern, developed, and civilized society with universal values of Islam can be established. This desire was expressed by Muhammad Iqbal in the context of modern formation of Islamic thought. Immediately after the establishment of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam and his comrades started the struggle for a Pakistan that is democratic, Islamic, and developed.

Jinnah believed that the legal system based on positivism and common law in Pakistan should be subordinated to the Qur'ān and Sunnah and thus a developed legal system should be established in a modern state through ijtiḥād which reflects modern Islamic law and its support. The legal system helped establish a society in the Kingdom of Allah (swt) with Islamic principles of peace, tranquillity, security, economic development, and social harmony, while fully protecting the rights of non-Muslims and the weaker sections of society. Furthermore, regional cultures and languages should be made part of a central Pakistani Islamic civilization in the light of Islamic principles. In the early years of Pakistan's existence, although the country faced many challenges where the partition was bloody instead of peaceful, many areas of Pakistan were handed over to India, and Kashmir was occupied by India, Pakistan was given its economic and financial status. Deprived of rights, but because of the constant struggle of the founders of Pakistan and the everlasting sacrifices of the workers of Tahrīk-e-Pakistan, Pakistan began to solve its problems, and it became stronger day by day.³⁹

The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawab Zada Liaquat Ali Khan, presented a resolution of objectives in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 2nd,

³⁹ Ali Usman Qasmi and Megan Eaton Robb, *Muslims against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2.

2013. This resolution of objectives is now a formal part of the Constitution of Pakistan, and it stipulates that the sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to Allah (swt) and the State of Pakistan is to exercise this power delegated by Allah within the limits set by Him. The objectives of the resolution also provided a framework for the constitution of Pakistan, and it was decided that the principles laid down by Islam such as democracy, freedom of speech, equality, tolerance, and social justice would be the basis of the constitution so that Pakistani Muslims can live individually and collectively according to the principles of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The resolution aims to protect the fundamental rights of Muslims and non-Muslims and stipulates that all citizens of Pakistan will have equal status and opportunities to move forward. There will be equal opportunities for social, economic, and political struggle and all will be equal before the law, while there will be no restrictions on freedom of expression, faith, belief, and worship, if it is all within the realm of law and be in accordance with general ethical rules.⁴⁰

By adopting these principles, this country could play its part in achieving human happiness. The resolution states that the state of Pakistan and its people must strive to ensure that Pakistan not only develops but also gains its rightful place in the community of nations as a respected country to achieve international peace and development.⁴¹

3.5 IS THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN ISLAMIC?

In today's world, Pakistan is the country where most legislations have been made according to Islamic principles. An example of this is the Constitution of Pakistan, the initial resolution of which contains the country's legislative objectives. In addition, Islamic provisions have been made part of the formal constitution. Special attention has been paid to the fact that no law of Pakistan will be un-Islamic, and the existing laws will also be subject to Islamic principles. To ensure this, special attention was paid to the establishment of the Federal Shari'ah Court, the Islamic Ideological Council, and the Institute of Islamic Research. This constitution is both Islamic and modern and represents all sections of Pakistan. The Constitution of 1971 is the blueprint for the future of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

⁴⁰ Liaquat Ali Khan, "Resolution of Objectives." *Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates*, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1949), 36.

⁴¹ Christophe Affrelet, *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*, (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 224.

Some hostile elements of Pakistan mislead the innocent youth with the slogan that tyranny is prevalent in Pakistan and the structure of government is not in accordance with Islamic law. This misleading thought does not correspond to the facts. The objectives of the resolution have been mentioned, which is the basis of Pakistan's Islamic and democratic identity. Not only that, but in the 5th, 6th, and 7th constitutions of Pakistan, it was declared an Islamic republic, and it was decided that no law would be enacted in Pakistan would contradict the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The Islamic Ideological Council was established in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Emirate to ensure the conformity of Pakistani law to the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In 1982, the Islamic Ideological Council submitted its final report to the Government of Pakistan. According to the report, 90% of Pakistan's laws do not contradict the Qur'ān and Sunnah, while the council has made several recommendations to bring the rest of the laws in line with the Qur'ān and Sunnah. According to the council's report, 50% of the laws are in accordance with Islamic teachings. Therefore, declaring Pakistani laws as un-Islamic on this basis is not only a mistake but it is also a proof of ignorance of the constitution of Pakistan.⁴²

3.6 CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN AND ITS ARTICLES

The legislative document of Pakistan is called the “Constitution of Pakistan”. The Constitution is the supreme law that determines all important matters and decisions within the state of Pakistan.

The President of Pakistan, Mr. Sikander Mirza, abrogated the Constitution of 1956 on October 7th, 1958, and enforced a Martial Law in Pakistan with the help of General Muhammad Ayyub Khan, who was the then Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. After some time, General Muhammad Ayyub Khan assumed all powers and became the President of Pakistan. At that time, it was generally assumed that the revolutionary regime under him would swing towards secularism. However, by President Ayyub's public statements emphasizing the positive role of Islamic ideology in the making of Pakistan allayed these fears. The President

⁴² Julten Abdel Halim, *Indian Muslims and Citizenship: Spaces for Jihād in Everyday Life*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 26.

probably had thought of a liberal understanding of Islam which was adaptable to the contemporary requirements. Building up Pakistan in accordance with the Islamic Shari‘ah was strongly considered because of the proportional lack of national cohesion between the two far-flung parts of the country who were differing in culture, language, and other civilizational habits. The only unifying aspect between them was Islam. Therefore, constitutional integration of Pakistan can best be achieved by promoting its national ideology with Islamic morals. This means, in other words, that Islam should have pre-eminence among the essential elements of our national culture.⁴³

There was almost a general recognition of the necessity of integrating Islamic principles in the Constitution of Pakistan, yet there has been no consensus on the nature and scope of Islamic state and as to the methods of establishing it. The ulama of Pakistan unequivocally demanded that the country should be made an Islamic state according to the precedents of the early Islamic political experience, hence they were identified as Traditionalists. The Fundamentalists, basing their arguments on the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, wanted to construct a totalitarian Islamic state in Pakistan. The Liberal League leadership, the de facto holder of political power, aimed at striking a synthesis between Islamic principles and modern life within a democratic constitutional framework. The Constitution of 1956 enshrines and represents an epitome of political compromise on Islamic provisions. The new Constitution, as endorsed by President Muhammad Ayyub Khan in June 1962, replicates the Islamic provisions of the old Constitution of 1956 with some amendments. The Islamic provisions of the Constitution have been phrased in a more liberal language. President Ayyub Khan’s speech promulgating the new Constitution reflected his broad and liberal understanding of Islam, and gave an insight into his deep, emotional, and intellectual dedication and loyalty to Islamic ideals:

Being an ideological State, our first objective must be to adhere unflinchingly to our ideology. The ideology of Islam. It is for this that we demanded and obtained Pakistan. It is the source of our strength and cohesion. We must do all we can to promote it to gain unity, equality, brotherhood and social and economic justice. In doing so, we shall be performing another important duty too. In this world of growing scepticism, penetrating enquiry and exacting reason, we shall be proving

⁴³ Mohammad Ayyub Khan, *Speeches and Statements* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1961), Vol: III, 127.

that Islam is timeless; that it is dynamic and can move with times; that it is a practical code of life here and an effective passport for life hereafter.⁴⁴

The important question that came to be debated in Pakistan since 1947 was whether there were any Islamic constitutional principles to be found articulated in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. The ulama applied themselves to the task of discovering the rules which should form the basis of Pakistan's Constitution. Many of the prominent ulama openly and emphatically affirmed that there were very strong rules on Islamic Constitution; as a delegate's point of view, a paragraph from Mufti Muhammad Shafi is reproduced below:

The Holy Qur'ān is a complete and perfect Code of Guidance for all peoples and races of mankind and for all aspects and walks of life. It deals not only with metaphysical verities like God, soul and the Hereafter, and spiritual institutions like prayer and fasting, but also with the Constitution of the State and the different branches of Law.⁴⁵

3.6.1 Some Islamic Features of the Constitution of Pakistan

The Islamic features of the constitution of Pakistan are as follows:

1. Pakistan will have a parliamentary system of government, with the prime minister as head of government and elected by a majority party.
2. Islam is the official religion of Pakistan and the president and prime minister must be Muslims.
3. The name of Pakistan is Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
4. Amendments to the constitution require a two-thirds majority in the lower house and an overwhelming majority in the upper house.
5. Urdu is Pakistan's national language.
6. People will be given opportunities to live their lives according to the Qur'ān and Sunnah.
7. The judiciary will be independent. The independence of the judiciary is

⁴⁴ Mohammad Ayyub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, 133.

⁴⁵ Mufti Muhammad Shafi, *The Basic Principles of the Qur'anic Constitution of the State*, (Karachi: Maktaba M'arif Islāmī, 1953), 2.

guaranteed.

8. Special arrangements will be made for free printing of the Holy Qur'ān.
9. Prostitution, gambling, usury, and pornography will be banned.
10. Arabic language is to be promoted, and Arabic education has been made compulsory for students up to eighth grade.
11. According to the constitution, a Muslim is a person who believes in Allah (swt) as one, the heavenly books, the angels, the last day, the prophets, and recognizes the Prophet (pbuh) as the final prophet of Allah. Anyone who denies the end of prophethood will be considered as being outside the realm of Islam.⁴⁶

The above-mentioned articles are in the constitution of Pakistan, which is indeed Islamic, but its major flaw is that it is practically against Islam. In this constitution, a lot of emphasis has been given to unity, which is also the command of Allah (swt). Unity means that the whole nation is united entity while the whole country is a united by a head of state or a chief executive i.e. the prime minister. Some such system was also established by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He had given the status of one unit to both parts of the country i.e. East and West Pakistan. It is necessary that the entire Islamic system should be implemented in Pakistan because this country belongs to Muslims and has been achieved on the slogan of Kalimah Ṭayyabah, but the infidels, socialist, secularist, and polytheists are allergic to it. So, the system in which Jinnah had been presented as the leader should be reintroduced.

3.7 RELIGIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES: SHAPING ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

3.7.1 What is a Political Party?

Public interest associations that represent and deliver citizens' petitions and promote their participation in democratic activity is called a political party.⁴⁷ Political parties

⁴⁶ National Assembly of Pakistan, *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, https://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1549886415_632.pdf accessed February 12, 2024.

⁴⁷ Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman, *The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 89.

have been formed to participate in and determine the political activity of a country as well as to help and draw the attention of citizens so that their needs or requests can be forwarded to the same public bodies.⁴⁸In other words, political parties are mediators between society and state institutions, they express pluralism and the will of the citizens, therefore, they are an important tool for political work and a bridge for people to reach the authorities with their issues. However, it should be remembered that political parties do not have public or organic power, but they have public coordination. The identity of the political parties is not clear, but it is believed that they originated in the Roman Senate, although it was not until the 19th century that they began to be organized and formed like the existing political parties and even have a constitutional basis.

Pakistan is a multi-political country where many political parties work individually and sometimes by alliance. Political party is the name given to a political faction that is formed to gain political power in a state government in any region. Political parties demonstrate their presence and political power in any state with the help of election campaigns, activities in educational institutions, or public protests. Political parties often present their ideas, plans, and views in writing to the public in what is called the party's manifesto, which informs the public about the mindset and specific goals of that party. Based on the same manifesto and goals, alliances between political parties in the state are formed or broken.

3.7.1.1 One-Party Political Scenario

Many countries have a one-party political scenario where there is only one political party and by law the same party rules the state. Although minority political parties are allowed in many places, they also must recognize the superiority of the single state party with a majority. It is not always the case that members of the only influential party join the government, it is often politically that political leaders in such a party are more powerful and influential than those holding key government positions in the state. Great examples of such political parties and governments are in China and Singapore. Germany's fascist government in the past is a prime example of this scenario too. In a

⁴⁸ Tanveer Bukhari, *Pakistan mein Siyasi Jamatein*, (Lahore: Ever New Book Palace, 2011), 9.

sense, a one-party political system in a state can be likened to a dictatorship.⁴⁹

In the one-party political scenario, on a small scale, a few minority political parties may be allowed to continue to operate at the discretion of the ruling party, but it is certain that these parties will never get a chance to participate in state affairs and governance. Moreover, these political parties do not have the right to influence the general picture of the state. However, it has been observed that in many countries, minority political parties have dominated the single ruling party, but due to legal complications and corruption of the ruling party, these parties have not been able to influence state affairs. The best examples in the one-party political scenario are the People's Action Party of Singapore, the African National Congress in South Africa, and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan.⁵⁰

3.7.1.2 Selection Method

The electoral process in political parties and its specific procedures determine a strong or complete political system in a state on a party basis. In countries where there is usually a choice of political parties based on which ones are the first and the second, there are usually only two political parties. In countries where the selection process is proportional, such as in Europe, or where the majority parties are determined, such as in Australia or Ireland, three or more political parties exist and generally, they form political alliances to run the affairs of state.⁵¹

3.7.2 Organization of Political Parties

Political parties consist of a group of people, who voluntarily decide to become part of a party with which they share their principles, ideologies, values, and the principles enshrined in their constitution. These people have the right to run for any of the available positions in their political parties through a secret ballot as eligible voters. They also have the right to be informed of what is happening and to participate in the activities

⁴⁹ Tanveer Bukhari, *Pakistan mein Siyasi Jamatein*, 9.

⁵⁰ John Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.1995), 172.

⁵¹ Tanveer Bukhari, *Pakistan mein Siyasi Jamatein*, 10.

that are offered.⁵²

Political parties also have a financial setup that relies on both public and private financial partnerships to cover political activities. They may also have the support of various media outlets through which they hold press conferences and inform the population about their political activities.⁵³

Similarly, some political parties can be distinguished from others because each represents a specific part of the country or a group of some particular people and their social interests. However, there are cases in which different political parties unite and oppose other parties. Therefore, political parties are democratic institutions that try to represent a social group, support their candidates, voice political oppositions and make government institutions aware of the will of the citizens. Political parties have several objectives, the main of which is to convey the demands of the citizens to various government agencies, so that a series of issues can be resolved.

3.7.3 The Importance of Political Parties

The absence of political parties at the local level is against the promotion of democratic values all over the world because democracy is rooted in the people and if political parties do not get a chance to work at the grassroots level, democratic traditions will not be strengthened. Political parties all over the world, especially in the West, have grown out of public political activism. They are now the lifeblood of modern democratic politics all over the world. In our history, political parties have faced restrictions, their leaders have been discredited and they have been kept out of the electoral process under various pretexts. In Pakistan, military dictators have also experienced non-partisan elections. The biggest challenge facing democracy in Pakistan now is to vote for the political party and its ideology rather than individualism in the electoral process. Our agrarian, caste-based society, and tribal structure force us to associate with individuals who have a place in society, rather than parties. The individual becomes a force to be reckoned with because of his representation and social influence. Some individuals and families have had political power since the colonial system. Now, whether it is martial

⁵² Tanveer Bukhari, *Pakistan mein Siyasi Jamatein*, 12.

⁵³ Plato, *The Republic*. (London: Macmillan and Co, Ltd.1935), 462.

law or democratic governments, such personalities are emerging on the political scene. That is why the party system has been weak in Pakistan. Even the military dictators in our country did not allow political parties to flourish on purpose. That is why today, seventy-six years after independence, the people of Pakistan are still far from experiencing true democratic values. In fact, personality traits extend from the local level to the national level. It has engulfed the entire political system.

The question now is how, in the presence of powerful figures, can political parties be empowered to deal with issues that plague them locally and nationally? The best way to do this is to give political parties a chance to thrive at the grassroots level. Therefore, local government elections need to be held on political grounds. If that does not happen, then democracy at the provincial and national levels will not be taken seriously. Of course, people can form an elected government even without political parties, but it has been observed that such people are no different from a mob in the house who come with votes. Therefore, it is futile to expect such people to abide by democratic traditions. It has also been observed that some political parties, whether in government or in opposition, are reluctant to adopt a democratic attitude. They do not hold elections in the party. Most political parties revolve around certain personalities of the past or present. In these circumstances, the promotion of political consciousness is nothing but a dream. To break the spell of individualism, it is necessary to represent the people at the local level and in doing so, to use the identity of a political party instead of one's own personality. In this way, people will vote for a political party, not a few individuals, and then they will be able to account for it based on its performance.⁵⁴

It has been observed that a powerful personality is free from the fear of all kinds of accountability. If we start the political system from the grassroots level, then caste, community, and tribal affiliation in the political process can be discouraged. If this does not happen, then the political process will continue in the same bleak cycle.

3.7.4 Manifestos of Political Parties

Every political party participates in politics because it will serve the country and the nation. The manifestos of all the political parties seem to indicate this and this is their

⁵⁴ Plato, *The Republic*. 462.

identity as well. In the manifesto, the delivery of justice has to be assured, and promises to put the interests of the country first are of paramount importance. Claims to accommodate people of all schools of thought can also be seen in manifestos. The manifesto is so important that no political party can register with the Election Commission without it. If a party cannot take a legal form without the manifesto, it means that it is the most important thing.

A political party attracts people based on its manifesto and people elect their candidates by voting only after seeing this manifesto. People vote for politicians because they think they will take care of them and the country in every way. They will spend their energy in strengthening the party which will make their life flourish. These are the fantasies that compel them to vote for the same party for many years and hope that maybe their situation will change but in most cases the circumstances do not change. People change political parties, but political parties do not care about them and maintain their manifesto.⁵⁵

3.8 ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTAN

If all the political parties, big and small, are counted in Pakistan, their number reaches about two hundred and fifty to two hundred and sixty, but if we want to separate a few big and important parties in terms of their number and impact it is not difficult to estimate their number. For example, in the context of the current political situation in Pakistan, there are about fifty political parties that are part of the political system in one form or another, whether they are individual or affiliated with a larger party.

If their scope is further limited by how many parties are present in the National Assembly of Pakistan now, then they are between fifteen and twenty. The following are the names of political parties in terms of seats in Parliament:

1. Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians: Headed by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari.
2. Muslim League-N: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif group headed by Shahbaz Sharif after the disqualification of Nawaz Sharif.

⁵⁵ Tanveer Bukhari, *Pakistan mein Siyasi Jamatein*, 15.

3. Muslim League Q: Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam, a political party supporting General (Retired) Pervez Musharraf.
4. Pakistan Tahrik-e-Insaaf: Headed by Imran Khan.
5. Muttahida Qaumi Movement
6. Awami National Party

Apart from these, the names of the political parties which are famous for their religious identity or have given special importance to the implementation of Islamic system in Pakistan in their manifesto are as follows:

1. Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan: The Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami is Hafiz Naeem.
2. Jamiat Ulema Islam Pakistan: Headed by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman.
3. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam S: The Amīr was Maulana Sami-ul-Haq.
4. Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith Pakistan: The Amīr is Hafiz Sajid Mir.
5. Tehrik Labbaik Pakistan (TLP): The Amīr was Allamah Khadim Hussain Rizvi and after his death, his son Maulana Saad Rizvi becomes its Amīr.
6. Jamiat Ulema Pakistan, Noorani: Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani's Jamat was the leader. After his death, his son Owais Noorani, is its Amīr.
7. Jamiat Ulema Pakistan Niazi: The Amīr was Maulana Kausar Niazi.

With so many political parties in the country, maintaining political stability depends on the politicians. Whether they can reach a consensus in a politically divided country is a challenging task. But a straightforward way to political stability is to make politicians understand that they are political opponents, not personal enemies. There is still time for them to take matters forward, negotiate, and communicate with each other before it is too late and the entire system collapses.

3.9 THE STATUS OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTANI POLITICS

Islamic parties in Pakistan have been a potent force to reckon with and can be counted among the elite groups that influence political processes and decision-making in the

country. These parties have a tremendous amount of street power, even though they have not done well in terms of votes in Pakistan's elections over the years. Some reasons are there for the considerable political influence of these Islamic parties which is disproportionate to their electoral support.

The Jamat-e-Islami (JI), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) have their place in forefront of Pakistani politics regarding religious point of view. Although they never got a notable number of seats in the National Assembly individually, sometimes they make alliances with each other to weaken the opposition. Then they have some influence in the assembly and then use their power to convince the government on issues like the establishment of Shari'ah Courts and legislation on subjects like usury, zakat, or overall Islamic Legislation in particular. The masses follow these parties, whether it is to blame their opposition or in starting a campaign against the USA, Europe, and other western policies on various issues like blasphemy, cartoon issues or the burning of Al Qur'an.

3.10 MAJOR ISLAMIC PARTIES IN PAKISTAN

3.10.1 Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) started off as a Sunni political party with its power base in Sindh and a major following in Punjab. JUP leaders mobilized support for Ayyub Khan's regime at crucial moments and during the 1965 presidential elections supported him. The *Mashāikh* (religious spiritual leaders/Sufi saints) organized a Jamiat-e-Mashāikh to support Ayyub Khan's candidature based on his assurance that he would bring all existing laws in consonance with Islamic injunctions.⁵⁶

In the 1970 elections, the JUP obtained the second largest number of seats in Sindh under the leadership of Maulana Ahmad Shah Noorani, but he was an outspoken critic of the Zia regime and refused to join Zia's PPP Cabinet in 1978. The JUP was active in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. Espousing the Barelvi school of revivalism, the JUP has several *Mashāikh* and *Sajjādah Nasheen* (the hereditary custodian or spiritual successor of a Sufi saint's shrine) among its members, thus,

⁵⁶ M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969*, 80.

reaching grassroots Pakistan. However, Noorani's party generally lost its urban seats in Sindh to the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement) in various local, provincial, and national elections, which allowed the Jamiat-e-Mashāikh loose group of Sajjadah Nasheen and pīr (spiritual guide), to make direct links with the state. Despite his belief in the universality of Islam, Noorani believes in "Pakistani nationhood". Noorani spent time in Africa propagating Islam, but he came to the forefront during the Gulf crisis in support of Saddam Hussein. In contrast, religio-political parties like the JI, JUI, Sipah-e-Sahaba and Ahl al Hadith have been supportive of Saudi Arabia and its policies in the region, while the Tehrīk-e-Nifāz-e-Fiqh-e-Ja'fria, representing Pakistan's Shī'ah, has been supportive of Iran.⁵⁷

The JUP's inability to convert a major following among the masses in Pakistan into an enduring political constituency could be due to Pakistan's citizens preference to hand over the electoral mandate to secular parties than to a warring ulama who disappoint their supporters with their vagueness on Islamic order and mutual intolerance. While people might rally around in the name of Islam with the aim to topple a government, it is difficult to establish a government based on Islam, enjoying a consensus from the ulama. Also, Shī'ah-Sunni differences which often turned violent, ethno-regional divisions within the ulama, and Saudi Iranian competition in Pakistan to carve out favourable constituencies were all factors which discouraged Pakistanis from making a total commitment to the religio-political parties.⁵⁸

3.10.2 Markazi (Central) Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith Pakistan

Markazi (Central) Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith Pakistan (MJAH) is the representative political party of Ahl al-Hadith people of Pakistan which consists of *Majlis e Shūrā*, Central Executive, and the Cabinet.

The Amīr of the Central Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith Pakistan is Senator Sajid Mir, while the General Moderator is Senator Abdul Kareem. This group, which is more than half a century old, is the largest group of the Ahl al-Hadith sect. Politically, it is a right-wing party and is known to be a supporter of the Pakistan Muslim League (N). This is

⁵⁷ Jamal Malik, *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, 213.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

an important member party of Muttahida Majlis e Amal (MMA) (The alliance of 5 Religious Political Parties of Pakistan) which exists in all the provinces of the country.⁵⁹

The following institutions work under its management:

- Weekly Ahl al-Hadith (Weekly Magazine) is available for online reading.
- The system of mosques and endowments.
- “Al-Madāris al-Salafīyyah”: Education Board of Ahl al-Hadith Madrassahs and Universities.
- “Message TV” (channel to spread religious teachings without sectarianism).
- Subsidiary Organizations.

The head of all the sub-organizations of the Central Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith Pakistan is Abdul Ghafoor Rashid, who is also the supervisor of the election board of this party. The following are the names of the sub-organizations of the congregation:

- Ahl al-Hadith Youth Force
- Ahl al-Hadith Students Federation
- Jamiat Asātīza (Teachers) Pakistan
- Jamiat Ṭulabā` (Students) Ahl al-Hadith
- United Commanders Front

On March 2, 2018, after 14 years, the disgruntled faction of the Central Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith Pakistan, under the leadership of Hafiz Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer, accepted the unconditional mandate of Senator Professor Sajid Mir to come together and end all their differences, and their Jamat, “Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith” merged into “Central Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith.”⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Bizaa Zeynab, *The Religious and Political Dynamics of Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith in Pakistan*, (Columbia: Columbia University Libraries, Columbia Academic Commons. 2010), 45-67.

⁶⁰ News Reporter *“Merger of JAH factions,”* (Dawn Newspaper. 2 March 2018), <https://www.dawn.com/news/1392639> accessed August 31, 2022.

3.10.3 Taḥrīk-E-Labbaik Pakistan

Taḥrīk-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is a Pakistani political party, which was formed under the leadership of Khadim Hussain Rizvi, the leader of Taḥrīk-e-Labbaik Yā Rasūlallāh. On July 26, 2017, the Election Commission of Pakistan was registered, and this organization was given the election symbol of a Crane.

After the death of Khadim Hussain Rizvi (the previous Amīr), his son Saad Hussain Rizvi became the present Amīr. He was later imprisoned when cases related to public disorder and anti-state activities were filed against him. On April 14, 2021, Taḥrīk-e-Labbaik was banned under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The Government of Pakistan had banned Taḥrīk-e-Labbaik Pakistan on April 15, 2021, under Rule 11 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.

3.10.3.1 The Purpose of this Movement

The reason for the foundation of this movement was the execution of Mumtaz Qadri, the killer of the former Punjab Governor, Salman Taseer, by the government of Pakistan on February 29th 2016, after the funeral prayer held at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi. On the next day, March 1st, a meeting was held. The aim of this movement was to put the current government in trouble and to fill the political-Islamic vacuum. After the news of the execution became public, there were protests in different parts of the country. The government imposed an immediate ban on holding rallies and processions by invoking Section 144 of the constitution due to fear of breach of peace in the city.

3.10.3.2 By-elections 2017

The TLP contested for the first time in the by-election held on September 17th, 2017, in the seat of NA-120, which was vacated due to the disqualification of Nawaz Sharif and took the third position. The party next won the fifth position in the by-election held on the NA-4 seat, which was vacant due to the death of Gulzar Khan.

In the by-election of February 12th, 2018, the party won the third position on the seat of the constituency NA-154, which was vacated due to the disqualification of Jahangir Tareen.

3.10.3.3 Conflicts

Tahrīk-e-Labbaik Pakistan protested the changing of wordings of the affidavit in the Constitutional Amendment Election Bill 2017, against which the government carried out mass arrests. During this time, eight members of the party were killed and more than 200 injured.

3.10.3.4 Manifesto

Following are the basic points of the party's manifesto⁶¹:

1. May the monotheism of God be preached and published.
2. What is the meaning of Pakistan? "There is no god but Allah". What will be the constitution of the state? The implementation of "Muhammad-ul-Rasulullah" means the implementation of the system of the Prophet (pbuh) and the protection of the status of the Prophet.
3. Belief in the end of prophethood.
4. Reform beliefs and practices.
5. Spread Islam.
6. May Allah (swt) guide Pakistan in various spheres of life such as religious, political, economic, and social matters.
7. All the necessities of life such as food, clean water, education, medical treatment, housing, law and order, and justice should be within easy reach of the public.
8. A transparent justice system should be implemented to eradicate corruption and dishonesty so that the people of Pakistan can be protected from the capitalist and communal system and enjoy the blessings of Islam.
9. By abolishing the usurious system of society, commercial and economic systems should be prevalent in the light of *Mudārabah* and Islamic principles.

⁶¹ Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan. *Manifesto of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan*, <https://tlyp.org>, accessed January 25, 2024.

10. The education system should be subject to Islam, not Islam should be subject to the current non-Islamic system.
11. Adequate housing, food, education, and medical treatment should be provided for the poor and needy.
12. The people of Pakistan should stay away from provincial, regional, linguistic, and ethnic prejudices, and chant the same slogan as Salman Farsi (RA), that is, my everything is for Islam.
13. Women should be provided with all the fundamental rights provided by Islam.
14. There should be workshops to teach skills to the youth through which they can have meaningful and dignified employment opportunities.
15. The rights given to non-Muslim minorities by Islam should be protected.
16. A code of conduct should be enforced to establish unity in the principles of religion and to tolerate minor differences.
17. May the warriors of Islam who guards the front of the Prophet (pbuh) be morally and legally supported.
18. There should be a continuous effort to present the bright face of Islam to prevent the temptations of false forces.
19. There should be legislation to deal with latinity, nudity, and obscenity on print, electronic, and social media.
20. For the supremacy of Islam, let the spirit of Jihād in the hearts of the Muslims of Pakistan be for the sake of Allah. Also, the spirit of self-sacrifice should be born for national defence, stability, and integrity.
21. Establish stable and strong ties with Muslim countries for the promotion of the Kalimat al-Ḥaq (The word of Truth).
22. There should be an end to foreign interference and infiltration in every sphere of life.
23. All possible help should be given to subjugated Muslim countries.
24. Welfare institutions should be established for the welfare of the people.

25. For the release and return of all the innocent prisoners abroad, especially Aafia Siddiqui, all steps should be taken that reflect national honour and dignity.

3.10.3.5 Party's Tagline

Unfortunately, due to the country's politics being in the hands of people who were ignorant of religion, Islamic ideas in Pakistan were not getting protection at the government level. The existing religious political parties also continued to form alliances with the political parties having atheistic manifesto for their political interest. So, instead of choosing an illegal shortcut to maintain the Islamic identity in the country, the leadership of Taḥrīk Labbaik Ya Rasūlallah decided to come into the mainstream and founded Taḥrīk-e-Labbaiḳ Pakistan. Shortly after its registration, the party participated heavily in the general elections held in the country. 561 candidates were fielded for various provincial and national assembly seats across the country. Such a high number of candidates from a fledgling party in the scenario surprised "all quarters" of the country. According to Taḥrīk-e-Labbaiḳ Pakistan, their political workers across the country faced discrimination during the polling process.⁶² Despite this, Taḥrīk-e-Labbaiḳ Pakistan emerged as the third largest party in terms of votes in addition to three seats in the Sindh Assembly. Moreover, Taḥrīk-e-Labbaiḳ Pakistan has not been given any media house since its inception until today. Not only this, but since the worst political crackdown on Taḥrīk-e-Labbaiḳ Pakistan for exercising their democratic right after the Asiya case verdict in November 2018, it has also been facing social media shutdown. Taḥrīk-e-Labbaiḳ Pakistan website tlyp.org was also shut down during the same crackdown without any evidence or prior notification.

3.10.4 Religio-Political Party Alliances in Pakistan

3.10.4.1 Islāmī Jamhūrī Ittīḥād (Islamic Democratic Alliance)

The Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) was a former political alliance of Pakistan that was formed to challenge the Pakistan People's Party in the 1988 general elections after the death of the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq. The Pakistan People's Party was boosted

⁶² Tehreek-e-Labbaiḳ Pakistan. <https://tlyp.org>, accessed January 25, 2024.

by the return of Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and her public popularity indicated that the People's Party would win the elections. To counter this "threat", all right-wing parties united and tried to block the way of the People's Party.⁶³

This Alliance consisted of 9 parties, in which the major parties were the Pakistan Muslim League, the National People's Party, and the Jamat-e-Islami. However, the Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif had a large majority and was elected from across the country and 80 percent of the candidates belonged to the same party. Hameed Gul, the head of Pakistan's secret agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), disclosed or admitted in August 2009 that he played an important role in the formation of the Islamic Democratic Alliance to unite right-wing forces at a centre against the current government.⁶⁴

The following is a list of the nine allied political parties:

1. Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
2. National People's Party (NPP)
3. Jamat Islami (JI)
4. Jamiat Ulama e Islam (Darkhwasti Group)
5. Nizam e Mustafa Group
6. Markazi Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith (Lakhvi Group)
7. Jamat-ul Mashāikh (Sahibzada Fazl e Haq Group)
8. Azad Group
9. Hizbullah Jihād

The head of this coalition was Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, while the most important leader was Mian Nawaz Sharif, who became the Chief Minister of Punjab province during the

⁶³ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 202–203.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 207.

Zia-ul-Haq regime and thus emerged from being an industrialist to becoming a leading politician.⁶⁵

In the general elections, the Islamic Democratic Union won only 53 seats, while the Pakistan People's Party won 93. The alliance won most of the seats from Punjab province and thus Mian Nawaz Sharif emerged as the most important leader outside the People's Party. He succeeded in forming the provincial government in December 1988 at the expense of the majority in the province of Punjab and became the Chief Minister of Punjab.

However, in the general elections of 1990, the Islamic Democratic Alliance achieved great success and gained power by obtaining 105 seats in the National Assembly, and thus Mian Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the first time.

By the time for general elections of 1993, the Islamic Democratic Alliance had ended and thus the alliance of the opposition forces of the People's Party ended too. The People's Party won in those elections and Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister of the country for the second time.⁶⁶

3.10.4.2 Muttahida Majlis Amal Pakistan

The Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) was established to give practical form to the state of Pakistan and the foundation of Pakistan as an Islamic and welfare state. It was a group of political parties that opposed President Pervez Musharraf and former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. There was not just one party but a coalition of them.⁶⁷

Muttahida Majlis Amal was formed as an opposition in 2002 with the aim of opposing Pervez Musharraf's pro-American policy. This alliance was of religious parties which included Jamiat Ulema Islam, Tahrik Ja'fria Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema Islam (F), Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith, and Jamat Islami Pakistan. In 2002, the MMA

⁶⁵ B. Chakma. *South Asia in Transition: Democracy, Political Economy and Security*, (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 25 June 2014), 114.

⁶⁶ Shaikh Aziz, "A Leaf from History: Friends and Enemies," *Dawn*, May 15, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1257904> accessed September 12, 2022.

⁶⁷ Jocelyne Cesari and José Casanova, *Islam, Gender, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective*, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 101.

contested the election against Pervez Musharraf in a vigorous manner but could not even get a one-third majority in the parliament.⁶⁸

In Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the MMA won all the seats of the National Assembly except three seats of the National Assembly, and its provincial government was formed in that province. Apart from this, the MMA won 5 seats in Sindh province, 3 seats in Punjab province and 6 seats in Baluchistan province. The party won 63 out of 342 seats in the National Assembly and 6 out of 100 seats in the Senate.

After the deadly terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, religious extremism began to grow in the military as a response to those attacks. Islamic political parties formed a think tank, known as the Pakistan-Afghanistan Defence Council and the establishment of the MMA in 2001 was the first time that it had a coalition of sorts entering the electoral process.⁶⁹

Despite its massive popularity and getting great support, the MMA alliance won only 63 seats compared to 94 seats for the PPP and 124 seats for President Musharraf's Muslim League (Q) during the 2002 general elections. The alliance included the following notable groups:

1. Jamiat al-Ulama Pakistan (JUP)
2. Jamiat Ulama e Islam Pakistan-F (JUI-F)
3. Jamat e Islami Pakistan (JI)
4. Tahrik e Ja'fria Pakistan (TJP)
5. Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith Pakistan (JAH)

Leading up to the elections, the MMA composed a 15-point manifesto as follows:

1. To revive the fear of God, affection to the Islamic Prophet Mohammed, and service to the people with particular emphasis on government officials and cabinet members.

⁶⁸ Mariam Mufti, Sahar Shafqat and Niloufer Siddiqui, *Pakistan's Political Parties: Surviving between Dictatorship and Democracy*. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 2020), 100.

⁶⁹ Mohammad Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 36.

2. To make Pakistan a true Islamic welfare state to ensure justice to the people and totally eradicate corruption.
3. To ensure provision of bread, clothes, shelter, education, jobs, and marriage expenses to all citizens.
4. To protect basic human rights (life, property, and honour) of citizens.
5. To create an independent, just, and humane economic system where citizens will be provided opportunities for 'halal' (legitimate) jobs, business, and investments.
6. To ensure uniform and quick justice to every citizen, from the president to a layman.
7. To develop God-fearing, helping, brave, and protecting police system.
8. To get the entire society literate within ten years to enable everyone to know one's rights and responsibilities.
9. To ensure compulsory and free-of-charge education up to matriculation (high school) level and provide opportunities to meritorious students and scholars for advanced research.
10. To protect rights of women guaranteed by Islam and restore their honour and prestige.
11. To abolish all chronic and new feudal systems with forfeiture of illegal wealth and its distribution among the poor.
12. To provide lands to peasants and farmers for their livelihood and guarantee reasonable prices for their produce.
13. To protect provincial autonomy and district governments, taking care of backward areas and classes and taking special steps to get them at par with developed areas.
14. To rid the country and people of imperialistic forces and their local agents.
15. To extend moral, political, and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed

with particular emphasis on Kashmiris, Palestinians, and Afghans.⁷⁰

The MMA's manifesto relies on heavy promises towards social services, eradicating foreign imperialism, extinguishing corruption, and exercising justice, while highlighting local and international struggles towards autonomy. Although the implementations of Shari'ah and gender segregation were cornerstones to the MMA's ideology, such goals were vague and rarely highlighted during election campaigns. In addition, its relative passiveness against Musharraf's incumbent regime helped the party's cause, such as exemption from restrictions on public rallies and madrasa registration.

Despite its conservatism, the alliance was short-lived, when the JUI(F) left it in 2008 over political differences over the boycott of the general elections. The government, led by the left-wing Pakistan People's Party (PPP), refused to revive the coalition in 2012, ahead of the upcoming 2013 elections, in opposition to the PPP.⁷¹

The restoration of the MMA took place on November 9th, 2017 in a second meeting at Mansoura, Lahore, in the presence of five Islamic parties which were Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, Jamat-e-Islami, Markazi Jamiat Ahl al-Hadith, Islami Tahrik, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan as well as other religious parties. The formal announcement took place on December 14th 2017, in Karachi and thus the MMA was revived.

Fazal-ur-Rehman became head of the MMA in March 2018, a political alliance of the above-mentioned 5 religious parties. The alliance has one election symbol which is a Book, a flag, and an election campaign manifesto.⁷²

3.11 ISLAMIC PARTIES SENARIO IN THE POST-ZIA PERIOD

The Islamic political movement in Pakistan has seen a gradual decline in influence despite a growing public propensity towards religion. Zahid Hussain, a well-known Pakistani commentator, is of the opinion that its diminishing electoral support has

⁷⁰ Ashutosh Misra, *Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects, Strategic Analysis*, (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), Vol: 27, 195.

⁷¹ C. R. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 12–14.

⁷² Habib Khan Ghori, "Maulana Fazl to Head Recently Revived MMA," *Dawn*, March 21, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1396614> accessed September 18, 2022.

marginalized its position in the country's politics, the paradox being that its decline began after General Zia, a pro-Islamist came to power in 1977. Almost all the major Islamic political parties backed General Zia's regime, which enforced Islamic laws for the first time. The election results of 1985, 1990, 1993, and 1996 indicated a slump in the vote bank of Islamic parties like the JI, JUI, and other smaller groups. This has happened even though the main Islamist party, the JI, is a well-organized party with a strong ideological base.⁷³

There are many factors which have limited the ability of the Islamists to gather voter support in Pakistan. Firstly, very few Pakistanis would like to see their country transformed into a theocratic state. Secondly, the Islamic parties never focused on the basic economic and social issues which confronted the common people. Thirdly, their support remained confined to a small section of the middle class, as in the case of the JI, or to a particular ethnic group as in the case of the JUI. The slogan of Islamization also lost its charm after General Zia's imposition of the Islamic Sharī'ah laws only succeeded in fuelling sectarian strife in the country. Also, the support of Islamist groups for autocratic military rule caused serious damage to Islamic forces. Their electoral support fell drastically with the return of democracy to the country. Another factor which caused political support for Islamic parties to wane was when they became a part of the Islami Jamhūrī Etihad (IJI) alliance, due to which they lost their political identity and eroded their political base. The alleged involvement of leaders of Islamic parties like the JUI in corruption has also damaged their political position.⁷⁴

For the JI, like most other religious parties, the scenario seemed to be much more hopeful until the end of the 1960s. The party participated in the 1970 elections with the aim of capturing power, but its hopes were dashed as it won only four seats in the National Assembly and four in the Provincial Assemblies. By entering politics, the Jamat lost much of its moral authority. The JUI fared much better during the 1970 elections, particularly in the NWFP and Baluchistan. It was able to form a coalition government in the NWFP with its chief, Maulana Mufti Mahmud, as Chief Minister. The government, the first and last formed by a religious party, was later dismissed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Religious parties appeared to be at the height of their popularity

⁷³ Zahid Hussain, *The Rise and Decline of Political Islam*, (Newsline: February 1998), 43.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

during the Opposition PNA movement in 1977, launched against the PPP government. Though the movement began as a protest unfair practices adopted in the elections, it gave a religious turn to the political discourse, forcing Bhutto to introduce some religious measures to counter the movement. The PNA movement resulted in General Zia-ul Haqq's martial law, which was the most significant period for religious politics in Pakistan. The foremost in giving support to Zia's policy of Islamization was the JI, then headed by Maulana Tufail Mohammad. The JI continued to support the Zia regime even after other religious parties distanced themselves.⁷⁵

The clergy's hand was infinitely strengthened with the advent of Zia's martial law and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution and the Communist coup in Afghanistan, followed by the Soviet intervention there in 1979 contributed to a closer working relationship between the government and doctrinal forces. The Jamat had been privy to the government's Afghan policy since 1977, when, following Nur Muhammad Tarakai's coup in Afghanistan, General Zia and General Fazal-e-Haq had met with Mawdūdī, Mian Tufail, and Qazi Hussain Ahmad to explore a role for the Jamat in Pakistan's Afghan policy. The party had played a major role in marshalling public opinion in favour of an Islamic crusade against the Soviet Union. Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Zia brought the Jamat into his Afghan policy, using its religious stature to legitimize his depiction of the war as a Jihād. The Jamat benefited from the huge flow of funds from Saudi Arabia and money and arms from the US. The Afghan War was advantageous for the Jamat in that it promoted close ties between the Jamat and the Pakistan Army and security forces and opened the inner sanctum of the government to the party. The Jamat played a crucial role in the Afghan Jihād as large sums of money were channelled to the mujahideen through the Jamat by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The maximum funds went to the Hizb al Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which was the Jamat's most favoured resistance group. The Jihād not only involved the Jamat in the flow of funds and arms to the Mujahideen, it also provided the Jamat and IJT members with valuable military training. This involvement gave the Jamat access to material resources which were out of its reach till then. This closeness to the centres of power further enabled it to press for Islamization,

⁷⁵ Zaigham Khan, "Losing Control", *The Herald*, (May 2000), <https://www.heraldscotland.com/> accessed February 23, 2021.

along the lines of the Jamat's perception of Islam. The Jihād for Zia served as a means of making use of the Jamat's energies and diverting them away from domestic politics.⁷⁶

Meanwhile, hundreds of young Pakistanis, products of the madrassas that sprang up all over the country during General Zia's rule, joined the Jihād against the Soviets and Communism. Those madrassas, rather than being considered merely as institutions of learning for the socially weak, became institutions of political importance during this time. Many madrassas were established in the NWFP and tribal areas. According to one source, 19 schools were established after the Soviet intervention, six in the district of Dir and seven in the Bajorr Agency, both located directly on the Afghan border.⁷⁷ Some of the Islami madrassas of the JI were established exclusively for the Jihād and required financial and other support, which was granted among other sources out of zakat funds. The JUI, during the Afghan Jihād, chose to set up thousands of madrassas throughout the country, but especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan where Afghan refugee students were enrolled and many Mujahideen recruited. Students from these institutions later formed the Taliban and established control over most of Afghanistan.⁷⁸

Another factor which impacted the standing of these parties was the emergence of militant sectarian groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba and Tahrik-e-Jafri Pakistan. These organizations which divided the Islamic political forces, fuelled extremism and sectarian violence, and further alienated the people from religious politics. According to the Newline of February 1998, in a survey conducted by Aashir Associates (Pvt) Ltd representing 1,000 men and women in equal number from every stratum of Pakistan's urban society, 56.6 per cent of the respondents said they were in favour of the implementation of the Shari'ah in letter and spirit. However, most of the respondents also said that they would not vote for a religious party, and an even larger number believed that religion had been misused by successive governments in Pakistan for their own ends.⁷⁹

When the Afghan War came to an end in the late eighties, the religious parties found it very difficult to redefine themselves but found a calling in the insurgency in Kashmir. With the help of Hekmatyar's Hizb al Islami, the JI formed the Hizbul

⁷⁶ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 195.

⁷⁷ Jamal Malik, *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, 209.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 151.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

Mujahideen, a militant organization to which Pakistani men were introduced in large numbers to wage Jihād in Kashmir. A group of Hizb fighters later formed the Al Bader, another Jihādī organization. Also, militants belonging to the Deobandi sect formed the Harkat-ul Ansar, now called the Harkat-ul Mujahideen, after the US declared it a terrorist group, which has well established links with the JUI. Their recruits take part in the Afghan civil war, along with the Taliban, as well as the so-called Jihād in Kashmir. While the Jamat is a force to be reckoned with in the sense that it can mobilize its supporters easily, bring some major cities to a standstill, and wield some influence in the government and army because of its involvement in the Afghan Jihād, the Jamat could not hope to do well electorally. When democracy was restored in 1985, the Jamat tried populist measures to win over the masses. During the 1993 elections, its other wing, Pasban, ran a massive campaign which did not show results, and in 1997, the Jamat boycotted elections to save face.⁸⁰

The fortunes of the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts have been closely linked from the very start as they have been indoctrinated by Pakistani religious parties, provided a base of operations on Pakistani soil, and have been sponsored and supported by the Pakistani establishment. Pakistani backing of the Taliban, a Pushtun group emerging from theological schools in Baluchistan and the NWFP, run by the JUI (Fazal-ur-Rehman) is no secret.

While the rise of the Taliban was a great morale booster for the JUI, the image of the Taliban as perceived in Pakistan did not help JUI in winning over the people. The party is divided into two groups called Fazal and Sami, and both groups reorganized themselves along the lines of "revolutionary politics". Also, it is believed that instead of controlling the Taliban, the JUI became subservient to their dictates as its own militant cadres were directly influenced by the Taliban. Members of the Harkat-ul Mujahideen received training in Afghanistan, and pledged allegiance to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The two factions of the JUI competed to get closer to the Taliban, which also explained Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman's anti-US campaign. Meanwhile, the JUP had been almost wiped out of the political arena. Representing the Barelvi sect, which Wahabi Arabs detested, the JUP could not hope to receive Arab money or participate in the Afghan War. To fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the JUP,

⁸⁰ Sairah Irshad Khan and Muna Khan, *Among the Believers*, (Newsline: February 1998), 22.

the Pakistani Awami Tahrik (PAT) emerged in the eighties. Set up by Maulana Tahir al Qadri, the PAT took part in the 1990 elections but lost ignominiously.⁸¹

A worrying trend which is the direct outcome of the Afghan Jihād and General Zia's Islamization process is the emergence of dozens of fundamentalists, religious movements of varying persuasions, each more militant than the next, some examples being the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, the Tahrik-e-Jafri Pakistan, the Sipah-e-Mohammed, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and the Sipah-e-Jhangvi. The growing religious intolerance is evident if one sees the statistics of sectarian strife. In 1997, more than 300 people were killed in outbreaks of sectarian violence. In the beginning of 1998, the Momin Pura massacre took place in which 24 Shī'ah worshippers were killed while offering prayers. Among other numerous reports of religious intolerance, the example of Salamat Masih, a 13-year-old Christian boy stands out. He was accused and subsequently acquitted on the charges of blasphemy, but his relative was shot down outside the Lahore High Court in 1997.

The level of extremism became a matter of concern as people from all walks of life were affected. People were increasingly alarmed over incidents like the occupation of a newly built hospital to be run by well-known social worker, Maulana Abdul Sattar Edhi in Karachi in December 1997, by religious students from a madrassa run by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman's JUI. Just eight days after the incident, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman went there and made a speech against Edhi, calling him an infidel and defending the action of his students by calling it a holy war against Edhi.

In another incident, the second largest parliamentary group in Baluchistan's five-party coalition government, the JUI-F, decided to boycott Cabinet meetings in early March 1999 due to government action taken against JUI members responsible for ransacking the newly built Capri cinema in the provincial capital. The JUI (F) celebrated Ramzan by stepping up their drive to enforce a Taliban style Sharī'ah in Baluchistan. Some of its activists attacked and ransacked video shops and burned down the cinema. The Baluchistan coalition government was eventually forced to act against its coalition partner, arresting JUI activists and conducting raids on madrassas and residences of JUI

⁸¹ Samina Ahmed, *The (Un)holy Nexus? Internal Conflicts in Pakistan*, (Newline: September 1998), 31.

leaders.⁸²

However, it is obvious that the leaders of religious parties did not share these concerns, nor were they willing to take the blame for such happenings. In an interview given to a leading Pakistani newsmagazine, *Newsline*, the Amīr of the JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, stated that the Jamat was a religious party and not a sectarian one. He further stated that it would be very simple for them to control sectarianism because the party had in its fold Shī'ahs, Sunnis, Deobandis, Brelvis, members of the Sipah-e-Sahaba, Sipah-e-Mohammed, Ahl al Hadith, etc., and it would be possible to hold a dialogue and exchange ideas.

The Islamic parties continued to show their ability to garner support for or against political decisions and events. Nawaz Sharif's attempt to consolidate his control over the state in the name of Islam, by moving the 15th constitutional amendment in 1998, met with unprecedented resistance. Ironically, even the religious political parties like the JI and JUI were not prepared to back the government on the issue and declared that the bill had nothing to do with Islamic Sharī'ah. Almost all the major political parties from the JI to the PPP referred to Nawaz Sharif's action as part of a plan to establish autocracy in the country. Some analysts suggested that the proposed bill was aimed at pre-empting the increasing political power of the radical Islamists. The increasing militancy of the extremist religious groups was evident during the countrywide anti-American and anti-government protests following the US missile attack on the hideout of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in August 1998. The groups accused the government of colluding with the Americans. The US military strikes gave an impetus to Pakistani religious extremists to pressure the Pakistan government for Islamization. Using the US military action to mobilize domestic support for their cause, the Islamist parties successfully demonstrated their street power.⁸³

⁸² Shahzada Zulfikar, *The Maulana's Wrath*, (*Newsline*, April 1999), 49.

⁸³ Samina Ahmad, "The Fragile Base of Democracy in Pakistan", *The Post-Colonial States of South Asia* Vol: 3, Issue: 1998, 16-17.

3.12 USING RELIGION FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES: A DANGEROUS TREND

3.12.1 Historical Perspective

Renowned historian Mubarak Ali says that since Pakistan was founded on religious politics, there has been an influence of religious classes from the beginning and all politicians have used religion for political purposes. He told DW (Deutsche Welle), "First of all, Liaquat Ali Khan declared the invasion of tribals in Kashmir as jihād and thus our army became a jihādist force." Interestingly, except for Maulana Mawdūdī, all the political leaders called this invasion a Jihād.

According to Mubarak Ali, the second impetus for the religious trend was the Cold War. Pakistan wanted to be an ally of America in this war and that's why all the leaders including Liaquat Ali Khan used religion for politics and tried to show the West that they were against communism. Liaquat Ali Khan's speech in America was also about this.

Mubarak Ali stated that once this tradition started, everyone used it. Ayyub Khan also used religion for politics, but he wanted a progressive interpretation of religion, while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave the constitution a very religious colour, and General Zia made religious laws and supported clerics at the state level pushing the country towards extremism.⁸⁴

3.12.2 Why did All-India Muslim League Resort to Religion?

Mubarak Ali said that the All-India Muslim League had neither made any economic plan nor decided how the constitution would be drawn while creating Pakistan. "When Pakistan was created and Pakistan's economic problems increased, people's attention was diverted from economic problems to religious issues, the dire consequences of which we are now suffering."⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Mubarak Ali, "Siyasi Maqasid ky liye Mazhab ka Istemal: Aik Khatarnak Rujhaan". (*Deutsche Welle (DW)*), <https://www.dw.com/ur/63653182> accessed October 11, 2022.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

3.12.3 Use of Religious Card

In Pakistan, it is estimated that only the Awami National Party (ANP) clearly calls itself a secular party in its manifesto. Some left-wing parties away from electoral politics are also strongly opposed to using religion for political purposes, but almost all parties active in national politics use the religious card.

Khalid Bhatti says that politicians have not learned anything from the past and are still using the religious card, which is very dangerous. He told DW, "Besides the politicians of the past, the politicians of the recent era also used the religious card well." Nawaz Sharif tried to implement Shari'ah Bill. He pushed for the amendment the blasphemy bill and talked about promoting the ideology of General Zia. Benazir Bhutto promoted religious symbols and the trend of reciting Tasbeeh in public places was also started by Benazir. Imran Khan also used religion well.

3.12.4 Responsibility of Political Parties

Nazir Mahmood, a researcher from Islamabad says that there are political parties responsible for using religion for political gain in the country. He told DW, "When leaders in our political parties use abusive language against religious minorities, political party leaders do not take any action against them. For example, no action was taken against Captain Safdar and Javed Latif on this issue".⁸⁶

According to Nazir Mahmood, those who can influence public opinion should speak very carefully. "But in our country, the Chief Justice also speaks against the religious minorities and so do the political leaders. Their hateful statements influence the public and encourage the extremists". According to him, the political parties should immediately suspend the membership of such members who are involved in spreading hatred against any religious minority. "But the way the country is heading towards religious fanaticism, that doesn't seem to be happening".⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Nazir Mahmood, (*Deutsche Welle (DW)*), <https://www.dw.com/ur/63653182> accessed March 11, 2022.

⁸⁷ Ibid.,

3.12.5 Religion has Nothing to Do with Extremism

However, religious leaders say that some secular elements associate extremism with religion to defame religion and religious parties. Samiyah Raheel Qazi, a former Member of Parliament belonging to Jamat-e-Islami, told DW in this regard, "Jamat-e-Islami is a religious party and hardly any political party in the history of Pakistan is as moderate and peaceful as Jamat-e-Islami. We do not believe that extremism and political intolerance and religion have any relationship, but secular elements are more extremist and have historically used more violence for political purposes". According to Samiyah Raheel, the US and other world powers at the global level have used force against other countries the most and fostered the trend of violence.⁸⁸

3.12.6 A Series of Attacks and Accusations

It should be noted that before the attack on Imran Khan in Pakistan, an extremist threw a shoe at former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Non-League leader, Ahsan Iqbal, was shot at. Before that, the PPP leaders, Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti, were killed. Some elements also made accusations of blasphemy against many politicians including Sherry Rehman. On the Faizabad sit-in, Federal Minister Zahid Hamid had to leave the country for some time.


In Pakistan, such accusations were not only made against politicians, but also some actors including singer Junaid Jamshed who faced similar accusations, while activists fighting for women's rights were also tried to be dragged into these accusations.

3.13 CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the intricate relationship between Islamic principles, constitutional frameworks, and political dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It began by exploring the historical context and ideological vision behind Pakistan's establishment, including the perspectives of its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The analysis then delved into Pakistan's constitution, scrutinising its Islamic features

⁸⁸ Samiyah Raheel Qazi, *Deutsche Welle (DW)*, <https://www.dw.com/ur/63653182> accessed March 11, 2022.

and the ongoing debate surrounding its religious character. The chapter also investigated the pivotal role of religious political parties in shaping Pakistan's governance, providing an overview of major Islamic parties, their ideologies, and efforts to implement Islamic principles. It discussed the changing scenario of Islamic politics in the post-Zia era, as well as the controversial use of religion for political purposes. Building on this foundation, the upcoming chapter will conduct a comprehensive examination of two prominent Islamic political parties in Pakistan: Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam. It will analyse the history, constitution, manifestos, and organisational structures of these parties, offering insights into their strategies to translate Islamic ideals into functional governance frameworks within Pakistan's democratic landscape.



CHAPTER FOUR

JAMAT-E-ISLAMI AND JAMIAT ULAMA-E-ISLAM: THEIR HISTORY, CONSTITUTIONS, MANIFESTOS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter undertakes a comprehensive examination of two of the most influential Islamic political parties in Pakistan: Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). The discourse commences with an in-depth exploration of Jamat-e-Islami, tracing the party's historical genesis, its prominent role in the country's political landscape, and the evolution of its organisational structure and constitutional frameworks over time. This analysis encompasses a granular review of JI's membership requirements, internal decision-making processes, and the key tenets of its extensive party manifesto which spans a wide spectrum of policy domains—from proposed constitutional reforms and minority rights protections to economic development initiatives and educational interventions.

The chapter then shifts its focus to Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, scrutinising the party's origins, its resurgence in the post-independence era, and the core ideological underpinnings of its political program as articulated in its manifesto. The discussion delves into JUI's core objective of establishing an Islamic Sharī'ah-based system of governance, as well as its policy positions on education, health, finance, industry, agriculture, and judicial reforms. Additionally, the chapter examines the party's stances on minority rights, foreign policy, and other contemporary socio-political issues.

By providing a comprehensive analysis of the history, constitutional frameworks, party manifestos, and organisational structures of these two influential Islamic political movements, this chapter aims to offer valuable insights into the efforts and strategies employed by religiously inspired actors to translate their ideological visions into functional governance frameworks within the context of Pakistan's evolving political landscape. The granular exploration of the JI and JUI's institutional evolution and policy priorities serves to elucidate the complex interplay between religious-political thought and the realities of modern democratic praxis in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

4.2 JAMAT-E-ISLAMI

4.2.1 Founder of Jamat-e-Islami

The founder of Jamat-e-Islami was Maulana Syed Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī. He was born in Aurangabad, Hyderabad on September 25th, 1903. He completed his primary education and passed the Maulvi examination at the age of 11. He started journalism at the age of 15 and joined the Madinah newspaper Bijnor. When he started the Khilāfah movement, he took full part in it. He focused on the completion of Islamic studies and the study of English and edited the Muslim newspaper of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind in 1922. After the closure of the paper, he took over the editorship of the Jamiat (Delhi) and held the post until 1928. At the age of 26, he wrote a book on Islamic law and war titled "Jihād in Islam." He started a monthly magazine from Hyderabad Deccan under the name of Tarjumān-ul-Qur’ān. He started doing this and after some time he founded "Jamat-e-Islami".¹

Jamat-e-Islam came into being on August 26th, 1941. Its founding assembly was attended by 175 people. The gathering was held at Maulana Mawdūdī’s residence in Islamia Park, Chouburji, Lahore where they unanimously elected Maulana Mawdūdī as the Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami. The purpose of the formation of Jamat-e-Islami was stated during the meeting. The entire system of human life encompasses all spheres of thought, belief, religion, character, education, training, civilization, culture, economy, politics, law, justice, war, and international relations, including the worship of Allah (swt) and the Prophets. This system should be established on guidance derived from Islamic principles".²

In June 1942, Maulana Mawdūdī moved from Lahore to Turkey and then moved to Dar al-Salām, a small settlement near Sarnari Railway Station on Amritsar Road, a short distance from Kasil Town Pathankot in Gurdaspur District. Maulana Mawdūdī worked hard to make Jamat-e-Islami active. Until the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the total number of members of Jamat-e-Islami was around five, reflecting its early status as a nascent political and religious organization. In August 1932, the Hindus invaded

¹ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, (Aligarh: Alisha Publications, 2014), 336.

² Rozina, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind 1919-1945*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1991), 29.

Pathankot and started forcing the Muslims from there. Most of the Muslims took refuge in Jamat-e-Islami's centre (Dār al-Salām). The party workers risked their lives to protect him until he moved to Pakistan. On August 8, Maulana Mawdūdī and several Jamat activists reached Lahore from Dar al-Salām in a military convoy. Following this, Maulana Mawdūdī moved from Lahore to Turkey and then returned to Dar al-Salām, where he took up residence.³

Pakistan was facing so many problems that some politicians started planning to make Pakistan a general secret nationalist state. Realizing this danger, Maulana Mawdūdī, with the help of some Pakistani friends, started a series of speeches for the implementation of the Islamic system and on January 6, 1956 at Kolkata Lodge in Lahore, called on the government to form a system of government in Pakistan based on the Islamic constitution. In a speech, he called on the Constituent Assembly to make these goals clear without delay for which Muslims have made unprecedented sacrifices. He stated the following objectives of formation of Pakistan.⁴

1. The power and sovereignty in Pakistan will belong to Allah (swt).
2. The basic law of Pakistan will consist of Islamic law.
3. All current laws of Pakistan will be changed in accordance with the Qur'ān and Sunnah within a certain period and no law will be made in the future contrary to the Qur'ān and Sunnah.
4. The Government of Pakistan shall exercise its powers within the limits prescribed by Allah.

Maulana Mawdūdī clarified his position while addressing meetings in different cities for the implementation of the Islamic system in Pakistan. At a public meeting in Karachi, he announced a four-point demand for the implementation of Islam (these points have been listed above). People who loved Islam responded to Maulana's voice. On the other hand, the elders of the government started making accusations against the government. Maulana Mawdūdī was against Jihād-e-Kashmir and considers its martyrs' death as the death of a dog.

³ Rozina, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind 1919-1945*, 32.

⁴ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 337.

As the movement created by Maulana Mawdūdī grew, the government began to impose strictures on him, culminating in his arrest on October 14th, 1958, along with his followers. After his detention, the Jamat-e-Islami activists continued to advocate for the demands of this movement and the implementation of Islam. The date of approval of the resolution was March 8th, 1959.⁵

On November 11th, 1960, the second meeting of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan was held in Karachi in which Maulana Mawdūdī highlighted the purpose of existence of Jamat-e-Islami and explained the four major components of the party's strategy which are as follows:⁶

1. Refined ideological construction
2. Finding, educating, and training good people
3. Reform society
4. Reform of the system of government

4.2.2 Towards Jamat-e-Islami in 1971

An eight-point demand was made for a Constituent Assembly and a nationwide campaign for an Islamic constitution was launched. During this time there were strong demonstrations against the Qadiani. Jamat-e-Islami members led by Maulana Mawdūdī attended an all-party convention in Karachi to demand that the Qadiani be declared a minority. The issue of Qadiani was protracted. Party workers raised the issue through rallies, which led to the arrest of Maulana Mawdūdī and his comrades on March 5th, 1953. He was charged with treason by the government and sentenced to death. A wave of grief swept across the Islamic world and strikes and protests erupted across Pakistan. Though people demanded for Maulana's release, he was not released, but the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Later, on April 7th, 1959, Maulana Mawdūdī was released on a purely legal basis after he and his comrades had been jailed for six months. The third Pakistan gathering of Jamat-e-Islami was held in Karachi in

⁵ Rozina, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind 1919-1945*, 29.

⁶ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 97.

that year.⁷

In 1971, Maulana Mawdūdī demanded an Islamic constitution from the Jamat-e-Islami and launched a campaign. He also visited East Pakistan for approximately two months and explained his position there. In the same year he went to Mecca for Hajj. In 1956, the fourth all-Pakistan gathering of Jamat-e-Islami was held at Machi Goth. In 1958, Maulana expressed concern over the political instability in the country at a public meeting at Mochi Gate, Lahore. Then, when General Ayyub Khan imposed martial law in the country, Jamat-e-Islami was banned. From November 7th to the 8th, 1962, Maulana Mawdūdī travelled to Ard-ul-Qur'ān to see Islamic monuments and historical sites in connection with the understanding of the Qur'ān. During this time, he presented a resolution for the unity of the Islamic world.⁸

In 1961, General Ayyub Khan drafted family law based on Islamic ideas. Maulana Mawdūdī launched a campaign protesting it. At the same time, Muslims in African countries invited him to preach there but the government did not allow him to go. When the Founders of Islam Conference was held in Mecca in 1952, an organization called Rabṭāh al-Ālam al-Islāmi was formed. Maulana Mawdūdī was elected a member of the founding committee of the organization. Various tactics were used to thwart the gathering. There was a murderous attack on Maulana Mawdūdī, but he escaped unharmed, but a party worker was martyred. On January 5th, 1963, Maulana Mawdūdī and his six Majlis-e-Shūrā comrades were arrested, and the Jamat-e-Islami was declared illegal. The government seized all the records of the party. In September 1963, the Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of Jamat-e-Islami and the release of Maulana and his associates. After his release, Maulana addressed meetings held at various places to expose the apathy of General Ayyub Khan's dictatorial government.⁹

When Maulana Mawdūdī received an invitation to attend a meeting at the University of Madinah in 1979, the government confiscated his passport. During the Indian War, Maulana Mawdūdī awakened the spirit of the nation by giving speeches about Jihād. Meanwhile, Jamat-e-Islami activists carried out relief work and helped the

⁷ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 338.

⁸ Rozina, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind 1919-1945*, 29.

⁹ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 340.

victims by collecting donations from the public. After the end of the war, when Tashkent came into being, Maulana Mawdūdī presented a resolution against it. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman presented six points which were against the unity of Pakistan. Maulana visited East Pakistan and campaigned against Mujeeb's six points.¹⁰

In 1969, Maulana formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) along with other Six parties to restore democracy. In the same year, the issue of the sighting of the crescent moon became controversial, particularly for the beginning of Ramadan. It became controversial. If Maulana did not agree with the government scholars, he was to be arrested. During the conflict with the government and ideological opponents, he became ill and went to London for treatment. A conference of political leaders was held in 1971 in which some constitutional demands were made by the government. Maulana Mawdūdī also attended the conference. In the same year, he attended the founding conference of the Islamic University in Morocco. When the election campaign began in 1990, Maulana Mawdūdī visited East Pakistan. and when he was addressing a rally at Paltan Maidan in Dhaka it was attacked by government thugs.

Maulana Mawdūdī resigned from the Emirate of Jamat-e-Islami on November 1st, 2013, due to continuous illness and poor health. He went to the United States for some time for treatment. On September 4th, 1979, he underwent a kidney operation. He had a heart attack on September 9th, but his condition was improving. Maulana Mawdūdī died on September 9, 1979, at Bazile Hospital, New York.¹¹

After the death of Maulana Mawdūdī, Mian Tufail Muhammad became the Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami. After some time, the party was ideologically divided into two factions where one group was led by Mian Tufail Mohammad and the other by Qazi Hussain Ahmed. Mian Tufail Muhammad was against Qazi Hussain Ahmed because he thought that Qazi Sahib deviated from the principles of Jamat. In 1990, Jamat-e-Islami formed the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) to compete with secular parties and managed to secure more votes in the elections than other strong parties.¹²

¹⁰ A R. Muhammad, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958*, (Islamabad: NIHC,2000), 49.

¹¹ Gholamali Haddad Adel, Mohammad Jaffar Elim and Hassan Terumi-Rad, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, (New York: EWI Press, 2012), 66.

¹² Nighat Rasheed *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 342.

4.2.3 The Role of Jamat-e-Islami

Jamat-e-Islami was initially just an ideological party. Maulana Mawdūdī, the founder of this party, was especially a preacher of religion and he established this party only for the promotion and propagation of Islam. After its inception, Jamat-e-Islami, before parts of India became Pakistan, strengthened its bi-national ideology through its literature, but this movement remained separate from Pakistan. The author of this literature was Maulana Mawdūdī himself who was of the view that democracy was based on Western ideas and the assemblies formed under it were based on a non-Islamic concept. Therefore, Maulana was of the view that as ordinary Muslims became associated with the Tahrīk-e-Pakistan, they were moving away from the same Islamic culture and traditions. They also wanted to get rid of the British. That was why Jamat-e-Islami did not participate in the 2008 elections. In those days, the Jamat-e-Islami had only about a dozen members and had not yet been introduced as a political party.¹³

After the formation of Pakistan, Maulana Mawdūdī settled in Pakistan (Lahore) and he started the struggle for the status of Pakistan as an Islamic state. He was of the view that the Muslim League had won through the slogan of "La ilaha illa Allah" in the 2014 elections. Therefore, the Islamic system should be implemented in Pakistan, and it should have the status of an Islamic state. He remained steadfast to this throughout his life.

Gradually, the party began to participate in politics and established its party system on a strong and stable footing. It has offices, officials, and workers across the country. The party participated in social activities more than politics where during the war, floods, and natural disasters the members always helped the victims.¹⁴

After the death of Maulana Mawdūdī, the Jamat-e-Islami immediately supported the government. It is said that even when Maulana was alive, the party had supported the Yahya government. During Zia's martial law regime, some of the party members joined the regular government and worked in certain ministries. In General Zia's slaughter, Jamat-e-Islami as a special part of the party. In the case of Afghan refugees, the party also sided with General Zia and fully supported the Mujahideen (who later

¹³ Rozina, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind 1919-1945*, 33.

¹⁴ A R. Muhammad, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958*, 49.

emerged as the Taliban). Commenting on the role of Jamat-e-Islami, Prof. Muhammad Usman writes:

As far as his political understanding is concerned, he often proved to be misguided. Pakistan was becoming increasingly unstable, he could not see the reality of Pakistan. As East Pakistan was seceding (apart from other reasons) from the dictatorial attitude of Ayyub Khan and Yahya Khan, the party did not see the secession and its background. Bhutto and his rival political parties had almost reached an agreement that Zia-ul-Haqq should form an immediate government. The immediate government will work on a method and where will it take the country? The leaders of the party do not have any misunderstanding about this.¹⁵

The professor writes in connection with the organization of the said party:

Jamat-e-Islami is the only party that is working in a scientific way. By this I mean that this political party adheres to the principles that are the constitution of the largest and most successful parties in democracies.¹⁶

Jamat-e-Islami never fully emerged in the elections, so it could not assert its existence politically. During the Ayyub era, when the elections were announced in 1990, Fatima Jinnah stood as a candidate against General Ayyub in the presidential election. When five political parties refused to support him and remove General Ayyub from the government, the Jamat-e-Islami joined them, although religiously and ideologically the Jamat-e-Islami differed from other united parties. In the Yahya elections under General Yahya, Jamat-e-Islami nominated nine candidates from East Pakistan out of which only four were successful.¹⁷

In the election, the Jamat-e-Islami was part of a nine-party coalition that lost to Bhutto. Then, when Major Zia-ul-Haqq announced the elections on non-partisan basis, most of the political parties protested this and refused to participate in the elections, but Jamat-e-Islami participated in them. Eight parties formed an alliance, including the Jamat-e-Islami.

From the above facts it could be seen that Jamat-e-Islami was not able to gain popularity among the people nor was it able to assert itself as a political party.

¹⁵ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 66.

¹⁶ A R. Muhammad, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958*, 49.

¹⁷ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 343.

One of the reasons for the popularity of Jamat-e-Islami among the people is probably the envy of the scholars of the founder of the party, Maulana Mawdūdī. Maulana was not educated in any school, but he had acquired self-knowledge through his hard work due to Allah (swt)-given abilities. When he became famous for his writings, other Maulvis became jealous of him.¹⁸

4.2.4 Military School Teaching

Maulana Mawdūdī did not even attend a college or university, but due to their jealousy and hatred, some Maulvis came up with a slogan against Maulana Mawdūdī saying "One Mawdūdī equals to a hundred Yahūdī (Jews)" making people went against him. Maulana Mawdūdī did not believe in superstitions, so in his writings he stated only those things which are reasonable. He did not give any recognition to the so-called pīr (Sufi Scholar) and *Mashāikh* in his beliefs even though those are the pioneers of spirituality in people's perspective. That was why the people were not interested in Maulana's writings and beliefs. Maulana Mawdūdī was religiously the embodiment of the renaissance of this century but the so-called ulama portrayed him as a modernist and turned people away from him by making speeches against him.¹⁹

In any case, votes in elections are not obtained based on religion but based on caste, community, and influence. Therefore, Jamat-e-Islami could not get votes from the people regarding religion and could not get a significant political position.

The Jamat-e-Islami unit also had to manage some other bitter realities at hand. For example, in colleges and universities, student organizations of the Jamat were involved in bullying and collected weapons and ammunition and spread terrorism. Due to this, the reputation of Jamat-e-Islami was damaged. One of the main reasons for the failure of Jamat-e-Islami was that the feudal capitalists and elders use tactics to win elections. They were never able to use Jamat-e-Islami because they did not believe in the politics of dishonesty. The other parties did not include the elders of Islam who

¹⁸ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 68.

¹⁹ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 343.

could answer the question of the elders of other political parties, even forcefully.²⁰

Religiously, the services of the Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami, Maulana Mawdūdī, are unforgettable. His writings are a beacon for students of MA in Islamic Studies, Political Science, and Law and are used as a reference. Maulana had tried to free the nation from the clutches of superstition through his writings. If the nation itself thought of its own betterment in being trapped in this clutch, then what is the fault of Maulana in this? Secondly, the organization of Jamat-e-Islami is commendable, but the organization may not have any significance in politics. What do landlords and capitalists have to do with education? For them, tactics are enough when the time comes to assert their interests.

The constitution presented by Jamat-e-Islami is based on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. It can be called the constitutional outline of an Islamic state. If a constitution can be drafted under this framework, it will be a complete Islamic constitution. After studying this constitution, it could be possible that if Jamat-e-Islami came to power through elections and adhered to its manifesto and constitution, then Pakistan could become a true Islamic state.

4.2.5 Constitution of Jamat-e-Islami

4.2.5.1 Constitution of 1941

The first constitution of Jamat-e-Islami was adopted on the day of its formation, which was declared by the party on August 26th, 1941. The Jamat-e-Islami was formed in Lahore (Punjab), but its headquarters shifted to Dar al-Salām (Pathankot) after the passing of Maulana Mawdūdī. After some time, when Pakistan came into existence, Maulana came to Lahore and the central office of the party operated in Lahore again. At the time of the partition, the party was also divided into two parts like the country, namely Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan and Jamat-e-Islami India. In this chapter, the focus is on Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan.²¹

²⁰ Rozina, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind 1919-1945*, 38.

²¹ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 343.

4.2.6 Constitution of 1952

Shortly after the formation of Pakistan, the Jamat-e-Islami held its all-Pakistan General Assembly in Karachi from November 10th to the 13th, 1952, to amend its constitution.

The redesigned constitution came into force on August 5th, 1953. Then, the Amendment committee which was held by the members of Jamat-e-Islami was dissolved on February 6th, 1954.²²

4.2.7 Resolution Summary

Jamat-e-Islami's All Pakistan Gathering in 1975 was held to decide on the change to the constitution of the party. The following is a summary of this resolution:

1. The ultimate responsibility for running the Jamat-e-Islami and the Tahrik-e-Islami will rest with the Amir of the Jamat, and he will be accountable to the *Majlis -e-Shura* and the members of the Jamat.
2. The Amir will consult the *Majlis-e-Shura* in formulating the policy of the Jamat-e-Islami and in dealing with important issues.
3. From among the members of the *Majlis-e-Shura*, the Amir-e-Jamat will have the power to elect its own *Majlis-e- Amilah* and that *Majlis-e- Amilah* will have the powers which will be given to it in the next constitution.
4. If there is an urgent need to act on important matters and it is not possible to convene a meeting of the Working Committee of the *Majlis-e-Shura*, the Amir may take such a step with the advice of the members of the Working Committee or the members of the *Majlis-e-Shura*.
5. The Amir will be able to appoint deputy chiefs to assist them and to perform the duties assigned to them. They will have authorized him powers assigned to them.
6. The number of members of the *Majlis-e-Shura* shall at least be fifty. Prior to the election, the number will be divided by the number of members in different constituencies, but one constituency will lose at least one seat.

²² Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 51.

7. The members of the party will be able to attend the meeting of the Central *Majlis -e-Shūrā* as listeners. However, for the special meeting, the Amīr will be able to revoke this permission for the sake of the party.
8. If a no-confidence motion is passed against the Amīr of the Jamat by a two-thirds majority of the total elected members of the *Majlis -e-Shūrā*, the Amīr will be deposed.
9. The *Majlis-e-Shūrā* will have the power to interpret the constitution and amend the constitution.

Another statement presented at the meeting suggested that members of the party should abide by the party's constitution, but in practical ways to achieve their goals, their views should differ from those of the party. The following boundaries must be observed within the group:

1. They shall have full right to express themselves in the meetings of the Jamat, but they shall not have the right to use the press and public platforms for this purpose, nor shall they have the right to wail among the individual members of the Jamat.
2. Decisions made by majority vote in the party will be recognized as binding by the party. However, they will have the right to try to convert these decisions into relevant meetings within the prescribed limits.
3. If a member of the party disagrees with the policy of the party, he will not be able to hold any position in the party whose duty is to implement the party policy.

4.2.8 Constitution of 1957

The election of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* of Jamat-e-Islami was held on March 1st, 1957. The first meeting of this council was held from May 2nd to the 26th of the same year in which the entire constitution was unanimously approved except for Article 6 of the Constitution Day. This constitution came into force on May 5th, 1957.

The reorganization of Jamat-e-Islami was suspended for almost 14 years during

President Ayyub's martial law and after the constitutional system was established in June 1962, political parties were revived on July 16 under the Political Parties Act.²³

4.2.9 Amendment of the Constitution

In 1963, the party had proposed to make some changes to its constitution, but the party and the Amīr were defeated in the eyes of the government. At the meeting of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* in 1975, necessary amendments and additions were unanimously approved in the constitution of the party. These amendments came into force on January 1st, 1976.²⁴

4.2.10 Guide

Following the enactment of the Amendment to the Constitution, the new constitution was published by the Jamat-e-Islami in January 1954, with all the amendments and additions up to that time.

4.2.11 Edits

During the meeting of the Central *Majlis -e-Shūrā* of Jamat-e-Islami held from May 17th to the 21st, 2012, some amendments were also made in the constitution of the party which came into force on May 5th, 2012. With these amendments, the constitution of Jamat-e-Islami was published in November 2012 as the fifth edition.

4.2.12 Amendment Code

In the year 2000, some administrative amendments were made in the constitution which came into force on October 6th, 1971.

²³ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 70.

²⁴ A. R. Muhammad, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958*, 49.

4.2.13 Amendments After 1957

In 1957, the constitution of Jamat-e-Islami was amended in terms of its administrative nature. Then, amendments were also made in February, April, and December of 1957.

4.2.14 Membership and Responsibilities of Members

4.2.14.1 Membership of Jamat-e-Islami

Every sane and mature person, whether male or female, belonging to any caste or community, can become a Jamat-e-Islami activist, if he is a knowledgeable person and testifies to Allah (swt).

1. The disciplinary committee of the congregation should be satisfied that he is eligible for membership of the congregation.
2. After understanding the mission of the party, he should assume that this is his own mission.
3. After studying the constitution of the Jamat, he should promise that he will abide by the discipline of the Jamat.
4. Be bound by Sharī'ah duties and avoid major sins (*Kabā'ir*).
5. He should not have any means of such livelihood which is defined as disobedience, partaking in usury, alcohol, adultery, dancing, and so on.
6. If he has taken possession of a property in any forbidden manner, which includes the destruction of rights, he should then relinquish it and deliver the rights to the rightful claimants.
7. He should not belong to a party or institution whose principles and objectives are contrary to the creed and mission of Jamat-e-Islami.

To become a member of Jamat-e-Islami, a Muslim must repent from his past sins and confess to following the Sharī'ah of Muhammad in the future. By fulfilling the above conditions, he can become a member of Jamat by avoiding major sins (*Kabā'ir*), earning halal sustenance, knowing the truth, and not depriving anyone of their rights, as they are the basic principles of Islam. Whoever adopts these principles is a Jamat-e-

Islami activist.

4.2.15 Duties and Responsibilities of Party Members

What are the responsibilities of a member after becoming a Jamat-e-Islami activist? The answer to this is found in the manifesto of Jamat-e-Islami which states that after accepting the membership, the tasks and changes that every member must do in his/her life are as follows:

1. Acquire at least some knowledge of the religion so that one can become acquainted with the differences and boundaries between Islam and Jamat.
2. Adapting one's thoughts and actions in all matters of life according to the teachings of the Qur'ān and Sunnah and one's own. The purpose of life is to change the quality of one's likes and dislikes and the axis of one's loyalty to the pleasure of Allah (swt).
3. To make maximum efforts to make one's outward appearance in accordance with the Shari'ah and to purify one's life from ignorant rituals.
4. To purify one's heart and conscience from all kinds of prejudices, i.e., disputes, debates, hobbies, and interests.
5. Avoid immorality and associate with noble and virtuous people.
6. He focuses his efforts on the pursuit of the religion of Allah (swt) and the pursuit of Allah.
7. It is obligatory for every member of the congregation to present the congregation's invitation (belief and lineage) to the servants of Allah (swt) as far as he can reach in his circle of introduction. He should invite those who are ready for struggle to join the system of Jamat-e-Islami.²⁵

From the above, Jamat-e-Islami is a preaching organization. It is the duty of every member of the party to first acquire the knowledge of religion himself and then to impart this knowledge to others. The Jamat-e-Islami has not opened any school for

²⁵ Charles J. Adams, *Mawdudi and the Islamic State*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 102.

teaching religion, but for this purpose there are books of Amīr Jamat Maulana Mawdūdī which are in the form of small booklets and in the form of huge books. In Islam, a white person has no superiority over a black person, a black person has no superiority over a white person, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab. Jamat-e-Islami has adopted Islamic principles in determining the status of its members. No one is given any position based on academic credentials, degrees, or wealth, but on piety and action (the basis of performance). All the duties that are imposed on male members are within the purview of female members (i.e., their family members, etc.).²⁶

4.2.16 Membership Pledge

The commitment made when becoming a Jamat-e-Islami activist is as follows.

I confess to Allah (swt), the Lord of the worlds, that:

1. I have fully understood the belief of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan with the interpretation which is mentioned in Article 3 of the Constitution of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan. There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.
2. I have well understood the mission of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan with its interpretation as mentioned in the delegation of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan. After realizing this, I confess that establishing the religion of Allah in the world is the goal of my life and I am joining the Jamat-e-Islami purely in pursuit of this goal and in this work, I have Allah in mind. There is no purpose other than the pleasure of Allah (swt) and the welfare of the Hereafter.
3. I have understood the constitution of the Jamat well and I pledge that I will abide by the entire system of the Jamat in accordance with these constitutions.

4.2.17 Election of Amīr Jamat-e-Islami and Majlis-e-Shūrā

The head of Jamat-e-Islami is called Amīr Jamat. The heads of organizations at the

²⁶ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 345.

district and tehsil (sub-district) levels are also called Amīr. Amīr Jamat and members of *Majlis -e-Shūrā* are elected by ballot. The following is a summary of the procedure that the Jamat-e-Islami had formulated and issued in December 2012 in connection with the elections.²⁷

1. The appointment of the Moderator shall be made at least three months before the date of election. He will be able to appoint his own deputy.
2. The Centre shall submit to the Nāzim (administrator) the complete list of party members 60 days before the date of an election of the Central *Majlis -e-Shūrā*.
3. Each constituency will prepare its own list of the number of voters and notify the moderator 60 days before the date of an election.
4. Members shall have the right to issue ballot papers up to 5 days before the election. Subsequent members will not have the right to vote in this election.
5. All the voters will be counted as official members in the list in terms of training and the same number will be the election number for counting.

(1-A): However, the name, number, and address of the voter will not be entered on the ballot. All these data will be listed on the duplicate along with the number, and only the envelope will be numbered so that the moderator receives the vote. Mark the list with the number of the envelope to satisfy the receipt of crores. At the time of counting, all the envelopes will be opened at the same time, the opinion forms will be separated, and then the counting will be done.

(2-B): The one who gets the most votes in the count will be selected. If there are equal votes in favour of more than one person in the by-election, the election will be decided by lot.

6. There will be no need to provide a list of members in the election of Central Amīr Jamat. However, for the election of the Central Council, the constituencies will be responsible for providing lists of their members to the opposition parties and dissidents.

²⁷ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 71.

7. For the election of the Central *Majlis-e-Shūrā*, the election of the Regional Nazims will be held. Delivery, receipt, and counting will be done by Regional Moderators (Constituency Heads) and the Central Moderator will be selected by compiling a list of constituency-wise elected members. This is followed by a formal announcement of the results.
8. After the counting, the elected regional moderators will send the account of the ballot paper to the Central Election Office. All other records will be kept in their offices for six months.
9. The election of the Central Amīr Jamat will be under the direct supervision of the Election Nazim.
10. Election petitions will be valid within 30 days after the announcement of the election.
11. The Electoral Tribunal shall appoint the Central Amīr of the Jamat for the election of the Central *Majlis -e-Shūrā*. However, for the election of the Central Amīr Jamat, the Central Council will appoint a tribunal with the appointment of the nominee.

4.2.18 Constituency Women's Organization

Men as well as women can become members of Jamat-e-Islami. They are organized separately from men. The Central Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami appoints a "Qaima" (lady coordinator) to lead the women's circle. In her appointment, the views of women members of Jamat-e-Islami across Pakistan are considered. The tenure of the Qaima is for about three years and the Qaima can hold on to her position if the Amīr Jamat is satisfied with her work and performance. The duties and powers of a Qaima are fixed in the constitution of Jamat-e-Islami.

A Women's *Shūrā* Council is elected to assist and advise the Women's Constituency of Pakistan. The number of members of this *Shūrā* Council can be a minimum of seven and a maximum of twenty-five. It is ensured that at least one-woman

representative from each province is included in the *Majlis -e-Shūrā*.²⁸

A Nāzimah (Lady Supervisor) is appointed from each province, district, and local system by the women's constituency. The notice of this appointment is given to the relevant authorities. The local Nāzimah prepares the monthly report of her activities and forwarded its copy to the Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami of her district. The district Nazim has given her quarterly report to her Amīr and its copy to the Amīr of her province and the central women's circle. Nāzimahs are required to send their reports to the centre.

The women's circle has its own treasury at every level which is regularly accounted for. To check this, the finance director sends the financial report to the women's circle after getting approval from the Amīr Jamat in the form of proper rules and regulations. In the light of these rules and regulations, the accounts of the treasury are checked and audited. The women's discipline at each level is guided by the party disciplinary rules at the same level.²⁹

4.2.19 Proceedings and Procedures of the Central Majlis-e-Shūrā

4.2.19.1 Agenda Setting

When the Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami decides to convene a meeting of the Central *Majlis-e-Shūrā*, he informs the members of the Jamat in writing about the date, time, and place of the meeting. The agenda of the meeting is formulated by the Jamat-e-Islami as per the direction of the Amīr-e-Jamat and it is usually issued fifteen days from the meeting. Amīr Jamat is authorized to convene a meeting of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* on notice of less than 5 days in emergency conditions. If a member wishes to raise a particular issue on the agenda, he can record it and send it to the Qā'im Jamat (coordinator) within ten days after the announcement of the meeting and if approved by the Amīr Jamat or the committee appointed by the working committee, he can take it to the meeting. The suggestions of the members of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* must be included in the agenda.³⁰

²⁸ Irfan Ahmad, *The Jewish hand: the response of the Jamat-e-Islami Hind*, 138.

²⁹ A R. Muhammad, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958*, 49.

³⁰ Irfan Ahmad, *The Jewish hand: the response of the Jamat-e-Islami Hind*, 138.

4.2.19.2 Questions

Any member of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* who wants to raise a question can send it in writing to the Qā'im Jamat at least 3 days before the meeting. The questions and objections of the general members of the party are presented in the meeting of the *Shūrā* members.

4.2.19.3 President and Substitute President

The meeting of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* is chaired by Amīr Jamat-e-Islami himself. In his absence, his nominee presides over the meeting. In both cases, the meeting is usually scheduled to take place the next day or when the members are ready for it.

4.2.19.4 Discussion Method

The issue presented by the Centre is one of the issues that has been added to the agenda by a member of the *Shūrā*. Once an issue has been decided upon, it cannot be reopened for discussion. No one is allowed to be allotted with more than fifteen times during the debate. No other issue can be raised until an issue has been resolved or the meeting has been adjourned. During the debate, the speakers take turns to speak in the order prescribed by the President. Irrelevant discussions are expected during the discussion. Speech in the *Majlis* is to address the President, and his speech should be in response to the *Shūrā* member.³¹

4.2.19.5 Committees

When a seat on a committee becomes vacant due to its member being unable to work, and the committee has yet to do its work, then a replacement situation is presented during the meeting of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā*. If the previous member returns, the *Majlis* will reinstate him; otherwise, the Amīr Jamat is authorized to fill the vacancy.

The Committee submits its report in writing to the *Majlis-e-Shūrā* or the person or persons appointed by it. If the *Majlis* has made any statement in this regard, the Committee shall submit its report to the Amīr of the Jamat who will take appropriate

³¹ Charles J. Adams, *Mawdudi and the Islamic State*, 103.

action thereon. If necessary, the Amīr Jamat can may appoint someone based on the committee's recommendations.³²

4.2.19.6 Budget

Before presenting the budget, the report on the work of the party and the details of the proceedings are presented before the *Majlis-e-Shūrā*. The Nāzim of Finance or Qā'im Jamat or any other authority appointed by the Amīr Jamat then presents the budget for the coming year. Members are given the opportunity to discuss the report and the budget proposal. The goal is to complete the budget approval process within three days.³³

4.2.19.7 No-Confidence Motions

Any resolution can be moved against the Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami or any active official in the meeting of the *Majlis-e-Shūrā*. The method of secret ballot is used for this, however, whoever is accused is given a chance to clear his name.³⁴

4.2.20 Manifesto of Jamat-e-Islami

The following is the manifesto of the Jamat-e-Islami, which was published by the party in the 1970 general elections. In addition to the preface, it consists of 3 main points and 73 sub-headings.

4.2.20.1 Policy Program

The preamble to the manifesto states that Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan is not a political, religious, or reformist party, but in the broadest sense an ideological party that seeks to implement Islamic principles in every sphere of the whole of human life. According to this group, the real cause of corruption is disregard for Allah (swt), the Hereafter, and

³² Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 73.

³³ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 346.

³⁴ Irfan Ahmad, *The Jewish hand: the response of the Jamat-e-Islami Hind*, 138.

the guidance of the Prophet, and the cure for this corruption is obedience to Allah. It has also been clarified that Jamat-e-Islami is not a nationalist or partisan party, but its ideology is universal, and the welfare of all humanity is in its view. It has also been pointed out that the party wants the implementation of every Islamic system in Pakistan which has not been established yet. The party has said that it is engaged in spreading the knowledge of Islam and removing the misconceptions created by ancient and modern sects. It is necessary to reform the government of the day and the system of government because without it, the establishment of justice is possible. The party aims to change the system of government in as many and in the most democratic ways as possible so that Pakistan becomes a state whose concept is presented below.³⁵

1. One who is a follower of the Qur'ān and Sunnah and follows the model of the Righteous Caliphate in which the principles and rules of Islam are fully implemented.
2. One who eradicates evil, cultivates goodness, and exalts the word of Allah (swt) in the world.
3. Who will rebuild the society based on Islamic values and establish the isolation of moral and unethical influences in every aspect of life by eradicating any form of oppression, abuse, and moral depravity.
4. Whoever is a servant of the people of the state, guarantees to every citizen his basic needs (food, clothing, housing, education, and treatment). Increase the wealth of the country and arrange for the fairness of this wealth.
5. Those who understand the needs of the people before they start screaming and reach out to help before they cry.
6. One who is in fact a benefactor of the people in whom all the basic rights of the people are fully protected.
7. In a true democratic government, the people who want other people to freely confess to them should come to power through elections, and the people who they want to remove due to negative values can be easily removed through

³⁵ A R. Muhammad, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958*, 49.

elections.

Finally, those who agree with the above objectives are invited to cooperate with the Jamat in achieving them.

4.2.20.2 Public Principles

The general rule consists of 3 provisions. In it, the Jamat-e-Islami outlined the general principles to which it vows to adhere automatically. Below are the general principles of Jamat-e-Islami.

1. Pakistan is an Islamic state. If anyone tries to impose any other ideology on it to make it a secular state, such a movement will be fiercely opposed.
2. Maintaining the unity of Pakistan is the first duty of the party. For the survival, security, independence, and sovereignty of Pakistan, it is necessary to establish a cloud system by creating a sense of unity. In the eyes of the party, all those movements are destructive.
3. Jamat-e-Islami will redress the injustices that have taken place in the past and the government will give the people of every region the opportunity to exercise their sovereignty while safeguarding the integrity of the country.
4. Immigrants from India (Muhājir and Anṣār) have equal rights and it is not permissible to distinguish between the old inhabitants.
5. Jamat-e-Islami recognizes Bengali and Urdu as national languages of the whole country and opposes making any of them the specific language of the region.
6. According to Jamat-e-Islami, no sustainable political, social, or economic system can be established in Pakistan unless all the elements of national life sincerely and honestly agree on the following principles and decide to abide by them. ³⁶
7. Since a great majority of the people of the country wants an Islamic system, those who do not agree with it should accept the Islamic system in the country according to the opinion of the majority and give up its resistance in undemocratic ways.
8. Pakistan belongs to all the people and not to any class or group. Groups do not

³⁶ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 97.

have the right to exclude the common people from the affairs of the country and make it their own.

9. Running the country is the job of the country's representatives. Government employees work by following the instructions of these representatives. If the government employees do not want to obey the representatives of the nation, they should resign. They can try to change the system of government through constitutional and democratic means, but they do not have to take the form of a political group themselves. They should use the powers given to them to manage and defend the country.
10. The only true representatives of the country are those whom the people choose at will. Those who won the elections under the influence of rigging and join the government are usurpers who do not believe in democracy. Those who belong to politics should make it clear that they will not continue to rig elections and will not support those who rig.
11. Each group must mobilize public opinion for its point of view in a democratic and constitutional manner and the opinion should not be restricted. It is permissible for everyone to obtain power in this way but to seek power in any other way is not allowed. Tahir-ul-Qadri, a prominent political figure and leader of the Pakistan Awami Tahrik, should refrain from doing so for the good of the country.
12. The press, radio, television, and news agencies should not be used for one-sided propaganda in favour of anyone.
13. According to Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan, political life cannot be clean unless all parties operating in Pakistan adhere to the rules.
14. The ideology of Pakistan Islam should not be used against the system of life and the unity and integrity of the country.
15. A party or any of its responsible persons should not use slanderous and indecent propaganda against a candidate during an election period. The person who accuses a leader or a candidate is responsible for the burden of proof.
16. Every party has the right to hold rallies and peaceful demonstrations, but it does not have the right to disrupt the rallies and processions of others. If a party comes to disrupt others, the election law should state that it will not be allowed to run in the election.

17. No party has the right to bring about a revolution through violence. The party doing so should not have the right to work in the country.
18. A party leader can boycott an election but cannot make such announcements that he will not allow the election to take place or stop the participants. Such a person or party should not be allowed to participate in politics. The punishment for such a crime should be fixed.
19. After the announcement of the election and during the election, do not try to get anyone else to vote for money. Do not force the voters to vote by pressuring them through government officials.
20. Each party must pledge that if it comes to power through elections, it will abstain from any unethical practices that undermine democratic principles.
21. Use of government employees and government resources for the benefit of the party.
22. Using the media for propaganda in favour of his party and against the opposition.
23. Restricting press and platform freedoms in the interest of his party.
24. Breaking the other party's members through licenses, permits, or any other financial interests, or using undue influence on sway individuals, is not acceptable.
25. No party will have to participate in the elections if it does not believe in the Islamic basis of Pakistan or wants to bring another system against the democratic system in Pakistan or is against the unity and integrity of Pakistan.³⁷

4.2.20.3 Constitutional Reforms

In the first phase, Jamat-e-Islami wants to declare the constitution of the country with the following amendments.

1. Two Houses of Consensus should be established in the Interim Centre. Representation should be based on population in the lower house and all provinces should be given equal representation in the upper house. In case of disagreement between the two houses, a joint meeting should be held. The

³⁷ Charles J. Adams, *Mawdudi and the Islamic State*, 106.

decision of this joint meeting should not be unfair to any part of the country.

2. One unit system should be broken and the former provinces of West Pakistan should be restored. The Komi and Kalat divisions should be given the status of an entire province. Karachi should be included in Sindh, and Bahawalpur should be made a separate province.
3. Defence matters, foreign exchange, federal affairs, foreign and international trade, communications, and other issues should be agreed upon by the Home Centre and the Centre should have the power to impose direct taxes to run the sectors.
4. Except for the aforesaid matters, all powers should be transferred to the governments which, according to the Constitution. Each government should have full autonomy.
5. The existing Free Frontier Areas should be fully incorporated into Pakistan, and their residents should be granted the right to vote, with universal adult suffrage implemented. All laws of Pakistan should be enforced in these areas, and any special status they hold should be abolished.
6. After the aforesaid memes, when the constitution of the year is declared as the constitution of the country and the power is transferred to the assembly. In the second phase some further amendments in these constitutions as follows:
 - The Holy Qur'ān and Sunnah should be recognized as the first source of the word Surat.
 - Satisfactory machinery should be set up to convert all former non-Islamic laws in accordance with Islam as soon as possible.
 - The separate method of selection should be re-enacted and the non-Muslim minority of Pakistan should be given separate representation in terms of its population. Either that, or the method of 'Proportional Representation' should be adopted.
 - All unreasonable and unfair restrictions on the provisions of fundamental rights should be abolished, and especially the rule of the precautionary

principle should be amended in such a way that a person's freedom is not taken away without a court decision and without giving him a chance to rectify.

- The judiciary should be separate from the administration and completely independent.
- Revoke the power to suspend fundamental rights in emergencies.
- The unconditional and unlimited powers to impose martial law and to make provisions of the Indemnity Act should be limited to reasonable limits.
- Military employees should be given the right to appeal against the decisions of military courts in the Supreme Court in the same way as other citizens of Pakistan have the right to appeal.³⁸

4.2.20.4 Rights of Islamic Sects

Muslim Islamic sects enjoy complete religious freedom under the rule of law. They will have enough freedom to teach their men their religion. They will be able to express their views freely. The decisions of their personal articles will be according to their own Naqib and their judges will decide.

4.2.20.5 Non-Muslim Minorities

The policy on non-Muslim minorities will be:

1. All their civil and legal rights will be protected, and the government will be fully responsible for protecting their lives, property, dignity, and civil liberties.
2. They will be assisted in passing laws to improve their society.
3. They will be given legitimacy in their educational and religious affairs with the resources of the government.
4. Their religious and social affairs will not be unduly interfered with.

³⁸ Irfan Ahmad, *The Jewish hand: the response of the Jamat-e-Islami Hind*, 138.

5. Efforts will be made to address any reasonable grievances in the name of majority conduct or government.
6. They will have complete freedom of religion, worship, culture, and education within the limits and laws.
7. Special attention will be given to the welfare of the Scheduled Caste.³⁹

4.2.20.6 Foreign Policy

The principles and objectives of our foreign policy are as follows:

Pakistan is a principled and ideological state, so like its other policies, its foreign policy must be based on the ideology adopted by it and must meet its requirements. The natural implication of the ideology is that the members should be aware of justice in the world, oppose oppression and tyranny, work honestly, and persuade others to do the same. Covenants are self-sustaining and the members should inspire others to make them. The party wants world peace, and it will not spare a single minute to maintain it. In the party's view, not only the absence of war is tantamount to peace, but peace also means the establishment of an atmosphere of international justice in the world in which all nations and countries can develop freely. Nobody can encroach on the legitimate rights of the people and hinder anyone's peaceful development.

Jamat-e-Islami attributes imperialism and the colonial system to international injustice and one of the main reasons for unrests in the world. This imperialism, be it Eastern or Western, is reprehensible. The party will do its best and its support will always be with oppressed nations. Characteristically, wherever Muslims are being persecuted in the world, religion and humanity are required of them.

Jamat-e-Islami wishes to have friendly cooperation with all the nations of the world, but are we ready for friendship or unity which is against our ideology and legitimate national interests, or which has an adverse effect on our freedom? We are also not ready for any nation, whether it is Sri Lanka or any other country to help us in any way, to start importing its culture and its ideas into our country and preaching its

³⁹ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 347.

principles. So, open the doors of her country.

The Jamat wants to keep Pakistan separate from the great nations of the world and their blocs, and it wants to end Pakistan's adherence to the SATO and SOA agreements. In its view, Pakistan's foreign policy should be completely independent in accordance with its own interests and principles. Giving Kashmir autonomy through referendum and resolving the issue India's Muslim minority is a prerequisite for closer ties with India. The Jamat use extraordinary resources and tactics for these problems.⁴⁰

The Jamat wants to establish closer ties with the Islamic world. It will do its best to ensure that Muslim countries unite based on Islam and come up with a common strategy on the following issues. The revival and promotion of Islamic civilization, and protection of the Islamic world from the growing flood of non-Islamic civilizations. There is also the issue of a good and balanced education policy for all Muslims. With joint efforts, the armament industry in Muslim countries demands that these countries be self-sufficient in matters of defence.

Other issues include the establishment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for the settlement of disputes between Muslim countries, as well as the use of Arabic as the common language of Muslims. There must also be attempts to protect Muslim minorities in different countries from oppression and violence.⁴¹

4.2.20.7 Parliamentary Policy

The parliamentary party of Jamat-e-Islami in the Provincial and National Assemblies will work on the following principle.

1. It will co-operate with the leading parties of the Assembly in the establishment of justice, the real welfare of the country, and the implementation of Islamic rules, but will not be instrumental in fulfilling their intentions in illegitimate matters.
2. If it is in the majority, it will form its own ministry, and it will have its own

⁴⁰ Irfan Ahmad, *The Jewish hand: the response of the Jamat-e-Islami Hind*, 138

⁴¹ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 74.

policy.

- a) Public criticism should not be ignored in the ruling claim.
 - b) Pay full attention to the complaints of the people and try to resolve every legitimate complaint.
 - c) In the affairs of the government, the intellectuals should be consulted, and their cooperation should be sought.
 - d) Ministers should be close to the public and raise the standard of ethics and service.
 - e) Government machinery should not be used for party purposes.
 - f) The powers of the government should be used against the opposition political parties.
 - g) To abandon Western diplomacy and run the government with truth and integrity.
3. Do not try to cling to a ministry at all costs, insist on implementing reform programs in accordance with the party's beliefs and goals, and resign if he does not have the opportunity to successfully serve.
 4. If this party is in the minority but there is a possibility of forming a joint ministry with other parties, then this possibility should be taken advantage of.
 - a) The parties participating in the joint ministry agree with the party's beliefs, objectives, and manifesto, at least with the basic principles of their reform programme.
 - b) They agree to abide by this policy as stated in No. 2.
 5. Even if this party must remain in opposition, it will not disagree. It will adhere to the principle of agreeing with truth and opposing falsehood.⁴²

⁴² Charles J. Adams, *Mawdudi and the Islamic State*, 109.

4.2.20.8 Legal Reforms

Jamat-e-Islami wants to amend the existing laws of the country as follows:

1. The rules of Islam as a law should be prevalent in an Islamic state to legislate for their implementation.
2. Repeal unfair law (e.g. deprivation of liberty without trial or deprivation of fundamental rights).
3. Laws restricting the freedom of expression of the press or the public.
4. To provide free justice to the people by abolishing court fees.
5. Immediately enact laws to prevent adultery, alcohol, gambling, nudity, pornography, prostitution, immorality, obscene movies, pornographic books, indecent advertisements, and any other forms of moral degradation.
6. Amend Criminal Code and Civil Code terms to enable speedy and thorough justice in the courts.
7. To make laws for giving women the rights granted by Shari'ah and to correct the existing family laws in accordance with the rules of Shari'ah.
8. To make new laws for the betterment of society in accordance with Islamic principles.
9. Immediate law reform in the light of Islamic principles and the laws of modern democracies.⁴³

4.2.20.9 Religious and Moral Reform

Jamat-e-Islami will implement the following programme to correct the religious and moral condition of Muslims.

1. Arranging the five times prayer among Muslims.
2. Establishing respect for Ramadan in full force.

⁴³ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 98.

3. Holiday on Friday instead of Sunday.
4. Formation of a board of scholars to manage endowments in accordance with Shari‘ah rules.
5. Appropriate arrangements for the preparation of *Imām* and *Khaṭīb* in mosques.
6. Provision of facilities for Ḥajj.
7. To take appropriate measures to make people aware of Islamic beliefs, rules, and teachings.
8. To have programmes for moral reforms for the country.
9. Elimination of immorality and corruption through law and administrative powers
10. Measures for the improvement and training of public morals
11. Eliminate family planning and promote resource development.⁴⁴

4.2.20.10 Educational Reforms

Jamat-e-Islami gives primary importance to knowledge in the construction of society and the programmes in this regard are:

1. To create Shari‘ah ideology in the education system.
2. To remove several education systems and introduce a single education system.
3. Incorporate ethical training in every field.
4. To make every child of secondary education aware of the necessary rules of life throughout the Qur’ān. Giving moral education to non-Muslim children instead of Islamic education.
5. Establishment of high-level institutions for the determination of the sciences and special attention to the research of Islamic sciences.

⁴⁴ Nighat Rasheed, *A Critical Study of the Reformist Trends in the Indian Muslim Society During the Nineteenth Century*, 348.

6. Measures to eradicate illiteracy as soon as possible.
7. To make primary education compulsory and free or to make secondary education free.
8. The system of education.
9. Establishment of large-scale technical education and training institutions.
10. Elimination of co-educational methods and establishment of separate schools for girls.
11. Establishing open spaces in educational institutions and giving autonomous status to universities.
12. Setting reasonable remuneration for teachers.
13. Paying special attention to teacher training.
14. To keep in view the ideology of Pakistan along with the teacher in the appointment of teachers.
15. Mission schools taken over by the government.
16. Elimination of continuous establishment and operation of public schools at government expense.
17. Encourage private educational institutions and ensure that the government does not become involved as their supervisory and commercial institutions.
18. Bengali in East Pakistan and Urdu in West Pakistan as a medium of instruction.
19. Arrangement of military training in educational institutions.
20. Teaching Arabic as a compulsory subject.
21. Declare the national language as the medium of instruction instead of English.
22. Provision of all kinds of facilities for the development of regional languages ⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, 52.

4.2.20.11 Administrative Reforms

In the Jamat's view, even the best programme for the betterment of the country cannot be useful unless there is an honest, competent, and responsible administration to implement it. For this the Jamat wants to take the following measures:

1. Measures to eliminate bribery, betrayal, and other corruptions and irregularities in government departments and address the causes that lead to the spread of bribery among salaried employees.
2. At the time of appointment of a person holding a high position, the financial statuses of the individual and his relatives are reviewed to see if there is any increase that exceeds their sources of income.
3. Inviting or not inviting those who lead a higher standard of living than their legitimate financial status to government positions or events.
4. Establishment of a high-powered country that will hear complaints about the violation of the knowledge and privileges of government employees.
5. In the context of competitive exams, the subject of Islamic studies has been declared as a compulsory subject. The same applies to the system of moral and religious education in departmental institutions.
6. Reforming English-era employment regulations and harmonizing them with Islam.
7. Prohibiting government employees from wearing conspicuous clothing during working hours and government functions.
8. Reducing administrative expenses and eliminating unnecessary expenditures related to the national anthem.
9. Stopping all barbaric and uncivilized methods of criminal investigation.
10. Preventing the misuse of the secret police and using it for anti-crime, bribery, and surveillance of employees.
11. To separate the Accountability Department and Investigation Department of the Police.

12. To change the barbaric and uncivilized rules of the prison according to Islamic methods and to reform the moral and mental condition of prisoners.
13. Ending the monopoly of one head over an administration.
14. Improving the salaries and working conditions of doctors, engineers, and other employers.
15. Prohibiting the upper class of government officials to take the form of a political party.
16. To take appropriate measures for the reform of Pakistani embassies abroad.⁴⁶

4.2.20.12 Economic Reforms

The economic system that is in place in Pakistan at this time has become oppressive only because of it has accumulated all the evils of the old feudal system and capitalism, exacerbated by the wrong economic policies of the government and the selfishness of an authoritarian bureaucracy. Justice cannot be established in this whole system unless fundamental changes are made, but the changes must be in accordance with the principles of Islam with which the fundamental rights of individuals are protected, and civil liberties of society are maintained.

The main objectives of Jamat-e-Islami's policy are:

1. Fair distribution of wealth.
2. Prevent wealth from being concentrated in a few hands.
3. Eliminate all forms of oppression and abuse.
4. Provide equal opportunities for all people.
5. Give an opportunity to all the people of the country to benefit from economic development.
6. Eliminate poverty from the country and guarantee the necessities of life.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 77.

⁴⁷ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 100.

4.2.20.13 Agriculture

To eliminate the inequalities that have arisen due to the long-standing misrepresentation of agricultural property, the rule of training will be followed. In exceptional circumstances, such extraordinary measures may be taken when a rule contradicts the principles of Islam.

1. All old fiefdoms created by the misuse of power during a period of government will be abolished.
2. In the case of ancient property, the ownership of the land shall be limited to a nominal period. In the fertile areas of West Pakistan, the limit will be between one and a half to two and a half acres in terms of land production capacity and in East Pakistan, it will be limited to Bigha. Excess property will be purchased at a fair rate.
3. All land will be cultivated through barrages. All agricultural land will be sold to farmers in easy instalments and no land will be donated to any individual.
4. All Islamic laws of agriculture will be strictly adhered to.
5. Every effort will be made to ensure that a farmer has at least a decent living.
6. Arrangements will be made for farmers to get a fair price for their produce.
7. Owners of up to 110 acres across Pakistan will be exempted from possession.
8. High-income and low-income earners will be encouraged, and recovery methods will be improved.
9. No occupational tax will be levied on the working class of the rural population.
10. Mechanized farming will be promoted, and cooperative farming and market will be encouraged.
11. Provision of better equipment and fertilizer for farmers will be made.
12. Farmers will be given interest-free loans.
13. Flood prevention measures will be taken.
14. In rural areas, foreign workers will be evicted.

15. The protection of forests will be expanded, and necessary measures will be taken for their use.
16. Fertile plots of land will be barred from being used for industries.
17. In rural areas, industries will be developed which will reduce unemployment and increase the agricultural population.⁴⁸

The following measures will be taken to address the food shortage in the country.

- Cultivation of cultivable lands.
- Making cultivable barren lands cultivable.
- Preventing the spread of bean sorghum, improving the lands affected by them.
- To make full use of available and possible irrigation resources and provide these facilities to the people on a cost basis.
- Ensure balance between cash crops and food crops.
- Protect crops from pests, protect land from seawater, and eliminate crop failure.
- In the food trade, the causes and methods that lead to material shortages and inflation will be eliminated. Also, the same measures will be taken to make the goods available to the consumers at cheaper rates and to the farmers at a reasonable price.⁴⁹
- Martial Law Regulation 1 and 91 will be repealed and the victims will be compensated.

4.2.20.14 Industry and Trade

The following measures should be taken to prevent the excessive concentration of wealth that has arisen. It is taking place due to unsound laws and administrative policies in the country that fails to spread centralized wealth.

1. Forbidden methods of acquiring wealth (usury, speculation, hoarding, etc.) will

⁴⁸ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 101.

⁴⁹ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, 52.

be legally abolished.

2. Those who have an extraordinary accumulation of wealth will be held accountable. Wealth will be confiscated.
3. Ownership of large industries and trades will be extended to the common people. The management of companies is paid by their profits or through government subsidies.
4. Managers will be assigned to work under a board selected by public shareholders.
5. Eliminate capitalist domination over banks, insurance companies, markets, and public financial institutions.
6. Lending policies will be reviewed, and loans will also be given to small and new investors.
7. Companies will be compelled to declare their profits correctly and distribute it among the institutions.
8. Break down monopolies and business alliances.
9. Export Bonus Scheme will be reviewed.
10. The use of bonuses will also be restricted, and only essential items will be allowed to be imported.
11. A board should be set for the issuance of licenses for industries and import and export trade.
12. The United States will be closely monitored to ensure that industrialists and big businesses do not make more than a reasonable profit.
13. The party are opposed to adopting the system of national ownership as a principle, but those industries which are of key and fundamental importance, and which are in their owners' hands are detrimental to them, should be compensated in national ownership or self-government. It is not even permissible for the government to set up and run an industry, but it has to decide which industries need to be run under national management. This is the job of

the people's representative assembly and in doing so the government has to be satisfied that industry management should not suffer from the well-known flaws of the bureaucracy.

14. In the Jamat's view, the entire banking and insurance system must be rebuilt in accordance with Islamic principles of participation and co-operation.
15. For the development of the country, the party considers it necessary to set up heavy industries as soon as possible.⁵⁰

4.2.20.15 Rights of Workers and Low Paid Employees

1. Jamat-e-Islami will reduce the gap between compensations for workers, which is more than any other, and it will bring those compensations to the present level of all. Additionally, it will be ensured that no compensation should be less than the amount required for the basic needs of a family based on current prices of essential goods.
2. Appropriate facilities will be provided to the low paid employees for health treatment and education of their children. Support programs will also be established for their professional development.
3. The existing labour laws will be replaced by fair laws.
4. Weekly work will be kept for a maximum of 3 hours.
5. One and a half days' leave will be given in a week.
6. Children under the age of twelve will be prohibited from working.
7. Women and men will not be allowed to work together.
8. In the case of illnesses and mechanical accidents, treatment will be arranged. In the event of termination of employment, fair compensation, a pension, or a provident fund will be provided upon retirement.
9. Workers and employees will be given the right to strike.

⁵⁰ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 77.

10. Professional organizations will be encouraged. Workers and labourers will be authorized to participate in trade unions.

11. Arrangements will be made for workers to work in a healthy environment.⁵¹

4.2.20.16 General Economic Reforms

Arrangements will be made by the government to collect alms for charity and funds will be spent only on the following as per Sharī'ah rules.

1. Financial support and benefits to the elderly, the disabled, the handicapped, and all other needy people.
2. Education of orphans and poor children and sponsorship of their expenses.
3. Support for the unemployed until their employment is arranged.
4. Helping people who can be self-sufficient with a little capital.
5. Good loans for needy and deserving people.
6. Treatments for poor people.
7. Passenger assistance in case of need for travel assistance.
8. Rehabilitation of mosques and support for all religious institutions.
9. Scholarships for practical workers.
10. From these periods, whatever is preached in the world on a large scale will be spent on helping Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries and other work for the sake of Allah. The tax policy will be reviewed.
11. The elected representatives will be involved in the economic planning and all the plans will be implemented with the approval of the legislature.
12. In economic planning, public health education should be regarded as a social responsibility, and the development of agriculture will be given importance.

⁵¹ Kamal Azfar, "Pakistan Government Plans Operation Against Jamat-e-Islami." *Ausaf Islamabad*, (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), International Reports/Dialog, 2005).

13. The expenditure of wealth in haram ways will be stopped and appropriate measures will be taken to prevent extravagance and waste.
14. Large and magnificent buildings will not be constructed for government needs.
15. The public treasury will be cleansed of illicit income and their use in all legitimate expenditures will be stopped.
16. Reliance on external loans will be eliminated, and every effort will be made to get rid of past debts.
17. The causes of inflation will be eliminated.
18. Measures will be taken to curb unemployment.
19. Cheap houses will be built for low-income people and house rents will be brought down to a reasonable level.
20. Health treatments will be made available in rural areas. Clean water and means of transportation will be provided.
21. Efforts will be made to develop the backward areas of the country.
22. Unjust profiteering from public work and commercial activities being carried out under public administration will be stopped.
23. The Refugee Fund will be spent only on the resettlement and welfare of the pilgrims.⁵²

4.2.20.17 National Health

Jamat-e-Islami wants any citizen of Pakistan deprived of health treatments due to poverty, and the general health of this country, which is declining day by day, to be taken care of. For this purpose, the Jamat will make the following suggestions.

1. To take necessary measures to manage the supply of cheap flights and lower the cost of treatment.

⁵² Mahmud Khalil. "Pakistan's Jamat-e-Islami Leader on Ties with Musharraf", *Al-Majallah*, (London: FBIS-NES-2003-0117 21 Jan. 2003/Dialog), 21-34.

2. Gradual expansion of government hospitals and private homes.
3. Ethical correction of hospital staff so that they become true sympathizers and servants of patients.
4. To make Greek medicine and homeopathy hospitals official like allopathy.
5. Special attention to be given to the prevention of tuberculosis, epidemics, and infectious diseases.
6. Strictly stop mixing food and medicine.
7. Satisfactory management of healthcare in cities and villages.
8. Hygiene, care, prevention of epidemics, inclusion of healthy food and immediate medical aid in the syllabus of madrassas.⁵³

4.3 CURRENT ANALYSIS OF JAMAT-E-ISLAMI

The thinker, researcher, and leader who presented the concept of Islamic revolution through constitutional, intellectual, and political struggle, Maulana Mawdūdī, when he founded Jamat-e-Islami 77 years ago, would not have imagined that there would be a time when his own party will become an obstacle in the way of the concept of revolution and will negate the style of politics that he had laid the foundation for.

Before the establishment of Pakistan, Jamat-e-Islami was established on 3 *Sha' bān* 1360 Hījri (corresponding to August 26th, 1941). Today, the party, which calls itself the biggest and oldest political movement of Pakistan, has had such a failure in the last two general elections, one after the other, that it is necessary to examine its strategies and policies in detail. There has never been a more appropriate time than this to review the policies.

Jamat-e-Islami boycotted the 2008 elections due to it being already significantly out of the electoral process, but success in the 2013 and 2018 elections were very few. On July 25th, 2018, it obtained only one seat each in the National Assembly and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly. It was also almost wiped out from its strongholds like

⁵³ Mahmud Khalil. "Pakistan's Jamat-e-Islami Leader on Ties with Musharraf", *Al-Majallah*, 21-34.

Dir and Buner.⁵⁴

After the defeat, Jamat-e-Islami continues to try to investigate the situation once again. First, the Central Majlis-e-‘Āmilāh (working committee) then the Central Majlis-e-Shūrā, held a meeting in which the election results were reviewed. In the meeting, the general elections of July 25th, 2018 were described as non-transparent, impartial, and unfair, saying that this is a big failure of the Election Commission.

The Jamat says that interference in politics and elections by the establishment has been done in one way or another in the past, but according to them, for the desired results of the elections 2018, their interference was clear and visible to everyone. There was an intervention “which is not only for the country and the nation” but also for the institutions themselves.

Jamat-e-Islami has also discovered foreign conspiracy in it. The statements made by the United States and India on the defeat of the religious parties in Pakistan have made it clear in its view that the game of rigging against religious parties involved the domestic as well as the international establishments.⁵⁵

The Central *Majlis-e-Shūrā* has also continued to solicit the opinions and suggestions of its workers, to prepare for the remedy for whatever will happen to the Jamat in the future. A four-member committee has also been announced. This committee will work on invitation, training, and organization of its members, assessing what changes are necessary now. They are also working on how to expand the invitation and training system. To what extent is change possible in the organization and constitution? Whatever strategy the party may devise for the coming days, a glance at its past shows that internal and external efforts to undermine it have been ongoing ever since.

Disagreeing with the thoughts of Maulana Mawdūdī, many respectable figures of the party left Jamat-e-Islami including Maulana Amin Ahsan Iṣlāḥī, Israr Ahmad and Maulana Abdul Jabbar Ghazi. The year 1977 was a painful year in Mawdūdī 's life, in which he was most saddened by the leadership of Jamat-e-Islami, who supported the

⁵⁴ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan*, (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), 217.

⁵⁵ Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?* (London: Penguin Books, 1983), 139.

military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq.⁵⁶ There was a feeling within the Jamat that from that day onwards, an unstoppable journey of relegation and humiliation of Jamat-e-Islami had started, which is still going on.

Before the martial law of General Zia-ul-Haq, Jamat-e-Islami workers used to be very active, organized, and aware of the current situation. Zia-ul-Haq, apparently with religious inclinations, plotted to divert Jamat-e-Islami workers from the political struggle, in which he was extremely successful. Young workers were given the guise of 'Afghanistan Jihād' and the rest risked their lives in the name of 'Kashmir Jihād'.⁵⁷

The fresh blood that the political process needed was handed over to the army and the martial law field for the political struggles of their puppets. "Jihādi culture" spoke loudly in Jamat-e-Islami and by ignoring a person like Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, the way was paved to make Qazi Hussain Ahmed, a completely non-political but important character of "Jihād-e-Afghanistan", the leader of the Jamat.⁵⁸

He did whatever the security establishment asked, which was against Syed Mawdūdī's concern. Instead of the politics of theory and truth, Qazi Hussain Ahmed did what other political parties are famous for by involving in manipulations with the alleged help of the army.

Syed Munawar Hassan was elected Amīr after Qazi Hussain Ahmed and tried to bring back the Jamat-e-Islami name, flag, election symbol, and concerns of Syed Mawdūdī, which necessarily resulted in the end of the alleged connection with the army. A successful campaign was launched based on one of his statements. This was an apparent sign of the utter helplessness and death of Syed Mawdūdī's intellectual community. After him, Siraj-ul-Haq's performance was disappointing and directionless so far.⁵⁹

Jamat-e-Islami will have to return to the full political struggle of Syed Mawdūdī and beware of those who cheat intellectually, otherwise the movement and Jamat-e-Islami will end with its ideology.

⁵⁶ S.S. Bindra, *Politics of Islamization: With Special Reference to Pakistan*, 253.

⁵⁷ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan*, 105.

⁵⁸ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 121.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 210.

4.4 JAMIAT ULAMA-E-ISLAM

4.4.1 Formation of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

On October 29, 1935, a grand meeting of the allies of Muslim League was held in which the formation of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) was announced. Its first president was Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.⁶⁰

4.4.2 Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani

Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was born in Bijnor in 1887. His father, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, was an inspector in the education department, his birth name was Fazlullah. Later, the family started calling him by the name of Shabbir Ahmed and he became famous by that name. He read early Urdu books by Hafiz Muhammad Azeem. In Persian education, Manzoor Ahmad and Maulana Muhammad Yaseen received their degrees from the Madras Department of Persian Darul Uloom Deoband, and Shabbir Ahmed was closely associated with them. He also studied Arabic at Darul Uloom Deoband. His teachers included Maulana Ghulam Rasool, Hakim Muhammad Hussain, and Shaykh-ul-Hind Maulana Mahmood Hassan. He graduated from Darul Uloom with a degree in Hadith and then started teaching there. In 1908, Maulana Usmani was appointed as the President of Madrasa Alia Fateh Puri in Delhi, but later returned to Darul Uloom Deoband. In 1929, he was assigned to teach Tafsir and Hadith in Jamia Islamia, Dabheel, Surat District. In 1934, he continued to serve as the President of Darul Uloom Deoband and in 1935, he moved from Darul Uloom to Dabheel.⁶¹

Muhammad Hassan, the teacher of Maulana Shabbir Ahmed, had formed a party called Jamiat-ul-Ansar in the year 1909. He started his political activities from the platform of the same party and gave speeches and read articles in its meetings. He also addressed the meetings during the *Khilāfah* Movement. He then joined the meetings of the Muslim League and began to speak on behalf of Pakistan. He fully supported the Muslim League and the Muhammad Ali Jinnah and that was why he was called the right hand of him. He played an important role in the Muslim League-K in the 1945-46

⁶⁰ Muhammad Rizwan, Manzoor Ahmed and Saima Gul, "Ideology and Politics of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (1947-1973)", *Global Social Sciences Review, Humanity Only*, Vol: 3, Issue no:1, 2018, 44-55.

⁶¹Ibid.,

elections. Maulana Shabbir Ahmed mobilized the people of NWFP (Now KPK) in favour of Pakistan through his student ulama council in connection with the NWFP referendum.

4.4.3 After the Establishment of Pakistan

After the formation of Pakistan, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani reached Karachi from Deoband to attend the celebrations in Pakistan. Jinnah officiated the flag hoisting ceremony and inaugurated the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. After the formation of Pakistan, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, under the leadership of Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, formulated its policy. The resolution of objectives presented by Liaquat Ali Khan in March 1949 was inspired by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani visited the Islamic University of Bahawalpur in 1949 at the request of the Prime Minister. On the 21st of Safar, he had a fever and went hungry till morning. There was pain in his chest, and he passed away on March 21st, 1949.⁶²

4.4.4 Organization of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

According to Safdar Mahmood, the main political parties of Pakistan reorganized the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam at the residence of Maulana Ehtisham-ul-Haqq Thanvi in 1947. A meeting was held on the movement under the chairmanship of Syed Suleiman Nadavi in the year 1949 in which scholars of different schools of thought participated and the leaders unanimously approved 22 points in favour of Islamic system.

4.4.5 Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam West Pakistan

Mariam Mufti says that Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam was established in 1952. Maulana Ahmad Ali Lahori became its first Amīr and Maulana Ehtisham-ul-Haqq Thanvi was the first Nazim.⁶³

⁶² Muhammad Rizwan, "Ideology and Politics of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (1947-1973)" *Global Social Sciences Review, Humanity Only*, 44-55.

⁶³ Mariam Mufti, et al. *Pakistan's Political Parties: Surviving between Dictatorship and Democracy*, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2020) <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/74492> accessed May 12, 2022.

West Pakistan was added to the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam because in those days Pakistan consisted of two provinces, West and East Pakistan. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam West Pakistan was part of the same party whose initial leader was Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.

When the convention of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam was held in 1954, Maulana Mufti Muhammad Hassan was elected its Amīr, but due to his illness, Maulana Mufti Shafi continued to serve as the acting Amīr. In 1956, Maulana Ahmad Ali was re-elected as the Amīr of the Jamiat while Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi became its scholar. Mufti Mahmood was among those who joined the Jamiat on this occasion. Haqq Thanvi protested because Ahrār had opposed the Muslim League and Pakistan. As a result, Maulana Thanvi split from the Jamiat along with a group supporting the Tahrik-e-Pakistan. After the death of Maulana Ahmad Ali, Maulana Abdullah was elected Amīr of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam.⁶⁴

4.4.6 Revival of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

When General Ayyub Khan imposed martial law in the country, he banned political parties. However, in 1962, political parties were revived.

Islamic scholars then, reorganized themselves. Prior to that, their activities focused on the most pressing and significant issues. In those days, the acting head of the Jamiat was Amīr Mufti Mahmood. When General Ayyub Khan included Mufti Mahmood in the National Assembly, the party was started to openly be known as politically motivated. Ayyub Khan resorted to Mufti Mahmood to amend the constitution. Thus, for a few days, the party remained under the approval of the government.⁶⁵

Leading Islamic scholars participated in the elections and won seven seats in the Federal Assembly from Baluchistan and some parts of Sard. Mufti Mahmood won a landslide victory by defeating PPP leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in his constituency. Due to this, the Jamiat gained a lot of fame. This community formed a coalition government

⁶⁴ Muhammad Rizwan, "Ideology and Politics of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (1947-1973)" *Global Social Sciences Review, Humanity Only*, 44-55.

⁶⁵ S.A. Sandelvi, *Khutbat Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind*, (Lahore: Maki Dar-al-Kutub, 1998), 37.

in NWFP and Baluchistan with the participation of National Awami Party. Mufti Mahmood himself became the Chief Minister of NWFP and thus became the leader in Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam and NWFP.

Mr. Bhutto used the slogan of socialism, while Mufti Mahmood called socialism a heresy. As a result, animosity arose between Bhutto and the Mufti. In any case, Mufti Mahmood took the following steps during his tenure in the ministry.

1. Prohibition of drinking and selling alcohol.
2. Friday off instead of Sunday.
3. Urdu was declared the national language.
4. Declaring shalwar kameez as official (national) dress.
5. Attempted to implement the Islamic system.

Although Mufti Mahmood denounced socialism as blasphemy, he shared power with the pro-socialist National Awami Party for some expediency. Shortly afterwards, the central government (that of Bhutto) fired the governor of NWFP and the governor and chief minister of Baluchistan. Mufti Mahmood resigned in protest of the NWFP ministry, and it was unknown at this time what he would do after leaving the post. However, Mufti Mahmood remained stubborn and eventually resigned from his position in the government. Leading Islamic scholars also won significant victories in the 1977 elections in NWFP and Baluchistan, but until the formation of the Assemblies, General Zia-ul-Haqq imposed martial law in the country and neutralized the political parties. In those days, the Jamiat, along with the Pakistan National Alliance, had played a key role in the movement against Bhutto.⁶⁶

During the tenure of General Zia, Mufti Mahmood passed away in the year 1980 and was replaced by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman as the President of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam. In Zia's early days, the Jamiat participated in the government. After some time, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman separated from it and started participating in the struggle for the restoration of democracy. Mufti Mahmood was an active member of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) through the efforts of the Jamiat Ulama-e-

⁶⁶ Syed H. M. Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1996), 44.

Islami. It may be recalled that Maulana Faiz-ur-Rehman is the son-in-law of Mufti Mahmood.⁶⁷ At the same time, the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam fell victim to factionalism and a group called the petition group split from the Jamiat. There were to be more groupings later.

4.4.7 Manifesto of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

The Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam drafted a manifesto in September 1969, and it was approved by the elected members of the *Majlis*. According to this manifesto, the governance of Pakistan will be in the hands of the elected and most competent persons from the Muslim people of Pakistan, and it will be made an Islamic state. Qur'ānic verses were also used in this draft. Some changes were made to the Manifesto in March 1986. The gist of the revised Manifesto of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam is as follows.⁶⁸

4.4.7.1 Manifesto Program

The following steps will be taken to make Pakistan a true and complete Islamic state with Islamic rules of governance.

1. The official religion of the state will be Islam.
2. In the light of 22 Islamic points compiled by representatives and eminent scholars of all sects, the constitution of the country will be made fully Islamic.
3. Only the rules of the Qur'ān will be the basic laws of the country.
4. In the constitution and law of the country, the perfect religion of Islam and the name of the Prophet (pbuh) will be protected.
5. The reigns of the Four Caliphs of Islam and the Companions will be considered as the criteria for determining the details of the Islamic system of government.
6. Key positions in the state will be prohibited for non-Muslims.

⁶⁷ M.Q. Zaman, *The Ulema in Contemporary Islam, Custodians of Change*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 29.

⁶⁸ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, (Peshawar: Jamiat-ul-Ulema Publishing Division, 1992), 23.

7. The President and the Prime Minister must be Muslim men, and most Pakistanis must be Sunni.
8. The legal definition of a Muslim would be:

Believing in the Qur'ān and Hadith, he should consider them as authoritative sources in the light of the interpretations of the Companions and affirms that Muhammad (pbuh) is the final prophet, and no new divine law will come after Islam.
9. The sects that have deviated from the basic tenets of Islam, such as the end of prophethood, etc., will be declared as non-Islamic sects, and in the future such deviations will be prohibited in the constitution.
10. The Islamic provisions of the Constitution will not allow any amendment in the principles of the Qur'ān and Sunnah and the Islamic status of the state.
11. Spoken words or preaching against Islam and any of its rules and beliefs will not be allowed either orally or in writing.
12. The direct representation and authority of the Muslim people will be explicitly recognized in the Constitution.
13. It will be legally clarified in the constitution that sovereignty belongs only to Allah, the Lord of the worlds and the Muslim state of Pakistan will be the real owner of the powers of Pakistan within the limits set by Allah.
14. Electoral system for representation in *Majlis-e-Shūrā* (Assemblies), etc. of Pakistan will be based on party competition instead of individual competition and parties will participate in elections based on their manifestos instead of individuals and percentage of success. *Majlis* will be entitled to the membership of the *Shūrā* and will form the government.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 24.

4.4.7.2 Establishment of Sharī'ah System

Muslims in the country should observe congregational prayers and Sharī'ah punishments will be imposed on those who intentionally abandon prayers.⁷⁰

- Each wealthy person will supervise taking one-tenth and one-half of the fixed amount from the wealth of the wealthy, to spend it in the prescribed amount of *Zakāt*, and to take out the obligatory alms according to the Sharī'ah rule and distribute it among the deserving.
- Will abide by all acts of worship, rules, and Islamic slogans.
- At the governmental level throughout the country, the Department of Propagation, Da'wah, and Guidance will ensure that all Sharī'ah rules are observed, and that violations of Sharī'ah principles are prevented.
- Adultery, theft, robbery, and use of alcohol will be irreconcilable crimes. Sharī'ah penalties will be imposed on illegal imports, export and smuggling.
- Legally, the country will be accused of obscenity, nudity, indecency, and dancing in the name of culture, etc., as well as the publication of immoral photos, materials and pictures published in newspapers, magazines, and commercial advertisements.

4.4.7.3 Education

1. The education system will be completely Islamic.
2. Education will be based on Islam.
3. Education will be free till the tenth grade. Education in the higher grades will also be made more accessible and efforts will be made to make education free in all grades within ten years.
4. The door of education will be opened equally for all, and no barriers will be imposed on admissions.

⁷⁰ S.A. Sandelvi, *Khutbat Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind*, 39.

5. Vocational and scientific education institutions will be opened in abundance and in various places.
6. Education of illiterate adults will be extensively arranged so that at least 1/4 of the population of the country will not be deprived of basic education within 5 years and no adult will remain illiterate in the country within 20 years.
7. To facilitate the peasant population in the villages and to facilitate the working population of the factories in the cities, free education up to secondary (matric) standard will be provided near them.
8. There will be special schools for the children of poor people. Curriculum books and stationery will be provided to the students free of cost and necessary facilities will be provided to them.
9. Higher education will be provided free of cost to the children of the poor who succeed in school.
10. Higher education institutions will be empowered and operate under the supervision of an elected administration.
11. Private educational institutions will be encouraged, and the government will monitor their evolutions in such a way that the independence and autonomy of these institutions will not be affected.
12. While maintaining the independence of religious schools, maximum assistance will be given for their development. Their credentials will be equivalent to the credentials of government schools and every effort will be made to solve every problem of these madrassas.
13. The curriculum will include, from the first grade to the last, the meaningful interpretation of the Qur'ān al-Hakīm, the Sunnah of the Prophet, the history of the Companions, and the basic issues of *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence).
14. The curriculum will not allow anything against Islamic beliefs, belief in the end of prophethood, and the sect of Ahl al-Sunnah.
15. Paying appropriate salaries to and respecting religious teachers/scholars in educational institutions will be mandatory.

16. Foreign, Christian missions, and other non-Muslim educational institutions will be closed.
17. Non-Muslim minorities in the country will have the right to open their own religious education institutions, but no Muslims or their children will not be allowed to enter them.
18. Islamic education will be compulsory in general educational institutions but not for children of non-Muslim minorities.
19. Co-education will be prohibited.
20. The education of women will be arranged according to separate Islamic principles.
21. English language education will be kept as an optional subject.
22. Arabic will have the status of a compulsory language in institutions.
23. Regional languages will be developed.
24. Educational Institutions in the form of National Institutions of Higher Education and Institutions of Agricultural and Industrial Studies will be opened and expanded and they will be encouraged and talked about.
25. Admission to educational institutions will be on merit basis.⁷¹

4.4.7.4 Health

1. One of the largest hygiene and medical institutions in the country will be set up with a special focus on rural peasantry, factory workers, and the urban poor.
2. Appropriate medical aid centres, maternity wards, and sanitation will be regularly arranged in each area.
3. Certified and expert physicians will be appointed in these centres.
4. All treatment facilities will be provided free of cost.

⁷¹ M.Q. Zaman, *The Ulema in Contemporary Islam, Custodians of Change*, 29.

5. A big hospital will be set up in every tehsil (sub-district) in which there will be a modern system of treatment, and the poor people will have access to special facilities there. A health centre will be set up at each union council.
6. There will be special arrangements for mothers and children. All hospitals will have male staff for men and female staff for women.
7. At least one Nursing College will be established in each district in which first aid, and Nursing education and training will be fully arranged so that the trained people from these colleges can stay in their vicinity and provide maximum treatment to the people.
8. All types of pharmaceuticals in the country will be managed on a high scale and the country will be made self-sufficient of medicines.
9. Indigenous, Greek Homoeopathic, and Ayurvedic medicine will be promoted in the country. Specialists in these therapies will be given the same rights as allopathic physicians. colleges and hospitals for these therapies and pharmaceutical institutes will be established.
10. Medical universities will be established at the provincial level and medical colleges at the divisional level in the country.⁷²

4.4.7.5 Salary

1. Every citizen of Pakistan will be provided with dignified earning opportunities and women will be given their own.
2. Employment opportunities will be provided in specific sectors within the limits of Shari'ah
3. Landless persons engaged in farming in rural areas will be given free plots of land for their family's subsistence.
4. Interest-free loans will also be provided if required.
5. Depending on the land, there will be exemptions from all types of finances.

⁷² M.U. Farooq, *Azadi ki Inqilabi Tehrekeen*, (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Ahrār, 2000), 36.

6. Local small-scale industries will be set up at various places in the villages.
7. Industries for food processing (including cold storage for vegetables and fish), manufacturing of small agricultural implements and ploughing equipment, dairy farms, poultry farms, and craft centres will be encouraged but not made mandatory.
8. Stores for sale and purchase of commodities will be opened in the villages on the principle of mutual aid.
9. A vast network of industries and factories will be set up in the cities to provide employment to as many locals as possible.
10. All unemployment in rural and urban areas will be actively worked to be abolished.
11. If a person remains unemployed, his living allowance will be fixed.
12. Those who cannot work due to disability, in case of death of guardian, orphans, widows and helpless people should be provided with reasonable arrangements immediately.⁷³

4.4.7.6 Finance and Economics

1. Wealth should not be confined among the rich. According to Islamic economic principles, the country's wealth will not be allowed to be concentrated among just a few families and certain classes."
2. Businesses such as usury, speculation, insurance, etc., through which the people are economically exploited, and the national wealth is concentrated within a certain class, the resources will be utilized to keep the people of the country.
3. Interest based business and all forms of interest transactions will be completely excluded from every sector and for the future, such businesses will be prohibited and a cause of severe punishment.

⁷³ Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*, (Islamabad: Quaid-e-Azam Chair, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, 1996), 44.

4. All government and non-government banks and institutions will be transformed into joint venture public enterprises and trading companies on the principle of mutual participation.
5. Withdraw all wealth of those who have acquired and accumulated it through illicit and haram means, such as usury, speculation, gambling, bribery, smuggling of illicit and illegal goods, or through illicit foreign exchange. The first attempt will be made to return the wealth to the people from whom it was wrongfully taken, as was practiced during the Caliphate of Umar Farooq.
6. The natural resources of the country, such as minerals, gas, forests, oil, etc. cannot be owned by an individual family or an institution. They will be the property of the government according to Sharī‘ah and the income will go to the treasury. They will be handled by the provincial government and the communicative governments will use these resources in their own principles.
7. Attempts will be made to conduct as much research as possible at the expense of the government at home and abroad.
8. A high Commission will be set up to determine the necessary expenditure on government events, embassies, official work, government, semi-government, autonomous institutions, and on all departments.⁷⁴

4.4.7.7 Trade

1. Monopoly and speculation in trade will be strictly prohibited.
2. A Qur’ānic command says:

“Whereas Allah has declared buying lawful and Usury unlawful.”⁷⁵
Under this, trade will be free from all kinds of usury.
3. Most of the required facilities will be provided to traders.
4. Commodity prices across the country will be determined according to the purchasing power of the poor.

⁷⁴ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 25.

⁷⁵ Al-Qur’ān, *Sūrat al-Baqarah*:275.

5. Burglary and adulteration will not allow. The perpetrators will be punished.
6. The principle of minimum profit will be introduced by eliminating the tendency of maximum profit in trade.
7. No monopoly will be allowed on import and export trade.
8. Export trade of domestic and surplus products will be expanded.
9. Import trade will be limited to essential and basic items.
10. All forms of corruption will be eliminated from trade.⁷⁶

4.4.7.8 Capital and Foreign Exchange

1. Capital will not be allowed to be transferred abroad from any part of the country that capital will be spent there.
2. Illegal foreign exchange will be prohibited.⁷⁷

4.4.7.9 Industries

Key industries will be nationally owned by the following:

1. Basic and key industries which are directly related to the interest of most of the people of the country or the country's defence or general system such as armaments industry, steel making, petrol industry, minerals industry, aircraft manufacturing, etc. will be nationally owned by the government.
2. Its workers will also be included in large joint venture industries.
3. Fifty percent of the workers will be represented in the system of these industries and in the Board of Directors.
4. Individual ownership and small-scale industries will be maintained and encouraged.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ M.U. Farooq, *Azadi ki Inqilabi Tehrekeen*, 36.

⁷⁷ M.Q. Zaman, *The Ulema in Contemporary Islam, Custodians of Change*, 29.

⁷⁸ S.A. Sandelvi, *Khutbat Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind*, 39.

4.4.7.10 Factories

1. Every citizen of the country will have the right to take up the profession of industry and handicrafts and will be able to set up a factory but the illegally set up factories will be taken into national ownership.
2. Factories which have been set up using illicit political bribes, money obtained from external loans and illicit means will be taken into national ownership free of cost.
3. Factories will not be allowed special privileges and opportunities in the future.
4. As far as possible, large factories will be set up with the participation of common shares, the profits of which will include the share of factory workers and employees.
5. The workers will be paid in full according to their ability and performance.
6. The monthly salary of any rehabilitated labourer should not be less than two thousand rupees and it is reviewed every year.
7. Better residential houses will be arranged.
8. The education of the rehabilitated workers' children will be arranged free of cost.
9. Hospitals will be better and free-of-charge for the treatment of workers and their relatives. The extraordinary disparity in the salaries of workers and employees will be eliminated and the ratio of one to five will be established immediately.⁷⁹

4.4.7.11 Jobs

1. The rights of all government employees shall be equal.
2. The pay gap will be reduced to one to five.
3. The system of housing, travel, treatment, education of children, etc. of low-level employees will be made official and free.

⁷⁹ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 35.

4. Employees will be given full facilities for general and necessary leave, sick leave, disability and old age pension, and accident compensation.⁸⁰

4.4.7.12 Holidays

Working Hours:

1. The working hours of employees and labourers will be kept short.
2. Holidays for Eid and historical days will be determined in accordance with the requirements of the day.
3. The weekly holiday in Pakistan will be on Friday only.
4. Working hours shall not exceed eight hours.
5. Dangerous work hours will be greatly reduced.
6. There will be time for prayers, rest, and breakfast during working hours.
7. Overtime will not be forced.
8. Overtime will be less than double the compensation.⁸¹

4.4.7.13 Agriculture

Whoever settles the homeless man, the land belongs to him, and the oppressor has no right to it.

1. According to the Prophet (pbuh), those who inhabit the barren land will be declared the owners of it.
2. Then those people will be considered as the owners to whom the land will be legally transferred in the gift of inheritance and in the waqf sale.
3. Shari'ah does not set any limit of land ownership, but if the system of large landowners has caused the corruption of the economy and collective economic governance and severe religious, national corruption and dangers are emerging,

⁸⁰ Syed H. M. Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*, 44.

⁸¹ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 37.

then in the light of the principles of Shari'ah, the government will make appropriate restrictions on land ownership.

4. The land and estates which have been forcibly and illegally acquired through fraud and deception as political bribes will be taken back without compensation and distributed among the deserving farmers of these areas.
5. The owner of the land will have all kinds of disposal on his land, but the farmers will not be evicted due to oppression and illegal reasons.
6. Farmers who have done development work on their lands cannot be evicted without paying full compensation.
7. Farmers will not be allowed to harm anyone.
8. Imām Yusuf and Imām Muhammad have given permission for allotment of land, but if the agricultural system of the country is not improved despite the above reforms, then the government has the right to redistribute it to capable farmers who can properly cultivate it. Imām Abu Hanifa, Imām Shafi'i, and Imām Malik prohibited the allotment of land according to sects and order the landlord to either cultivate his land or rent it out.
9. Owners of small plots of land will be relieved of the influence of the owners of large plots of land and will have unconditional ownership rights over their lands.
10. Modern agricultural facilities will be made common in the villages. The use of modern agricultural implements will be expanded.
11. Agricultural land will be protected from beans and sorghum.
12. Permanent arrangements will be made to protect agricultural land from floods.
13. The sale of agricultural produce will be arranged in such a way that its maximum benefit reaches the farmers and farm labourers instead of going into the pockets of middlemen, stockholders, stock exchanges, banks, speculators, brokers, etc.
14. Newly settled lands will be given on easy terms only to self-cultivators. Priority will be given to local farmers and farm labourers.
15. Illegal lands will be taken back from the people if their livelihood is second to

none or if it is not enough for self-cultivation as per their livelihood.

16. The methods of collecting taxes on agricultural land will be reformed in the light of training principles. Corruption and intrusive interventions will be completely curbed.
17. Arable land will not be allowed to be used for industrial needs.
18. A network of canals will be laid for the irrigation of agricultural lands. Dams will be constructed, and tube wells will be installed.
19. Small dams will be constructed to protect lands from floods and to use water for agricultural purposes.
20. All canals will be paved.⁸²

4.4.7.14 Judicial System

1. The judiciary will be completely independent of the administration.
2. Ways to get justice will be made much easier.
3. Getting justice from the courts will be free.
4. Judges will be appointed based on complete knowledge of the Book and Sunnah of Islamic law and the standard of Islamic conduct.
5. Changes will be made in civil and criminal laws of the country in accordance to Shari'ah.
6. Every citizen shall have the right to challenge in court any act of the administration and any action taken by any of its employees, big or small.⁸³

4.4.7.15 Administration

1. Changes will be made to the non-British civil service system.
2. The status of all the lower and higher members of the administration will be the

⁸² Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 25.

⁸³ M.U. Farooq, *Azadi ki Inqilabi Tehreeken*, 36.

servants of the country and the nation.

3. All appearances, showmanship, artificial horror, and prostitution will be abolished.
4. Good treatment of the people and the needy will be the first foundation of the administration.
5. Progress will be achieved only through honest performance.
6. Bribery and corruption will be punished severely in addition to dismissal.
7. No member of the management shall be authorized to conduct any other business while on duty.
8. Expropriation of position and employment will be severely punished with dismissal.
9. All proceedings of the administration may be presented in court.
10. In all administrative functions, the Islamic system and the principles of Islamic greatness will be kept prominent.⁸⁴

4.4.7.16 Taxes

1. All anti-Shari'ah taxes will be abolished.
2. No burden of taxation will be placed beyond the people's capacity to pay. Tax rates on everything from necessities to luxuries will be determined after public consultation.

4.4.7.17 Disseminating

1. Newspapers and press will have complete freedom.
2. All means of broadcasting will be used to propagate Islam and to express the views of the people of Pakistan.

⁸⁴ S.A. Sandelvi, *Khutbat Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind*, 39.

3. Broadcasting, newspapers, etc. will be controlled by the people.
4. Newspapers will not be allowed to be monopolized by any government group or individual.
5. Most of the ownership of newspapers will belong to the people.
6. The National Press Trust will be dissolved.
7. Journalists fired during the martial law will be reinstated.⁸⁵

4.4.7.18 Minorities

1. The religious freedom, civil rights, and opportunities for justice granted by Islam to the present non-Muslim minority of Pakistan shall be enjoyed without discrimination and equally.
2. Deviation from the belief of any Muslim in the end of prophethood will be considered apostasy.
3. The next new sectarianism and apostasy will not be allowed among Muslims and the Sharī'ah punishment of apostasy will be imposed.⁸⁶

4.4.7.19 Endowments

1. The endowment department will be maintained.
2. The endowment system will be re-established based purely on Sharī'ah.
3. Waqf income will be spent according to the will and will of the acquaintance.⁸⁷

4.4.7.20 Foreign Policy

1. This policy will be free and impartial based on the expression of Islamic greatness.

⁸⁵ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 27.

⁸⁶ Syed H. M. Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*, 44.

⁸⁷ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 33.

2. It will be free from the effects of the communist blocks and Western imperialism.
3. It will be based on maximum partnership with Muslim countries.
4. It will help in maintaining the welfare of mankind and world peace.
5. Steps will be taken in all international affairs by expressing the Islamic point of view.
6. The struggle for independence of the subjugated countries will be supported.
7. The struggle for restoration of rights in international affairs will be supported.
8. In the countries of the world where Muslims are in the minority, their Islamic status is respected by Islamic unity.
9. Great efforts will be made for the protection of housing, employment, life, and property.
10. The efforts to the establishment of a separate independent state in the Muslim-majority countries of the world, whether in the United States, Europe, Asia or Africa, will be supported.
11. The efforts to end of Jewish-US-British imperial dominance from Palestine, Jerusalem, and all Arab areas will be done. Along with them, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the independence of Kashmir, and the protection of Indian Muslims will be high in consideration.⁸⁸

4.4.7.21 Current Issues

1. The rights of the provinces will be protected.
2. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Currency, and Inter-Provincial Communications will remain with the federal government. Foreign trade will remain with the provinces while the policy will be decided by the federal government.

⁸⁸ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 35.

3. Representation in assemblies and national institutions shall be determined in proportion to population. Representation in the Senate will be through direct elections based on equality.
4. The provinces will retain autonomy in all other matters.
5. In view of the integrity and unity of the country, all the resources will be utilized upon equality among all the provinces.
6. Special attention will be given to the development of backward areas of provinces and their residents will be appointed in provincial jobs.
7. Provinces will be represented in military and central jobs in proportion to the population.
8. Water will be distributed across the country according to Shari'ah principles.
9. The energy crisis will be ended by promoting nuclear and solar energy.
10. Clean drinking water and electricity will be provided in every village and town.⁸⁹

4.4.7.22 Accommodation

1. Every human being has the basic right to have the necessary space and house to live in.
2. It is the responsibility of the government to provide space and housing for everyone in need with regular planning.
3. Arrangements will be made that no citizen of Pakistan is deprived of housing.⁹⁰

4.4.7.23 Communication

1. A network of roads will be spread across the country so that all the villages are connected to each other.

⁸⁹ M.U. Farooq, *Azadi ki Inqilabi Tehrekeen*, 39.

⁹⁰ Syed H. M. Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*, 44.

2. For transportation from one place to another by road, all modern means of communication will be disseminated in cities and villages.
3. Backward areas will have priority in developing communication.
4. Arrangements will be made for prayers and ablutions in the means of travel by train, bus, plane, etc.
5. Passengers will be protected and valued and difficulties in all kinds of journeys will be eliminated.⁹¹

4.4.7.24 Defence

1. Every adult and Muslim will be trained in jihād.
2. Local volunteer troops and mujahids will be formed everywhere.
3. The country will be made self-sufficient in defence.
4. Modern armament factories will be set up in the country.
5. Efforts will be made to ensure that the country is well versed in the manufacturing of all war materials.
6. To counter any threat, the country, along with the regular army, will enable the entire adult population to take full part in the defence.
7. The high standard of Pakistani forces will be raised.
8. In initial training, Islamic rules will be taught to army personnels and Sharī‘ah laws will be followed throughout their training period.
9. The direct link and cooperation between the Pakistani forces and the Pakistani people will be enhanced and strengthened. The discriminatory methods of the British era will be abolished.
10. The license ban on weapons will be lifted. Weapons will be registered at post offices.⁹²

⁹¹ M.U. Farooq, *Azadi ki Inqelabi Tehreken*, 36.

⁹² Syed H. M. Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*, 48.

4.4.8 Twenty-Two Points of the Scholars

A meeting was held in Karachi on January 24th, 1957, which was attended by eminent scholars belonging to different schools of thought in Pakistan and representatives of all Muslims. The meeting was chaired by Maulana Syed Suleiman Nadvi. At this gathering, the scholars unanimously prepared a document consisting of twenty-two points.⁹³ Among those who signed these twenty-two points were the following scholars:

- Syed Suleiman Nadavi
- Maulana Shamsul Haqq Afghani
- Maulana Ehtisham-ul-Haqq Thanvi
- Mufti Mohammad Hassan
- Maulana Khair Muhammad (Multan)
- Maulana Abdul Hamid Qadri Badavani
- Maulana Muhammad Idrees Kandhalvi
- Maulana Mufti Muhammad Shafi (Karachi)
- Maulana Azhar Ali (East Pakistan)
- Maula Abu Jaffar Salah (East Pakistan)
- Maulana Raghیب Ahsan (East Pakistan)
- Maulana Muhammad Habib-ur-Rehman (East Pakistan)
- Pir Mohammad Amin Al Hassan (Manki Sharif)
- Maulana Yusuf Binori
- Haji Khadim-ul-Islam
- Maulana Muhammad Ali Jalandhari
- Maulana Daud Ghaznavi

⁹³ M.U. Farooq, *Azadi ki Inqilabi Tehreeken*, 47.

- Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari
- Maulana Abu al A'ālā al-Mawdūdī
- Pir Muhammad Hashim Mujaddidi
- Mufti Muhammad Dar (Karachi)
- Maulana Shamsul Haqq Farid Puri (East Pakistan)
- Maulana Muhammad (Karachi)
- Maulana Ahmad Ali (Lahore)
- Maulana Habibullah (Sindh)
- Maulana Muhammad Ismail (Gujranwala)
- Mufti Jaffar Hussain Kifayat Hussain (Shī'ah)
- Maulana Muhammad Ismail (Gujranwala)
- Professor Abdul Khaliq

In a round table conference held in March 1969, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, General Coordinator (Nazim-e-'Umūmī) of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, presented the approved proposals of the Ulama to the rulers and political leaders and introduced them to Pakistan.

The Islamic scholars have included these 22 points in their Manifesto 1969 and the amended Manifesto 1986. The following are the twenty-two points approved by the scholars.⁹⁴

1. The real ruler is Allah, the Lord of the worlds.
2. The country will be based on the law of the Book and Sunnah and no law can be made that can be against the Book and Sunnah.
3. Explanatory Note: If there are already laws in the country that are against the Qur'ān and Sunnah, then it is also necessary to confirm that those will be

⁹⁴ Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kia Hay*, 48.

changed within a certain period or in accordance with the Sharī‘ah.

4. It will not be based on geographical, ethnic, linguistic, or any other image of a state but will be based on the principles and objectives based on the Islamic code of conduct.
 5. It will be the duty of the Islamic State to establish the objectives of the Qur’ān and Sunnah, to eradicate Islamism, to revive the rites of Islam, and to provide the necessary Islamic education for the scholars and related Islamic sects in accordance with their own religion.
 6. It is the duty of the Islamic State to strengthen the strong unity and brotherhood of the Muslim world and to eliminate ignorance and bigotry among the Muslim inhabitants of the state.
1. The State, without distinction of religion, race, etc., has provided adequate human needs, i.e. food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, and accommodation to all those who are not or have not been able to earn a living or are temporarily unemployed due to illness or other reasons.
 2. The people of the country will have all the rights granted to them by Islamic law, i.e., protection of life and property, dignity within the limits of law, freedom of religion, worship, caste, expression, movement, and assembly, and acquisition of sustenance. There is also the right to use equality and welfare in development opportunities.
 3. No citizen shall be deprived of any of the above-mentioned rights without a due process according to Islamic law and no punishment shall be meted out to anyone on the charge of a crime without providing an opportunity to clear his name and defend himself in accordance with legal procedures.
 4. The nation of Islamic sects will have full religious freedom under the law of the President. They will have the right to teach their followers/adherents their religion. They will be able to express their views freely. Their decisions will be in accordance with their own jurisprudential religions, and it will be appropriate to arrange for their judges to make these decisions.
 5. Non-Muslims are required to abide by the agreements made with the state within

the limits of Sharī'ah, and non-Muslims will have equal share in the rights of citizens.

6. Non-Muslims will have full freedom of religion, worship, culture, and private education under the law of the country, and they will have the right to decide their affairs in accordance with their religious law and customs.
7. It is necessary for the head of state to be a Muslim man whose democracy and confidence are trusted by his elected representatives.
8. The government of the head of state is not authoritarian but has become a Shūrā, i.e. the members of the government and the elected representatives will perform their duties in consultation with the people.
9. The head of state shall have the right to suspend the Constitution or to govern without consultation.
10. The head of state will be authorized to elect appoint officials/ministers, and he will also be authorized to remove them when necessary.
11. The head of state shall be subject to the same civil rights and legal obligations as other Muslim citizens and shall not be immune from legal accountability/prosecution."
12. The same rules and regulations shall apply to the members of the Government and to the public and shall be enforced by the ordinary courts on both.
13. The Department of Judiciary shall be separate and independent from the administration so that the judiciary is not influenced by the body of administration in the discharge of its duties.
14. Propagation and dissemination of such thoughts and ideas which lead to the demolition of the basic principles of the Islamic State shall be prohibited.
15. The administrative components of the various provinces of the country and the unitary state will be considered. Their status will not be that of tribal units but only of the administrative areas which, in view of the administrative powers, will be allowed to delegate administrative powers subject to the sovereignty of the Central Government. They will not have the right to secede from the Central

Government.

16. Any interpretation of the Constitution which is contrary to the Qur'ān and Sunnah will not be valid.
17. The Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam has also included a conscience at the end of its manifesto on the issue that if someone has become a landlord or manufacturer in a lawful and halal way, the Islamic government will not take away any of his property. All his possessions will be justified and declared. However, if after considering the time of the Islamic government and the advice of the learned scholars, they conclude that the legitimacy of a property and its use in it is against the public interest and harms the public, the country should buy it by paying adequate compensation for the defect and disrupt it in the public interest. The Islamic government has this kind of authority when it is needed, and it has its systems in place.

4.5 CURRENT ANALYSIS OF JAMIAT ULAMA-E-ISLAM

After the armed struggle of 1857, all the scholars of India founded the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in 1919 to guide the Muslims and to continue the political struggle instead of the armed struggle for the independence of India. The partition of the Muslim League was not in agreement with the formula of India, so in 1945, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani founded the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, which was trying to achieve independence from the British as well as a separate state for the Muslims of India. In 1947, India obtained independence from the British and the Muslims of India got a separate state in the form of Pakistan.

Since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 till today, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam is an important and the largest political party in the country's politics, and it is playing a positive role. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam is also credited with the leadership of the 1953 Movement of End of Prophethood, which culminated in 1974 when the Qadianis were declared non-Muslims.

In 1977, Tahrik Nifaz -e- Mustafā was led by Maulana Mufti Mahmood, which included all the religious and political parties of Pakistan. The opposition leader agreed

by all the parties against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the Parliament was Maulana Mufti Mahmood, who became the Chief Minister of Frontier Province in 1970.

This Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam did practical work to establish Islamic and Eastern traditions in its province and banned alcohol. Urdu was declared as the official language of the province. Official dress, school uniform, and shirt and shalwar were made compulsory, while Arabic and Islamic studies were made compulsory in the education curriculum. Along with this, interest was banned.

After Maulana Mufti Mahmood, since 1984 under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam is still playing its democratic, constitutional and parliamentary role in the Parliament of Pakistan. Since 1988, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam has become the largest political and religious party on the political scene of Pakistan. In the current setup of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, the total number of members in National Assembly, Senate, Baluchistan Assembly, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, and Gilgit, Baltistan Assembly is around 50.

Among the goals of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam is to protect the faith and belief of the people of Pakistan and to gather the scattered forces of Muslims and strive peacefully for the establishment of religion and the spread of Islam under the guidance of scholars. Apart from this, its goals are the protection of the rituals of Islam and the centre of Islam i.e. the Holy Harams, the protection of various Islamic institutions in Pakistan including religious schools, mosques, and schools and in the light of the Holy Quran and Prophetic hadiths in all spheres of life, political, and economic. Its primary objective is to guide Muslims in economic, religious, and national affairs, and to make positive practical efforts accordingly. Furthermore, its goals are also to strive for the implementation of the Islamic justice system of government in Pakistan and to strive for the promotion and development of a comprehensive and universal education system in Pakistan, which is compatible with the faith and belief of the people of Pakistan. Similarly, protecting the religious values and Islamic system, protecting the existing constitution of Pakistan, adapting the anti-Islamic laws to Islam, and preventing any un-Islamic legislation from being made, are among the top priorities of this party. Apart from these, within the boundaries of Pakistan, by speech, writing, and other constitutional means, the incitement of false seditions, the prevention of corrupt morals and anti-Islam activities, by establishing stable and fraternal relations with the Muslim

world especially neighbouring and nearby Islamic countries and establishing friendly relations with the countries of the world based on equality is included in the manifesto of this party.

4.6 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter has provided a detailed look at two key Islamic political parties in Pakistan: Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). By examining their histories, organisational structures, and constitutions, the way each party approaches politics and governance has been shown. The JI focuses on a structured, and disciplined approach to establishing an Islamic state, while the JUI emphasises a traditional Sharī'ah-based system of governance, covering areas like education, finance, and health. Both parties aim to bring Islamic principles into Pakistan's political system, but they face challenges in balancing their religious ideals with the realities of modern governance. This chapter sets the stage for the next, which will explore how the JI and JUI try to put their Islamic visions into practice, and the difficulties they encounter in making these ideas work within Pakistan's political landscape.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE METHODOLOGY OF IMPLEMENTING ISLAMIC SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN BY BOTH PARTIES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the strategies and methods used by two major Islamic political parties in Pakistan, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) in their efforts to establish an Islamic system of governance. Building on the previous chapters, it begins by outlining the key principles and conditions that these parties believe are essential for successfully Islamizing the Pakistani state.

The analysis then explores the different approaches of the JI and JUI, focusing on their electoral strategies, participation in legislation, and interactions with the political system. It discusses how they use various intellectual methods, such as textual, inductive, deductive, and critical approaches, to shape their political visions of an Islamic state. The chapter also looks at their attempts to influence public opinion, push for governance reforms, and deal with the challenges of coalition politics and democratic processes.

The differences between the two parties are highlighted, especially in how they respond to political challenges and their views on issues like national interests, minority rights, and the role of religion in the constitution. The chapter also assesses the chances of these parties in achieving their goals and the difficulties they face in balancing their Islamic ideals with the realities of modern governance in Pakistan.

5.2 BASIC PRINCIPLES TO IMPLEMENT ISLAMIC SYSTEM

People of a particular religion, nation, and tribe form a system of life by prescribing different ways of living and behaviour as well as performing rituals of happiness and sorrow, is called "Society". Being a follower of Islam, it is very important for every Muslim to know the Sharī'ah principles and important issues on which an Islamic good society are based on. Because a nation that is unfamiliar with its religious identity takes pride in imitating other nations. Such a nation can never live in dignity and honour with other nations of the world due to its citizens living in the worst kind of slavery.

Therefore, looking at the characteristics of an Islamic society and the basic rules of implementing Islamic system in it through Qur'ān and Sunnah, the following aspects have come to light.

The first and fundamental principle of reforming society is the reformation of the individual, because society comes into being from the collection of individuals. The real reason for the deterioration in society is that a person does not want to change himself, but when a reformer and a mentor talks with heavy heart to bring someone on the right path, there is only one answer. When every person is suffering from lies, deception, dishonesty, immorality, and many other evils, what revolution will come from me? This is the fascism and senseless thinking that is the biggest obstacle in the development of humanity and the development of society. Allah Almighty has clearly revealed this fact in His Eternal and Immaculate Book that without the reformation of the individual, the dream of reforming society can never come true. Allah (swt) Says in the Qur'ān:

Surely, Allah does not change the condition of a people unless they change themselves.¹

It is important that the scope of our thinking is widen, and everyone should have the view that if an individual is well, then society will be flourished.

Another important task that plays a fundamental role in the reform of society is the honouring of each other's rights. Since the beginning of creation, the war of rights has been going on among human beings as if it is a global and universal problem of humanity. But the tragedy is that all the efforts are for getting their rights, but no one is ready to fulfil the rights of others on their own while both the deserving and the giver are part of society. It is obvious that when the powerful usurps the rights of others based on their power and disobey to honour their rights, this man-made class division of rich and poor, powerful and weak, influential and ineffective, leads to social distortion. It will give rise to conflicts which will affect the common people as well and no one will trust anyone and will not deal with him.

To make the social life beautiful and flourish, one must enter the field of action

¹ Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Ra'd*: 11

with the auspicious spirit of honouring the rights of others rather than getting one's own rights. As Allah (swt) said while describing balance and moderation in the mutual rights of husband and wife:

“Women have rights like what they owe in recognized manner though for men there is a step above them. Allah is Mighty, Wise.”²

In the light of the saying of the Prophet (pbuh), the person who renounces his obligatory right to maintain an atmosphere of love and harmony in society is highly valued. The Prophet (pbuh) said:

Whoever abandons a dispute even though he is on the right, I (from Allah) will guarantee for him a house in the vicinity of Paradise.³

The third best principle of good society is to prevent the spreading of negative things in it and to spread encouraging trends to the common people.

In the society, where some people spoil the environment with their wrong behaviour, there are many God-fearing and good-natured people who present the true image of Islam and highlight its identity with their good character and good deeds. Most society, however, bring out the negative aspects of the society through social media and ignores the positive attitudes, which gives the general impression that our society is full of defects, faults, and flaws. People suffer from a sense of inferiority and stick to the wrong way of thinking that when everyone else is wrong, what are we supposed to do right?

Those who are responsible for the declining reputation of the society are also those who make a fuss about the fact that Muslims do not even leave the glass lying next to the water tank. But they are reluctant to say that the person who installs this tank from his halal earnings at the bus stops, passenger halls, and other public places, and provides cold water by paying thousands of rupees per month from his own pocket is also a Muslim.

Therefore, Muslims should get out of the shell of this low fantasy and proudly describe the God-given virtues found in the foothills of Islam so that the so-called Western pioneers of civilization and culture, and the ignorant European nations who scorn Islam for its conservatism, will know that from the beginning until the end that it

² Al-Qur'ān, *Sūrat al-Baqarah*: 228.

³ Abū Dāwūd Sulaymān Bin al-Ash'ath, *Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Kitāb al-Adab, Bāb fī Husn al-Khulq*, (Huston, Texas: Dār al-Salām Publications, 2008), Vol: 2, Hadith. 4800.

is impossible to present any other example of the constitution of life and Islamic society in accordance with the requirements of human nature.

Adherence to these golden rules is indispensable for the revival of the social values and traditions lost in the dust of time. For this, the study of the lives of the Companions and other great personalities is very important. It breathes a new spirit of revival and survival of Islamic society in the heart.

Huzaifa bin Yamaan (RA) was eating in a royal court with the ministers, advisors, and princes of the kingdom when the morsel fell from his mouth on the table. When it fell, he picked it up and moved it towards his mouth again. When his companions tried to stop him by whispering and elbowing him in the side, he said in great anger: “*Should we leave the Sunnah of our Prophet (pbuh) because of these fools?*”⁴

Unconcerned with his status and not affected by external pomp and circumstance, he was a great person to stick to his social norms and his life is a great example for our new generation. All the rules and regulations of the Qur’ān and Sunnah are obligatory for a Muslim and there is no distinction between personal, family, or social laws. Therefore, just as it is necessary for a Muslim to follow the rules of prayer, fasting, and worship, it is necessary for a Muslim society to follow the rules and regulations of the community and as Muslims, and all are bound by them.

The Islamic system will be implemented only by an Islamic government. The best and ideal method for establishing an Islamic government is the one that occurred after the demise of the Prophet (pbuh) where the Companions gave mutual advice to Abu Bakr Siddiq and after much debate, the Caliph was unanimously elected. After this, the method of selection of the different four Caliphs of Islam and the consensus forms adopted by the Companions may also be different forms of this method, but they must already have the system of Khilāfah. Nowadays, as the re-formation of the Khilāfah structure is underway, the method chosen by Siddiq Akbar is the correct method for it.⁵

The greatest distinction of the Islamic system is that it abolishes the system of personal government and establishes a constitutional government, the starting point of

⁴ Abū Dāwūd Sulaymān Bin al-Ash‘th, *Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Kitāb al-Siyar wal Maghāzī*, Hadith. 4205.

⁵ Mohammad Maimul Ahsan Khan, *Sangbidhanik Ain: Rajnetite Dharam O Shadhinota (Constitutional Law: Religion and Freedom in Politics)*, (Dhaka: Bishwa Sahitya Bhawan, 2008), 358.

which was the declarations of Abu Bakr Siddiq and Umar that our obedience is obligatory and if they deviate from the Qur'ān and Sunnah then the people not only have the right to a reform but also it is their religious responsibility.

The four Caliphs of Islam not only presented themselves to the people for accountability but also always kept themselves in the realm of public accountability and gave every citizen the right to interrupt their speech at any time and any place and they were bound to answer that. They practically exemplified a welfare state and held the government responsible for protecting the lives, property, and honour of the people, as well as guaranteeing them the necessities of life that today's world seeks.⁶

The four Caliphs of Islam made the rulers and officials want to live a simple content life, with the poor people at their level and presented the idea of a true people's government. The Islamic system, in the true sense of the word, established the relationship of society with the essence of Allah (swt) and based all its practices and policies on the fear of Allah and the accountability for the Hereafter.

The real work of enforcing the Sharī'ah begins with the recognition of divine revelation as a single and complete constitution in the form of the revealed Book and the Sunnah. In addition, things that do not contradict the Qur'ān and Sunnah in the prevailing laws may have the status of rules and regulations. Recognizing the Qur'ān and Sunnah as the constitution, make it the axis and guide of all efforts to move forward. This can not only prevent the tribulations of sectarianism, but also guarantee the true Islam. In this case, the basic suggestions of implementing Islam are as follows:

1. The Qur'ān should be declared to be the only constitution, and the Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh) should be considered as the only and definite interpretation of the Qur'ān.
2. Since the knowledge of the Qur'ān and Sunnah is acquired by the Ulama, it is necessary to appoint those Ulama to the key positions of the government machinery, provided that:
 - a) The appointment of scholars should be subject to obedience to the Qur'ān and Sunnah.

⁶ Md. Abdul Halim, *Constitution, Constitutional Law, and Politics: Bangladesh Perspective*, (Dhaka: CCB Foundation, 2008), 150-151.

- b) They are legally bound to avoid sectarianism.
3. Followers of all sects who do not believe in Sharī‘ah or do not give importance to Sharī‘ah in jurisprudence should be removed from all important sectors of the country (administration, judiciary, etc.). They, for example, are the esoteric sects, the Ismaili, the Fatimid, the Qadiani, the Pervezi, and those who either consider the Sharī‘ah to be with the *Imām* of the Unseen, or demand that their jurisprudence be superior to the Sharī‘ah.
 4. In defence, those who believe in the abolition of jihād in Islam or who consider the purpose of jihād in Islam to be the superiority of a particular race should not be placed in any key position.
 5. The Macaulay system should be completely abolished in the education system because it is meant to keep the foreign master continuously important. Instead, in the traditional system, by focusing on the Qur’ān and Sunnah, all cultural and scientific subjects should be given the status of servants of the Qur’ān and Sunnah.
 6. The media should be dedicated only to the promotion of Islam and the service of Muslims and be free from secular politics, false rituals, and interpreters of sectarianism.⁷

5.3 WHAT IS THEIR METHODOLOGY?

This part of the thesis focuses on how Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) are working to bring an Islamic system to Pakistan. It serves the fifth objective of this study by addressing the fifth research question. To simplify the presentation of the discussion, the part is organized into sections. The first highlights the different strategies used to assess any movement adopted by the JI and JUI. Moving on, the second section looks at the efforts made by these parties to make way for the implementation of an Islamic system in the country. It highlights the challenges they face and the steps they are taking. It ends by comparing the JI and JUI, offering suggestions on how they can

⁷ Muhammad Munir, *Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Law Publishing Company, 1978), 40-41.

improve their strategies for a more effective implementation of an Islamic political system in the region.

5.4 ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS AND THEIR STRATEGIES

In the Muslim world, various Islamic movements have played a significant role in the renaissance of the Islamic governance system, employing diverse methodologies to achieve this objective. Some have adhered to a traditional approach, exhibiting resistance to modernism and *ijtihad*, and new ideas while grounding their principles in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Noteworthy examples of such movements can be identified in African countries including Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya, and Egypt, including the likes of the *Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*. Additionally, there have been movements such as the Salafi Movement, the secular movement, the liberal movement, and the emergence of the Islamization movement.⁸

5.5 'SHIFTING THE BURDEN' MODEL

Evaluating any movement involves the application of various theories and approaches from the science of management. One such approach is the 'Shifting the Burden' model. According to this framework, two primary strategies exist for addressing issues: the short-term solution and the permanent, long-term solution. The short-term solution and approach adopted by some movements are symptom-based. An analogy can be drawn with political science, where religious political parties join the electoral process without bringing about legislative reforms. The short-term goal is to alleviate the immediate issue, but this approach may not address the underlying problems. Conversely, the long-term approach involves a comprehensive examination of the root causes. In the context of Islamic movements, this would entail a thorough examination of the socio-political landscape and a strategic, sustained effort towards reform based on Islamic principles.⁹

It is assessed that both Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) demonstrate a commitment to fostering sustainable solutions for the Islamic governance system. However, the JI distinguishes itself by concurrently engaging in comprehensive

⁸ Hussain Muhiyuddin Qadri, "Duniya ke badalte haalaat aur deeni tehreekon ka kirdar" *Tehrik Minhāj al-Qur'ān* (11 December 2021), accessed January 19, 2024.

⁹ *Ibid.*,

initiatives aimed at public mentorship and the provision of an intellectual framework tailored for the educated community. Essentially, the JI endeavours to cultivate a second tier of leadership while actively mentoring individuals to foster an acceptance of and adherence to Islamic political norms within society. On the other side, the JUI emphasizes joining political coalition governments, but there is no significant work on the ground to mentor citizens for a long-term solution. Conversely, the JUI places a notable emphasis on participating in political coalition governments, yet its efforts on the ground to mentor citizens for a sustained, long-term solution are comparatively limited. This distinction suggests a variance in strategic approaches between the JI and JUI, with the former actively involved in intellectual and mentorship endeavours to influence societal norms, while the latter primarily concentrates on political participation without an equivalent emphasis on grassroots mentorship initiatives.

5.6 AL-MANHAJ AL-NAQLĪ (TEXTUAL APPROACH)

This method involves relying on quotes and references to substantiate and justify one's stance.¹⁰ In this context, both parties, Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), use quotes and references from Islamic history to support their positions. The JI places a greater emphasis on this strategy, given its foundational commitment to implement Islam. On the other hand, the JUI does not utilize political affiliations for religious outreach (dawah). Instead, it actively supports constitutional and democratic norms in society. This makes the comparison more complex, showing different sides of how the JI and JUI approach Islamic governance ethics in Pakistan.¹¹

5.7 INDUCTIVE APPROACH

This approach involves the process of deriving general principles from specific facts, moving from particulars (juziyyāt) to universals (kulliyyāt), and from the specific (khāṣ) to the general (ʿĀm). It is operationalized through three crucial stages: observation and experimentation, formulation of a scientific hypothesis, and subsequent actualization or

¹⁰ This method also called *Al-Manhaj al-Naqlī* or *al-Manhaj al-Wathāʾiqī*.

¹¹ Islam, Mohammad Aminul and Thameem Ushama, "Ahmed Deedat's Methodology in Comparative Theological Discourse and Zakir Naik's Integration", *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, 10(12), 2024: 323–338. <https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.1012.16091>

realization. Jamat-e-Islami (JI) employs a strategic application of this method by actively participating in the electoral process to gain practical insights and observe prevailing circumstances. Additionally, the JI emphasizes the development of human resources, imparting a comprehensive understanding of the inherent challenges within the existing system. This approach culminates in advocacy for the implementation of an Islamic political system in Pakistan. On the other hand, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) does not have a clear plan or stage for bringing Islamic governance to Pakistan.

5.8 DEDUCTIVE APPROACH

Notably, the JI was part of establishing Pakistan, a place where the Islamic system would be practiced. Following its creation, the JI actively contributed to addressing the formulation of the constitution, ensuring it aligns with Islamic principles. This working style involves moving from overarching ideas to concrete implementation. On the other hand, the JUI was not in favour of the Separate homeland.

5.9 CRITICAL APPROACH

Systematic criticism plays a distinctive role in societal reformation, construction, and rectification. Both parties, recognizing this fact, employ a critical approach in scrutinizing the governing parties. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam had earlier opposed the creation of Pakistan for the sake of the survival of Islam, but later when Pakistan was created, it accepted it as the best place to practice Islam. And after that, whenever anti-Islamic legislation was introduced in Pakistan, this party always criticized the legislation and debated it in the assembly and abolished it altogether or tried to adapt it according to Islam.

5.10 PARTIES' DISTINCT ENDEAVORS

5.10.1 Methodology of Electoral Participation

Generally, both parties make alliances with other religious and non-religious political parties to join the electoral process. Jamat-e-Islami has achieved representation in the government through electoral coalitions, as individual attempts have not yielded

substantial results in the assembly. Notably, the JI opted to boycott the electoral process in 1997 and 2008. In contrast, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam has consistently and actively participated in elections since its inception, securing significant seats in both national and provincial assemblies. Unlike the JI, the JUI has refrained from boycotting elections and has displayed a preference for participating in alliance governments, highlighting a sustained commitment to electoral engagement.¹²

5.10.2 Electoral Slogan and Objectives

Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) articulate distinct electoral slogans and objectives reflective of their divergent ideologies. The JI perceives politics as more than a mere route to governance, viewing it as a religious commitment for societal transformation. Conversely, the JUI's approach is characterized by the assertion that Deoband, in its context, is not merely a religious sect or Maslak but a political tradition. The JUI separates the realms of religious proselytization (dawah) and politics, considering politics a secular endeavour with its own ethical framework. The JI's primary objective is the establishment of an Islamic order (iqamat e Deen) through a multifaceted approach involving intellectual discourse, mentorship, organizational efforts, and political engagement. The JUI emphasizes fair elections, democracy, and constitutional supremacy as its slogans, aligning with conventional political discourse. Unlike the JI, the JUI strategically uses religious identity for votes, like other parties using local slogans for elections. Scholars contend that, in essence, the JUI is not inherently a religious political party.¹³

5.10.3 Assembly Leadership and Representation

Both parties have distinct policies towards voters and supporters in the country. The JI places a strong emphasis on mentoring the educated segment of the population, despite facing challenges in achieving significant electoral success in its initial eras. That is why there was a discussion among members about whether the party should conduct a

¹² Sahil Waraich "Mazhabi Jamaa'atoun Ki Nishisten Kam Kyun?" *Daily Jang*, (September 5, 2018) <https://jang.com.pk/news/545363> accessed November 11, 2023.

¹³ Khursheed Nadeem, "Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam ki Kamiyabi," *Roznama Dunya*, (December 23, 2021), <https://dunya.com.pk/index.php/author/khursheed-nadeem/2021-12-23/37884/86215729> accessed November 11, 2023.

national election or just focus on the mentorship of the public, and then it decided to participate in the election. However, due to the party's primary focus on the intellectual grooming of voters, there is often ambiguity in its electoral strategy, resulting in either limited success in by-elections or obtaining minimal seats. Nevertheless, the JI consistently ensures the nomination of educated leaders for representation in assemblies. On the other hand, the JUI tends to nominate individuals from its immediate circles, including lesser-known personalities and religious teachers, for party representation in assemblies. This approach underscores the JUI's reliance on religious sentiments and close community ties to secure representation in the political sphere.¹⁴

5.10.4 Active Opposition

In the Pakistan National Alliance 1977, Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam joined under Maulana Mahmood's leadership. During General Zia-ul-Haq's rule in 1978, Jamat-e-Islami aligned with his cabinet to promote their ideological goal of "iqamat e deen," resulting in ministerial roles. Islamization measures were applied to all institutions, introducing compulsory Islamic and Pakistan Studies subjects up to the bachelor's level in colleges nationwide. The Shari'ah Court was established, and Islamic principles were integrated into the constitution. Differences emerged later, as Zia became less reliant on Jamat's support. In the 1980s, the JUI collaborated with the Pakistan People's Party for the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. In 2020, the Pakistan Democratic Movement opposing Pakistan Tahrik-e-Insaf was also led by the JUI.

5.10.5 Relationship with the Establishment

The JI generally maintains friendly relations with Pakistan's military, working together in the national interest and within the bounds of the constitution. There have been times when they agreed with the military, like during Zia's regime, when they helped Islamize

¹⁴ Sahil Waraich "Mazhabi Jamaa'atoun Ki Nishisten Kam Kyun?" *Daily Jang*, (September 5, 2018) <https://jang.com.pk/news/545363> accessed November 11, 2023.

laws. On the other hand, the JI also played a crucial role in the Lawyers Movement, which ended General Pervez Musharraf's unconstitutional rule.¹⁵

5.10.6 Clear Stance on National Interests

The JI typically supports what's good for Pakistan. Like other political groups, it endorsed the National Action Plan. It provided full moral, political, and legal support to the armed forces in their fight against militants, aiming to eliminate terrorism in the country. The commitment of Jamat leaders to this endorsement has come at a cost, with several local leaders in areas such as Peshawar, Darra Adam Khel, Hangu, and Swat falling victim to attacks by the militants. Notably, the former Amir of Jamat, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, was targeted in November 2012. The draft of "Pegham e Pakistan" (Message of Pakistan) is also a link in the same chain which has been unanimously approved by all the scholars of Pakistan for a peace-loving global recognition of Pakistan.

5.10.7 Democratic and Welfare Norms

Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan distinguishes itself among contemporary Islamic movements by maintaining robust democratic traditions since its inception in 1941. It operates under a written constitution governing its organization and consistently adheres to the country's constitution. The approach to societal transformation involves intellectual appeal, community organization, and mobilization of the masses, aligning with the strategies employed by political parties worldwide. The JI asserts that Islam offers a universal and dynamic life vision relevant for human welfare in all contexts. Beyond its political and governance roles, it actively participates in social, religious, and welfare activities. This attitude of the JI promotes welfare concepts in politics, fostering public trust in the Islamic model of the political system in the country.¹⁶

Likewise, under the JI, Al Khidmat Foundation is a non-governmental organization of Pakistan under the management of which so many welfare institutions are being run in

¹⁵ Asif Luqman Qazi, "How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamat-e-Islami in Its Own Words", *Brookings*, (April 25, 2017.) <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-to-islamize-an-islamic-republic-jamaat-e-islami-in-its-own-words/> accessed August 29, 2022.

¹⁶ Syed Habibullah Shah and Syed Ihsanullah Shah, "*Jameyat Ulma e Islam ki panch Sala (2008-2013) parlmani wa siyasi Karkardgi wa khidmat*, (Zoob: JUI office, 2013), <https://fb.com/photo/?fbid=1359758864085249> accessed August 29, 2022.

many areas of Pakistan. It was established in 1990 and currently it is working in seven departments. These sectors include education, health, orphan care, clean water, mortgages (provision of interest-free loans), social services, and disaster prevention. Al-Khidmat Foundation, formerly known as “Shu‘bā -e- Khidmat” (Services Department) of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan, was registered as a non-governmental organization in 1990.¹⁷

5.10.8 Public Mentorship in the Islamic Political System

Jamat-e-Islami has embraced a four-point program focused on the individual and societal levels: firstly, reforming life and mindset at the individual level; secondly, organizing, motivating, and training virtuous individuals; thirdly, instigating broader societal reform; and fourthly, restructuring the government and political system in accordance with Islamic principles. In fact, the JI endeavours for socio-political transformations in Pakistan, aspiring beyond mere governance over the public. Its goal is to establish an ideal Islamic society governed by an Islamic political system.

5.10.9 Practice of Good Governance

Jamat-e-Islami has actively participated in various local and provincial administrations, confronting governance challenges and addressing issues related to public welfare and accountability. Notably, Jamat's mayors have successfully led local bodies in Karachi, Pakistan's largest metropolitan city with a population exceeding 23 million. Despite facing opposition from presidents like Pervez Musharaf, these mayors have earned appreciation for their performance. Moreover, the World Bank has recognized the integrity and performance of Jamat's provincial ministers in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.¹⁸ The political agenda of the JI encompasses a range of crucial issues, including education, healthcare, agriculture, youth employment, ensuring a consistent supply of electricity and other public utilities, as well as combating corruption. Certainly, the transparent governance model of the JI has garnered public attention and fostered trust in Islamic political norms.

¹⁷ <https://alkhidmat.org/introduction/> accessed September 18, 2023.

¹⁸ Akmal Hussain, *Inclusive and Sustainable Development: Analytical Basis and Policy Framework*, (Report presented to the UNDP Pakistan and the Planning Commission, June 2017), <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/pk/Inclusive-and-Sustainable-Development.pdf> accessed June 24, 2022.

5.10.10 Political Coalition Dilemma

In Jamat-e-Islami, people have different ideas about whether it should establish political coalitions with other parties or not. While some advocate for maintaining a presence within the corridors of power to enhance political influence, others emphasize entering coalitions only when in a leading role to shape decisions.¹⁹ What makes Jamat's leaders stand out is their strong religious commitment to serving the public and a record of being open and honest, even recognized by rivals like Imran Khan. A source of inspiration for Jamat members is the success of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), prompting a re-evaluation of their agenda in alignment with the masses' needs. Significantly, the JI steadfastly maintains its fundamental Islamic identity, even within political coalitions. A notable instance was its withdrawal from the Zia regime when practices were perceived to deviate from the spirit of Islam.

5.10.11 Calls for Organizational Reforms

It is observed that the JI's organizational structure, initially designed for revolutionary efforts, may not be the most suitable for parliamentary elections. Respected leaders of Jamat, such as Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Khurram Murad, and Khurshid Ahmad, have emphasized the necessity of transitioning towards a more open and broad-based structure better suited for political campaigns. Despite being recognized as one of Pakistan's most internally democratic parties, the JI is focused on elections, not just participating in them. Another challenge is the limited emphasis on winning elections as a primary objective. Jamat's organization dedicates significant human and financial resources to its ideological and social agenda. In contrast, many political parties concentrate solely on electoral success. One proposed solution currently under consideration involves establishing an independent political wing while maintaining the same central emir.

¹⁹ Asif Luqman Qazi, "How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamat-e-Islami in Its Own Words", *Brookings*, (April 25, 2017.) <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-to-islamize-an-islamic-republic-jamaat-e-islami-in-its-own-words/> accessed August 29, 2022.

5.10.12 Peaceful Means of Protest

Jamat-e-Islami draws a clear distinction between a government and its people and values. As a manifestation of this principle, the organization prohibits its members from burning the flags of any party or country while expressing dissent against the policies of a particular government.²⁰

5.10.13 Islamic Identity in the State's Constitution

Islamism in Pakistan has a historical connection with constitutional and democratic processes. Notably, Jamat-e-Islami does not advocate for radical changes to the constitution of Pakistan. In the past, the JI played a role in contributing to the constitutional Islamic framework of Pakistan. Founder Abu al-A'la al-Mawdūdī was even invited by Pakistan's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to deliver lectures on the foundations of an Islamic system of life, broadcasted from official radio channels. These lectures outlined the social, political, and economic foundations for the Muslim society the newly established state aimed to adopt. Against this backdrop, Mawdūdī, along with 33 other prominent Islamic scholars representing all recognized schools of thought in Islam, took a keen interest in the development of Pakistan's first constitution. These scholars unanimously adopted a 22-point charter to serve as an Islamic basis for the country's constitution.²¹ In practice, the JI advocates for the implementation of Islamic provisions within the constitution and actively supports Islamic institutions overseeing the Islamization process in the country, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Federal Shari'ah Court (FSC).

5.10.14 Opposition to Non-Islamic Norms

Jamat-e-Islami (JI) has been a prominent force in Pakistani politics since independence. It actively participated in events such as the anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances in 1953 and opposed the Family Law Ordinance in 1961. The JI faced a ban in 1964 due to its

²⁰ Army has sought to collaborate with JI-affiliated proxy forces like Al Badr (East Pakistan) during the early 1970s, Hizb-e-Islami (Afghanistan), during the 1980s, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in Kashmir (after 1989).

²¹ Asif Luqman Qazi, "How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamaat-e-Islami in Its Own Words," *Brookings*, (April 25, 2017), <https://brook.gs/3J98Q0t>, accessed August 29, 2022.

criticism of Ayub Khan's policies²² but later engaged in the 1965 elections, drawing criticism as a fascist organization. During the 1970 elections, the JI campaigned against Bhutto's Islamic socialism and criticized Mujib-ur Rahman's six-point program for greater autonomy, labelling it as un-Islamic.²³

5.10.15 Contribution in Islamization

Jamat-e-Islami (JI) experienced significant growth from 1977 through the 1980s, primarily attributed to General Zia's policy of Islamisation. The initiation of the Islamization process under General Zia reflected an earnest endeavour to embrace doctrinal values and practices popularized in Pakistan by Mawdūdī.²⁴ Following General Zia's ascent to power in 1977, there was a noticeable increase in conservative Saudi influence in Pakistan. The JI, under Mawdūdī's leadership and aligned with Saudi interests, emerged as the ideological mentor of the new regime.²⁵ The JUI broke with the Zia regime due to the slow pace of the Islamization process and did not let its members contest the 1985 elections.²⁶

5.10.16 Shari'ah-Complaint Legislation

The JI, along with several religious leaders, declined to endorse the Shari'ah Ordinance proclaimed by President Zia in June 1988. The ordinance, fell short of their expectations and the committee's draft chaired by the head of the Islamic Ideology Council.²⁷ Maulana Fazlur Rahman, general secretary of the JUI, strongly criticized the Shari'ah Ordinance promulgated by General Zia in June 1988, and called it an attempt to sabotage the Constitution of Pakistan. Additionally, in 1991, when Sharif introduced the enforcement of Shari'ah Bill, perceived by the JI and JUIF as mere religious and

²² M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969*, Vol: II (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986), 95.

²³ S.S. Bindra, *Politics of Islamisation: With Special Reference to Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1990), 251.

²⁴ Craig Baxter, et al, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, (London: Westview Press, 1987), 191-192.

²⁵ Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?* (United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1983), 139.

²⁶ Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1987), 390.

²⁷ "Special Report: Daughter of the East 1988-1990/1993-1996," *The Dawn*, (June 19, 1988), <https://www.dawn.com/news/1366832> accessed October 17, 2022,

political rhetoric, both parties abstained from supporting it.²⁸ Furthermore, the MMA promptly enacted the contentious Hisba Act to regulate public 'morality.' Nevertheless, in 2006, the Pakistan Supreme Court nullified this legislation.²⁹ Furthermore, the MMA proposed a bill in the National Assembly to impose the death penalty on unrepentant male apostates. However, this bill did not progress beyond its standing committee, and to date, Pakistan lacks a law addressing apostasy. As the Islamization agenda encountered obstacles, the MMA shifted its focus from religious principles to constructing a pragmatic (i.e., populist) programme centred on social and economic reform.³⁰

In fact, Islamic law incorporation was initiated through the Objectives Resolution in 1949, the inclusion of Islamic provisions in the constitutions, and the promulgation of Islamic decrees related to taxation and hudud punishments in 1979. Furthermore, the establishment of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Federal Shari'ah Court (FSC), amendments in penal laws, anti-blasphemy laws, the declaration of the Ahmadiyya community as a minority, and the introduction of ordinances related to *Zakat*, *Ushr*, and *Ramzan* were significant steps in this process. The JI and JUI played pivotal roles in shaping these developments.³¹ Additionally, an ordinance, implemented by Zia-ul-Haq in June 1988, aimed to complete Pakistan's transformation into an Islamic state. This ordinance empowered courts to review laws and statutes that were deemed inconsistent with Islamic principles. However, the death of Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash on August 17, 1988, prevented the finalization of this transformation, as the National Assembly did not pass the ordinance into law following his demise.³²

²⁸ JI and the JUI articulated different ideas about the relationship between Islam and the modern state. Both parties believed that a modern-model Muslim-majority state necessitated vigilant supervision by religious elites. This oversight aimed to prevent the enactment of laws that could be deemed incompatible with the principles of Islam. See more: see Matthew j. Nelson, "Islamic law in an Islamic state: what role for parliament?" In constitution-writing, religion, and democracy, a. Bali and h. Lerner, eds. (Cambridge, 2015).

²⁹ Iqbal, Nasir. "Hasba bill infringes personal freedom: SC." <https://www.dawn.com/news/154829/hasba-bill-infringes-personal-freedom-sc> accessed March 11, 2022.

³⁰ Joshua t. White, *Pakistan's Islamist frontier* (Arlington, Va: centre on faith in international affairs, 2008), 47. see more: Nelson, Matthew j. "Islamist politics in south Asia after the Arab spring: parties and their proxies working with and against the state." (Washington DC: Brookings's institution, 2015).

³¹ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. "Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jamat-i Islami, 1977-88." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Volume 25, Issue no. 2, (1993), 261–283.

³² Peter Topychkanov. "Islam and the paths of Pakistan's political development." *Carnegie Moscow briefing paper*, Volume 11, Issue no. 2, (2009), 1-14.

5.10.17 Political Parties Bill 1962

In the 1962 elections, there was a commitment to amending the Constitution to align with the Quran, Sunnah, and democratic traditions. In July 1962, support was lent to the Political Parties Bill, advocating that only parties dedicated to Islamic ideology should operate in Pakistan.³³ The Political Parties Act incorporated these provisions.³⁴

5.10.18 Role in International Conflicts

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the JUI played a supportive role for the government by organising Jihād conferences and collecting defence funds. Post-war, it advocated for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue in line with UN resolutions, expressing dissatisfaction with the Tashkent Declaration but refraining from participating in opposition movements against it. Moreover, religious-political parties like the JI, the JUI, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Ahle-Hadith aligned with Saudi Arabia, while Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafria, representing Pakistan's Shias, supported Iran.³⁵ Furthermore, some of the JI's religious schools were established exclusively for jihād and received financial support, including zakat funds. During the Afghan jihād, the JUI also set up numerous madrassas, especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan, enrolling Afghan refugee students and recruiting Mujahideen. Graduates from these institutions later formed the Taliban, gaining control over much of Afghanistan.³⁶

Before concluding, it is crucial to highlight the roles of Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) in significant legislative and political matters. Both parties have played pivotal roles in the 18th constitutional amendment, the Mithaq-e-Jamhuriyat (Charter of Democracy) 2006 and the Kerry-Lugar Berman Bill (KLB) 2009. They function as influential pressure groups, contributing substantially to national discourse, particularly in peace talks with the Taliban. Notably, the JI, in particular, has actively engaged as petitioners in courts, challenging and seeking nullification of legislation perceived as inconsistent with Islamic principles in Pakistan. Recent

³³ Sumita Kumar, "The role of Islamic parties in Pakistani Politics." *Strategic Analysis*, 25, no. 2 (2001), 271-284.

³⁴ M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969*, 85.

³⁵ Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity*, (Oxford: St. Anthony's College, 1997), 220.

³⁶ Zaigham Khan, "Losing Control", *The Herald*, (May 2000), <https://www.heraldsotland.com/> accessed February 23, 2021.

petitions filed by these parties include objections against The Protection of Women Act 2006, Waqf Properties Act 2020, Domestic Violence Bill 2020, and the Transgender Bill 2022. Additionally, these parties have been outspoken critics against issues such as the case of Aafia Siddiqui, the US influences in Pakistan, and drone attacks.

5.11 PROBABILITY AND CONCERNS OF ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES

Factually, several factors have constrained the ability of Islamists to garner voter support in Pakistan. Firstly, a limited number of Pakistanis are inclined towards transforming their country into a theocratic state. Secondly, Islamic parties often neglect addressing fundamental economic and social issues faced by the general population. Thirdly, their support remains restricted either to a small segment of the middle class, as seen with the JI, or to a specific ethnic group, as observed with the JUI. The appeal of Islamization dwindled after General Zia's imposition of Islamic Sharī'ah laws exacerbated sectarian tensions.³⁷ Furthermore, the endorsement of autocratic military rule by Islamist groups led to a significant decline in their electoral support upon the restoration of democracy.³⁸

5.12 JAMAT-E-ISLAMI AND ITS METHODOLOGY TO IMPLEMENT THE ISLAMIC SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN

5.12.1 Initial Struggle to Organize Jamat

Jamat-e-Islami was established on 3 Sha'ban 1360 AH (August 26th, 1941). At the time of establishment, Jamat-e-Islami had 75 people and a capital of 74 rupees. Maulana Mawdūdī founded Jamat-e-Islami on four concepts derived from Qur'ān and Sunnah:

1. Excellence in piety
2. Excellence in knowledge
3. Internal and external resistance to tyranny from the national level to the international level.

³⁷ Zahid Hussain, *"The Rise and Decline of Political Islam"*, (Newline: February 1998), 43.

³⁸ Sumita Kumar, "The Role of Islamic parties in Pakistani Politics." *Strategic Analysis* 25, no. 2 (2001) 271-284.

4. Selfless service to Muslims and humanity at large.³⁹

5.12.2 Central Leadership

1. Syed Abū al-A‘lā Mawdūdī. From August 26th, 1941 to November 4th, 1972
2. Mian Tufail Muhammad. From November 1972 to October 1987
3. Qazi Hussain Ahmed. From October 1987 to April 2009
4. Syed Munawar Hasan. From April 2009 to May 2014
5. Sirajul Haq. From June 2014 till now.⁴⁰

5.12.3 Background

However, after the 1984 referendum, the Jamat’s political fortunes plummeted. Since 1977 when General Zia-ul-Haq came to power, conservative Saudi influence grew considerably in Pakistan. The JI of Mawdūdī, an ally of the Saudis, became the ideological mentor of the new regime. In February 1985, elections to the National Assembly were held under the 1973 Constitution which had been partially retained. The elections were held on a non-party basis, but several candidates supported by General Zia-ul-Haq and his political ally, the JI were defeated.⁴¹

Maulana Tufail Muhammad, a former Amīr of the JI, and several other religious leaders did not endorse the Sharī‘ah Ordinance promulgated by President Zia in June 1988. The ordinance issued by Zia did not meet their expectations and fell short of the draft submitted by the committee, appointed by the president himself, headed by the chairman of the Islamic Ideology Council. The Jamat won only 3 percent of the popular vote (640,000) in the 1990 elections to the national assembly, and 4 per cent, 3 per cent, and 0.8 per cent of the vote in the Provincial Assembly elections in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab, and Sindh respectively. Although running for fewer seats, the Jamat did better in these elections than in 1988. It won 8 out of 18 contested national seats (as opposed to 7 out of 26 in 1988), and 20 out of 37 contested provincial

³⁹ M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969*, 101.

⁴⁰ S.S. Bindra, *Politics of Islamization: With Special Reference to Pakistan*, 251.

⁴¹ Craig Baxter, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, 191-192.

seats (as opposed to 11 out of 44 in 1988).⁴²

About Islam and Jihād, Mawdūdī believed that Islam "provides a complete code of waging warfare, negotiating peace, arranging exchange of prisoners-of-war and instructions about how to deal with various categories of enemies. Jihād, as a medium of conducting positive warfare, is, therefore, an essential duty of the Islamic state. Conditions permitting, it can be legitimately launched." In 1947-48, in the context of the covert war by Pakistan in Kashmir, Mawdūdī first believed that "it was sheer hypocrisy to sanction a Jihād, stealthily declared while Pakistan told the whole world that it was in a state of cease-fire with India." Pakistan should either desist from Jihād, or preferably go to war.

However, in the face of the wrath of the government, by August 1948, Mawdūdī moved from debating the logic of Jihād in Kashmir, to giving oaths of allegiance to Pakistan, denouncing the Indian policy in Kashmir, and declaring support for Pakistan's claims over Kashmir. He now argued that while the ceasefire agreement was binding on the government, volunteers could still participate in the "freedom movement" in Kashmir. When in September, the Pakistan government officially admitted to its involvement in the conflict in Kashmir, Mawdūdī lost no time in supporting a Jihād, to demonstrate the logic of his position. In 1965, Mawdūdī, to assist the state in its moment of crisis, declared a Jihād to liberate Kashmir from India. He publicized his declaration of Jihād on Radio Pakistan, at the insistence of Ayyub Khan. After the ceasefire between India and Pakistan was declared on September 23, 1965, Mawdūdī again appeared on Radio Pakistan, and spoke of Jihād in peacetime. However, the Tashkent Agreement of January 1966 proved to be unpopular, and Mawdūdī criticized it for side-stepping the future of Kashmir and for its tacit acceptance of a "no-war" arrangement with India.⁴³

The JI was one of the best organized parties in Sindh and it had considered urban Sindh, and especially Karachi, to be its power base since 1947. It had a major following among Urdu speakers and a large number of Sindhi speaking elites, but from 1984, the Muhajir Quami Mahaz (MQM) began to claim the same constituency. The JI's support for the policies of General Zia and the role of its student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-

⁴² Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 213.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 214.

Tulaba (IJT)⁴⁴ damaged its standing. The emergence of the second generation of Urdu speakers in Sindh blurred the loyalties of the old vanguard for the JI and replaced them with the desire to have a new and responsive organization based on ethnic solidarity. The JI, until the early 1980s, remained strong in Sindh even though its performance in elections was dismal. The leaders of the JI campaigned for an Islamic solution to the ethnic problem in Pakistan.

Their support for the Afghan War or the Kashmiri activists has largely rested on the same premise which in 1971 aligned them with Yahya's troops against Mujibur Rahman whom they considered to be an Indian agent. The JI actively supported military action in Muslim Bengal through organizations like Al-Bader and Al-Shams, which were heavily represented by the Urdu speaking inhabitants of Bangladesh known as Biharis. However, while its support for Zia might have helped, the JI suffered a credibility gap among the democratic forces.

Since its inception in 1941, the JI has gone through several phases but is not mass based and so its political ambitions have not been achieved through electoral politics. It has usually supported authoritarian, non-democratic regimes like those of General Yahya Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq. Its attitude towards plural forces and its aggressive role on university campuses through the IJT alienated it from the grassroots and ethnic groups. Another reason why it has not achieved popular appeal is because of its elitism and its exclusivity in terms of its theological explanations of Islam. "The JI has not been able to come to grips with the sensitive and mutually conflictive forces of nationalism, ethnicity, folk culture, democracy and Islam. Its problems with Bengali nationalists during the war in 1971 and its confrontation with ethno-regional forces in contemporary Sindh illustrate this difficulty." It has played a major role in Afghanistan and Kashmir by supporting religion-based resistance movements. Under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad, who is a native Pushtun, the JI seems to have accepted a combination of Islam and nationalism, which is a unique, but not openly acknowledged, shift in ideology. In the 1993 elections, the JI despite assuming a populist stance, faced overwhelming defeat from the national parties, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Muslim League.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Jamal Malik, *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, (Delhi: Manohar, 1998), 21.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 32.

5.12.4 Methodological Features

To understand the methodology of Jamat-e-Islami in implementing Islam in Pakistan, it is essential to recognize that the party has a comprehensive approach that spans political, social, and economic dimensions. Here are some key aspects of Jamat-e-Islami's methodology:

Islamic Ideology:

Jamat-e-Islami emphasizes the establishment of an Islamic system based on the principles of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The party advocates for the implementation of Sharī'ah law as the foundation of the legal and judicial system in Pakistan.

Political Engagement:

Jamat-e-Islami actively participates in the political process to influence legislation and policy decisions. The party aims to achieve its goals through democratic means, engaging in elections and seeking public support.

Educational Initiatives:

Jamat-e-Islami places significant emphasis on education as a means to promote Islamic values and principles. The party is involved in establishing educational institutions that integrate Islamic teachings into the curriculum.

Social Welfare Programs:

The party is engaged in various social welfare activities, aiding the underprivileged and working towards the betterment of society. These initiatives are rooted in Islamic principles of social justice and equity.

Media and Communication:

Jamat-e-Islami uses media and communication channels to disseminate its ideology and promote awareness of Islamic values. This includes utilizing print, electronic media, and online platforms to reach a wider audience.

Legal Advocacy:

The party employs legal advocacy to challenge laws and policies that it perceives as inconsistent with Islamic principles. Through legal channels, Jamat-e-Islami seeks to influence the legal framework of the country.

Grassroots Mobilization:

Jamat-e-Islami focuses on grassroots mobilization, organizing campaigns, rallies, and gatherings to connect with the public and garner support for its agenda. The party believes in building a mass movement for the implementation of an Islamic system.

Collaboration with Like-Minded Groups:

Jamat-e-Islami collaborates with other Islamic groups and organizations that share similar goals. This collaborative approach aims to create a united front in advocating for the implementation of an Islamic system in Pakistan.

It is crucial to note that the implementation of an Islamic system is a complex and multifaceted process, and Jamat-e-Islami employs a combination of political, social, educational, and legal strategies to work towards its vision. Additionally, the party's methodology may evolve over time in response to changing political and social dynamics.

5.12.5 Ideological Methodology

Jamat-e-Islami has some unique identifications which are follows:

1. Jamat-e-Islami does not classify all human beings and Muslims into any sect,

religion, nationality, language, race, geography, culture, or any province.

2. Jamat-e-Islami calls Muslims only to Allah, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), Islam, Qur'ān and Sunnah and Islamic history and civilization. This is the reason that Jamat-e-Islami is the bouquet of all the flowers of the society, and it is a symbol of the universality of Islam.
3. Jamat-e-Islami has the honour of being the first party in the world of Islam, which discredited communalism and played its role in its defeat.
4. Jamat-e-Islami proved that the Western capitalist system is a manifestation of complete ignorance and darkness in its knowledge, civilization, society, and state.
5. It is a long struggle of Jamat-e-Islami to end the system of oppression in Pakistan. It wants to free the common man from the chains of slavery and create a state like Madinah where the servants can be freed from the slavery of humans and serve God.
6. Jamat-e-Islami is against every concept of violence and armed struggle. It adopts only peaceful constitutional democratic struggle to achieve its goals. Dawah, organization, training, reforming society, and revolutionary leadership are its plan of action. In the Constitution, every illegal method except peaceful constitutional democratic struggle is rejected.
7. Jamat-e-Islami has the most ideological and academic assets in the form of books and personalities.⁴⁶

5.12.6 Historical Features

The history of Jamat-e-Islami is a witness to the fact that the selection of individuals here is not based on heredity, caste, community, financial status, etc., but purely depends on the fear of Allah, love of religion, and how effective he is in the sacrifice and performance for the Jamat.

History tells us that the Jamat has been trying hard since its inception to bring

⁴⁶ H. Malik Iftikhar, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity*, 220.

about change in society. After the establishment of Pakistan, when making the constitution was in process, Jamat-e-Islami was always in the forefront to get the resolution approved, to give ideological direction to Pakistan, to run the movement to declare the Qadiani as infidels, to support Fatima Jinnah against the dictatorship, to counter socialism, communism, and capitalism on intellectual grounds, and to run the Bangladesh Rejection Movement. The continued to work hard on the Islamic provisions of the 73 Constitution, on the "Nizam e Mustafa" Movement, on the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and on the issue of Kashmir Jihād. Whether it was to fight the dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf, to run the movement for the restoration of the judiciary, to raise the slogan of "Go America Go" or talk about a corruption-free Islamic and prosperous Pakistan, in all these issues, Jamat-e-Islami positive and historical character is not hidden from anyone.

5.12.7 Structural Methodology

When Jamat-e-Islami was established, there were only 75 people with it, but today the number of members of an ideological party like Jamat-e-Islami is more than 30 thousand. Its number of candidates for membership is more than 15000, the number of active workers is more than one and a half lac (150,000), while the total number of members is 40,44833.

Jamat-e-Islami has not ignored half of the population of the society i.e. women. Jamat-e-Islami has established a separate organization for women for religious, ideological, and political education and training. The number of women members is in thousands. The number of active workers is more than 50 thousand while the number of total women members is 281,231. Thus, the women's constituency of Jamat-e-Islami is bigger than those of any other party in Pakistan.

When the Islamic Jamiat Ṭulabā' started working after the establishment of Pakistan, the country's educational institutions were completely dominated by communist and liberal elements. In two decades, Pakistan's educational institutions have turned from "red" to "green". Jamiat Ṭulabā' Arabia accomplished the feat of raising the voice of unity in the fight of factions and gathering and organizing many young scholars. Religious unity, which was once considered impossible, is now felt everywhere.

Labor movement of Jamat-e-Islami, National Labor Federation, and Tahrik Lakhi have repelled the laden elements in the labour sector and raised the flag of Islam in dozens of important national institutions. The range of fraternal organizations of Jamat-e-Islami is wide. Among them Islamic Jamiat Tulaba' is for male and female students, Ittehad Ulama is for religious scholars, Pakistan Islamic Medical Association is for doctors, Kisan Board is for farmers, Pakistan Business Forum is for businessmen, Islamic Homeopathic Association is for homeopathic doctors, Islamic Lawyers Movement is for lawyers, JI-Youth is for general youth, Pakistan Engineer Forum is for engineers and organization, and Tanzim -e- Asatizah Pakistan is for teachers of Pakistan. All these sub parties are the symbol of all struggles of Jamat-e-Islami.

5.12.8 Implementing Islamic System of Education

Jamat-e-Islami has been involved in numerous fields of service including education, health, provision of good deeds, craft schools, provision of clean drinking water, free legal aid, sponsorship of orphans and the poor, help in natural disasters like earthquakes and floods across Pakistan. It has rendered great services, and no other political party can even come close to the services of this party in helping the people of Pakistan especially in natural calamities.

Jamat-e-Islami has played a major role in popularizing education in this country. This party has worked to develop education on theoretical basis. Thousands of schools, of institutions and individuals, associated with it are still running in the dimensions of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Special emphasis is placed on training along with education. According to Jamat-e-Islami, eradicating ignorance is essential for the development of Pakistan. Therefore, Jamat-e-Islami has repeatedly raised its voice in the parliament for the right of every Pakistani to education and made laws in this regard. Institutions like Educational Research Institute (ERI) and Afaq are rendering valuable services for research and curriculum development on education. A literate and developed Pakistan is the mission of Jamat-e-Islami.

Jamat-e-Islami has never left the poor and weak alone and has made many efforts to eradicate ignorance and illiteracy in poor people throughout the country. Jamat-e-Islami is a party of the poor and common people and time has proven that the prosperity of the poor man in Pakistan is not a matter of any other party except Jamat-e-Islami. Its

approach has been different from any other party regarding education.

This motto of Jamat-e-Islami is not only for Pakistan. It should be noted that Pakistan was not yet in existence when the Jamat was formed. So, this motto is for every country and the whole world. It is natural to establish and develop relations with those who agree or work with them and for this purpose the Jamat has made conscious efforts from the beginning. To communicate with the Arab countries, he established an institution under the leadership of Maulana Masood Aalam Nadavi under the name of Dar al-‘Arūba and started the work of Arabic translation of the Jamat's literature. Later, Maulana Khalil Hamidi was its head.⁴⁷

Jamat-e-Islami inspired the modern educated Muslims, influenced by rationality and westernization, with Islam through rational and scientific reasoning (logic) and presented the solution of modern problems in the light of Islam. This is the reason that the majority of educated middle class and poor people are in Jamat-e-Islami today.

The work of Jamat-e-Islami is local, but its concern is worldwide. That is the reason why Jamat-e-Islami is in close contact with Islamic movements, parties, and personalities working all over the world. It is an association that connects and integrates an individual with the entire world. Not only his knowledge, his thoughts, vision, and immense intellectual expansion is created by this connection. Such vastness is the true identity of the essence of a Muslim and his aspiration.

Jamat-e-Islami's vision is global, but South Asia is the region on which Jamat-e-Islami has a deep imprint. The reason for this is that the JI is not only present in Pakistan, but it is also serving in India, struggling in Bangladesh, active in Sri Lanka, and the effects of Jamat-e-Islami can be felt in Afghanistan as well. However, the Jamat's of all the states are struggling in the form of separate Jamat's in their respective countries.

5.12.9 Political Approach to Implement Islam

Jamat-e-Islami is the first party in the subcontinent which introduced Islam as a modern political system. It provided the basis of the two-nation theory to the Muslims of India.

⁴⁷ Syed Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, *Jamat-e-Islami ka maqsad, tarikh aur laihah-e amal*, (Lahore: Maktaba Jamat e Islami, 1958), 29.

Maulana Mawdūdī's book "Issue of Nationality" was the literature of Tahrīk-e-Pakistan activists. During the partition of Pakistan, the JI workers actively participated in voluntary activities and proved that the Jamat can work wholeheartedly for Pakistan in difficult times. The Jamat opposed the creation of a non-Islamic Pakistan and raised awareness regarding the Islamic system in the country.

After the creation of Pakistan, the party struggled to highlight its Islamic identity. The "Qarārdād e Maqāsid" (Resolution of Objectives) was approved, which was written by the founding party, and secular people had to suffer defeat. The famous slogan at the time of the formation of Pakistan was "Pakistan ka Matlab kya" (What is the meaning of Pakistan?) "*La ilaha illa Allah*". To realize the dream of *La ilaha illa Allah* and declare the state as Islamic in principle in the Resolution of Objectives, the JI started a movement by smoothing public opinion among the people and achieved success in it.

The Jamat, while guiding the people intellectually, proved that the Qadianis are excluded from Islam due to their denial of the end of prophethood after the passing of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). The founder of the Jamat was imprisoned for almost 3 years. During this time, he was offered the possibility of commuting his death sentence if he renounced his stance against the Qadianis, but he refused to do so. Due to national and international pressure, the government first changed the death sentence to life imprisonment, but later released him.

Jamat-e-Islami strongly opposed the dictatorship of General Ayub Khan in 1958 and allied with other political parties for the restoration of basic rights and democracy including civil liberties. At that time, a group emerged under the government's patronage who said that hadith had no status in Islam, and even a judge refused to accept hadith as authentic. On this occasion, Allamah Mawdūdī proved the fundamental status of Hadith in Islam with Sharī'ah and rational arguments and declared both as the source of Islamic law. The publication of "Manşab e Risālat No. of Tafsīr "Tarjumān al-Qur'ān" of Abu al-Kalām Āzād, and Mawdūdī's book "*Constitutional Status of the Sunnah*" was also a strong response to the fitnah of the denial of Hadith.

During the Ayyubid dictatorship, Ms. Fatima Jinnah (Sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah) decided to participate in the election for the sake of the country and called the democratic forces of the country for help against the oppressive military dictator. It was a principled decision to support and save the motherland from dictatorship and to try to

implement *Khilāfah* system.

On January 6, 1964, a fed-up Ayyub Khan declared Jamat-e-Islami against the law and imprisoned prominent JI workers including Allamah Mawdūdī. Allamah and other 65 leaders of Jamat-e-Islami steadfastly endured the hardships of imprisonment for 9 months. Again in 1967, Allamah was arrested and kept in Banu jail for two months for raising the Sharī'ah rule on the issue of Eid moon.

Maulana Bhashani, the pro-communalist leader of East Pakistan, announced a communal revolution in the entire country on June 1, 1970, then, Allamah Mawdūdī and the activists of the Jamat mobilized the people throughout the country and celebrated "Shaukat e Islam Day" before his proposed a date which was May 31, 1970. So, the thousands of processions had destroyed the dream of communal revolution with their devoted protest on this issue.

5.12.10 Inclusion of Islamic Provisions in the Constitution

Jamat-e-Islami played an active role to include Islamic provisions and other guiding principles in the 1973 constitution. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Mahmood Azam Farooqui, Sahibzada Safiullah, and Nazir Shaheed played a key role in bringing the country a unified constitution. In the election of 1970, four members of the party were elected, yet these four exerted a strong influence within the assembly through their performance. A strong public campaign was conducted against the Qadianis by joining other religious parties and the Qadianis were declared as a minority.

Apart from the military dictators, Jamat-e-Islami also fought democratic dictators in Pakistan. Dr Nazir Shaheed was killed in this case. Jamat-e-Islami elected the poorest and middle-class people in the Houses of Pakistan. A moderate and upright man like Professor Ghafoor Ahmad was its parliamentary leader. He was considered the glory of the city of Karachi and its language.

The Jamat started the Movement of "Nizām e Mustafā" which was later destroyed by Zia-ul-Haq after seeing the false promises. When Russia invaded Afghanistan, Jamat-e-Islami strongly condemned it before the US and Zia-ul-Haq, and provided intellectual, moral, and financial support to the Mujahideen. The JI also smoothed the public opinion to support Jihād in Pakistan. Jihād played an active role in

Afghanistan and pushed back the "red storm" advancing towards the homeland.

While guiding the nation on the Kashmir issue The JI played a key role in Jihād there. Through the Islamic Democratic Alliance, the JI reiterated its commitment to once again implement Nizam Mustafa in the homeland, but the other parties involved in the alliance were not ready to implement the election manifesto later. In 1993, the Islamic Front was formed to realize the dream of implementing the Islamic system in the beloved country of Pakistan, but the Islamic Front managed to get only three seats. In 1999, Musharraf's dictatorship closed the door to secularism, resulting in Qazi Hussain Ahmed, being the first politician prevented from entering Peshawar. The first order of the dictatorship was issued on him.

Amīr Qazi Hussain Ahmed of Jamat-e-Islami played a key role in forming the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in 2002. The MMA achieved unprecedented success in national elections and formed governments in KPK and Baluchistan. In the entire electoral and parliamentary history of Pakistan, religious parties have never had such an influential number in the Houses. Even today, the religious alliances of the MMA are remembered in Pakistan. Jamat-e-Islami also formed the National Solidarity Council for harmony among *Masaliks*, which fostered tolerance and tolerance among *Masaliks*.

Pakistan can progress only with honest and trustworthy leadership. Jamat-e-Islami campaigned for Article 62-63 of the Constitution and demanded that it should be truly implemented to rid the country of corrupt and corrupt leadership. The JI played the most effective role in the judiciary reform movement and Qazi Hussain Ahmed led the movement. On the arrival of the Chief Justice in Karachi, eight of his workers were martyred. Thousands were sent to prisons.

Jamat-e-Islami launched a movement for the abolition of usury. Even now, the JI is a party in the federal Sharī'ah court for the abolition of usury. They fought obscenity on the media where there is a petition on it by Jamat-e-Islami in the Supreme Court.

Jamat-e-Islami launched the "Go America Go" campaign and exposed the imperialism of the government across the country. Time is proving that Jamat-e-Islami's stand was right, and Pakistan will have no choice but to take a U-turn soon. The JI launched a very powerful campaign to eradicate corruption in the country. The judges of the Supreme Court were forced to say that if 62-63 is implemented, there will be no

one left in the parliament except Sirajul Haq. It should be noted that according to the survey by Pal Dat, Jamat-e-Islami is the most democratic party of the country with an effective system of elections.

5.12.11 Moral Values and Ethical Standards in Political Practice

The Jamat-e-Islami's commitment to moral integrity in politics can be demonstrated through several examples: Not a single person of Jamat-e-Islami is included among the beneficiaries of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). Neither is a single person's name related to the JI included in the Panama Leaks, Dubai Leaks loan waiver, and NAB mega scandals, while the names of all the key parties of Pakistan are there. No member of Parliament of Jamat-e-Islami has, to date, taken a plot of land in Islamabad and no selected revenue of the JI has been involved in kickbacks and customs duty waivers. There is no name of any person related to Jamat-e-Islami in the Iqama scand These examples demonstrate the party's consistent stance against corruption and its commitment to ethical political conduct.

Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh has created a golden chapter of eternal sacrifices. The Amīr of Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Mutī' ur Rahmān Nizāmī, was hanged for the crime of love for Pakistan. Prof. Ghulam Azam, the former Amīr Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh was jailed. Abdul Qadir, Mujahid, Qasim, and the entire leadership of the front line were hanged for the crime of sympathizing with Pakistan. All of them accepted to be martyrs with a smile on their faces but did not accept having to write an apology letter against Pakistan for their love for Islam and Pakistan.

5.12.12 Protection of Human Rights

Jamat-e-Islami campaigned for the protection of human rights. If human rights are violated anywhere in the world, including Pakistan, the JI is the most effective voice of all the political parties in the country. This is the reason why Jamat-e-Islami's voice continues to be heard when human liberties are violated through state repression in Kashmir, Palestine, Burma, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Bangladesh.

5.12.13 Religious Rights to Minorities

Jamat-e-Islami gives the title of Pakistani community to the non-Muslims in the country and the community is organized under the umbrella of the Jamat. The non-Muslims should get all the rights that exist in the constitution of Pakistan along with security in acts of worships, rituals, and festivals in the Pakistani community.

5.13 THE EFFORTS OF JAMIAT ULAMA-E-ISLAM PAKISTAN FOR ISLAMIC SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN

5.13.1 Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

The Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) is another Islamic party which was formed prior to the partition. The Jamiat represents the Deobandi school of Islamic revivalism which emphasizes a more puritanical form of Islamic government. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani strived to bring together all the Ulema-e-Haqq (righteous religious scholars) of Pakistan on a single platform to make Pakistan an Islamic state.

According to Iftikhar Malik, the JUI and its various factions are offshoots of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) which supported the Indian National Congress (INC) against the All India Muslim League (AIML) during the nationalist era and the latter reflects personal differences among the ulama rather than any specific ideological school. Two members of the JUI contested the April-May 1962 elections and were elected where Maulana Mufti Mahmud became a member National Assembly (MNA) and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, a member Provincial Assembly (MPA) of West Pakistan. Mufti Mahmud, while taking his oath as an MNA, vowed to have the Constitution amended to make it conform to the Qur'ān and Sunnah and democratic traditions. In July 1962, he supported the Political Parties Bill and demanded that only those parties which were committed to Islamic ideology should be allowed to function in Pakistan. The Political Parties Act made provisions to this effect. When political parties started functioning, it was not difficult for the JUI to revive itself, and Mufti Mahmud, the acting Amīr at the time, called a meeting in Lahore on August 4th, 1962, when the JUI was revived formally.⁴⁸

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the JUI garnered support for the

⁴⁸ M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969*, 85.

government by organizing Jihād conferences and collecting defence funds. After the war, it urged the government to negotiate a peace settlement for a solution to the Kashmir problem in accordance with the UN resolutions on Kashmir. Although it was not satisfied with the Tashkent Declaration it refrained from joining the opposition sponsored movements against it.⁴⁹

The JUI split into two factions in 1969 and the more leftist faction under the leadership of Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi merged with the PPP in 1977. The more conservative faction under the leadership of Mufti Mahmud, a Pathan, opposed the PPP in the 1977 election. Mahmud also headed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), the coalition of parties attempting to unseat Bhutto in a re-election, and was assisted by a council composed of leaders of member parties including Mian Tufail Muhammad (JI) and Maulana Ahmad Shah Noorani (JUP). The JUI broke with the Zia regime due to the slow pace of the Islamization process and did not let its members contest the 1985 elections.⁵⁰

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, general secretary of the JUI, strongly criticized the Shari‘ah Ordinance promulgated by General Zia in June 1988 and called it an attempt to sabotage the Constitution of Pakistan. The JUI led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, son of the late Maulana Mufti Mohammad, has had stronger roots in Baluchistan and the NWFP with a limited constituency in Sindh. Re-election took place in 1954, and Maulana Mufti Mohammad Hassan Thanvi was elected as Amīr.⁵¹

Mufti Mohammad Hassan was unable to perform the duties of an Amīr due to illness and disability so, he directed through a written message to Maulana Khair Muhammad Thanvi for new elections to take place. Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly formed by Ghulam Muhammad (Governor General of Pakistan) drafted and passed a constitution and by the order of Sikandar Mirza (Governor General) it was implemented in the country.⁵²

Although in the preamble of this constitution Pakistan was recognized as an Islamic state and Islam as a guide for legislation, in the original constitution such

⁴⁹ M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969*, 87.

⁵⁰ Ali Banu Azizi and Myron Weiner, *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*, 340.

⁵¹ S.S. Bindra, *Politics of Islamization: With Special Reference to Pakistan*, 263.

⁵² Hassan Abbas, *The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*. (London: Yale University Press, 2014), 67.

provisions were placed which would leave the way open for apostasy and deviations from Islam. It is stated that any law will not be made against the Qur'ān and Sunnah, but to protect other provisions of the constitution, it is also stated that it does not affect the other provisions. So, due to this contradiction and without removing the permanent obstacle and the path of distortion that had been opened, the efforts of implementing the Islamic provisions of the constitution could have led to the false results.

Therefore, Maulana Ahmad Ali Lahori was elected as Amīr and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi was elected as General Nazim to consider this situation. A committee was appointed to change anti-Islam constitutional provisions. In 1958, martial was imposed. In the meantime, an organization called Nizam-ul-Ulema was formed to protect religious power. The ulama affiliated with the organisation raised their voices against it in mosques and public meetings and continued to be the target of government harassment.⁵³

5.13.2 New Selection of *Nizām-al-Ulama*'

Maulana Ahmad Ali Lahori passed away in 1961 and was replaced by Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti as Amīr of Jamiat. Meanwhile, Martial law was abolished in 1962, and political parties began to recover from the restrictions of martial law. Mufti Mahmood announced the appointments of the Acting Amīr of the Jamiat, Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti, as Amīr and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi as Nāzim.

5.13.3 Establishment of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in East Pakistan

After 1962, a Provincial Jamiat was also established in East Pakistan and the Jamiat of both the provinces started working enthusiastically in their respective places.⁵⁴

⁵³ Wajid Mehmood, *Consensual and Conflictual Political Culture in Pakistan: A comparative Analysis of Jamat e Islami & Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Socialization Process*. (Peshawar: University of Peshawar, 2008), 212.

⁵⁴ Nighat Rasheed, *A critical study of the reformist trends in the Indian Muslim society during the nineteenth century*, 336.

5.13.4 Election of Pakistan Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

In May 1967, representatives of both the provinces came together in Lahore and the central election of Pakistan Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam took place.

5.13.5 Central Officials

The JUI central officials from the May 1967 elections were as follows:

Central Amīr - Hafiz-ul-Hadith Maulana Muhammad Darkhwasti, Deputy Amīr Central No. 1 - Maulana Sheikh Bashir Ahmad Khalifa Madani; Deputy Amīr Central No. 2 - Maulana Obaidullah Anwar; Nazim Central No. 1 - Maulana Arif Rabbani Memon Shahi (East Pakistan), Nazim Central No. 2 - Maulana Abdul Wahid Gujranwala (West Pakistan); and Treasurer - Hafiz Nasrullah Khan Khakwani Bahawalnagar.

5.13.6 Historical Conference of Lahore

On May 3rd to the 5th, 1967, a grand historical conference was organized in Lahore under the auspices of Pakistan Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in which millions of Ulama and Mashaikh participated. The daily Jang Karachi wrote that there had never been such a big procession of scholars in the subcontinent.⁵⁵

5.13.7 Historical Procession of Scholars

On the last day of the 1967 conference, thousands of scholars participating in the conference also staged a procession in which they protested the anti-Islam and anti-people measures of the Ayyub government and openly challenged the government from the platform of the conference.

5.13.8 Ending the Political Stalemate and Starting the People's Movement

The holding of the conference by Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam proved to be a tremendous revolutionary turning point in the politics of the country. Rallies began to be organized

⁵⁵ Gholamali Haddad Adel, *Muslim Organizations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, 67.

all over the country, going through various stages, and soon the Ayyub government came to an end.⁵⁶

5.13.9 Yahya Government Announcement

The Yahya government announced that it would formulate future policies on Islam and public issues in accordance with the demands of the Muslim people.

5.13.10 Expectation

Thus, after the fall of the Awami League dictatorship, the new martial law government was expected to transfer power to the Muslim people of Pakistan through a general election and gave the country's political parties a chance to hold a general election on December 7th, 1970 in which the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam also participated where it won second position in West Pakistan. After the general election, General Yahya Khan convened a meeting of the National Assembly in Dhaka. Shortly after convening the meeting, Yahya Khan in his lust for power, announced the adjournment of the National Assembly. Maulana Mufti Mahmood, leader of the Jamiat, strongly opposed the adjournment and demanded an early meeting. The adjournment provoked a strong reaction in East Pakistan which resulted in the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam strongly condemned the military coup and urged Yahya Khan to make a political pact with the Awami League for the survival of Pakistan. The result was the fall of Dhaka on December 16, 1971.

After the fall of Dhaka, the ruling PPP took over. Apart from the centre, the government was also formed in Punjab and Sindh. In the NWFP (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan, there was a majority of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam and National Awami Party members, as a result of which Jamiat leader, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, became the Chief Minister. As soon as he became the Chief Minister, he immediately started implementing the manifesto of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam. Alcohol was banned, and despite being a Pashtun province, Urdu was declared the official language of the province. The weekly holiday was declared Friday instead of Sunday. The federal

⁵⁶ Mohamed Osman and Mohamed Nawab, "The Ulama in Pakistani Politics South Asia," *Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol: 32, Issue no: 2, 230–247.

government continued to conspire against the Jamiat government. Mufti Mahmood resigned from the Chief Ministership of the NWFP in protest of the removal of Baluchistan government from power, which is unprecedented in the history of Pakistan. The federal government did not accept the resignation of Maulana Mufti Mahmood for a week, and he was urged to withdraw his resignation and continue to rule but Maulana Mufti Mahmood refused power for the sake of principles.⁵⁷

The undemocratic behaviour of the federal government forced the political parties to sit together, and a united democratic front emerged. In 1973, the United Democratic Front launched a movement for the restoration of democracy in which the sacrifices of the workers of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam were paramount. In 1974, there was a movement in support of the end of prophethood in which the leaders and workers of the Jamiat took full part. In front of the National Assembly, Maulana Mufti Mahmood was the leader of the convoy, while the most effective and active role outside was that of the workers of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam. The sacrifices of the Jamiat workers for the sake and the honour of the Prophet (pbuh) came to fruition and the National Assembly unanimously declared the Qadianis as a non-Muslim minority. Meanwhile, the opposition parties unanimously elected Mufti Mahmood, as parliamentary leader. In 1977, there was talk of elections in the country due to which the United Democratic Front was expanded and an alliance of 9 political parties was formed in the name of Pakistan National Unity. The leadership was handed over to Mufti Mahmood.⁵⁸

In response to the rigging of the 1977 elections, a great movement arose in which the common people of the Muslim ummah also participated and their spirit gave the name Nizam-e-Mustafa to this movement. As a result of this movement, negotiations took place with the PPP government. In the negotiations, the nine-member delegation of National Unity was led by Maulana Mufti Mahmood while the government delegation was led by the late Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

The talks were so close to success that the power-hungry generals and the connivance of some politicians once again instituted martial law on July 5th, 1977. General Zia-ul-Haqq, the Chief of Staff of the Bader Army, assumed power in the name of Islam. In his inaugural address, General Zia-ul-Haqq announced that elections would

⁵⁷ Mohamed Osman, "The Ulama in Pakistani Politics South Asia," *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 230–247.

⁵⁸ Irfan Ahmad, *The Jewish hand: the response of the Jamat-e-Islami Hind*, 138.

be held within 90 days, but instead of holding elections, he imposed censorship on newspapers and forced severe restrictions on political parties.

In September 1980, a meeting of the Central General Assembly of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam was held in Lahore. Under the circumstances, Jamiat leader, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, keeping in view the unity and integrity of Pakistan, organized a new alliance (Movement for Restoration of Democracy) for the purpose of the restoration of democracy. Before the declaration of this alliance was signed on October 14th 1980, at one o'clock in the morning, Maulana Mufti Mahmood met his creator in an academic meeting in Jamiat-ul-Uloom-ul-Islami, Muhammad Yusuf Binori Town, Karachi. To Allah, we belong and to Him, we shall return.⁵⁹

Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam has also played an important role in the constitutional struggle to make its beloved homeland an Islamic welfare state. Allah (swt) has blessed the leaders of the Jamiat with great achievements on this front as well. The study of the Constitution shows their efforts very well.

1. Under Article 2 of the Constitution, the official religion of Pakistan shall be Islam.
2. In the preamble of the Constitution, it is stated very clearly that the sovereign power belongs to Allah (swt) alone and according to the commandments of Allah, the people of Pakistan will use their powers as a sacred trust and democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, the principles of forgiveness and social justice will be followed in accordance with the methods given in Islam. The Muslims of Pakistan will be enabled to live their lives according to the Qur'ān and Sunnah.
3. According to Article 3, it will be the responsibility of the rulers of the state to take such steps so that the individual and collective life of the people of Pakistan is in accordance with the Qur'ān and Sunnah.
4. In accordance with Article 2 (a), the resolution of objectives has been made a part of the constitution which guarantees the full implementation of the Islamic way of life.

⁵⁹ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 110.

5. Article 227 states that all the prevailing laws of the country shall be made in accordance with the Qur'ān and Sunnah.
6. Article 228 relates to the establishment of the Islamic Ideological Council, which will be constituted within 90 days of the enactment of the Constitution.

If the Constitution of Pakistan is implemented today, it will be a complete Islamic welfare state, and people will be comfortable and prosperous and Pakistan and Pakistani people will be dignified and respected all over the world and the world will imitate our social life.⁶⁰

Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam has played a pivotal role in the movement for the implementation of Islam and the overthrowing of the dictatorship. The JUI participated in the general elections held in the country until today and has effectively represented the religious parties in the parliament. In the 2002 general elections, the Jamiat participated on the platform of the Muttahida Majlis -e-Amal, an alliance of religious parties (which came into being through the efforts of the great Jamiat) and won 27 seats in the National Assembly. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was elected Leader of the Opposition. Muttahida Majlis -e-Amal government was formed in the NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwah). The leader of the Jamiat, Muhammad Akram Khan Durrani, was elected Advocate Chief Minister. Revolutionary initiatives in all fields including law and order, education (free education for women up to FA (Faculty of Arts/Intermediate level), women's universities, medical colleges) and health were established which was unprecedented in the last 65 years. By joining the Jamiat took practical steps in health education and development projects of the province.

The Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam participated in the 2008 general elections alone and was once again honoured to represent the religious circles in the National Assembly. Therefore, in these camera sessions of the Parliament, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman addressed the audience for more than an hour and a half despite the usual practice of using cameras and pictures. The Parliament decided to formulate and restructure domestic policies and made future agreements with any country subject to the approval of Parliament. Thus, through this process, the direction of stability of the country, its prosperity, and the development of the people were determined and has the status of a

⁶⁰ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Vanguard of Islamic Revolution*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 119.

revolution in the whole country. An all-party committee was formed in the National Assembly to review the constitution and Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was an important member of this committee. Some parties in the committee suggested to name the country as the People's Republic of Pakistan instead of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and said that Islam, the official religion of Pakistan, should be removed from the constitution and resolution objectives should be removed from the constitution including the law of honour. Amendments for the elimination of other existing Islamic provisions were submitted but by the grace of Allah (swt) Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman thwarted such conspiracies with the best strategy, and because of this strategy the dream of creating a secular state was not realised.⁶¹

Among the leadership figures and patrons of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in different periods were Shaykh-ul-Islam Pakistan Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Maulana Ahmad Ali Lahore, Hafiz-ul-Hadeeth Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, Khawaja Khan Muhammad, Maulana Abdul Karim Qureshi, Maulana Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Maulana Syed Hamid Mian, Maulana Siraj Ahmad Deenpuri, Maulana Muhammad Abdullah as well as Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haidari.

After the approval of the resolution's objectives and the emergence of the five constitutional points of the scholars, the nation expected that practical progress would now be made towards the implementation of Islam. But due to the martyrdom of Khan Liaquat Ali Khan and the passing of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the matter came to a halt. The Muslim League, meanwhile, had been embroiled in power struggles and squabbled for seats, while Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam struggled in finding new leadership. In 1959, Maulana Ahmad Ali Lahore, Maulana Muhammad Abdullah Darkhwasti, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi took over the reins of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan and reorganized it at the national level. By doing so, they started a new journey towards the implementation and implementation of Islamic law. On this the scholars of truth said:

- The JUI pointed out the un-Islamic provisions of the constitution of 1967 and declared a struggle against them.

⁶¹ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military*, 96.

- During the martial law of 1971, the JUI continued its struggle under the name of "Nizam-ul-Ulema Pakistan" and raised its voice against the disgraceful family laws.
- On the draft constitution presented by the late President Muhammad Ayyub in connection with the new constitution, the nationwide demand for making Islamic provisions the basis of the constitution was led by Maulana Muhammad Abdullah's petition from the platform of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam.
- Maulana Mufti Mahmood in the Ayyub National Assembly and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi in the West Pakistan Assembly fought a parliamentary battle for Islamic laws and traditions.
- The JUI participated in the 2014 elections under the "Islamic Manifesto". Gaining the power of "balance" in the Baluchistan and NWFP elections, they formed coalition governments with the "National Awami Party". as the Chief Minister of KPK, Maulana Mufti Mahmood carried out several Islamic reforms.
- As members of the Constituent Assembly, Maulana Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, and Maulana Abdul Haqq of Akorra Khattak played a significant role in drafting the new constitution and succeeded in incorporating various Islamic provisions into the constitution.
- The Tahrik-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa was led by Maulana Mufti Mahmood, Secretary General of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan and head of Pakistan Qaumi Etihad.
- At the risk of its political reputation, the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan (JUI-F) joined hands with the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in the military government, claiming to implement the Islamic system and sincerely cooperated in enforcing the Hudood Ordinance and various other Islamic laws.
- After the death of Maulana Mufti Mahmood, the political alliance formed without laying the foundation of the Islamic system, refused to join the (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy). Islamic scholars of Pakistan raised the banner of Islamic traditions by protecting the unique and privileged position of the Ulema-e-Haqq by equally opposing the rulers who used the name of Islam for the sake of power and the politicians who reject Islam.

- Presenting the "Sharī'ah Bill" in the Senate of Pakistan for the practical implementation of Islamic law, Jamiat leaders Maulana Sami ul Haqq and Maulana Qazi Abdul Latif called for a continuation of the struggle for Islamic aims and objectives of the resolution. Maintained to this end, the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan (JUI-F), by bringing together scholars of all schools of thought on the platform of the United Sharī'ah Front, publicly challenged the hypocritical attitude of the rulers towards the implementation of Islam.
- Leaders and activists of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan (JUI-F) played a significant role in the Movement for the Abolition of Prophethood in the 5th, 6th, and 9th years of his tenure and played an active role in the struggle of the Nation of Islam for the suppression of Qadiani sedition.
- The Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam is constantly working on the platform of the United Sunni Front to curb the growing sectarian aggression against the Sunnis and to protect the constitutional and legal rights of the Sunnis.⁶²

5.13.11 Political Struggle

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was confirmed as the JUI (F) Amīr for the third consecutive time at the central Majlis-e-Shūrā meeting at Lahore in March 2002. Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haidari, furthermore, was also recommended as the general secretary for the third successive term. The party under the leadership of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman has progressed politically in all provinces of state. Due to their progressive politics the JUI-(F) had been holding an international Deoband conference at Peshawar since April 2001. The conference was joined by millions of party members from all over Pakistan and overseas. It was organized to honour the 150th anniversary of the establishment of the madrassa (in the Native Indian city of Deoband) that has always been a resource of religious and political motivation for the JUI.⁶³

Significantly, the conference was organized at a time when Afghanistan was governed by the Taliban, many of whom were graduates of religious seminaries (Madrassas) in Pakistan. The supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah Muhammad Omar,

⁶² Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military*, 124.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 139.

had sent his senior representative with a written message that was read aloud at their Madrassa. This was crucial because, for the first time, the JUI had a government and formed its strength from the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The JUI leadership had been keeping close interaction with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Seeing the achievements of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan, the JUI (F) could expect identical success in Pakistan. This was one good purpose why at an Aieen-e-Sharī'ah (Sharī'ah Constitution) conference at Iqbal Park Lahore in October 1997, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman declared dissociation from the electoral procedure and announced the struggle for the Islamic revolution in Pakistan. The decision was recommended by the Majlis-e-Shūrā.⁶⁴

The Taliban increase in power nearby had emboldened the JUI (F) workers to the level that they had openly started to ignore the law of land. The problem was more serious in areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwah and the tribal places where its party workers started to frighten people and destroy facilities of lawful installations like satellite television systems. They went circular, striking television places and confronting those in-charge to shut down movie centres. They released threatening claims and assaulted Non-Governmental Organization teams (NGOs) whose members were working for the betterment of women in tribal areas. The party was also the most prominent force in anti-government agitation when Pakistan declared its complete assistance to the US-led international coalition war on terrorism following the 9/11 strikes in New York and Washington. That involved the choice to give up the Taliban in Afghanistan and assisting the international group The Taliban in Afghanistan, who had provided both governmental and religious support to Pakistan, were now to be abandoned. This U-turn in Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban meant losing a significant ally and supporter. It took many followers to demonstrations on the roads and demands for Jihād against the U.S forces. There were also calls for the end the assistance given to America going against the Taliban government. The agitation, however, failed due to the absence of community assistance. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman was placed under detention and the whole activity fizzled out with the failure of the Taliban in November 2001. The JUI (F) had been enjoying a significant part in the strategy against national initiatives to

⁶⁴ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military*, 123.

control Islami Madāris and Jihādī outfits.⁶⁵

5.13.12 Enforcement of Sharī'ah: Ballot or Bullet

It is claimed that by having potential violent opposition, religious political parties posed a threat to democratic change and advancement⁶⁶), but JUI-F's actual political role seems quite divergent. Unlike Pakistan's insurgent groups such as Tahrīk-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its subgroups, JUI-F has always acknowledged peaceful political transition and Sharī'ah implementation by taking an active role in the democratic system and strengthening political culture and institutions rather than interfering in direct and aggressive clash with civil and military institutions. Such extremist groups have attempted to murder Fazal-Ur-Rehman and have murdered thousands of members along with members of parliament and philosophers associated with JUI-F, including famous religious scholar and man of letters Maulana Meraj u Din. Recently a suicide bombing on party General Secretary Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haidari was attempted for not owning the militant groups' Jihādī ideology and strategy and participating in a democracy-like Un-Islamic Political System.

While democracy was perceived alien to Islam and a personification of the Western agenda of subjugating Islam and Muslims, the JUI-F has dramatically altered the views and understandings of traditional religious scholars on democracy. In essence, the JUI-F is not against the democratic and popularly elected governance system because their democratic approach is manifested by the party constitution itself. It states that all important decisions will be made based on the majority opinion. There was a new development in which exclusive social reformist movements such as the one led by Pir Zulfiqar Ahmed Naqshbandi (a Sufi scholar who leads a large number of Deobandi Muslims with a spiritual tendency), and Tablighi Jamat (the reformist movement of the Deobandi school of thought, established exclusively and dedicated to the preaching of Islam at the grass-root level), were in close contact with Maulana Fazal-Ur-Rehman and showed interest in Pakistan's democratic system by voting the

⁶⁵ Filippo Ozella and Caroline Ozella, *Islamic Reform in South Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 479.

⁶⁶ International Crisis Group, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*, *Crisis Group Asia Report no. 216* (2011), 11. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/216%20Islamic%20Parties%20in%20Pakistan.pdf>. accessed June 12, 2024,

JUI-F. The JUI-F appeared keen to develop a democratic process by not participating in movements such as the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Defence of Pakistan Council DPC), an ally of hard core, establishment and religious political and jihādist parties created in the wake of civil military conflict over certain security and defence problems. A certain approach was experienced in the latest tussle between democratic government and army establishment under the camouflage of the case of Panama Paper, in which Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif was disqualified by the Pakistan Supreme Court for the position of Premier despite being elected by popular majority votes. The JUI-F preferred favouring and defending the democratic government rather than endorsing the establishment line as Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and other religious political parties did. Within the party, the JUI-F undergoes democratic transitions.

Even though it needs to promote the democratic culture in the party, it will take longer to adopt it over time and progressively. Various views are expressed about the weakness and strength of the JUI-F's organizational structure. It has only been labelled as a party of clergy and madrassa graduates, but it is true that they have appointed a person like Akram Khan Durrani as chief minister, who is not a religious person or a madrassa graduate in the real sense. Instead, he had previously had a political affiliation with Awami National Party, a secular and nationalist political party.⁶⁷

In addition, the last general elections in 2013 and local government elections in 2015 indicated another shift in the JUI-F leadership's political outlook. They designated such candidates who don popular symbols of religion such as beard, turban, certain dresses, etc. All three Khyber Pakhtunkhwa PK-74, 75, and 76 provincial assembly constituencies were allocated to members of local elite families. The same trend has also been observed throughout Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in local elections.

5.13.13 Militancy versus Democracy

The very first article of the JUI-F's 2013 election manifesto begins with the statement that "Peace is going to be our main political priority." Distancing itself from the pro-establishment political movements and joining forces with those in favour of a smooth and continuous democratic process, the JUI-F has adopted a policy of bringing about

⁶⁷ Filippo Ozella, *Islamic Reform in South Asia*, 480.

change through democratic processes rather than joining forces with militant and jihādīst organizations.

Consequently, in the form of murder attempts on top leadership, parliament members, intellectuals, and activists, the party faced dire consequences. Although the party sacrificed many well-educated and knowledgeable religious scholars, seasoned parliamentarians, and devoted activists, it never used the same coin to retaliate. Instead, it encourages its members to maintain confidence in the transition to democracy that leads to long-term strategy with self-discipline and sacrifice rather than accepting short-term violence and religious extremism by terrorizing the masses and engaging in an unnecessary armed struggle against the country's military and military forces.⁶⁸

5.13.14 Sectarianism and Pluralism

History observed a division in the JUI-F because of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman's pluralist approach. A new non-Shī'ah group, prone to violence and extremism, named Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Companion Soldier) was formed. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan began to emerge as a defender of the Messenger's religious position and dignity (Allah (swt) be pleased with them) as a reaction to the organized movement to defame and disrespect the Companions (May Allah be pleased with them) by a few extremist Shī'ah scholars. It hurts those hardliner's religious sentiments, and they began to react similarly and ultimately resorted to violent fighting against the Shī'ah community. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman never favoured their understanding of the issue and their strategy to address it. He was therefore criticized by the fanatics and even attacked, but he distanced himself from the anti-Shī'ah approach. That was why in his native district, Dera Ismail Khan, a considerable number of people from the Shī'ah community cast their votes in his favour in every election. He also gained the favours of Bareilvi voters as well as the district's majority religious community because of his pluralist political approach. The leadership of the same anti-Shī'ah militant groups became evident in recent years. For example, Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi was one of Maulana Fazal-Ur-Rahman's closest affiliates. Additionally, Maulana Masroor Nawaz Jhangvi, the son of renowned non-Shī'ah scholar Maulana Haqq Nawaz Jhangvi and a member of the banned SSP (now

⁶⁸ Mohamed Osman, "The Ulama in Pakistani Politics: South Asia," *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 230–247.

operating as Ahl e Sunnah Wal Jamat), won the by-election for the Punjab provincial assembly. This came after Maulana Fazal Ur Rahman convinced him of the need for and importance of democracy in Pakistan and of the dangerous impacts of sectarianism, extremism, and violence on almost all parts of the country with religious groups. He did not only join the JUI-F after winning the by-elections but also distanced himself publicly from the non-Shī'ah propaganda.⁶⁹

5.13.15 Minority Rights

The leadership of the JUI-F organized a three-day conference and invited nearly all political leaders, ambassadors from different countries, as well as the Bishop of Pakistan. It was the first political gathering organized by a religious party to invite not only a non-Muslim representative but also to share his views with the participants. The effort shows their pluralistic approach to politics.

The JUI-F currently has a senator for a Christian minority group, Asia Nasir, in their party. She admits that the party has never encouraged her to pursue the Islamic path, but that she was free to support and experience her own religious doctrine. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (F) 2013 Election Manifesto includes few pledges on the status and rights of minorities in Pakistan. It claims that minority groups will be equal under the law of Pakistan and will have all the fundamental rights assured in Islam and the Constitution, including freedom of religion. The anti-Muslim minority in the state will enjoy the freedom of religion, human rights, and unbiased access to justice.⁷⁰

5.13.16 Electoral Representation in the Parliament

The big crack for the Jamiat came following the general elections of 1970. Mufti Mehmood won the national assembly seat against the former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the in Dera Ismail Khan with a difference of ten thousand votes.

The defunct National Awami Party (NAP) of Khan Abdul Wali Khan and the JUI entered a political partnership consequently and established a coalition provincial

⁶⁹ Masooda Bano, *The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 70-71.

⁷⁰ Arif Jamal, *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir*, (London: Melville House, 2009), 108–109.

government in the Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Although the NAP was the largest party with thirteen members of Provincial Assembly (MPA), the chief ministership of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was granted to Mufti Mehmood whose party had only four members of the Provincial Assembly in a house of 40 MPA.

On May 1st, 1972, Mufti Mehmood took the oath of his office and immediately took steps to prohibit alcohol. Declared as un-Islamic, Bhutto charged NAP with being a secessionist party following the recovery of arms and weapons from the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. This occurrence was said to be connected to the JUI in Baluchistan. On February 15th, 1973, the NAP-JUI government in Baluchistan was eliminated from power. Mufti Mehmood's government in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa resigned during the elimination. Maulana Mufti Mehmood died on October 14th 1980 to be quickly succeeded by his elder son Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the same year he was chosen as party deputy secretary-general at the central Majlis-e-Shūrā conference in Lahore.

5.13.17 Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (F) position in the Parliament

In 1988, the party was divided into two groups over policy matters. The faction led by Fazal-ur-Rehman became JUI (F), and the other was known as the JUI (Darkhwasti). Darkhwasti, however, disbanded his team. Nevertheless, the faction stayed outside the party, advanced by Maulana Sami-ul-Haqq to become the JUI (S). In the political scenario, the JUI (F) continued to be the mainstream Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, experiencing support both in political and electoral conditions. In the 1993 elections, the JUI (F) properly secured four seats of the National Assembly, two each in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the 1997 elections, the party could secure only two seats, both in Baluchistan. Fazal-ur-Rehman himself lost the 1997 elections.⁷¹

On the provincial field, the JUI (F) could get only one seat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the 1993 election. The same happened in 1997. In Baluchistan however, it obtained the complete seven seats in the 1997 elections and completed developing a coalition government. It enhanced its count of three seats in the 1993 elections. In the 1997 elections, the JUI (F) fared better in comparison to other political and religious parties by gambling 1.7% and 2.27% of the overall ballots polled in the

⁷¹ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and Islamic Revivalism*, 97.

national and provincial assembly elections respectively (Election Commission of Pakistan). The JUI (F) indicated better leads to Baluchistan where it obtained ascendancy at the price of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party in the Pushtun-dominated areas. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa however, it had been able to win only one seat in the Provincial Assembly. The party head, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, had been successful in his native Dera Ismail Khan constituency.⁷²

5.14 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the methodologies and strategies employed by Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) in their quest to establish an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. It has outlined the core principles and approaches that define their political vision, focusing on their electoral strategies, legislative participation, and intellectual frameworks. The chapter highlighted the distinct methods both parties use to engage with the political system, shape public discourse, and respond to the challenges of democratic norms and coalition politics. Moreover, it underscores the differences between the JI and JUI in addressing key issues such as national interests, minority rights, and the role of religion within Pakistan's constitutional framework. Despite their efforts, both parties face significant challenges in reconciling their Islamic ideals with the practical demands of contemporary governance. Ultimately, this chapter offers a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in translating ideological aspirations into effective political action in Pakistan's evolving political landscape.

⁷² Sayyid A. S. Pirzada, *The Politics of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan 1971-1977*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 154.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the study, summarizing the key findings and insights gained throughout the research. It reflects on the major themes and methodologies discussed in the preceding chapters, offering a comprehensive understanding of the efforts by Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) to implement an Islamic governance system in Pakistan. Additionally, this chapter provides recommendations for future initiatives, offering practical steps and strategies to further explore the challenges and opportunities identified in the study. Through these conclusions and recommendations, the chapter aims to contribute to ongoing discussions on the role of Islamic political movements in shaping governance frameworks in Pakistan.

6.2 CONCLUSION

Today's world divides human society into two parts: the lawmakers and the law enforcers. The logical consequences and negative effects of this distinction could not be eliminated despite all efforts and the world is still divided between the rulers and the subjugated. The only solution to this is in Islam, that there is only one law maker, and all human beings are equally bound by the laws and rules made by Him.

The global conflict between capitalism and communism, and the subsequent usurpation of interest, profiteering, speculations, and halal and haram market economy, has left the world in a quandary. It is necessary to bring the world back to the realm of halal and haram based on divine teachings and to adopt economic principles based on mutual benefit and public interest instead of unilateral profits, which only Islam has at present.

Even today, the ideal for the establishment of a truly welfare state in the eyes of the world was only achievable during the period of the righteous Caliphate, especially by Umar bin Khattab and Umar bin Abdul Aziz. In some cases, they are being followed,

but the fruits of a system cannot be reaped by adopting only partial aspects, it is necessary to adopt the whole system for its proper use.

Nationalism, regionalism, and linguistic bigotry have once again taken over human society and in today's world, the affairs of human society are again being decided with reference to the nation and the country. Whereas Islam, by declaring racial, linguistic, and territorial divisions ignorant values, had bound the concept of nation, language, and country only within the limits of introduction and distinction and had practically liberated the human race from the exploitative role of these prejudices. Today this liberation from prejudices is needed again and only Islam can play a role in this.

The main reason for the failure of religious political parties in the elections of Pakistan is hypocrisy among them. Whenever religio-political parties contested elections together, they achieved considerable success. Even during the rise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Maulana Mufti Mahmood of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam formed the provincial government in Frontier Province, and he was elected as the Chief Minister. Religious parties played a key role in the nine-party Pakistan National Alliance against rigging in the 1977 elections against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This alliance launched a vigorous political movement called "Tehrīk Nizām e Muṣṭafā" which was successful and Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was removed from power.

In 1990, "Islamic Democratic Alliance" (IJI) was formed, in which the majority of religious and political parties formed an electoral alliance with Mian Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League and defeated Benazir Bhutto's popular political party People's Party. Under General Musharraf, in the general elections of 2002, religious and political parties formed the electoral alliance Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), which established governments in the two provinces of the country, Sarhad and Baluchistan. It was successful and 60 members of the MMA were elected to the National Assembly, while Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League (N) together could not send to the Assembly even 40 members.

There is a vote bank of religious political parties in Pakistan. If you look at the election history of Pakistan and examine the election statistics, it is not very difficult to figure out that whenever religious parties participated in the election together, their candidates will win. The number was also higher, and the percentage of votes obtained

was also much higher. If we take the average of these statistics, it will be known that the single vote bank of a few major religious parties is close to twenty percent in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Similarly, in Punjab and Sindh, the vote bank of some religious parties is more than 12 percent.

If all the religious political parties unite, it can easily become the third largest political force in Pakistan. It is also difficult to estimate the exact vote bank of religious parties, because the vote of the parties also goes to other political parties, among which now Tahrīk-e-Insaf is at the top. When a common voter, no matter how religious he is, sees no chance of a candidate of a religious party winning, will not vote for a candidate of a losing religious party, as he thinks his precious vote will be wasted. That is why he has been voting for the candidates of two major political parties, first Muslim League (Nawaz) and now Pakistan Tahrīk-e-Insaf is taking advantage of this. How surprising is that Imran Khan, the popular leader of the country's largest political party, cannot hope for success without giving it a fake "religious touch". On the other hand, the real exponents of Islam and religion, those from religious parties, do not realize their power. If religious and political parties forget their differences and unite, no major political party at the centre can form a government without their support. The question arises that if the advocates of the unity of the entire Muslim Ummah cannot create unity within themselves, then how much negative impression will it create among the people. Leaders of religious and political parties should understand this very well. If they cannot unite by forgetting their group, sectarian, or religious issues, then how can they expect the people to unite under their flag, when the flag itself is not one. How surprising is that the flag of those who believe in one Allah, one Messenger, one Book, one House of Kaaba, one House of the Prophet, and one Day of Resurrection, is not the same.

The religious and political parties believe in the constitution of Pakistan. They are supporters of the constitutional democratic system and protectors of the Islamic provisions given in the constitution but are unable to achieve political electoral success without political unity and cooperation among themselves. Electoral success is the key to the implementation of the constitution. It is not an easy task because not only do religious parties mistrust each other, the same religious party is internally divided into many factions. As far as religion or school of thought is concerned, there are more than one political party of the same sect or religion. Today's world and human society have become alienated and even rebellious from the divine teachings and commands of Allah

(swt) who created them. At present, the world has no alternative but to embrace the Islamic system and bring society back to the divine revelation and the sovereignty of Allah Almighty.

The interesting thing is that the cause of hypocrisy in religious parties is not religious but political as there is disagreement among those who should lead. A solution to this problem can be found by sitting together. Most importantly, success in alliance with another major political party is also possible when these religious parties are united. The biggest advantage of the unity among the religious parties will be that the three major political parties of the country, Pakistan Tahrik-e-Insaaf, Pakistan Muslim League (N), and Pakistan People's Party, will look to them for electoral success. A coalition of religious parties can make seat adjustments or electoral alliances with any of them considering their political advantage. There can also be alliances with separate political parties in the centre and provinces. In this way, the candidates of religious parties can reach large numbers in assemblies.

According to the above analysis, the alliance of religious and political parties can become a major electoral force. All the religious parties should gather on one platform and struggle together so that these parties are able to implement their manifesto and program. If the religious parties do not unite, the possibility of their success in the upcoming elections is very doubtful.

6.3 FINDINGS

The discussion in the previous pages concludes that:

This study evaluates Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan's and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-F's significant actions in their political strategy that somehow changes their ideology towards implementing Islamic system in Pakistan.

The perfect and contemporary notion of democracy is alien to societies, apart from a few exceptions. The colonial governments and their political system, which ruled over the Muslim majority nations during the colonial era, are one of the primary factors of the anti-democracy strategy. For different social, political, and religious reasons, the JUI-F Pakistan has undergone inevitable political changes and ideological transformations. Major events that have occurred demonstrate its political shift. While

some of Deoband's academics like those in the JUI-S still favour radical groups and promote their cause, but in this situation, the JUI-F Pakistan is an exception. The party's general political function may not be fully and ideally democratic, but occurrences demonstrate their in-depth knowledge of continuing political changes and ground-based realities at regional and international levels. The ability of Pakistan's extremist Islamic parties to face a limited but potentially violent opposition had to face democracy, and through expansion, reduce religious extremism and improve a more peaceful and stable society. It is difficult to do as it reflects the effective extremist basis of these parties or that they are ready to protect it through great inspiration and revelation. While their electoral popularity in the masses remains low, the religious political parties have increased their influence in the parliament after introducing the Islamic structure in the politics of the state. Various aspects of the party agenda and organization analysis and other aspects that impact legal, political, and general society, provides estimate to how the Pakistani religious leaders pressurize the government. The capability to demonstrate the support of these groups on their various agreements is clearly expressed internally, in policymaking procedures and relationships between management, leadership, rating, and file. After that, those from the ruling parties will likely understand their role in the country and their future relationships as prospects to influence state politics.

The dominant perceptions about the Islamists are that of rigid, uncompromising, and anti-democratic actors. The objective of this thesis is to ascertain the reality behind such claims. A case in point is Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI) which is blamed for its tactical support to the authoritarian regime of General Mohammad Zia-ul Haqq during the years 1977-88, and resultantly being labelled as an anti-democratic force. Prominent works authored by distinguished scholars were explored to ascertain the reality behind this claim. One-to-one interviews were also conducted to cross-verify the facts. The party's decisions during this period were analytically reviewed with the help of background context. This study found that the party's main concerns during the Zia period were the implementation of Nizam-e-Mustafa as demanded by the anti-Bhutto movement, early elections, and avoidance of confrontation with state institutions. When the party realized that the methods adopted by the incumbent regime contradicted the JI's vision, the party stalwarts started criticizing the regime. Due to the Afghan issue and the previous experience of the Bhutto regime, the party did not join the opposition movement led by Pakistan People's Party. However, the party vehemently opposed the

dictatorial stance of Zia's sympathizers in the higher courts. Resultantly, criticism of the military regime cost the party in the form of the neutralization of its student organization (Islami Jamiat-e-Tulabā') and the dismissal of its city government of Karachi. Based on these facts, claiming the Islamists as being non-democratic falls short of being convincing proof. The study transpired that JI, through a pragmatic approach, has continuously tried to synthesize Islamic politics with democratic norms as per its understanding.

After 30 years of hectic efforts, Jamat-e-Islami succeeded in organizing a mass movement in 1977 in favour of the party's declared mission of implementation of Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic System of Life). Admittedly, it was the most successful right-wing political movement in Pakistan, just as Bhutto's 1968-69 movement was Pakistan's most successful popular movement. Support for the movement came not only from the religious segment of society but also from the seculars and leftists. It was an alliance of a broad spectrum of left-leaning, centrist, and rightist parties with their main focus on giving opposition to Bhutto, however, it acquired an Islamist hue from the very early days. The basic cause of this unprecedented alliance was the hopeless performance of the Bhutto regime from 1971-1977. He was supported by the masses, as well as the leftist intellectuals in the 1970 elections with the hope of establishing social justice and rectification of economic imbalances created during the ten years of Ayyub Khan (1958-1968) during which the fruits of industrialization and economic progress were stolen by a few industrialist families. The public felt deceived and deprived, and Bhutto promised to rectify these wrongdoings, hence, the people supported him wholeheartedly. However, within the short period of the PPP rule, its fascist policies antagonized most sectors of society. It was commented by certain political analysts that conceit and authoritarianism were central to Bhutto's achievements as well as his downfall. As a result of the PNA movement and after the tainted 1977 elections, the situation got out of Bhutto's control and the military dethroned him on July 5th, 1977. As the movement against Bhutto adopted the slogan of Nizām-e Muṣṭafā, the masses found in it the solution to their chronic problems of poverty as well as others. The military regime promised elections within 90 days and announced steps for the implementation of Nizām-e Muṣṭafā (Prophetic Way of Life). When the martial law administrator used the same terminology used by the JI for steps for Islamization, the party felt that the scheme of implementation of such a process will be as suggested in

their literature, i.e., gradual enforcement of Islamic injunctions after ensuring the fulfilment of basic needs of the masses accompanied by a comprehensive reformation program of the bureaucracy and the people at large through education, training, and media propagation. The party's basic theme was that public support was a prerequisite for the success of Islamization. However, the military leadership had its limitations as well as certain perceptions of an Islamic system. One of the major differences among these views was regarding the parliamentary system of government in Islam. Another threat to the regime was the comeback of Bhutto through elections. However, up till 1979, the regime managed to retain the party's full support. By that time, they had gotten rid of Bhutto and successfully maneuvered the disintegration of the PNA. When the November 1979 elections were postponed, despite Jamat-e-Islami and other political party's opposition, the military regime felt confident that they could ignore the JI and managed support from other religious and orthodox elements for their narrative. Military authorities also knew the JI's hate for the PPP and of the little chance of joining the opposition led by Bhutto's decedents. However, they kept the party engaged from 1984-1985. By that time, they neutralized the JI as well as Islami Jamiat-e-Tulabā by banning student unions, supporting the MQM, the nationalists, as well as Pakistan Muslim League (PML Pagara Group). JI felt constrained in opposing the martial law authorities openly and actively due to the party's stakes in the Afghan Jihād, its previous shocking experience with the 1970s PPP government, and the dangers of Sindhi separatists' activities. Although the JI aspired for democracy as depicted in their leader's detailed arguments in a case in the Shari'ah bench of Lahore High Court, it but could not confront the martial law authorities because of the above-mentioned constraints. This conflict caused a lot of discontent within the party and as soon as the situation in Afghanistan took a positive turn and the law-and-order situation in Pakistan improved, the party openly joined the opposition in 1987-1988. It is rightly said that during this period the JI, which vied for an Islamic System in Pakistan, opposed Zia's Islamization. However, even in such a situation the party continuously criticized the authoritative style of the military ruler though the party did not involve itself in an open confrontation with the regime as done from 1947- 1977 due to certain reasons of their own. This study concludes that the JI has its understanding of a gradual Islamization that is not in contradiction with democracy. Even the feeling of the top leader of the JI that the strong resistance in the party did not allow him to cooperate with Zia and the severe opposition by the party towards Zia's narrative of an Islamic system in the court

supports this conclusion. It also points toward the party's sensitivity toward anarchy in the country, as it was also one of the major factors in not challenging the military regime due to the precarious situation in Sindh and Afghanistan. Although the opponents time and again blamed the party as a B team of Zia, the party refrained from creating a law-and-order issue in the country despite glaring differences with the regime and knowing well that it will damage the party's political fortune.

Linking Islam to Pakistan was the interpretation of "Pakistan ka matlab kya" (What does Pakistan mean?) but we see that most of the laws that govern the lives of the people of Pakistan are not entirely derived from Islam. Not all our affairs are being decided by Islam, whether at the governmental or the judicial level. In government orders and laws to run the affairs of the country, in taxes levied daily, or in judicial decisions in resolving controversial issues, Islam is not entirely their centre and source. After seventy-five years, the names and numbers of Pakistan's laws and Penal Codes are the same as the British. They are section 302, 307, or 420 or Partnership Act 1932. The Police Ordinance of 1861 was in force with several subsequent amendments. Whereas an Islamic state requires the complete implementation of Islam in which everything except Islam is rejected.

After the establishment of Pakistan, all the governments tried to give the impression that some level of progress and efforts towards the implementation of Islam were going on in the country. From the very beginning, happy announcements started coming out that the State Bank of Pakistan would be established on the Islamic model. In 1949, the drawn Objectives Resolution became an important and fundamental effort towards the implementation of Islam. The 1962 and subsequent constitutions included Islamic clauses, and the 1973 constitution, was unanimously agreed upon by religious parties and secular circles.

The Islamic Ideological Council for the Implementation of Islam or the Federal Shari'ah Court created by General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s whose main responsibility was to challenge laws that conflict with Islam and to remove un-Islamic clauses from the Constitution will end.

Apart from this, there are elected representatives of the people in the Parliament, National Assembly and Senate, ordinary courts, Shari'ah courts, and appellate benches in the Supreme Court. Despite all these activities, we see that Pakistan as a state is

moving away from the goal of Islam and despite all these efforts and institutions, we have not succeeded in implementing an Islamic ruling on usury.

Be it British or American colonialism and their remnants, they never present themselves as enemies of Islam. They present themselves as friends of Muslims and Islam and they seem to recognize Islam more than Muslims. In Article 3 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, the United States has recorded that "*there shall be no law against the holy religion of Islam*".

Similarly, in Article (A) 2 of the Constitution of Iraq, the United States itself has written that "no law can be made that is against the principles of Islam". Thus, what the Afghan leadership and Saddam Hussain could not do about Islam, America has done.

Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan also states that no law shall be made in Pakistan contrary to the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In fact, to formulate its formal system, a constitutional body consisting of 20 members was also formed in the same constitution in articles number 228, 229, and 230 under the name of Islamic Ideological Council, which reviews matters referred to it by the president, governor or most of the assembly. After reviewing the Islamic status of the matter, they had to submit their report within 15 days. In the presence of these laws, who can doubt that efforts are being made to enforce Islam in Pakistan. However, in practice, we see that since 1990, an Islamic order has been circling the corridors of the courts for implementation, and yet the effort to implement it is not fruitful. On one side is the constitution of Pakistan and on the other side is a veritable forest of doubts arising from the failures of practical efforts. on the pages of the Constitution of Pakistan, if Pakistan is moving towards the implementation of Islam, then the active and successful role of all governments, government institutions, and high courts is the biggest obstacle to stop this progress. People, religious circles, and religious political parties are entangled in this conflict, between belief and doubt, existence and non-existence, in this game of swinging ladder and snake. This deceptive game of climbing the ladder and pulling the ladder has been arranged with great skill, in the presence of which Islam cannot be fully implemented in Pakistan even in a thousand years. Generation after generation, Pakistan as a nation and state is moving away from Islam instead of coming closer to it. Instead of Islamic laws, non-Islamic laws are increasingly practised in Pakistan.

Anyone who comes to power in Pakistan gets busy with constitutional

amendments and legislation of his own choice. Every government uses the power of legislation in its own interest to make laws, in which even one percent does not feel the need to consult the scholars and get a fatwa whether these laws are in accordance with Islam or against it and whether the Qur'ān, Sunnah, *Ijmā'*, and *Qiyās* references are exact or not.

If any party, member of parliament, or individual has any objection to this legislation, he can certainly approach the courts to have it declared invalid, which is unlikely to succeed. The role of the Islamic Ideological Council is no more than an advisory committee unable to implement its decisions. Parliament is not bound to legislate from Qur'ān and Sunnah but can derive laws from anywhere.

One of the main objections raised against the Islamic Ideological Council and the Federal Shari'ah Court is that why laws against Islam or against the Qur'ān and Sunnah are made and must be challenged in the courts. If in the constitution of Pakistan, instead of "No law in Pakistan shall be made contrary to the Qur'ān and Sunnah", it is stated that "Every law in Pakistan shall be derived from the Qur'ān and Sunnah" then the root problem of legislation against Islam can be removed. These institutions are proof that the laws in Pakistan are not being made by deriving them from Qur'ān and Sunnah. This basic mechanism is wrong which aims to deceive people and is just an Islamic touch, not a pure Islamic line of action.

6.4 SUGGESTIONS

Participating in elections without changing the system is tantamount to political suicide for religious parties.

Jamat-e-Islami along with other religious parties should be separated from this invalid system. All parties should consult with each other, explain the defects of this system to the public, present their demands to correct this system, and protest by holding rallies. There is also the choice of doing civil disobedience if necessary. Demands or proposals may take the form of the following suggestions:

1. Only educated people should be given the right to vote. The minimum requirement should be matric pass, and the age of voters should be at least 25 years. Israr Ahmad opines that the ideal age should be 40 years. This is very

important, and this is the root of Western democracy. The voter should not be punished by any court. Because a vote is also a testimony in favour of a servant of Allah, the testimony of a transgressor is not accepted in Islam.

2. The administration conducting the elections should consist of civil people and agreed by people of all parties.
3. The procedure should proportionally be representation. That is, parties should fight elections, not individuals.
4. Election campaigns should be limited and free from the use of money.
5. Election should be carried out through electronic machines.
6. There should not be a presidential system because there is no external pressure on the judiciary, administration, and legislature. The President can appoint any person outside the Parliament as a minister, whereas in the parliamentary system that is prevalent in our country, it is the opposite.
7. Elections should be held separately.
8. The loopholes in provisions 61 and 62 should be removed and its implementation should be made practically possible.
9. President, Governor, Chief Minister, Minister, etc. should not get any kind of exception.
10. In the current constitution, all the constitutional clauses that conflict with the practical implementation of the Qur'ān and Sunnah as the supreme law should be abolished.
11. The suggestions of the Islamic Ideological Council should be accepted as the final letter should not be given the status of a mere recommendation and should be made a part of the law immediately.
12. The procedure for reporting any law that conflicts with the Qur'ān and Sunnah to the Islamic Ideological Council should be made simple. The Islamic Ideological Council should be given the authority to take notice automatically.
13. The head of all the policy-making bodies of the state will be Muslims only.
14. Women should be represented only as needed.

15. After the election, the parties who nominate their candidates for parliament should have a very high transparency ratio.
16. Parties formed in the name of linguistic, regional, and purely communal hatred should be banned.
17. The number of provinces should be increased through mutual consultation. If they are made at the division level, then it is very good.

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Religious parties should open schools, institutions, and colleges for poor children where these children can study at very low cost.
2. Schools like Dar e Arqam should not be for the children of nobles only.
3. Scholarships should be given to those children who are capable so that they can prepare for competitive exams like CSS.
4. Religious parties should spend money on worthy and religious people and prepare them for high civil and military positions. Such officers will join these institutions and will not block the way of religious parties but promote them to make easy the implementation of Islamic system in Pakistan.
5. As much money as religious parties have been spent on this democracy. If it is spent on the poor, then they will consider you as their sympathizer.
6. By doing this, the bureaucracy and the army role will also improve in Pakistan.

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