

MODERNIZATION IN TÜRKİYE: AN ANALYTICAL  
STUDY ON ATTİLA İLHAN (1925-2005) AND  
NECMETTİN ERBAKAN (1926-2011)

BY

ESRA POLAT

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the  
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AbdulHamid AbuSulayman Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed  
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## ABSTRACT

This study explores the perspectives of Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan, two influential figures with contrasting worldviews, on Türkiye's modernization process. Utilizing a comparative methodology, the research first examines the concepts of modernization and Westernization, highlighting their distinctions. The findings reveal that non-Western modernization theory emerged as a critical response to modernization theorists who conflated modernization with Westernization. To substantiate this theory, the modernization trajectories of Japan and Malaysia are analyzed as successful and applicable examples. The study identifies a persistent misconception in Türkiye and beyond, where modernization and Westernization—conceptually distinct processes—have often been erroneously equated by modernizers, both historically and in contemporary discourse.

Tracing Türkiye's modernization journey from the late Ottoman period, the research demonstrates that this conflation originated during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, persisted through the Tanzimat reforms, and became entrenched in the policies of the Republic of Türkiye under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Following Atatürk's death, İsmet İnönü's presidency marked a period of reflection, during which the concepts of Westernization and modernization were re-examined with greater nuance, revealing a modernization process heavily influenced by Western cultural paradigms.

By analyzing the ideas of Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan, the study concludes that both thinkers critically assessed Türkiye's modernization as flawed, arguing that it leaned more toward Westernization than genuine modernization. Ultimately, this research provides an in-depth evaluation of Türkiye's modernization process by identifying historical missteps and advocating İlhan and Erbakan's perspectives for a modernization model that aligns with Türkiye's cultural traditions, historical legacy, and societal values, rather than uncritically adopting Western frameworks. The study asserts that an alternative, culturally resonant modernization path is possible and essential for Türkiye's future development.

## ملخص البحث

وهما، أربكان الدين ونجم إلهان أتيلًا نظر وجهات الدراسة هذه تستكشف تركيا في التحديث عملية حول، متباينة عالمية رؤى ذواتا مؤثرتان شخصيتان مُبرزاً، والتغريب التحديث مفهومي أولاً البحث يدرس، مقارنة منهجية باستخدام فعل كرد نشأت الغربية غير التحديث نظرية أن النتائج وتكشف بينهما الفروقات تُحلل، النظرية هذه لإثبات بينهما خلطوا الذين التحديث منظرٍ على نقدي تُحدد كما. للتطبيق وقابلة ناجحة كأمثلة وماليزيا اليابان في التحديث مسارات المحدثون ساوى ما كثيراً حيث، وخارجها تركيا في سائداً خاطئاً مفهوماً الدراسة وفي تاريخياً، خطأً - مفاهيمياً مختلفتان عمليتان وهما - والتغريب التحديث بين، العثماني العهد أواخر منذ تركيا تحديث رحلة البحث يتتبع. المعاصر الخطاب خلال واستمر، الثاني محمود السلطان عهد في نشأ التداخل هذا أن ويوضح مصطفى عهد في التركية الجمهورية سياسات في وترسخ، التنظيمات إصلاحات خلالها أعيد، تأمل فترة إينونو عصمت رئاسة مثلت، وفاته بعد. أتاتورك كمال تحديث عملية عن كاشفةً، الدقة من بمزيد والتحديث التغريب مفهومي في النظر الغربية الثقافية بالنماذج بشدة تأثرت.

كلا أن إلى الدراسة خلصت، أربكان الدين ونجم إلهان أتيلًا أفكار بتحليل نحو اتجه بأنه مجادلين، معيب بأنه نقدياً تقييماً تركيا تحديث قيماً المفكرين تقييماً البحث هذا يُقدّم، المطاف نهاية في. الحقيقي التحديث من أكثر التغريب والدعوة، التاريخية الأخطاء تحديد خلال من، تركيا في التحديث لعملية مُعمّفاً الثقافية التقاليد مع يتماشى تحديث نموذج إلى الداعية وأربكان إلهان رؤى إلى دون الغربية الأطر تبني من بدلاً، المجتمعية وقيمها، التاريخي وإرثها، التركية، التركية الثقافة مع مُنسجماً، بديلاً تحديثياً مساراً أن الدراسة وتؤكد. تمحيص المستقبلية تركيا لتطور وضروري مُمكن.

## APPROVAL PAGE

The thesis of Esra Polat has been approved by the following:

*Olsi Jazexhi*

---

Dr. Olsi Jazexhi  
Supervisor

---

Asst. Prof. Dr. Alwi  
Co-supervisor

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Özay  
Internal Examiner

---

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---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Spahic Omer  
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
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
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*Dedicated to my beloved spouse Alparslan Onbaşı, who has been the guiding light in  
my life and a source of endless growth.*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> (Justice and Development Party)
ASELSAN	Military Electronics Industry Inc.
CHP	<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> (Republican People's Party)
D-8	Developing Eight Organization for Economic Cooperation
FP	<i>Fazilet Partisi</i> (Virtue Party)
GNA	Grand National Assembly
IMF	International Monetary Fund
İSDEMİR	İskenderun Iron and Steel Inc.
JAMECA	Japan-Malaysia Economic Association
MAJECA	Malaysia-Japan Economic Association
MGH	<i>Milli Görüş Hareketi</i> (National Outlook Movement)
MNP	<i>Milli Nizam Partisi</i> (National Order Party)
MSP	<i>Milli Selamet Partisi</i> (National Salvation Party)
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association
R&D	Research and development
ROKETSAN	Rocket Industry and Trade Inc.
RoT	Republic of Türkiye
RP	<i>Refah Partisi</i> (Welfare Party)
TAI	Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc.
TÜMOSAN	Turkish Motor Industry and Trade Inc.
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UCAV	Unmanned combat aerial vehicle

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The word “modernity” is derived from the Latin *modernus*, connoting “now” or “recently”, which was first used by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), the famous political scientist, and which was subsequently deployed in the sense of connoting new intellectual trends by the early modern epistemologists Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-1650). The term “modernity” covers a wide range of interpretations, generally alluding to dramatic social change with the advancement of democracy, religious pluralism, and secularisation, as well as the establishment of the nation-state and the development of industrial society, which is based on the concept of limitless improvement based on intellect, modern science, and technology. Furthermore, modernity denotes a new perspective to those living at the dawn of the modern era as well as to political society because of social and cultural upheaval.<sup>1</sup> Modernity is an endless process implying the idea of permanent innovation, which is the constant creation of the new. It is oriented towards the future, eager for novelty, and promotes innovation while living in the present.<sup>2</sup> The British sociologist Krishan Kumar considers the concept of “modernity” as a comprehensive definition of all the intellectual, social, and political changes that brought about the modern world.<sup>3</sup>

Modernity is associated with the phenomenon of “modernism”, which in general can be expressed as the process of the differentiation and individualization of lifestyles in

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<sup>1</sup> *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Science*, 2nd edition, “Modernity” (2008).

<sup>2</sup> Alberto Martinelli, *Global Modernization Rethinking the project of modernity* (London: SAGE Publications, 2005), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Krishan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society New Theories of the Contemporary World* (United States: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 91.

consumer societies, increasing urbanization, the predominance of science and technology in all areas of life, and the continual evolution of capitalism, associated (according to modernist philosophy) with weakening belief in traditional religious values and sources of political and moral authority. Modernism clearly pertains to every moment of life, and modernism tends to dissolve traditional societal authorities to create a society free of customs, habits, and beliefs. In this context, modernism is the substitution of differences for traditional structures by expressing change in the social field.<sup>4</sup> Modernism emerged through certain stages of historical development, which can be categorized as the Age of Enlightenment (the *intellectual* process of modernism), the French Revolution (the *political* process of modernism), and the Industrial Revolution (the *economic* process of modernism).

The Enlightenment movement, which constitutes the intellectual foundation of the infrastructure of modernism, emerged as a concept in 17<sup>th</sup>-century European thought, expressing the effort of man to understand and interpret life with his mind by breaking away from religion and traditions.<sup>5</sup> The Enlightenment movement built on the Renaissance and the Reformation. The Renaissance movement, which started in Italy and spread to Europe, led to the rebirth and development of classical literature, fine arts, and science, with the role of religion beginning to be pushed into the background. Towards the end of the Renaissance, many believed that knowledge ought to be based solely on reason, and it was argued that certain information could be only reached through reason.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the Middle Ages came to be viewed as the “Dark Ages”, while modernity was conceived of as a time of emergence from darkness, a time of awakening and “renascence”, heralding a luminous future.<sup>7</sup> From the Renaissance onwards, knowledge began to be understood away from the authority of the Church, gaining a new character that increasingly gravitated towards materialist, scientific, and secular worldviews. The decreasing authority of the

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<sup>4</sup> Anthony Giddens & Christopher Pierson, *Making Sense of Modernity*, (London: Polity, 2013), 23.

<sup>5</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Modernity: An Incomplete Project*, in *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, ed. Hal Foster (Washington: Bay Press, 1983),35; Macit Gökberk, “*Felsefe Tarihi*” (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2nd edn. 1966), 325.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Burke, *The Renaissance*, (London: Macmillan Publisher, 1987), 9.

<sup>7</sup> Krishan Kumar, 98.

church caused the Reformation process to be experienced more quickly, particularly in Protestant political regions of Europe.<sup>8</sup>

The Age of Enlightenment was reflected in the political manifestation of the French Revolution (1789), which constituted the political pillar of modernization.<sup>9</sup> With the French Revolution and its far-reaching consequences, the concept of the nation replaced the importance of religion in political and social lives, and this model was subsequently disseminated to the Muslim world, directly via actual imperial colonization, and indirectly via “Modernist” ideologies among indigenous political elites. The concept of the nation became the chief instrument of modernity and secularism.<sup>10</sup> The concept of democracy, which emerged as a result of the nation-state model, was assumed to be instrumental in the socio-economic infrastructure of the Industrial Revolution and capitalist development.<sup>11</sup>

The Industrial Revolution first emerged in the United Kingdom, and then spread throughout Western Europe, North America, and the world. If the French Revolution gave modernity its rational form and characteristic conscience, the Industrial Revolution gave it its material essence. The Industrial Revolution, which is the economic stage of the modernization process, has been a process where production and economy based on agriculture and crafts have been replaced by production and economy based on industry. The development of explosives in the Industrial Revolution, the power of steam and steel, and other technological breakthroughs accelerated economic transformations. In this process, Western societies showed the greatest differences and contrasts. Thus, they became the vanguard of modernity in terms of economic and social organization, political relations, and cultural characteristics.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: Routledge, 2004), 269.

<sup>9</sup> Leo Huberman, *Man's Worldly Goods - The Story of The Wealth of Nations*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994) 92.

<sup>10</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Publisher Verso Books, 2006), 25-26.

<sup>11</sup> Leo Huberman, 92.

<sup>12</sup> Alberto Martinelli, 7,8, 88.

Some non-Western nation-states thought that the way to catch up with the economic prosperity, technological development, and military power of Western societies was to simply imitate the West. For example, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,<sup>13</sup> the first President of Türkiye, thought that the way to achieve the economic prosperity, technological development, and military power of Western societies was to become like the West, notably by imitating outward. When the Republic of Türkiye (RoT) officially declared its sovereignty on 29 October 1923, Atatürk made radical changes in Türkiye to cajole it into conformity with what he considered to be the requirements of a modern secular state within a short period.<sup>14</sup>

Atatürk decided that to modernize Turkish society it had to be Westernized, and he rejected non-Western cultures and institutions.<sup>15</sup> Thus, through an attentively calculated series of reforms in the 1920s and 1930s, Atatürk sought to alienate the “Turkish” people from their eclectic and geographically widespread Ottoman and Islamic heritage, and to actively “Westernize” them as a national race in a nation state (like the French in France or Germans in Germany). For example, Hans Kohn, observing the radical changes in Türkiye, stated that he concluded that the process of changing the religious identity of Muslims was being carried out at an admirable pace in Türkiye:

Only twenty-five years ago the Turks, described themselves first and foremost as Mohammedans. They were not yet conscious of ethnical designations, or only accorded them secondary consideration. Today the Mohammedan is primarily a member of his nation or a citizen of his state, and only afterward a Mohammedan.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) was born in Thessaloniki (Salonika). He became the President of the new Turkish Republic, serving until his death in office in 1938. See, Edward J. Erickson, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Leadership, Strategy, Conflict* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2013), 6-7.

<sup>14</sup> Suna Kili, *The Atatürk Revolution: A Paradigm of Modernization* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2008), 208.

<sup>15</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 115-117.

<sup>16</sup> Hans Kohn, *Nationalism, and Imperialism in the Near East* (London: Routledge Press, 1932), 34.

The most fundamental reforms of Atatürk were the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, and the Caliphate on 3 March 1924.<sup>17</sup> As he remarked about the Caliphate:

Turks were a great nation before they accepted Islam as their religion. However, after accepting this religion, the national feelings of the Turkish nation disappeared. Religion numbs the national excitement of the Turks.<sup>18</sup>

Atatürk also noted in his *Nutuk* (Speech) that:

Our nation has been moved from this absurd viewpoint for centuries. But what happened? Millions of people died everywhere. Do you know the number of Anatolian children who died in the desert of Yemen? How many people have died to protect Syria and Iraq, do you know?<sup>19</sup>

Thus, the abolition of the Caliphate was the beginning of secularization for Atatürk. Another important reform was that madrasas (Muslim religious schools) were closed, as they were identified as the chief obstacle to modernization (i.e., Westernization) by the government. Instead of religious schools, the government opened schools where modern sciences and secular worldviews were exclusively taught.<sup>20</sup> The religious courts applying Islamic law disappeared, and a new legal system based on Swiss civil law was introduced in their place. Atatürk prohibited the wearing of the fez as a symbol of religious traditionalism, advocated the wearing of a Western hats, and mandated that Turkish be written using the Roman alphabet rather than the Arabic script.<sup>21</sup> For Atatürk, abandoning the fez was the most important symbol of being modern and Western. Atatürk also stated in his *Nutuk* that:

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 181.

<sup>18</sup> Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazuları*, edit by Neriman Aydın (İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 2010), 44.

<sup>19</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, edited by Nejat Bayramoğlu & Kurtuluş Güran (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 542.

<sup>20</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge Press, 2006), 23.

<sup>21</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) 118.

Gentlemen! It was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, fanaticism, or hatred of progress and civilization, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilized world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilized mankind.<sup>22</sup>

Atatürk did not make any legal arrangements regarding the (*peçe*) niqab and (*başörtü*) headscarf during the “hat revolution.” However, all of Türkiye knew the direction of travel, and the President increasingly insisted on women unveiling themselves in each meeting he attended.<sup>23</sup> For example, Türkiye’s First Lady, Mevhibe İnönü (1827-1992), attended the first Turkish Republic Ball in 1927 without a headscarf, to show that she was modern and Western. At the ball, Atatürk appreciated Mevhibe for coming without a veil and scarf. However, Reşide Bayar (1887-1962), wife of Celal Bayar (1883-1986), Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA), had difficulties in giving up the scarf. She attended the same party with a special headwear covering her head, but she faced problems in attending the ball. Reşide Bayar’s daughter, Nilüfer Gürsoy (b. 1921), described this situation as follows:

Atatürk approached her and asked why she did not reveal her hair. My mother was surprised and too embarrassed to answer. My father came and said that she would never cover her head again, and after that, she did not.<sup>24</sup>

The main purpose of these modernization reforms made by Atatürk was to become a modern state like the West. According to the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, modernization is to increase the economic, military, and political power of society; Westernization, on the other hand, is arranging the ideas, religion, and culture of a society according to the mores of Western societies. To be a modern country, there is no axiomatic need to accept the thought, religion, and culture of the West. Türkiye sought a way to be modern by being Western, but modernization does not mean Westernization.

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<sup>22</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 864.

<sup>23</sup> Şaziye Karlıklı & Defne Tozan, *Cumhuriyet Kıyafetleri*, (İstanbul: GSD Holding) 1998, 72.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

According to Huntington, Türkiye is a country that has been trying to modernize, Westernize and become a part of the West since the 1920s, but it has failed in its modernization; non-Western societies can modernize without abandoning their own culture and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions, and practices.<sup>25</sup> Thinking in this context, Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan have examined the modernization process of Turkey in-depth and, despite having essentially opposite world views and perspectives, they have concluded that the modernization process in Türkiye is erroneous. According to both, the process in Türkiye has been more of a Westernization rather than a modernization. The results of this process have also been negative for Turkish society. The solution of both thinkers is that Türkiye should create a local and national model by preserving its history and culture and by adopting only technology and industry innovations from the West. In other words, a modernization model other than Westernization is possible for Türkiye. Just like Japan and Malaysia, Türkiye can implement a national modernization model that is compatible with its own history and culture by adopting only scientific methods and technologies from the West without actively destroying its culture and history.

Against this backdrop, this thesis aims to evaluate Türkiye's modernization process and address the question of whether a modernization other than Westernization is possible, particularly regarding the case of Türkiye. At this point, it is beneficial to briefly touch upon the concepts of secular/secularization/secularism and laicism. This is because, in this thesis, we will occasionally touch upon the concept of *secularism* in connection with modernity, especially within the context of Türkiye. When secularism is mentioned in Türkiye, another idea that comes to mind is *laicism*. Although it is not directly related to our thesis, we will briefly address the difference between *secularism* and *laicism* to explain why we did not use the term laicism instead of *secularism*.

The concept of *laicism*, often mentioned alongside *secularism* by some social scientists, is distinct from *secularism*.<sup>26</sup> *Laicism* (derived from the French term *laïcité*) refers to a strict separation between religion and the state, asserting that religious institutions should not

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<sup>25</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 96-97.

<sup>26</sup> Mehmet Özay, *Sekülerleşme ve Din*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık,2007),113.

interfere in governmental affairs.<sup>27</sup> In other words, *laicism* is a policy tied to the legal system and represents a constitutional/legal order.<sup>28</sup> The term *secular*, derived from the Latin *saeculum*, carries a dual connotation encompassing both time and location.<sup>29</sup> Temporally, it refers to the “present” or the “here and now,” while spatially, it denotes the “world” or the “worldly.” Thus, *saeculum* signifies “this age” or “the present time,” specifically pointing to events and phenomena occurring in the material world. In this context, the concept of *secular* refers to the state or condition of the world in a specific time, period, or age. *Secularization*, viewed as an ideological approach that supports the process of *secularism* or emerges as a result of this process, is defined as the liberation of man from religious and metaphysical control over his mind and language. This means that all supernatural myths and sacred symbols are eliminated. So, *secularism* crystallization, as it were, of the process of *secularization* into a particular and distinct form, an ideology.<sup>30</sup> Nearly all sociologists, led by Auguste Comte, approach the issue within this context. According to them, secularism, as a distinct outcome of the secularization process, represents an ontological and epistemological worldview. At the core of this worldview lies the idea that “religion/ metaphysics will disappear in all societies confronted by modernity” and all societies unavoidably transit from metaphysic to positivist society, from belief to scientific knowledge.<sup>31</sup> As a result, *laicism* is a policy and a constitutional/legal order, while *secularism* is an ontological and epistemological worldview. In the context of Türkiye, *secularism*<sup>32</sup> takes on this meaning. However, these concepts hold no significance

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<sup>27</sup> Jean Baubérot, *Laïcité 1905-2005 Entre Passion et Raison*, translated from French to Turkish from Alev Er, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 59; Olivier Roy, *La laïcité Face à l'Islam*, translated from French to English from George Holoch, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007), 8.

<sup>28</sup> Marion Eggert & Lucian Hölscher, *Religion and Secularity Dynamics in the History of Religions*, in Sylvie Le Gran, *The Origin of the Concept of Laïcité in Nineteenth Century France*, (Boston: Brill Press, 2023), 60.

<sup>29</sup> Cox Harvey, *The Secular City*, (New York: Collier Books, 1990), 16.

<sup>30</sup> Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1993), 16-17-18-19.

<sup>31</sup> Burce Steve, *Sociology of Religion Vol I-II*, (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1995), xvii.

<sup>32</sup> We specifically prefer the concept of “secularism” because the ontology of the modern era is materialism, it is epistemology is logical positivism, and it is axiology (moral value judgments) is secularism. Laicise, on the other hand, is the political reflection of the moral/value system constructed on this ontology and epistemology. Therefore, we do not have a problemetic with political or constitutional concepts. Our primary objective here is to critique the worldview of modernity. This discussion could perhaps be elaborated further in another thesis. Also, for a philosophical analogy on how ontological perception shapes epistemological

for our thesis because, as will be explained, our focus is on examining—within the framework of Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan—whether breaking away from traditional ties during the modernization process is a necessity. Is modernization possible without severing traditional ties? What role does tradition play in modernization? Therefore, for our thesis, the concepts of *laicism* and *secularism* are less prominent, while the concepts of tradition and traditionalism take center stage.

In this context, it is necessary to distinguish between Anglo-Saxon secularism and the French secularism model. Anglo-Saxon secularism emerged as an internal development within the Protestant tradition. The Protestant Reformation and influential thinkers such as Martin Luther, Roger Williams, and John Locke significantly shaped this transformation by embedding secular principles into governance and social structures.<sup>33</sup> A defining characteristic of Anglo-Saxon secularism is its ability to bridge the religious and secular spheres and promote a model that resonates with liberal democratic values. This approach maintains a flexible yet structured interaction between religion and the state, balancing religious freedoms with state neutrality.<sup>34</sup> In contrast, the French secularism model, or *laïcité*, diverges from the Anglo-Saxon approach. This model advocates for the confinement of religious and cultural symbols to the private sphere. This policy reflects a broader integration strategy within the French nation-state framework, aiming to construct a cohesive national identity independent of religious affiliations.<sup>35</sup> In this context, Turkish secularism, which adopts the French secularism model, emerged as part of a modernization effort in the early 20th century. Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership, the Turkish Republic adopted a secular framework that sought to minimize religious influence in public life. This form of secularism was more state-centric, involving direct government control over religious institutions through institutions like the *Diyanet* (Directorate of Religious

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understanding, moral/value judgments, and consequently the political system and governance. See: Plato’s “The Republic” and Al-Farabi’s “Al-Madina Al-Fadila “(The Virtuous City).

<sup>33</sup> Jacques Berlinerblau, *How to Be Secular: A Call to Arms for Religious Freedom*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 2012), 16-17.

<sup>34</sup> Fred Kniss and Gene Burns, *Religious Movements*, in David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, Doug McAdam (eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, (New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2013), 710.

<sup>35</sup> Olivier Roy, 10-11.

Affairs). In contrast, Anglo-Saxon secularism allowed for a more pluralistic interaction between religion and state, promoting religious diversity without direct state intervention. Another key difference is the societal perception of secularism. In Anglo-Saxon societies, secularism is often viewed as a mechanism for ensuring religious freedom rather than suppressing religious expression. In Türkiye, however, secularism has historically been associated with state-led modernization efforts, sometimes at odds with traditional religious communities.<sup>36</sup>

At this point, the perspective of Turkish sociologist Niyazi Berkes is particularly significant because, according to his analysis, secularism in Türkiye fundamentally differs from its counterparts in the Western world.<sup>37</sup> Turkish secularism is not merely a technical matter of “separating religion and state affairs” but rather a much more comprehensive and profound societal transformation project. At the heart of this transformation lies the goal of breaking free from traditional values and creating a modern society.<sup>38</sup> Within this framework, it is particularly valuable to emphasize that Turkish sociologist Şerif Mardin shares similar views with Berkes. According to Mardin as well, secularism in Türkiye has been implemented as a modernization project<sup>39</sup> and has been an important tool for eliminating the traditional values of society and creating a modern society.<sup>40</sup>

At this juncture, an examination of both İlhan’s and Erbakan’s perspectives becomes essential. Attila İlhan interprets the concept of secularism in the early Republican period as a natural extension of the War of Independence against imperialism. During this era, secularism formed an organic unity with modernization, national independence, and the anti-imperialist struggle. However, according to İlhan, particularly after the 1950s, secularism transformed into “a Jacobin ideology imposed top-down by the state upon the people.”<sup>41</sup> In his proposed model, while secularism should prevent the exploitation of

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<sup>36</sup> Nevzat Çelik, “From Secularism to Laïcité and Analyzing Turkish Authoritarian Laiklik”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Winter 2018),195.

<sup>37</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Atatürk ve Devrimler*, (İstanbul: Adam Yayıncılık, 1982), 126.

<sup>38</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964); 479-483.

<sup>39</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 312.

<sup>40</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006).215.

<sup>41</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Laiklik?* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2004),239-239.

religion for political purposes, it must also establish a balanced framework that respects the religious beliefs of the people.<sup>42</sup> According to Necmettin Erbakan, another central intellectual figure in this thesis secularism means that everyone has freedom of thought, conscience, and worship, and that no one can oppress anyone because of their beliefs. However, in Türkiye, secularism has been applied as a tool of oppression against the Muslim majority population. Erbakan argued that it is necessary for Turks to learn the *true* meaning of secularism, which is not oppressing personal religious identity with the force of the state.<sup>43</sup>

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

After the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Atatürk officially declared the sovereignty of the RoT as a nation-state, confirming what had already been a *de facto* political reality since the end of WWI. For Atatürk, the idea of an Islamic state was a symbol of backwardness, whereby maintaining an Islamic identity for the emerging state of Türkiye would *ipso facto* maintain the backwardness of the Turkish nation. He wanted the Turks to be rid of backwardness and become what he considered a “modern” country. According to Atatürk, the only way to live as a developed and civilized nation was to become a “modern” nation-state, which for him meant imitating France and other Western European countries.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, Atatürk built a new Türkiye from the rubble of the Ottoman State and embarked on a tremendous endeavour to modernize the country. He sought the secret of the success of Western societies in Western values and institutions and tried to apply them in his own society. He tried to transform Turkish society into a Western one (especially French society), seeking to achieve economic and technological development and political

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<sup>42</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak*, (İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005),296.

<sup>43</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, edited by Yusuf Aktaş, (İstanbul: Aktaş Yayınları, 2020),172.

<sup>44</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge Press, 1993), 53.

harmony with Western societies. He undertook the difficult and traumatic task of destroying centuries-old cultures and replacing them with the template of the homogenous Western European nation-state.<sup>45</sup> The radical reforms of Atatürk angered the public, who were predominantly Muslim and socially conservative. Following the abolition of religious law (particularly sharia provisions for family and inheritance law) and the prohibition of the fez, public rebellions became more severe. From March 1925 to March 1926, *İstiklal Mahkemeleri* (Independence Courts) issued 138 execution orders, and approximately 20 death sentences were passed for revolts against the “Hat Law”.<sup>46</sup>

In the Republican era, modernization was identified with Westernization. For the Turkish Republic, modernity was a holistic project, embracing and internalizing all cultural dimensions that they thought comprised European modernity.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, in the process of Turkish modernization, the distinction between what is considered “civilized” and “uncivilized” was carefully drawn, whereby anything European-style was considered appropriate and valuable, while anything traditional (i.e., Ottoman or indeed Turkish) was viewed as worthless and inferior. In the eyes of the state, dressing like a Westerner, going to the theatre, dancing at the ball (ideally with others than one’s spouse), and wearing hats with brims were the hallmarks of a civilized person.<sup>48</sup>

Although the state forced the people to imitate Westerners with various policies and reforms, most of the Turkish people, who were loyal to the Turkish-Islamic tradition, silently resented the increasingly intrusive demands placed upon them by the state. Thus, there was a latent dichotomy between society and the state. The Westernization policies initiated during Atatürk’s rule (1923-1938) continued in some venues to the current day. The most obvious manifestation of these simmering tensions are the intermittent military coups and attempted coups that have beleaguered Türkiye over many decades, with the

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<sup>45</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 92-115.

<sup>46</sup> Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (New York: Overlook Press, 2002), 421.

<sup>47</sup> *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, University of Washington Press, 1997, 37-38.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 85-125.

military seeking to protect the “secular Constitution” against popular manifestations of democratic will. Such military interventions have always been premised on protecting the Constitution (i.e., Western values) from the threats of popular democracy.

The most important of these tensions was experienced in the 1980s, by which time Türkiye’s modernization policies had manifestly resulted in economic backwardness and social turmoil. Turkish people, who had been compelled to accept the government’s modernization policy for “enlightened and prosperous tomorrows”, began to inquire about this concept of modernity, which had been completely equated with Westernization for decades.<sup>49</sup> Two prominent thinkers in this introspective agenda were Attila İlhan (1925-2005) and Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011).

Attila İlhan was one of the most important names of Turkish literature in the Republican era. He undertook deep research on the Western problem, evaluating the Turkish modernization process to conclude that the main mistake of the modernization process was the conflation of modernization with Westernization. According to İlhan, Türkiye unquestioningly sought to imitate the West as its blueprint, without pausing to consider the West’s stages of historical development and socio-economic processes into account. Therefore, locked in this paradigm of blind imitation, Türkiye could not go beyond mimicking the West superficially.<sup>50</sup> According to İlhan, Turkish society does not have to be like the West for economic prosperity, technological development, and military power; rather, Turkish society should take the technological developments from the West and blend them with its own culture to create its own national synthesis.<sup>51</sup>

The Turkish politician, engineer, and academician, Necmettin Erbakan, who was the Prime Minister of Türkiye between 1996 and 1997, also pondered Westernization deeply, and couched his own conclusions in the patriotic case that the Turkish nation has

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>50</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 2002), 125.

<sup>51</sup> Attila İlhan, *Söyletme Kötüyü*, edit by Belgin Sarmaşık (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2005), 97- 103.

been shedding light on humanity for a thousand years. Consequently, instead of blindly adopting the culture and civilization of the West, the Turks ought to know and protect their own culture and history. For this reason, Erbakan stated that he was against “Westernization” *per se*, as in imitating the traditions and customs of Western countries, and was against pro-Western people within Turkish society who propagated (whether implicitly or explicitly) the doctrine that the Turks and their nation are inferior to the European nations. According to Erbakan, Türkiye can produce its modernization model based on its traditions, institutions, and values. Society should produce its national technology by adopting technological developments from the West and blending them with its own culture.<sup>52</sup>

These Turkish thinkers opined that Türkiye has been going through the wrong modernization process since the early twentieth century. As a solution, it has been suggested that Türkiye should develop its own modernization program, adopt technological developments originating mainly from the West, and blend them with its own culture and civilization. They also emphasized that the difference between modernization and Westernization should be deeply analysed and not be confused and that these different concepts should not be conflated.

This study evaluates Türkiye's modernization process in depth and identifies the mistakes made in this historical process. By systematically examining İlhan and Erbakan’s views on the modernization process, it answers the question of whether a modernization model other than Westernization is possible for Türkiye and what form and orientation it should take.

### **1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

This study is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it will be shown that non-Western Turkish society does not have to be like the West for economic prosperity, technological

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<sup>52</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davam*, (Ankara: Milli Gazete Ankara Kitap Kulübü, 2015) 120-172.

development, and military power. For Atatürk, who emerged as the indisputable national leader, the main objective was to reach the level of the contemporary “modern” civilization of Western nation-states. Türkiye thus applied the model of Western countries to the Turkish context, and subsequent secular reforms severed the Ottoman past from the national identity. In other words, the main objectives of Atatürk’s reforms were the *Westernization* and *secularization* of society, and the destruction of Ottoman-Islamic heritage.<sup>53</sup> However, these reforms in the name of *modernization* failed.

If non-Western societies are to modernize, they must do it their way, not the Western way. There have been countries that have tried this way and succeeded. Notable examples include Japan and Malaysia, in East and Southeast Asia (respectively), both of which have developed economically and scientifically without accepting Western values or abandoning their traditional cultures wholesale.<sup>54</sup> These and other Asian nations attribute their economic prosperity and technological development not to their import of Western culture, but rather to their adherence to their own culture. They consciously limited their modernization to the adoption of technology and industrialization and encouraged people and societies to have confidence in their own cultures and to become culturally assertive.<sup>55</sup>

This study is significant in its assertion that Turkish society can also be successful by implementing a modernism program in an analogous way. By doing so, Türkiye can become a modern country that is technologically and economically strong, while at the same time honouring the religious and cultural heritage and rights of the Turkish nation.

Secondly, this thesis demonstrates that the two studied Turkish scholars, who held different perspectives and worldviews, both accepted that Türkiye has gone through an

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<sup>53</sup> Talip Kucukcan, “Secularization of the State and Secular Nationalism: Foundations of Civil Religion in Turkey,” *George Washington International Law Review*, No. 4, Vol.41, (2010), 963-965; Nuray Atlındağ, “Türkiye Milliyetçiliğinin Siyasallaşması ve Batı/Batılılaşma Algısı”, *AÇÜ Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol.2 (2016), 45

<sup>54</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 182-195.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 94-115.

erroneous modernization process, and they arrived at a common point as a solution proposal. Attila İlhan, who grew up in a modern and secular family, described himself as a “leftist”, and he consistently propagated a socialist political ideology throughout his career.<sup>56</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, who identifies as an Islamist with an anti-secular point of view, represents the school of thought epitomized by his teacher, Mehmed Zâhid Kotku (1897-1980),<sup>57</sup> and the Naqshbandi Sufi community (one of the venerable Sufi schools in Ottoman and Muslim history).<sup>58</sup> These intellectuals, despite having essentially opposite worldviews and perspectives, independently reached the conclusion that the modernization process in Türkiye had been mistaken, and decided that only scientific methods and technologies should be taken from the West without actively destroying the culture and history of the Turkish nation in the quest to modernize. They offered a national model of modernity that is compatible with Turkish history and culture.

Thirdly, this study demonstrates that the importance of Islam in Turkish society is profound, and Islamic identity is interwoven with Turkishness, which is why the experience of decades of suppression of manifestations of Islamic identity has failed to erase Islamic consciousness from Türkiye’s Muslims. For most Turkish people, being Muslim (in varying ways and to varying degrees) is inherent in their self-identification of being Turkish.<sup>59</sup> For centuries, Islam united the Anatolian-Ottoman Muslim population and Turks in other regions regardless of their ethnic or racial backgrounds.<sup>60</sup> However, during the Republican period, Western influence became a dominant factor both in the construction of the national identity and in the fundamental processes such as secularization and democratization. Consequently, Türkiye took very concrete steps toward Westernization.

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<sup>56</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006), 58.

<sup>57</sup> Mehmed Zahid Kotku is a well-known Naqshbandi Sheikh in Turkey. He worked as an imam and orator at the İskenderpaşa Mosque in İstanbul for many years. Kotku was a very popular imam among his congregation, whose sermons were listened to with interest. This community is known as the İskenderpaşa Community. See, Metin Erkaya, *Anılarla Mehmed Zâhid Kotku (R.H.A.) Hazretleri*, (İstanbul: Seha Yayınevi, 1997) 17-18.

<sup>58</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davam* (Ankara: Milli Gazete Ankara Kitap Kulübü, 2015) 9.

<sup>59</sup> Carte V Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity 1789-2007* (United States: Yale University Press, 2010), 7.

<sup>60</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *Islam Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge Press, 2006), 27.

For Atatürk, who emerged as the indisputable national leader, the main objective was to reach the level of the contemporary modern civilization of Western nation-states. Türkiye thus applied the model of Western countries to the Turkish context, and subsequent secular reforms actively sought to sever the Ottoman past from the national identity. In other words, the main objectives of Kemalist reforms were Westernization and secularization, and the destruction of Ottoman-Islamic heritage.<sup>61</sup>

This research presents a novel scholarly contribution by conducting the first comparative study of these influential Turkish thinkers. Crucially, neither Erbakan's nor İlhan's views on modernization have been subjected to systematic academic scrutiny before, rendering this investigation both unprecedented and original. The ideas and critiques of modernism of these important Turkish scholars have not received significant academic analysis. Most of their own books are scattered, and works on their ideas in English are particularly rare, thus their ideas are not known to a broader audience. Thus, this research also contributes to the field by introducing the lives and ideas of Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan to an English-speaking audience.

#### **1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

By focusing mainly on the modernization process in Türkiye, the present work endeavours to answer the following questions:

1. What is the relationship between modernization and Westernization, and are the two integrated and inseparable?
2. What kind of modernization process did the Ottoman States and Türkiye go through?

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<sup>61</sup> Patrick G. Rear, "Atatürk's Balancing Act: The Role of Secularism in Turkey", *Global Tides*, Vol.8, No.9,(2014),3; Nuray Atlındağ, 45.

3. Why does Attila İlhan find Türkiye's modernization process to be faulty and what kind of solutions did he propose?
4. Why does Necmettin Erbakan find Türkiye's modernization process to be faulty and what kind of solutions did he propose?

## **1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The objectives of this study are as follows:

1. To study the relationship between modernization and Westernization, and whether the two are inherently integrated or inseparable.
2. To study the modernization processes of the Ottoman State and Republic of Türkiye.
3. To explore why Attila İlhan found Türkiye's modernization process to be faulty and what kind of solutions he suggested.
4. To probe why Necmettin Erbakan found Türkiye's modernization process to be faulty and what kind of solutions he suggested.

## **1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW**

This literature review is divided into three sections. Section one reviews the definition of modernization and Westernization, and reviews the differences between modernization and Westernization, and how they can be reconciled. Section two reviews the modernization process of the Ottoman State and Türkiye and contrasts these experiences with the modernization experience of countries, which succeeded in modernization without Westernization. Section three reviews literature on Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan's thoughts on modernization.

### 1.6.1 Definitions of Modernization and Westernization

The first thematic group consists of some different sources. For example, the book *Global Modernization Rethinking the Project of Modernity*<sup>62</sup> by Alberto Martinelli explains the definitions of modernization and modernity and goes into detail on the processes that were effective in the formation of modernism itself. Martinelli explains how Western societies differ from other communities in terms of economic and social organization, political relations, and cultural characteristics, and how modernity is particularly identified with the West. This necessarily and ostentatiously reiterates some Eurocentric assumptions that the West is somehow special and has a manifest destiny to be the harbinger of modernity, which more recent perspectives from non-Western scholars seek to interrogate.

In this regard, Krishan Kumar's book entitled *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society New Theories of the Contemporary World*<sup>63</sup> is a major book for understanding the concept of modernism. The author gives a detailed definition of the concept of modernism, and then explains in detail the following processes that were effective in its formation, namely the Age of Enlightenment (the intellectual process of modernism), the French Revolution (the political process of modernism), and the Industrial Revolution (the economical process of modernism). As a person of Indian heritage, he claims that "Western modernity" is essentially non-universal, and that "modernization" is synonymous with "Westernization". His claim that Western modernity is not universal makes a positive contribution to this study, but an antithesis is explored in this work concerning his claim that modernization is Westernization.

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<sup>62</sup> Alberto Martinelli, *Global Modernization Rethinking the Project of Modernity* (London: SAGE Publications, 2005).

<sup>63</sup> Krishan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society New Theories of the Contemporary World* (United States: Blackwell Publishing, 1995).

*Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*<sup>64</sup> by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel shows that modernization is a human development process that triggers cultural changes, based on a wealth of evidence from societies comprising 85% of the world's population. However, they emphasize that no matter how much the cultures of modernizing societies change, their religion and traditions are permanent. According to them, the influence of cultural traditions does not disappear, and belief systems have remarkable durability. Their findings are very important for this study, which shows that modernizing societies by breaking them off from their own cultures and beliefs is doomed to failure.

One of the cornerstones of this work is Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Reconstruction of World Order*.<sup>65</sup> The author clearly delineated between the concepts of modernization and Westernization and explained the differences between them in detail. According to Huntington, a political scientist, modernization comprises industrialization, urbanization, and increased welfare levels in societies, whereas Westernization concerns efforts by non-Western societies to adopt Western culture. He argues that modernization increases the economic, military, and political power of society as a whole, and encourages its people to be culturally assertive and confident in their own culture. His fundamental contention is that modernization does not mean Westernization and that non-Western societies can modernize without abandoning their own cultures and adopting Western values, institutions, and practices altogether. Moreover, he specifically evaluates Türkiye's modernization process in his book and explains that the reforms made in the name of modernization in Türkiye have failed. According to him, if non-Western societies are to modernize, they must do it their way, not the Western way. There have been countries such as Japan that have tried this path and succeeded. By following the Japanese model, Türkiye can produce its modernization model based on its own traditions,

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<sup>64</sup> Ronald Inglehart & Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>65</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

institutions, and values, to achieve material development without destroying its own culture.

Another substantial book by Samuel P. Huntington is *Political Order in Changing Societies*,<sup>66</sup> in which he explains the concepts of modernization and Westernization, exploring modernization in the intellectual, demographic, and economic dimensions. Moreover, he explains in detail the reforms made in Türkiye's modernization process, from education to social life, and criticizes the experience, which has produced violence, instability, and political chaos. According to him, modernization cannot exist where there is political impotence. His idea explains why the modernization reforms made in Republican Türkiye failed, which Huntington attributes primarily to the botched political handling of Türkiye's modernization.

Joseph Heath's article *Liberalization, Modernization, Westernization*<sup>67</sup> distinguishes the three eponymous processes of change. According to the author, modernization and Westernization are two different concepts; the latter is the adoption of Western values by non-Western societies due to the superior prestige of Western lifestyles. Moreover, Westernization is a process whereby non-Western societies choose to imitate Western values. The author examines the concepts of modernization and Westernization in detail in this article to eliminate the confusion between these concepts.

Unlike previous studies examining the concepts of modernization and Westernization, this thesis presents the non-Western modernization theory, which argues that non-Western societies can modernize while preserving their own cultural and traditional foundations, as an alternative model. More importantly, by analyzing the modernization processes of Japan and Malaysia, which broke the mold of modernist thinkers who claimed that modernization was not possible without Westernization, it argues

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<sup>66</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1968).

<sup>67</sup> Joseph Heath, "Liberalization, Modernization, Westernization", *Philosophy & Social Criticism Journal*, Vol.30.

that Turkey can create a localized and national model just like these two countries by integrating its own historical and cultural heritage with Western technology and industry.

### 1.6.2 Modernization in the Ottoman State and Türkiye

Eric J. Zürcher's book *Turkey, A Modern History*<sup>68</sup> is used as a textbook in major universities in Europe and the USA. It deals with Türkiye's modernization process in detail and reveals what kind of modernization process it is going through. In the first part, Zürcher deals with Türkiye's Western influences on modernization and early initiatives. The second part of the book explains the political and social events of it after 1950. This section is an important section to understand and evaluate the results of the reforms made in the name of modernism during the republican period.

Bernard Lewis's *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*<sup>69</sup> covers the emergence of the RoT over two centuries, including the decline and collapse of the Ottoman State. Lewis, who considered himself to be an expert on Turkish history, explained the stages of reform in the nineteenth century and then discussed the process of building the new Türkiye by Atatürk in the direction of a modern secular state. This book is important in terms of understanding how Turks have been subjected to transformations in their religious and cultural lives in the name of modernization.

Halil İnalçık's *Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye*<sup>70</sup> (Ataturk and Democratic Türkiye) attempts to reiterate a classical republican case for transition and modernization from the Ottoman State to the Turkish Republic. İnalçık argues that Atatürk was correct in trying to modernize Turkish society by trying to make the Turkish people like Westerners in their family life and personal, whereby he thought Turkish society would become a modern society. İnalçık critiques how the modernization reforms made in the Republican period

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<sup>68</sup> Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd Publisher, 1993)

<sup>69</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2001).

<sup>70</sup> Halil İnalçık, *Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Yayınları, 2007).

were interpreted by foreign historians, and argues against those who claimed that modernization and Westernization were falsely conflated in Türkiye. He anachronistically reiterates that Turkish society must be completely Western in order to be modern. Moreover, he compares Japan and Türkiye in the last part of the book, to respond to foreign writers who think that Türkiye can modernize without Westernization like Japan, seeking to demonstrate that while this may have been possible for Japan, it is not possible for Türkiye. This book is an essential work to show how modernization and Westernization in Türkiye can be understood from different perspectives. It is particularly important in terms of comparing the views of those who think that Westernization is necessary for modernization and those who advocate the opposite of this idea.

*Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*<sup>71</sup> edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba claims that the modernization program initiated during the Republican period was not successful. According to the authors of the articles, some of which were presented at a conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1994, the modernity project implemented in Türkiye has been problematic from the very beginning, purporting to be in the name of modernity, while ignoring the liberating dimension of modernity. The first seven articles in this book provide a historical summary of Türkiye modernization. Two articles in the book deal with the gender dimension of Türkiye modernization. Every revolution brings a definition of an ideal *man*, but the symbol of reforms for the Kemalist revolution is the image of an ideal *woman*.

In the early years of the Republic, key images in the Türkiye state's iconography of modernity were young girls in shorts and miniskirts carrying the flag at parades, or women dancing in ballrooms. The main purpose of selecting *this* symbol of modernity for women was to destroy the Turkish-Islamic tradition and to create a Western nation. Two articles in the book give place to the cultural dimension of modernity debates in Türkiye. These articles examine how modernization affected the fields of music and architecture in

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<sup>71</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997).

Türkiye. In the last part of the book, comparative observations of well-known historians and sociologists outside of Türkiye on Turkish modernization are given. This book, which consists of the articles of many academicians from different countries and different disciplines, is very important in terms of understanding the modernism process in Türkiye. Another important feature of this book is that it deals with the effects of modernism in Türkiye in terms of many different disciplines, such as in terms of culture, history, gender, and architecture.

As alluded to previously, the comparison of Japanese and Turkish modernization (i.e., successful Japanese and failed Turkish modernization) has been a subject that has attracted the attention of many social scientists and historians. One of the important studies on this subject is the book *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*<sup>72</sup> by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. In this book, many academics from Türkiye and Japan from different disciplines compare and analyse the modernization experiences of the two countries. John Whitney Hall from Japan and Halil İnalçık from Türkiye examine the harmony of modernism with the nature of traditional society. Economic and political modernization in Japan and Türkiye are discussed by William W. Lockwood and Peter F. Sugar. The authors first examine the modernization processes of the two countries in detail, and then deal with the differences in their modernization processes. When the modernization reforms of the two countries are compared, the reforms in Japan did not affect Shintoism, while the reforms in Türkiye started with the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, and affected Islam and Muslims on the local and global scale.

Moreover, as a result of the reforms in Türkiye, the old empire and its institutions were deracinated and destroyed, seeking to leave nothing of the past. Türkiye aimed to be a part of the West, and made the necessary radical and painful reforms, but since Japan as a society was devoted to its own culture and tradition (including its ancient monarchy), it applied the methods of the West according to the needs of its own society. This book

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<sup>72</sup> Robert E. Ward & Dankwart A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968).

compares the modernization processes of two non-Western countries and finally shows that a non-Western society like Japan could successfully modernize without abandoning their own culture and adopting Western values, institutions, and practices. On the other hand, a non-Western society like Türkiye abandoned its own culture and attempted to modernize by adopting Western values, institutions, and practices, but could not be as successful as Japan in terms of the fundamental aim of socio-economic and materialist development. Therefore, if non-Western societies are to modernize, they must do so in their way. There have been countries like Japan that have tried this path and been successful. By acting like Japan, Türkiye can produce its modernization model based on its traditions, institutions, and values.

Feroz Ahmad's *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*<sup>73</sup> explains the establishment and rise of the Ottoman State, and then explores how the French Revolution affected it, followed by an analysis of the decline of the state. The fourth chapter of the book covers the period of transition from empire to nation-state. In this chapter, the author focuses on the dramatic changes experienced by Turkish society, and examines the reforms made in the name of modernity in this period, when the state confused modernity with Westernization. The fifth chapter of the book examines how the reforms made in the name of modernity caused problems between society and the state. Since the results of Westernization policies exceed the period of Atatürk's rule, the author also analysed the period from Atatürk's death to 2003 in the last two chapters. This book presents a panorama from the establishment of the Ottoman State (c. 1300) to the year 2003 of the Turkish Republic, thus it is a comprehensive and important source for this study.

Murat Belge's *Militarist Modernleşme Almanya, Japonya ve Türkiye*<sup>74</sup> (Militarist Modernization Germany, Japan, and Türkiye) covers modernization processes in Germany, Türkiye, and Japan, with comparative examples. According to the author, Germany, Japan, and Türkiye offer examples of militarist modernization. The author especially focuses on

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<sup>73</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003).

<sup>74</sup> Murat Belge, *Militarist Modernleşme Almanya, Japonya ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011).

Türkiye, where he argues that the army has always spearheaded the establishment of modernization and nation-state. According to him, this situation was the same in the Ottoman State and the Turkish Republic. In addition, the author looks at the general character of the Westernization efforts of the Ottoman State and the Turkish Republic and compares them with Japan, which modernized while preserving its traditional structure, but the Ottoman State did not reach the speed and determination of Japan. When the Ottoman State collapsed and the Turkish Republic was established, Türkiye was not as successful as Japan in this “modernization by preserving tradition” business. This book, which explains why Türkiye was not successful in this process, is an important work for understanding the modernization process of Türkiye and the Ottoman State and why it did not modernize by preserving its traditions, unlike Japan.

Sena Karasipahi’s *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals*<sup>75</sup> offers an informative account of the conflict between modernism and the Turkish-Islamic tradition in the modern Turkish Republic. The author focuses on the ideologies that Muslim intellectuals developed as an alternative to Kemalism, as a result of the perceived failure of the modernization/ Westernization project of the ruling ideology. In the first part, she critically examined the shortcomings and contradictions of Kemalist ideology and the modernization process, describing the radical transformations in cultural, social, and political life and public life with Westernization. In the second part, for a clear understanding of Turkish modernization, she focuses on the Young Turks, a secular and constitutionalist group that emerged in the late Ottoman State. The author describes this group as a scientific, materialist, social Darwinist, and anti-religious.

Karasipahi examines Turkish modernization in-depth, and concludes that the concepts of modernization and Westernization can and should be used interchangeably in the case of Türkiye. In the third and fourth chapters, she examined the thoughts of

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<sup>75</sup> Sena Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals* (New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2009).

contemporary Turkish Muslim intellectuals. According to her, present-day Muslim thinkers, unlike the Islamist intellectuals of the Ottoman State, reject the West as a whole. Present-day Muslim thinkers do not take into account the material, scientific, and technological achievements of the West. However, the Islamic intellectuals of the Ottoman State embraced their scientific and technological achievements independently of Western culture. The ideas explained by the author as the ideas of Islamist intellectuals of the Ottoman State are the same as those of Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan. They think that the science and technology of the West should be acquired without taking the culture and intellectual accumulation of the West. It is a necessary book to support Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan's ideas on modernization.

Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw's *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975*<sup>76</sup> deals with the modernization of the Ottoman State, the collapse of the state, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Also, it presents an analysis of the internal and external problems of the Turkish Republic between 1923 and 1975. Based on comprehensive research in Ottoman archives and Western sources, this book first analyses the modernization of the Ottoman State and its collapse under the influence of nationalism, and then how the RoT as a nation-state was established, and the reforms it enforced. The last section analyses social and political events after Atatürk's death. This book is an important resource for understanding the modernization processes of both the Ottoman State and the RoT.

Kemal Karpat's *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi 1800-2012*<sup>77</sup> (Short History of Türkiye 1800-2012) consists of three main parts. The first part covers Ottoman modernization and collapse, charting the reform movements of the 1800-1918 period. In the second part of the book, the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the transition to the multi-party system

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<sup>76</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume 2: Reform, Revolution, and Republic – The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

<sup>77</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi 1800-2012*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012).

are examined. In the last section, democracy and identity debates are included. The most important feature of this book is that it shows the connections between the Ottoman State and the Turkish Republic, whereby the modernization processes of both regimes can be easily compared. It also demonstrates how the severance between the Ottoman past and the Republican future was not as clear-cut as popularly supposed.

Selim Deringil's *The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*<sup>78</sup> shows how the Ottoman State grappled with the challenges of modernity, especially emphasizing the importance of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909) in the history of modernization. During this period, the political, legal, administrative, cultural, and socio-economic structuring of the Ottoman State was shaped by an ideological balance established by the central authority between the past and the future. The author explains this period of Ottoman modernization history with an in-depth analysis. This book is a significant work for understanding the political structure and modernization policies of the Ottoman State.

*Nation-Building in Modern Turkey: The 'People's Houses', the State and the Citizen*<sup>79</sup> by Alexandros Lamprou argues that "Turkish modernization" needs to be examined from alternative perspectives. The majority of those who study Turkish modernization do not prefer to examine the Kemalist reform movement as a process of social change, and most evaluate Turkish modernization in terms of the state. However, the ways in which reforms affect individuals and society are very important. As a result of this analysis, the author decided to examine the "People's Houses", which contributed to the shaping of the modern identity of the society in the 1930s and 1940s. This book is an original work that gives information about the comprehensive modernization reforms made in the years when the RoT was ruled by a single-party regime.

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<sup>78</sup> Selim Deringil, *The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).

<sup>79</sup> Alexandros Lamprou, *Nation-Building in Modern Turkey: The 'People's Houses', the State and the Citizen* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015).

Unlike these books that examine the Ottoman State and the Republic of Türkiye's modernization, this study explains that the concepts of modernization and Westernization are confused and that Westernization policies implemented under the name of modernization policies began during the reign of Mahmud II and continued during the Republic period. In addition, this study has revealed that modernization policies implemented by imitating the West have never satisfied Turkish society, which is devoted to Turkish Islamic culture, and have always created conflict between the society and the state.

### **1.6.3 Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan's Thoughts on Modernization**

Serhat Işık's book *Attila İlhan ve Batı*<sup>80</sup> ( Attila İlhan and West) discusses Attila İlhan's perspectives on the West and its culture during his childhood and youth, followed by analysis of why his thoughts about the West changed after his trip to Paris. From the first years of the RoT, France and Paris were adored among the secularist elite in Türkiye, and profoundly affected political and social life until the 1950s. Influenced by this trend, İlhan travelled to Paris, and his observations of French society and politics, as well as the attitude of the Turkish people towards the West after returning to Türkiye, led to his conclusion that modernization in Türkiye was hampered by a lack of national synthesis. Turkish society does not have to be like the West for economic prosperity, technological development, and military power; according to his revised view, Turkish society should take the technological developments from the West and blend them with its own culture and create its national synthesis. In the last part of the book, the view of İlhan on Western art and literature is discussed. This study, meticulously traces the evolution of İlhan's critical engagement with Western civilization, particularly emphasizing the epistemological rupture caused by his time in Paris in the 1950s. As Işık shows, this experience precipitated a radical restructuring of İlhan's worldview from an unqualified anti-Westernism to a nuanced dialectical position. Through this framework, the study transcends mere biographical narrative to

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<sup>80</sup> Serhat Işık, *Attila ilhan ve Batı* (Bursa: Milena Kitap, 2016).

illuminate broader tensions in Turkey's engagement with modernity during the mid-twentieth century, offering significant insights into the intellectual history of post-Ottoman social thought.

*Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 6 İslamcılık (Political Thought in Modern Turkey, Vol. 6: Islamism)*,<sup>81</sup> edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, charts how Islam has been evaluated in terms of Turkish society and state in the stages of secularism and modernization. In addition, this book provides information on the ideas of Islamist politicians and thinkers in Türkiye and their impacts on public opinion. The encyclopaedic book includes the life and ideas of Necmettin Erbakan, who represented the Islamists in the 1970s, particularly emphasizing his ideas about modernization and Westernization. Erbakan evaluated the modernization process of the Republican period as fundamentally flawed. In the Republican era, the state tried to adopt Western culture to Turkish society in order to modernize the latter, while he conversely argues that Türkiye can produce its modernization model based on its traditions, institutions, and values. He fundamentally argued that Turkish society should produce its national technology by taking technological developments from the West and blending them with its own culture. This book is an important work to understand the ideas of Necmettin Erbakan, who claimed that Türkiye followed the wrong path toward modernization and suggested corrective solutions to redress this foundational error. Moreover, this book examines Erbakan’s critiques of the Western-centric world order while extensively discussing his proposed *Adil Düzen* (Just Order) based on cooperation among Islamic nations. The book also emphasizes that Erbakan’s ideas were not merely theoretical but had a practical dimension. His technocratic background, emphasis on industrialization, and advocacy for planned development demonstrate that Islamism offers not an “anti-modernization” stance but rather a distinct vision of modernity.

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<sup>81</sup> Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 6 İslamcılık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2005).

Zeynep Aliye's *Mavi Adam Attila İlhan'la Söyleşiler*<sup>82</sup> (Interviews with Blue Man Attila İlhan) presents a compilation of intermittent interviews held with Attila İlhan between 1998 and 2001. In the book, Atilla İlhan's thoughts on literature, history, and politics are explained in detail, especially concerning his views on modernism. İlhan finds both the modernization processes of the Tanzimat reform era and of the Republican period to be premised on false assumptions. According to İlhan, in both periods, policies imitating the West were implemented, while Turkish society should actually avoid imitating the West, and create its own national synthesis by taking technological developments from the West and blending them with its own culture. This book, drawing on insights from these interviews, underscores Attilâ İlhan's steadfast dedication to fostering domestic and national industry. More importantly, he emphasizes the necessity of resisting Western cultural dominance by advocating for Türkiye to be local and national in every field to preserve its cultural identity.

Ekrem Kızıldaş's *Herkesin Hocası Erbakan*<sup>83</sup> (Everyone's Teacher is Erbakan) is an important book to understand Erbakan Hodja and to have comprehensive information about his life. Necmettin Erbakan has left an important mark on Turkish politics as a political actor for the last forty years, and he has been a major political representative of conservative people in Türkiye. Besides being a politician, Erbakan was also an important academic, and in this capacity he deeply criticized Türkiye's modernization process. According to Erbakan, Türkiye should produce its modernization model based on its traditions, institutions, and values, and should stay away from any model that imitates the West. This book not only provides information about Erbakan's life, works, and views on modernism but also highlights his belief that Turkey must resist Western influence. It discusses the strategies he developed to counter Western cultural and economic domination.

While the above studies provide information about the lives and political thoughts of İlhan and Erbakan, this thesis compares these two thinkers, who have never been

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<sup>82</sup> Zeynep Aliye, *Mavi Adam Attila İlhan'la Söyleşiler* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2001).

<sup>83</sup> Ekrem Kızıldaş, *Herkesin Hocası Erbakan*, (İstanbul Hayat: Yayıncılık, 2016).

compared before, and focuses on their similar and different thoughts, providing information about their lives, major works, and political thoughts. More importantly, it examines their ideas about Türkiye's modernization process in depth and reveals their common thoughts on this subject.

## **1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS**

This study compares the concepts of modernization and Westernization and presents a conceptual analysis that aims to reveal that there is a possibility of modernization other than Westernization. After showing that a non-Western society like Japan can modernize without abandoning its own culture and without completely adopting Western values, institutions, and practices by jettisoning the cultural heritage and integrity of its own people, this study shows that Türkiye can produce a modernization model based on its own traditions, like Japan. The most important advocates of this perspective that have gained widespread popularity in Türkiye are Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan. This study develops an alternative modernization model for Türkiye based on the modernization ideas of these two intellectuals. In addition, the life works and periods of these two thinkers are examined in detail in this thesis.

The limitations of this thesis chiefly relate to its necessary restriction to studying two key thinkers in detail. While there have (naturally) been a diverse array of political theorists and philosophers over recent decades opining on the matter of Türkiye and its trajectory toward modernization, it is beyond the scope of this study to offer a comprehensive analysis of the entire political discourse pertaining to Türkiye modernization, to say nothing of international critiques from various perspectives.

## **1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This study examines primary and secondary sources within the scope of qualitative research methodology. The primary sources of this research are the original books of Attila İlhan

and Necmettin Erbakan in the Turkish language, which are utilized to analyse their ideas and views on modernization through a contextual analytical method. This study uses İlhan's most significant works, including *Hangi Batı* (Which West?), *Hangi Laiklik* (Which Secularism?), *Batı'nın Deli Gömleği* (Straitjacket of the West) and *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı* (National Culture War). Also, this study uses Erbakan's important works including *Davamız* (Our Lawsuit), *Yeni bir Dünya ve Adil bir Düzen* (A New World and a Just Order), *Davam* (My Lawsuit), and *Milli Görüş* (National Opinion). Primary sources are the main works of Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan that enable us to deal with their approaches to modernism. The primary sources are analysed by connective and documentary examination approaches to discover new conclusions.

Secondary sources consist of books and articles, including those reviewed above. These resources were generally based on documents written about Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan in Turkish and English.

The collected data were analyzed using a comparative method, highlighting the similarities and differences between the two thinkers. The findings indicate that both thinkers viewed Türkiye's modernization process as erroneous and proposed a common solution to address these shortcomings.

## **1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE**

This study is divided into five chapters and a conclusion.

1. This introductory chapter provides general information about the research question, objectives, and significance, with a review of key literature on the subject, and the study methodology.
2. Chapter two investigates the relationship between modernization and Westernization and whether the two are integrated or inseparable.
3. Chapter three examines what kind of modernization processes the Ottoman State and Republic of Türkiye applied historically.

4. Chapters four and five present intellectual biographies of Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan (respectively), highlighting their lives and times, major works, and salient critiques and suggestions about Türkiye's modernization process.
5. Chapter six concludes the study, identifying the main research findings and original contributions of this research.



## CHAPTER TWO

### MODERNIZATION AND WESTERNIZATION

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter studies the relationship between modernization and Westernization, which are often conflated and used interchangeably, but which are sometimes defined as two separate concepts. To eliminate the confusion between these concepts, this section examines the extent to which these two concepts are indeed integrated or separate. Firstly, the concept of modernization is examined in detail, drawing on the conceptualization of modernity. Secondly, the concept of Westernization is examined, and the relationship between these two concepts is researched in detail. Finally, the chapter examines the possibility of modernization *without* Westernization, as exhibited in the policies followed by Japan and Malaysia, which are countries that actively sought to pursue this path.

#### 2.1 MODERNITY

##### 2.2.1 Overview

To understand the concept of modernization, we must first consider the concept of “modernity”, which was first used in the late fifth century to distinguish “Christian” from “pagan” culture (the antonym of Christian “modernity” in this context was pagan “antiquity”). Therefore, the old world characterizes the dark, pagan world, while the new world refers to the Christian modern world of the salvific Messiah.<sup>84</sup> However, the modern implications of “modernity” are the opposite of its etymological origins, and modernity typically refers to the new “rational” way of life envisaged from the Enlightenment

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<sup>84</sup> Krishan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society New Theories of the Contemporary World* (United States: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 91-92.

onwards, in which science is replaced by religion, and religion is confined to private life. According to its apostles, Modernity replaces the understanding of God at the centre of society with science, and everything that is not based on scientific evidence in the understanding of modernism is rejected; commensurately, everything is re-evaluated according to reason.<sup>85</sup> Modernity means giving up the past, a new beginning, and historical means preferring a reinterpretation of the origin. For European Enlightenment philosophers and their intellectual descendants, modernity is intertwined with liberation from the hegemony of the Church and even Christianity itself, and increasing secularization of the public sphere, governance, and scientific inquiry.<sup>86</sup>

Modernity has a very long and complex history, and it is therefore difficult to place its birth and geographical spread in a historical framework. To understand modernity, it is very important to investigate its relationship with important historical developments. The American philosopher Marshall Berman (1940-2013) divides modernity into three historical phases.

In the hope of getting a grip on something as vast as the history of modernity, I have divided it into three phases. In the first phase, which goes roughly from the start of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, [when] people are just beginning to experience modern life; they hardly know what has hit them. They grope, desperately but half blindly, for an adequate vocabulary; they have little or no sense of a modern public or community within which their trials and hopes can be shared. Our second phase begins with the great revolutionary wave of the 1790s. With the French Revolution and its reverberations, a great modern public abruptly and dramatically comes to life. This public share the feeling of living in a revolutionary age, an age that generates explosive upheavals in every dimension of personal, social, and political life. At the same time, the nineteenth-century modern public can remember what it is like to live, materially and spiritually, in worlds that are not modern at all. From this inner dichotomy, this sense of living in two worlds simultaneously, the ideas of modernization and modernism emerge and unfold. In the twentieth century, our third and final

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<sup>85</sup> Alain Touraine, *Critique of Modernity*, (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 24-25.

<sup>86</sup> Fredric Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present*, (New York: Verso, 2002), 27; Ahmad N. Amir, Abdi O. Shuriye, Ahmad F. Ismail, "Muhammad Abduh Contributions to Modernity, *Asian Journal of Management Science and Education*", No.1, Vol.1, (2012), 63.

phase, the process of modernization expands to take in virtually the whole world, and the developing world culture of modernism achieves spectacular triumphs in art and thought.<sup>87</sup>

As Berman described in the above excerpt, the first phase of modernism can be traced to the sixteenth century, and pertains to the changing and restructuring of society in Europe since that time, contemporaneous with the Protestant reformation and the increasing assertiveness (or liberation) of the state from the Church.<sup>88</sup> One of the important events that changed society in Europe is the Renaissance, whose ideas of modernity fomented the infrastructure for the Enlightenment movement, which gave rise to discernible modernity itself.<sup>89</sup>

### **2.2.2 Renaissance**

The Renaissance from the end of the fifteenth century gradually spread all over Europe. The first person to use the concept of “the Renaissance” was Giorgio Vasari (1511-1571), an Italian painter, architect, engineer, writer, and historian. He defined it as the “rebirth” of civilization, to express the liberation of Europe from the oppressive, oppressive, and gloomy interim period between the classical Romans and his own contemporaries.<sup>90</sup> With the Renaissance, a division occurred for the first time in the history of the West into Antiquity, Medieval, and the Modern Age. The pre-Renaissance period, namely the Middle Ages, was called the “Dark Age”,<sup>91</sup> while the Renaissance was a harbinger of an exit from darkness, a time of awakening and rebirth, and a bright future.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*, (Canada: Penguin Books, 1988), 16-17.

<sup>88</sup> Anton C. Zijderveld, *The Abstract Society: A Cultural Analysis of Our Time*, (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 98.

<sup>89</sup> David West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 23.

<sup>90</sup> Michael White, *Leonardo: The First Scientist*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 52.

<sup>91</sup> Krishan Kumar, 110.

<sup>92</sup> Matei Calinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 20.

The most important reason why the Renaissance alluded to “rebirth” was that it was perceived to mark the re-emergence of Roman art and science that had been actively suppressed under the auspices of clerical domination of human intuitions and learning in the centuries since Constantine (d. 337) adopted Christianity as the official religion of the Roman imperium. Importantly, with the Renaissance, new critical and rational standards were developed for the authority of medieval thinkers and the church.<sup>93</sup> From Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374) to Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), almost all Renaissance thinkers had a negative perception of the Middle Ages. For Renaissance thinkers, the history of the Middle Ages was a dark and barbaric period of European history after the glorious days of Antiquity. Renaissance thinkers, as they focused on the humanities, saw their period and their work as a revival of classical wisdom and ideas.<sup>94</sup>

For Erasmus, for example, the Middle Ages was a period in which ancient wisdom was lost.<sup>95</sup> The movement collectively known as the Renaissance occurred in many different and disparate places, but its main hub was undoubtedly northern Italy, where secular authorities and power formations such as the Medici family in Florence increasingly sought to influence or curtail the domination of the papacy. The historical monopoly of the Church on education was depreciated to a great extent.<sup>96</sup> Renaissance thought matured with humanism, and it had a significant impact on the modernization of humanism education.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Krishan Kumar, 111.

<sup>94</sup> Marvin Perry, *Western civilization: A brief history, Volume: I to 1788*, (Boston: Wadsworth, 2013), 189.

<sup>95</sup> Erika Rummel, *Erasmus*, (London: Continuum, 2004), 26.

<sup>96</sup> Robert Black, “A Renaissance Education: Schooling in Bergamo and the Venetian Republic, 1500-1650 “, *History of Education*, Vol. 41, No. 4, (2010), 570.

<sup>97</sup> Cynthia M. Pyle, “The Two Cultures and Renaissance Humanism”, *Interdisciplinary Science Reviews*, Vol. 33, No. 2, (2008), 126.

### 2.2.3 Renaissance and Humanism

“Humanism” is conventionally traced to Francesco Petrarch (1304-1374),<sup>98</sup> but the popularization of the humanistic worldview can be attributed to the conquest of Constantinople (*İstanbul*) in 1453, after which scholars who fled to Europe took old Greek and Latin books and manuscripts with them, inciting a revival of interest in ancient Greek and Roman culture. As a result of this, the humanist worldview was born, which advocated that it is possible to reach the good, the beautiful, and the right through a human-based rationale process of deduction.<sup>99</sup> Like many researchers on these classical manuscripts, the Italian poet and thinker Francesco Petrarch also conducted research to show that there was a continuity between the Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations and Christianity.<sup>100</sup>

For humanists, the study and reinterpretation of Classical Greek and Latin texts was crucial because “almost everything worth learning” was “told in these two languages”.<sup>101</sup> As a result of the humanists re-examination of the ancient Greek classics, the idea that it is possible for people to be happy not only in the hereafter but also in this world emerged. According to medieval thought, as per Pauline Christianity interpreted by Augustine of Hippo (d. 430), man is in a condition of absolute defilement in a fallen world. People cannot be happy in this world and must aspire to happiness in the Hereafter through the salvation of Christ.<sup>102</sup> For the soul to be elevated, the body and this world had to be despised. However, according to humanists, the healthier the body, the healthier the soul would be. Humanists presented a new worldview centered on human happiness and health, rather than the morbid and Manichaeic *weltanschauung* of medieval thinkers.<sup>103</sup> As a result, the need

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<sup>98</sup> Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, John Herman Randall, *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 67.

<sup>99</sup> E. Lerner, Standish Meacham, Edward McNall Burns, *Western Civilizations: Their History and Their culture*, (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1993), 429.

<sup>100</sup> Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, John Herman Randall, 67.

<sup>101</sup> Erika Rummel, 26; Vito R. Giustiniani, “Homo, Humanus, and the Meanings of Humanism”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1985), 171.

<sup>102</sup> James D.G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (United State: Eerdmans, 1998), 183; Mina Urgan, *İngiliz Edebiyatı Tarihi I*, (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1986), 119.

<sup>103</sup> Corliss Lamont, *The Philosophy of Humanism*, (New York: Amherst, 1997), 14-16.

for a reorganization of religious life emerged, with growing numbers of mainly urban, cosmopolitan humanists not wishing for their affairs to be controlled by the Church.<sup>104</sup>

#### **2.2.4 Reformation**

In the Renaissance period, contemporaneous with increasing free thought among intellectual elites, there was growing popular discontent with the perceived abuses and corruption of the Catholic Church, which was considered venally compromised by worldly affairs and political intrigues.<sup>105</sup> As a result, people began to express their obvious discontent with the Church on religious grounds, which fomented the increasing Protestant movement from the fifteenth century onwards.<sup>106</sup> Protestants began to practice religion on a more individual basis, with emerging doctrines of their own that rejected the concept of the Church as an intermediary between them and God.<sup>107</sup> In this milieu, Martin Luther (1483-1546), an Augustinian friar, became synonymous with Protestantism when he nailed his 95 theses to the door of the church in Wittenburg, decrying the corruptions of the clergy and the Church itself. According to Luther, individuals can (and must) personally receive grace from Jesus in order to be saved, and the Church was not necessary for man's salvation. By opposing the church and the clergy, he gave voice to popular discontent with papal practices such as selling dispensations, whereby people were accorded forgiveness for their sins by the Church for donating money, and he described the sale of the confessional as a scam.<sup>108</sup> Additionally, his ideas entailed the idea that the church should not affect every aspect of human life.<sup>109</sup> His rebellion against the Church is considered the traditional beginning of the Protestant Reformation.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and its Sources*, edited by Michel Mooney, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 72; Macit Gökberk, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 108. 72

<sup>105</sup> E. Harris Harbison, *The Age of Reformation*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), 47.

<sup>106</sup> Stephen J. Lee, *Aspects of European History 1494-1789*, (London: Routledge, 2015), 20.

<sup>107</sup> E. Harris Harbison, 47.

<sup>108</sup> Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1958), 35.

<sup>109</sup> Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: Routledge, 2004), 272.

<sup>110</sup> Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1: The Renaissance*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3.

Luther acted as a catalyst that began an irreversible process of the dissolution of the political authority of the Catholic Church in Europe, and the birth of Protestantism.<sup>111</sup> According to Luther, people can have a direct relationship with God. The salvation of a believer does not depend on the mercy of the church and the clergy, and he described it as foolishness to forgive sins in the name of God.<sup>112</sup> This reformist view of Luther found many supporters and influenced many European countries. The printing press had a great influence on the spread of his views and the gathering of his adherents, because thanks to the printing press, Luther's views were translated and published in the languages of other Western European countries.<sup>113</sup>

The Reformation initiated by Luther significantly changed the understanding of religion and religious structure in Europe, although not completely. Europe, which was under the influence of the Catholic sect in the pre-Reformation period, partially turned to a new religious interpretation with the emergence of Protestantism as a sect. Protestantism, which spread especially in Northern and Western Europe, changed not only the religious understanding of the countries it spread but also its political stance and social structure.<sup>114</sup> As a result of the reform movements, the papacy became a religious organization separate from the state, and the door to secularism and modern science was opened. Thus, with the reform movement, inquiries have also begun in the form of state administration.<sup>115</sup>

### **2.2.5 Renaissance and State**

In medieval Christendom, adherence to Christianity was the basic principle of belonging to a particular city or state; while Jewish and even Muslim quarters might be tolerated in some

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<sup>111</sup> Erik H. Erikson, 35.

<sup>112</sup> A. Daniel Frankforter & William M. Spellman, *The West: Culture and Ideas*, (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 298-301.

<sup>113</sup> William Pelz, *A People's History of Modern Europe*, (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 44.

<sup>114</sup> Carter Lindberg, *The European Reformation*, (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 165, 239, 325.

<sup>115</sup> Leslie Lipson, *The Ethical Crises of Civilization*, (California: Sage Publications, 1993), 186; Oral Sender, *Siyasi Tarih İlkçağlardan 1918'e*, (Ankara: İmge, 2003), 84.

cities and countries, states were monarchies whose crowns were bestowed by the authority of the Church. Worldly authorities were sacralised (e.g., by coronation ceremonies), and laws were inherently based on adherence to the Bible.<sup>116</sup> The first duty of the state was to realize divine order on earth. Therefore, the Church, which was regarded as God's representative on earth and was powered by God, was above all else.<sup>117</sup> However, with the Renaissance, this understanding changed.

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), one of the most important political theorists of the Renaissance period, was among the first to advance the idea that the state should derive its power from the nation (and not necessarily from the Church/ God). He hearkened back to Roman law to demonstrate that just laws might be enshrined from the essence of the state as a natural institution. Furthermore, the state was inherently a worldly institution, not necessarily having anything to do with the afterlife.<sup>118</sup> According to Machiavelli, the most basic purpose of statecraft was to keep the state alive and to increase its power continuously. For this reason, every means to this end was legal and expedient. Secondly, law, morality, and religion depended on the state, so the state should use them as tools when necessary to achieve the most basic purpose. Thirdly, morality and law cannot exist independently of the state, morality, and law end where the state ends. Law and morality exist for the state. Finally, if the state is based on a nation, it can derive enough power from this root to sustain itself and increase its power. The Church, on the other hand, should not be against or above the state.<sup>119</sup>

In the Renaissance and Reformation periods, a human-centred understanding was adopted instead of a God-centred understanding of the world and the state, and the

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<sup>116</sup> Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 39.

<sup>117</sup> Brian Tierney, *The Crisis of Church and State: 1050-1300*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 2; Macit Gökberk, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 208; Steven Ozment, *The Age of Reform, 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) 79.

<sup>118</sup> Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* translated from Italian by William J. Connell, (Us: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2005), 6; Macit Gökberk, *Aydınlanma Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatürk*, (İstanbul: Yenigün, 1997), 14.

<sup>119</sup> Niccolò Machiavelli, 215.

foundations of the nation-state and secularism, which are the main elements of the modern age, were laid. Also, in this period, the door of modern science was opened. But the real advances in modern science came with the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century.

## 2.2.6 Seventeenth Century and Scientific Revolution

Along with the religious and political fields described above, the Renaissance brought changes in the field of science, including an approach to nature that was unknown to the Middle Ages. In the Middle Ages, the universe was defined as a finite and static whole that had completed its development, conforming with the Christian worldview.<sup>120</sup> However, in the sixteenth century, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) proposed the heliocentric universe theory, claiming that the Sun was the centre of the Universe, and that the Earth revolved around the Sun.<sup>121</sup> Copernicus took an empirical and observational approach, rather than relying on the medieval method.<sup>122</sup> However, the medieval church strongly condemned and opposed the Copernican system on the grounds that it was contrary to the teachings of the Bible and the Church.<sup>123</sup>

During the Middle Ages, the Church had entrenched a scientific system based on Aristotelian maxims conforming with the dogmas of the Bible, and the upset of empirical science based on observation was unacceptable.<sup>124</sup> This scientific revolution, for which Copernicus paved the way during the Renaissance period, continued in the seventeenth century. The seventeenth century is the century in which modern science and modern

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<sup>120</sup> Edward Grant, *Science and Religion, 400 B.C. to A.D. 1550: From Aristotle to Copernicus* (United State: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 126; Macit Gökberk, *Aydınlanma Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatürk*, 15.

<sup>121</sup> Marie Boas Hall, *The Scientific Renaissance, 1450-1630*, (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1962), 48.

<sup>122</sup> William Cecil Dampier, *A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 74.

<sup>123</sup> Thomas Sprat, *The History of the Royal Society of London, for the Improving of Natural Knowledge*, (London: Chapman Press, 1947), 153.

<sup>124</sup> Norman Birnbaum, *Social Structure and The German Reformation*, (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 428.

philosophy were born and at the same time, a “scientific revolution” took place.<sup>125</sup> This revolution was characterized by enormous advances in physics and astronomy, and very important (if less dramatic) advances in medicine, biology, and other fields. The emerging “modern science”, based on observation and experiment, revealed at the macro level the image of a radically different cosmology, while at the micro level, is unveiled a detailed analysis of the human body, eliminating many time-honoured misconceptions of ancient philosophers who sought to interpret the world.<sup>126</sup>

In this century, Isaac Newton (1643-1727) collected and systematized the discoveries made by Nicolaus Copernicus and made unprecedented leaps forward in physics and mathematics. He expounded the “Law of Gravity” in 1680, and in 1686 he published *Principia Mathematica Philosophia Naturalis*, in which he formulated the three basic laws of mechanics and the law of gravity, marking an epochal fulcrum in the scientific revolution.<sup>127</sup> With regard to the role of human beings on this planet, the most important and profound effect of the scientific revolution was the legitimation of the idea that humans can (and indeed ought to) *dominate* nature. The scientific revolution changed the understanding of nature from an enchanted realm directly governed by God and reflecting divine magnificence to celestial mechanics that have their own laws and that operate and regulates themselves in accordance with these laws.<sup>128</sup> Theologically, this was reflected in the increasing popularity of Deism – the belief that God created the universe, but then let it function according to its own pre-determined clockwork.

The central idea of the seventeenth century with regard to ethics was that a tool should be used to distinguish right from wrong that satisfies the rational mind, which nowadays would be referred to as the experimental method. Experiments became the main

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<sup>125</sup> Richard S. Westfall, *The Construction of Modern Science*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 129.

<sup>126</sup> John Desmond Bernal, *The Extension of Man: A history of Physics Before 1900*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), 145-146.

<sup>127</sup> A. Rupert Hall, *The Scientific Revolution*, (London: Longman, 1983), 176.

<sup>128</sup> George Basalla, *The Evolution of Technology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898), 180-181.

subject of seventeenth-century philosophy,<sup>129</sup> and scholars such as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) made breakthroughs in this regard. Bacon suggested the importance of the experimental method to find the truth, but he neglected rationale interrogation of the mind itself, the main element that must be used to observe the experimental method. René Descartes (1596-1650), one of the most important philosophers of this period, argued that the human mind is what is necessary to distinguish pro-actively.<sup>130</sup> For Descartes, the mind is the field of “eternal truth”. In everything we know with the power of reason, we directly recognize and know the “mark of God”. According to Descartes, the most important representative of the rationalist movement, reason “is what makes us (humans) superior and distinguishes it from animals”. It is a “God-given ability”.<sup>131</sup>

Spinoza (1632-1677), one of the important thinkers of the seventeenth century, also emphasized the importance of the mind, which he considered to be at the centre of everything. Spinoza (a secularized Jew) argued that man can attain salvation only by following his mind, and the only thing that allows one to have a free life is the mind.<sup>132</sup> With the importance given to reason and research in the seventeenth century, the narrow mentality of the middle age was eliminated, giving way to doubt and curiosity, the desire to learn more, and questioning and scrutinizing formerly hallowed assumptions.<sup>133</sup>

The Renaissance and Reformation period gave way to the period called the Enlightenment, during which secularism and reason became the dominant paradigms.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Franklin L. Baumer, *Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950*, (New York: Macmillan Pub Co, 1977), 66.

<sup>130</sup> E. Lerner, Standish Meacham, Edward McNall Burns, 652.

<sup>131</sup> René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, translated from French by Constantin Vaughn, (United Kingdom: Erebus Society, 2018), 52.

<sup>132</sup> Benedict de Spinoza, *A Political Treatise* translated from Latin by Robert Elwes, (United States: Independent Publishers, 2017, 46.

<sup>133</sup> Joseph Needham, *Background to Modern Science*, (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 208.

<sup>134</sup> Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* Mary J. Gregor (ed.), *Practical Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15-16.

## 2.2.7 Enlightenment and Modernization Process

The importance given to the mind in the seventeenth century continued and was amplified in the eighteenth century, as a result of which the idea of Enlightenment emerged. Enlightenment is interconnected philosophical, scientific, and social beliefs that developed in Western Europe during the eighteenth century. Enlightenment thought, unlike previous periods, rejected what it considered to be superstition and the supernatural, including spiritual and religious values. The Enlightenment was a broad European intellectual movement that constituted the origins of many modern worldviews today.<sup>135</sup> With the Enlightenment, the source of knowledge was based only on reason, and it was argued that certain and universal knowledge could only be reached through reason.<sup>136</sup> Enlightenment represented Western man reaching the level of being able to manage his own mind without needing the help of anyone else.<sup>137</sup>

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the greatest representative of the German *Aufklärung*, who attempted to formulate a rational basis for morality, defined Enlightenment as follows.

Enlightenment is man's leaving his self-caused immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to use one's intelligence without the guidance of another. Such immaturity is self-caused if it is not caused by a lack of intelligence, but by a lack of determination and courage to use one's intelligence without being guided by another. *Sapere Aude!* [Dare to know!] Having the courage to use your intelligence is, therefore, the motto of the Enlightenment.<sup>138</sup>

According to Kant, people fell into the situation of immature dependency on others because they did not use their minds.<sup>139</sup> Man had hitherto always used his mind under the

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<sup>135</sup> Peter Hamilton, "The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Science" in Hall S. and Gie-ben B. (eds.) *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 17-58. (23).

<sup>136</sup> Alain Touraine, *Critique of Modernity*, (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 25-26.

<sup>137</sup> Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1993), 62.

<sup>138</sup> Immanuel Kant, 11-22.

<sup>139</sup> James Schmidt, *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 5; Macit Gökberk, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 326.

guidance of others, but with Enlightenment, man now had to dare to use his own mind. During Kant's lifetime, metaphysics began to be seen as an unnecessary and deceptive guide to understanding the facts, which had to be abandoned altogether. This is because spiritual truths and facts cannot be known, they cannot be proven, and no one can be sure of their existence.<sup>140</sup> Modern philosophers typically continue to laude the Enlightenment, such as the German philosophers Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) and Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), who claimed that it always aimed to liberate people and free them from their fear. The Enlightenment project assumed that the demystification (*Entzauberung*) of nature was a fundamental requirement for human freedom, including to exploit nature and the world (including other human beings) for human development, without fear of moral or ethical implications.<sup>141</sup>

In other words, with the Enlightenment project, the veil of secrecy on nature would be lifted, and natural events would be explained not by supernatural forces, but by natural causes. The man who did not use his mind before enlightenment did not dominate nature and was afraid of nature. However, with the Enlightenment, the human being, who started to use his mind, managed to dominate nature with his technical knowledge. Man, who dominates nature, measures everything in nature, calculates, and can use nature as it works, insofar as it works for him.<sup>142</sup>

Enlightenment was a broad European intellectual movement that constituted the origins of many modern worldviews today.<sup>143</sup> The most important of these views is undoubtedly the theory of modernization. With the Enlightenment, the West began to think that it had a strong belief in the superiority of its own thought, institutions, values, and biological races. Thus, the West began to see itself as "the Modern West". While the

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<sup>140</sup> Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, 62.

<sup>141</sup> Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, (New York: Continuum, 2001), 13-14.

<sup>142</sup> Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, (London: Routledge, 1964), 10.

<sup>143</sup> Peter Hamilton, "The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Science" in Hall S. and Gie-ben B. (eds.) *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 17-58. (23)

“sorcery” of religion was effaced by the Enlightenment, in which Western thought was shaped, new sacral associations began to be attached to the concepts of homeland and nation<sup>144</sup>, which later found their apogee in the religious cult of the Soviet Union, but which were first reflected in the bizarre contortions of the French Revolution, when the prohibition of Catholicism in 1792 led to the conversion of churches into “Temples of Reason”, decorated with statues of philosophers.<sup>145</sup>

### **2.2.8 French Revolution (1789-1799)**

The eighteenth century was the period of the birth of nationalism in Europe, and the end of the traditional importance of religion as a pan-national source of unity in European society. With the French Revolution in 1789 and its far-reaching consequences, the concept of the nation replaced the importance of religion in political and social lives. The concept of the nation became the instrument of modernity.<sup>146</sup> When we look at the social structure of France, we see that it was essentially similar to the rest of Europe at that period. The fact that the Revolution took place in France reflected deep-seated social inequalities and financial mismanagement, including the crippling debts incurred by France’s efforts in the American War of Independence (1775-1783).

Clearly it is beyond the scope of this study to present a history of the French Revolution, but it can be summarized that the internal turmoil in France was exacerbated by the egregious inequality of the infamous luxurious life of the aristocracy, the frustration of the political ambitions of the proto-capitalist bourgeois class, and the worsening material conditions of urban shopkeepers, artisans, and the penurious lower classes. However, these social strata were experiencing discontent within their own tiers, with the aristocratic class finding fewer opportunities for sinecures and appointments, despite being inherently

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<sup>144</sup> David West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 19-20-40.

<sup>145</sup> James A. Herrick, *The Making of the New Spirituality* (Westmont, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 75–76.

<sup>146</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Publisher Verso Books, 2006), 25-26.

wealthy and privileged. The bourgeoisie class, despite its wealth, did not have a say in government. Peasants, whose literacy rate and independence were increasing, were despised and subjected to heavy taxes. For these reasons, dissatisfaction in the country began to increase gradually. The economic crisis that emerged over the years had increased so much that it affected the middle class as well as the peasants.<sup>147</sup> As a result of these factors, the Revolution occurred, and destroyed the established order of society and the state. The absolute monarchy was ultimately replaced by a militantly secular, anti-Christian Republic. The French Revolution overturned the former feudal society and created a new regime that espoused liberty, equality, and fraternity.<sup>148</sup>

With the French Revolution, all social institutions that existed in the old regime underwent major changes, including property, family, law, religion, and education. The 1793 Constitution guaranteed the right to life and livelihood of all citizens. The reason why the French Revolution went beyond a national revolution and reached the scale of a world revolution was that it was a social revolution rather than a political one. For the countries experiencing this social problem, the French Revolution set an example for a solution.<sup>149</sup> The Renaissance and Reformation movements had limited penetration in Muslim nations, but the French Revolution had a profound and momentous impact, partly because it quickly colonized the Muslim intellectual heartland of Egypt with Napoleon's invasion of 1899, and partly because it served as a template for bourgeois would-be revolutionaries throughout the Islamic world.<sup>150</sup> The cosmopolitan world understanding created by the French Revolution led to a deep modernization movement in all regions.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> George Rude, *The Crowd in the French Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 13-14.

<sup>148</sup> J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Modern, and Contemporary European History*, (United Kingdom: Wentworth Press, 2016), 13-14.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2001), 41.

<sup>151</sup> William H. McNeill, *A World History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 643.

### 2.2.9 Nineteenth-Century Positivism and Industrial Revolution

During the nineteenth century the natural sciences congealed in their distinctly modern form that could be recognised today, underpinned by the philosophical paradigm of positivism. Positivism refers to the ontological assumption that the material world exists and can be tested by experimental methods to test hypotheses and produce generalizable results.<sup>152</sup> The person credited with systematizing positivism is Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who claimed that all sciences had reached positivism by following a certain roadmap. He claimed that in this process leading to positivism, knowledge, and societies mature through three stages, which he dubbed the “Law of Three Stages”.<sup>153</sup>

The first stage, which he called the “Theological Stage”, covered the Ancient Age. At this stage, humanity tries to make sense of nature and its environment by using supernatural concepts. Every phenomenon was believed to be the result of the immediate actions of supernatural beings. For example, there is the prevailing understanding that earthquakes occur because of angering divine forces.<sup>154</sup> The second stage, the “Metaphysical Stage”, began with the Renaissance, and covered the period 1300-1800. In this stage, abstract concepts and imagination were used instead of divine powers in explaining natural events, which was a necessary intermediate stage for the final stage. The last stage, the “Positivistic Stage”, is that in which knowledge is completely based on observation and experimentation.<sup>155</sup>

To briefly explain these three stages, mankind initially understood the world to be directly animated by supernatural entity entities, after which a metaphysical evaluation led to the individual exploration of nature, based on the understanding that it was the result of uncertain forces. Finally, humankind reached the positivist age, where nature, which was

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<sup>152</sup> John Herlihy, 19; René Guénon, 62, 66, 84, 85; International Encyclopaedia of the Social Science, 2nd edition, “Positivism”; Christoph Delius et al., 20, 22; 25.

<sup>153</sup> Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, translated from French by John Harriet Martineau, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 157.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, 159-160.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 171-178.

previously perceived as an abstract and ambiguous dynamism, began to be grasped phenomenologically.<sup>156</sup> For Comte, societies can evolve from primitiveness to modernity with secular thought. With this theory, he conceived the rise of science and the fall of religion.<sup>157</sup> In fact, he considered religion to an attribute of the past in his three-state law, bound up with historical processes, ultimately yielding to inevitable secularizing structures with a positivist orientation.<sup>158</sup> This understanding was unpacked more thoroughly and directly by Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), important sociologist of the nineteenth century, who placed more emphasis on secularization as a source of social change in the transition to modern society.<sup>159</sup>

As can be understood from the examples above, the cumulative development of intellectual inquiry, social change, and economic processes from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century in Europe was accompanied by intellectual predictions of an inevitable impetus towards an ideal society, and to secularize the people in that society.<sup>160</sup> This aim became systematic with the thought of positivism put forward in the nineteenth century, and now the ideal desired society has become a secular society away from religion and tradition; Marx famously sought to actively foment this process, which he viewed as an inevitable outcome of capitalist development and the destruction of idyllic patriarchal relations. In the positive phase, dominated by scientific thought, science and reason came to the fore.

As a result, technology and science advanced along with the Industrial Revolution, which constitutes the economic pillar of modernity. The Industrial Revolution first appeared in England at the end of the eighteenth century, and quickly proliferated around

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<sup>156</sup> *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Science*, 2nd edition, "Positivism"; Auguste Comte, *A General View of Positivism*, translated from France by J.H. Bridges, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 34-35.

<sup>157</sup> Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, 26.

<sup>158</sup> Andrew Davie, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration*, (United State: Yale University Press, 1998), 47.

<sup>159</sup> Raymond Ailen Morrovv, & Carlos Alberto Torres, *Social Theory and Education: A Critique of Theories of Social and Cultural Reproduction*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 49.

<sup>160</sup> Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, 61.

the world, establishing the technological infrastructure and life of the twentieth century.<sup>161</sup> Prior to the Industrial Revolution, humanity basically depended on the energy provided by plants and animals (e.g., plants used for nutrition and fuel, and animals are used for nutrition and mechanical energy).<sup>162</sup> With the Industrial Revolution, the agricultural population dropped seriously, and the production of goods and services shifted from agricultural to industrial production. With the Industrial Revolution, many people had increasing access to goods and services. The Industrial Revolution greatly contributed to economic growth by increasing per capita production.<sup>163</sup>

As mentioned above, the Industrial Revolution was first seen in England, where foreign trade developed significantly, capital accumulation accelerated, and technical inventions were implemented. Industrialization quickly spread to America and Western Europe and, in confluence with Britain's rapidly expanding colonial empire, the rest of the world.<sup>164</sup> Due to its early lead in industrial production, Britain enjoyed greatly increased prosperity during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, dominating global trade with the Royal Navy after the defeat of Napoleon.<sup>165</sup> Each of the countries in the European continent was in a different development process economically and technologically, but all sought to industrialize as quickly as possible,<sup>166</sup> and industrialization developed with the railways built in these countries.<sup>167</sup> By the 1850s, European countries were closing the gap, especially those which switched to a free trade system like the UK.<sup>168</sup>

With the help of the technological, economic, military, and political power that developed after the Industrial Revolution, Western societies collectively became the

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<sup>161</sup> Thomas S. Ashton, *The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 18.

<sup>162</sup> Carlo Cipolla, *Dünya Ekonomi Tarihi*, translated from Italy Ahmet Angın, (İstanbul: Akşam Kitap Kulübü, 1967), 32.

<sup>163</sup> Ronald Max Hartwell, *The Causes of the Industrial Revolution in England*, (London: Routledge Press, 2018), 15-16.

<sup>164</sup> Jean Maillet, *İktisadi Olayların Evrimi*, translated from French by Ertuğrul Tokdemir (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1983), 142.

<sup>165</sup> Michel Beaud, *A History of Capitalism 1500-1980*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 97.

<sup>166</sup> William H. McNeill, 468.

<sup>167</sup> Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 308.

<sup>168</sup> Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century*, (London: Routledge Press, 2015), 78.

pioneers of modernity. Thus, the word “modernity” was used quite widely to describe the common features of the countries most advanced in technological, political, economic, and social development. Therefore, modernity was defined as the process of acquiring all the characteristics of developed (i.e., Western European) countries, which evidently dominated the backward nations of the earth, whose people they enslaved and whose resources they commanded.<sup>169</sup>

The Industrial Revolution, which originated in England in the West, is the result of a long journey that took place in the previous centuries.<sup>170</sup> With the Industrial Revolution, the way to become a rich and prosperous country was to sell the goods produced using free trade policies.<sup>171</sup> The countries that succeeded in this were the countries that achieved economic and technological superiority and that had a high level of welfare, that is, the modernizing countries. Countries that cannot achieve this are trying to modernize to be like these countries.

## 2.3 MODERNIZATION

Modernization primarily involves enhancing the economic and political capacities of a society: it boosts economic capabilities through industrialization and enhances political capacities through bureaucratization. It is the process of the restructuring of society to accommodate and utilize new discoveries and innovations. The shift from preindustrial to industrial society was marked by the “widespread rationalization across all aspects of society”, leading to a transition from traditional (and religious) values to rational-legal values in the economic, political, and social domains. Traditional characteristics of a culture’s political and economic institutions are reshaped by modernization.<sup>172</sup> Historically,

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<sup>169</sup> Cyril Edwin Black, *Dynamics of Modernization*, (New York: Harper, 1966), 18-19.

<sup>170</sup> Michel Beaud, 17.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>172</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-modernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change In 43 Societies*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997),5; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 84 ; Ahmad N. Amir

modernization is the result of changes in the social, economic, and political systems in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. These changes later showed themselves as a process that spread to other European countries, and then to South America, Asia, and Africa.<sup>173</sup>

Modernization, according to Alain Touraine, characterizes “modernity in action”.<sup>174</sup> According to Marshall Berman, modernization refers to the processes in which human beings live in a constant state of becoming, a mode of vital experience.<sup>175</sup> Modernization theory is based on the idea of human progress that emerged in the Enlightenment era, with the belief that technological progress would give humanity increasing control over nature.<sup>176</sup> Modernization, until the seventeenth century, was used as a term expressing the developments in secularism and rational thought and getting rid of the superstitious belief system.<sup>177</sup> However, this concept became a concept expressing reaching the same level with Western countries after the seventeenth century. It especially meant reaching the technological and scientific level of the West.<sup>178</sup>

Modernization is a multifaceted process that includes changes in all areas of human thought and activity. At the psychological level, modernization involves a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations. Traditional man expects continuity in nature and society and does not believe in the human capacity to change or control. Modern man, on the contrary, accepts the possibility of change and believes in its desirability.<sup>179</sup> At the intellectual level, modernization involves the enormous expansion of man’s knowledge of his environment and the dissemination of this knowledge in society through increased

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& Abdi O. Shuriye & Ahmad F. Ismail, “Muhammad Abduh Contributions to Modernity”, *Asian Journal of Management Science and Education*, No.1, Vol.1, (2012), 64.

<sup>173</sup> Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: protest and change*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 11.

<sup>174</sup> Alain Touraine, 44.

<sup>175</sup> Marshall Berman, 23.

<sup>176</sup> Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 16.

<sup>177</sup> Myron Weiner, *Modernization the dynamics of Growth*, (London: Basic Books, 1966), 5.

<sup>178</sup> Daniel Lerner, “Modernization”, in *The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), V. 10, 387.

<sup>179</sup> Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, (New York: Free Press, 1958), 438.

literacy, mass media, and education. Demographically, modernization means changes in life patterns, a marked increase in health and life expectancy, increased occupational, vertical, and geographic mobility, and rapid growth of the urban population as opposed to the rural population.

Economically, modernization exhibits greater diversity of activities, as a few simple occupations give way to many more complex occupations; the level of professional skill rises significantly; the ratio of capital to labour increases; subsistence agriculture gives way to market agriculture; and agriculture itself loses relative economic importance compared to commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural activities. With the emergence of a national market, sources of the national capital, and other national economic institutions, there is a tendency to expand the geographical scope of economic activity and centralize such activities at the national level. Over time, the level of economic welfare increases, and inequalities in economic welfare decrease.<sup>180</sup>

As stated above, modernization is a concept that is related to the increase of industrialization, urbanization, literacy, education, welfare, and social mobilization levels regardless of culture. Modernization has been a global process that we can observe in most of the major cities of the world, regardless of culture. At the societal level, modernization increases the economic, military, and political power of society as a whole and encourages its people to be culturally assertive.<sup>181</sup>

Non-Western societies, which could not provide a natural modernization spontaneously, wanted to modernize to have the technique and technology of the West. However, non-Western societies that wanted to modernize have confused the concepts of modernization and Westernization. In fact, in some countries, the concepts of modernization and Westernization continue to be intertwined and used interchangeably.

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<sup>180</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (London: Yale University Press, 1968), 33-34.

<sup>181</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 84-85.

For example, in Türkiye, these two concepts were directly conflated, and the concept of Westernization is directly understood in the same sense as modernization.<sup>182</sup> In order to eliminate the confusion between these concepts, it is necessary to examine the concept of Westernization in detail.

## 2.4 WESTERNIZATION

The concept of Westernization is a concept attributed to the culture and values of Western society. Westernization means cultural contact with and imitation of the West. Westernization is the adoption of Western values by non-Western societies due to the superior prestige of Western lifestyles. Moreover, Westernization is a process where non-Western societies choose to imitate Western values.<sup>183</sup> In other words, in Westernization, traditional indigenous cultural elements are directly replaced by Western elements.<sup>184</sup> Westernization is defined as the replacement of customs, traditions, values, and general cultures with Western societies' cultures.<sup>185</sup> With Westernization, non-Western societies aim to reach the social and intellectual components of the West.

Westernization means resembling the West in all aspects, whereby non-Western societies restructure themselves according to a Western-centred understanding of civilization.<sup>186</sup> Westernization detaches Third World peoples from their ancestral and indigenous cultures (and landscapes), and transforms them into masses devoid of an authentic intellectual culture, who must consume the products and artefacts of the dominant

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<sup>182</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 182; Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Bir Zihniyet, Kurum ve Kimlik Kurucusu Olarak Batılılaşma", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol.3, (2002), 125-126.

<sup>183</sup> Joseph Heath, "Liberalization, Modernization, Westernization", *Philosophy & Social Criticism Journal*, Vol.30, (2004), 670.

<sup>184</sup> Hirai Naofusa, "Traditional Cultures, and Modernization: Several Problems in the Case of Japan", *Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries Symposium*, Kokugakuin University, 1983, 1.

<sup>185</sup> Manoj Prakesh, "Impact of Western Culture on Indian Culture", *Academic Journal of Arts and Humanities*, V. 1, (2018), 18.

<sup>186</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 11-13.

Western culture. Westernization is to make them alien to their own culture.<sup>187</sup> As can be understood from the definitions above, the focus of the concept of Westernization is culture, while the focus of the concept of modernization is to advance technologically and economically.

## **2.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND WESTERNIZATION**

### **2.5.1 Overview**

During the nineteenth century, Western people firmly regarded their own culture and civilization as the pinnacle of human achievement and the leading force in cultural progress. For them, their own experience and consciousness were typical of the most evolved species.<sup>188</sup>

Western governments and elites justified their colonial expropriation of other people's resources by arguing that for people in other civilizations to modernize, they must become Westernized. In other words, the "white man's burden" was to replace the traditional values, institutions, and beliefs of inferior peoples with those of the West.<sup>189</sup> However, this thesis contends that modernization is a concept related to economic development, while Westernization is a concept related to culture. Modernization (i.e., economic development) neither requires nor produces cultural Westernization *per se*. At the societal level, modernization can increase the economic wealth and military strength of the country as a whole, and encourages people to trust their heritage and be culturally assertive.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Serge Latouche, *The Westernization of the World*, translated from French by Rosemary Morris, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 55.

<sup>188</sup> Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, 25; Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, (1995: New York: St Martin's Press), 95–6.

<sup>189</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal", *Council on Foreign Relations*, Vol. 75, (1996), 28.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid*, 36-37.

Cyril Edwin Black, like Samuel Huntington, criticized the equating of modernization with Westernization. According to him, supporting the modernization processes of societies and imposing the Westernization process are two different things. The development of their countries is different, and their adoption of Western cultures is different. Non-Western societies do not need to adopt Western culture to develop (i.e., to modernize).<sup>191</sup> When we accept the bifurcation of these two concepts, we can begin to understand the dynamics of their false conflation in a uniform modernization model emerges. It is a model in which the West is taken as an example and the institutions and cultures of the West are imitated.

However, every country has its own culture and traditions, and there are institutions built with them. Non-Western countries can create their own modernization modules by preserving their own culture and traditions, without accepting the culture and values of the west. Otherwise, when they accept that the way to modernization is Westernization and follow this uniform Western model, they lose their own culture and values. Therefore, we should not accept these concepts as one.

Before the advent of the multi-civilizational world advocates, Westernization, and modernization were in fact considered synonymous, including by subjugated natives as well as their white European colonizers. People did not perceive any dichotomy between these two concepts: to modernize meant to be civilized, and to become Westernized.<sup>192</sup> The association of modernization with Westernization arose from the idea that, despite national and regional differences, the way of modernization is basically the same as Westernization, with the top hat being as intrinsic to modernity as the steam engine. Even modern political scientists such as Francis Fukuyama advocate the idea that modernization is a fundamental economic process that dictates a common evolutionary model for all human societies and cultures.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Cyril Edwin Black, *Dynamics of Modernization: A Study of Comparative History Paperback*, (New York: Harper Torch, 1968), 7-8.

<sup>192</sup> S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of World Order*, 23.

<sup>193</sup> Frances Fukuyama, *The End of History, and the Last Man*, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 48.

According to Fukuyama, all societies *should* restructure their modernization processes according to the Western lifestyle. With this thought, Fukuyama argues<sup>194</sup> that Westernization is equivalent to modernization and describes Western civilization as a model and universal civilization that should be built above all other civilizations.<sup>195</sup> According to Fukuyama, humanity is now completely under the control of Western civilization, and other civilizations have disappeared because Western civilization has reached a perfection that can no longer be developed.<sup>196</sup> However, according to American historian Marshall Hodgson (1922-1968), Europeans are not the only civilization in the world, nor the superior one:

We Europeans have been lording it over the rest of the earth; the other nations are already objecting, and their objections seem likely to increase. Is it not time that we wake up to the fact that we are not the only people in the world that matter?<sup>197</sup>

In addition, he emphasizes that the claim that the phenomenon of civilization is unique to the West is not valid and that the knowledge that the origin of civilization is Mesopotamia and Egypt is now a subject that is closed to discussion.<sup>198</sup> There are reasons why modernization and Westernization are so conceptually combined, that is, the illusion that modernization is westernization. The origin and global character of the modernization process in the West was taken to constitute civilization as a universal paradigm. Therefore,

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<sup>194</sup> However, changes in world politics forced Fukuyama to reconsider his thesis. He accepted that there were various paths to modernization and that each society's modernization process was different and did not have to resemble that of the West. See, Francis Fukuyama, "Reflections on The End of the History Five Years Later", *History and Theory*, Vol.34, No. 2, (1995), 32.

<sup>195</sup> Stephen Chijioke Nwinya, "The Conflate of Modernization and Westernization and Africa's Quest for Authentic Civilization and Development", *Journal Of Humanities And Social Science*, Vol. 24, No. 10, (2019), 60-61; Hermann Kreutzmann, "From Modernization Theory Towards The Clash of Civilizations: Directions and Paradigm Shifts in Samuel Huntington's Analysis and Prognosis of Global Development" *Geo Journal*, Vol.46, No.4, (1998), 256.

<sup>196</sup> Frances Fukuyama, *The End of History, and the Last Man*, xiii; Recep Şentürk, "Medeniyetler Sosyolojisi: Çok Medeniyetli Bir Dünya Düzeni İçin Neden Yeniden İbn Haldun?", *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, V.16, (2006), 93.

<sup>197</sup> Marshall G.S Hodgson, *Rethinking World History*, edited by Edmund Burke, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 37.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

for non-Western societies, Westernization has been the way to be civilized and modernized like the West. Thus, modernization and Westernization have become synonymous. While modernization is necessary for a nation to become a power in the global system, Westernization might be considered a choice. There is a tendency for modernizing nations to adopt Western institutions and values in the modernization process, but this is not a necessary process. A non-Western nation can modernize by preserving its institutions and values. They are knowledgeable about the West's path, and therefore have choices about what to imitate and what not to imitate.<sup>199</sup>

The relative weight of the West in the conceptualization of modernity, which is the main element of modernization, is extremely important. Modernity began as a European project and was monopolized by Western and Central Europe until the USA became a major player in the world. It is argued that the West and its historical experience still dominate the conceptualization of global modernity.<sup>200</sup> However today the place of the West in the conceptualization of modernity is subject to heated debate. It is wrong to argue that there is only one model of modernity based on Western experience and that it should be applied.<sup>201</sup> Every society has its knowledge system and builds its establishments accordingly. The bases of thinking used in this process are different in each society, so the systems of thinking are also different.

Thus, two different systems, such as the Islamic and Western paradigms, cannot come together to build merely one civilization and compromise on a single understanding of what is correct to cover all universal issues.<sup>202</sup> Generalizations about social structures are of limited help in understanding the problems of societies because each society has its

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<sup>199</sup> Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Multiple Modernities*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 6; Recep Şentürk, 93.

<sup>200</sup> Cengiz Dinc, "Modernity and the West: Evolution of Their Relationship", *Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol.13, (2007), 97-98.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>202</sup> Rothacker Eric, *Tarihselcilik sorunu*, translated from Germany by Dogan Ozlem (İstanbul: Gündoğan Yayınları, 2008) 53; Black Cyril Edwin, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) 3, 4, 39, 40; Mevlut Uyanik, 71.

own culture, history, and heritage. No two societies can modernize in the same way because they do not have the same traditional institutions and traditional heritage. For example, Cyril Edwin Black (1915-1989) noted that generalizations on social structures were of only limited help in understanding the issues of societies. According to him:

No two societies modernize in quite the same way-no two have the same heritage of traditional institutions. No two are at the same stage of development, and no two have the same pattern of leadership or the same policies of modernization.<sup>203</sup>

Therefore, non-Western societies cannot modernize in exactly the same way as Western societies, because they do not have the traditional institutions and heritage of the West.

### **2.5.2 Modernization Theories**

Modernization theorists conceptualize modernization as the gradual transition of all societies from the traditional to the modern, complemented by the adoption of Western institutions, values, and behaviours.<sup>204</sup> Theorists such as Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Max Weber (1864-1920), and Auguste Comte (1798-1857), known as classical theorists, choose to define modernization, that is, the process of transition from traditional to modern, in a straight line. According to these sociologists, modernization is a gradual process, that all societies will inevitably experience due to the deterministic nature of global socio-economic evolution.

According to the modernization theorist Daniel Lerner (1917-1980), in the modernization process, non-Western societies will go through the same process as the West and will become copies of Western societies. The modernization model that has evolved in the West reveals its own existence as a historical reality and example. Regardless of race,

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<sup>203</sup> Cyril Edwin Black, 95.

<sup>204</sup> John Scott & Gordon Marshall, *A Dictionary of Sociology*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 261.

colour, or religion, the same pattern is reproduced across the globe in most modernizing societies. According to him, the process of social change that led to the modernization of the Western world is a recipe for Middle Eastern societies in transition to overcome their problems.<sup>205</sup>

However, more recent modernization theorists, such as Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (1923-2010), have acknowledged that such modernization theories are based on a Eurocentric point of departure, which assumes that the historical transformation processes of industrialized and urbanized Western societies *should* be followed by non-Western societies as well.<sup>206</sup> According to this understanding, the West is conceived of as superior to the East, and specifically, the West is inherently blessed with unique virtues. The East is determined as the opposite and the other of the West.<sup>207</sup>

However, there is a point that these Modernization theorists miss. Since it is not possible for human beings to operate in all areas at the same time and in the same way, any civilization cannot be superior to others in all respects and cannot develop in the same way.<sup>208</sup> Every culture has different historical processes, so every society's modernization experience cannot be the same; it must be unique. The only way to modernize cannot be to go through the same processes as the West. It is not necessary to imitate the Western model to modernize.<sup>209</sup> There is no universal modernization process that every society should follow. The modernization experience is a particular one. Every society should modernize itself according to its ways.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society, Modernizing the Middle East*, (New York: Free Press, 1964), 136.

<sup>206</sup> Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change and Modernity*, (New York: Wiley Publication, 1973), 47-72.

<sup>207</sup> Eric Wolf, *Europe, and the People without History*, (California: University of California Press, 1997), 1-2.

<sup>208</sup> René Guénon, *East and West*, translated from French, by Martin Lings, (New York: Sophia Perennis, 2001), 12.

<sup>209</sup> Dominic Sachsenmaier, Jens Riedel, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese, and Other Interpretations*, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 27.

<sup>210</sup> Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-2.

## 2.5.3 Non-Western Modernization

### 2.5.3.1 Overview

Modernization theories have been the target of increasingly intense criticism over recent decades, including from non-Western societies where “modernization” policies have been implemented with often disastrous results, and also by Western researchers.<sup>211</sup> In modernization theories, modernization, in general, is a process in which Western societies are situated as the ideal to which non-Western societies must aspire. Therefore, all modernization theories essentially carry European supremacist ideologies, and function to legitimize the uniqueness and privilege of Western societies.<sup>212</sup> However, the West is not the only civilization to follow. What is ordinary and standard need not be Western.<sup>213</sup> As a counterargument to these claims, the concept of non-Western modernity has emerged.

The concept of non-Western modernity seeks to realize and ground the modernization experiences of non-Western societies with their own social dynamics. The concept of non-Western modernity is an expression that includes the claim of being different from the West, and even consciously being an alternative to Western classical modernization.<sup>214</sup>

Non-Western modernity should be considered both as a reference to the West and as a development model independent of the West. It is a local, alternative, and plural reading of modernity. Tradition has an important place in this reading, and can be

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<sup>211</sup> Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*, (New York: MacMillan, 1967), 10.

<sup>212</sup> Peter Wagner, *Modernity as Experience and Interpretation*, (United Kingdom: Polity Press 2008), 12-13.

<sup>213</sup> Marshall G.S Hodgson, 18.

<sup>214</sup> Peter Wagner, 12-13.

modernized to the extent that it is accepted, not to the extent that it is rejected. Modernity and tradition need not reject each other, and new values can be created by mixing the two.<sup>215</sup>

Modern societies are not societies that actively erase the past and beliefs (unlike the Russian and Chinese Cultural Revolutions, both products of *Westernizing* modernization), but societies that can peacefully transform the old into the modern.<sup>216</sup> American sociologist Robert Neelly Bellah argues that there is no need to completely abolish traditional elements in culture in the modernization process. According to him, it is even possible to benefit from these cultural elements.<sup>217</sup> According to Cyril Edwin Black, culture is very important for the modernization of society. He claims that the modernization of societies is not the same for different configuration, and that they all necessarily produce different modernization results, according to their cultural and societal structures.<sup>218</sup> According to Samuel Huntington, modernization increases the economic wealth and military strength of the country as a whole, and can encourage people to be more (not less) assertive in their adherence to their cultural heritage.<sup>219</sup>

Non-Western modernization offers a new model of modernization to non-Western societies. This new model requires evaluating modernity from outside the West, instead of seeing it from the West, and understanding modernity on its own terms. Because the Western-centred understanding of modernity has characterized societies outside of itself as backward and primitive, modernization has inevitably been associated with colonialism and imperialism.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> Daniel Brown, *Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2-3.

<sup>216</sup> Alain Touraine, *Critique of Modernity*, (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 354.

<sup>217</sup> Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.64, No.1, (1958), 1-5; Fahrettin Altun, *Modernleşme Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Giriş*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2005), 115.

<sup>218</sup> Cyril Edwin Black, 47-48.

<sup>219</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal", *Council on Foreign Relations*, Vol. 75, (1996), 37.

<sup>220</sup> Eric Wolf, 3.

When we look at the modernization process of the West, we see that every society in the West goes through a modernization process according to its own economic and social structure. The participation of societies in the modernization process and the way they followed this process have been influenced by the social and political formations of those societies. For example, in the modernization practice of the UK, modernization arose because of a long process of economic, social, and political development, and was shaped as a product of the social history of that society. This modernization was marked by bourgeois entrepreneurship and civicism. In France, on the other hand, modernization gained a more public character due to the Revolution being under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. In Germany, the idea of modernization was built theoretically, but since the bourgeois class did not carry this thought, modernization was carried out by the state through direct intervention as an actor in society.

To summarize, modernization has taken different aspects, such as evolutionist and individual-centred in England, revolutionary and people-centred in France, and political and state-centred in Germany. As can be seen, the modernization theories that have been constructed have also differed within Western societies themselves.<sup>221</sup>

Thus, we understand that if non-Western societies are to modernize, they can do so in their own way, not by accepting Western values. There have been countries that have tried this way and succeeded. For example, Japan, an East Asian country, and Malaysia, a Southeast Asian country, are modern countries that have developed economically without accepting Western values.<sup>222</sup>

### **2.5.3.2 Japan**

From the fifteenth to mid-nineteenth century, the government in Japan was in the hands of the Tokugawa dynasty's shogunate. After witnessing the pretended superiority of Jesuit

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<sup>221</sup> David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 56-78; Muammer Tuna, Hasan Şen, Zafer Durdu, *Modern Toplumun İnşası (tarihsel ve sosyolojik bir perspektif)*, (Ankara: Detay Yayıncılık, 2011), 70.

<sup>222</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of World Order*, 182-195.

missionaries in the sixteenth century, and the intrigues of European colonial scouts, the shoguns deliberately closed Japan to the outside world. In this context, customs were established, international commercial activities were strictly recorded, regulated, and limited; and the construction of ships capable of deep sea voyages was prohibited. Japan's relationship with the West was limited only to the commercial activities of a small group of Dutch and Portuguese traders with special concessions.<sup>223</sup>

However, in 1853 Commodore Perry demonstrated Western superiority with literal gunboat diplomacy in 1853 and forced Japan to open to Western traders. Western countries were descending on the Asian continent to expand their sphere of influence, to expropriate local resources and sell their wares to captive local markets. They focused on how to exploit the production and underground resources of the Asian continent, and their interest in Japan increased due to its favourable position in relation to sea lanes, trade with China, and the presence of rich coal deposits for refuelling.<sup>224</sup>

Under the pressure of countries such as the USA, England, France, Russia, and the Netherlands, Japan under Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837-1913) had to make changes in its policy of minimizing the connection with the outside world, which it had been implementing for many years. In this direction, Tokugawa had to open some ports to Western traders. As a result, the Tokugawa administration made its first international agreement (the Treaty of Kanagawa) with the USA on 31 March 1854, after which a series of foreign trading concessions were established in various ports. These concessions were forced upon Japan, and implied the evident weakness of the warrior caste of Japanese governance in the face of superior Western technology.<sup>225</sup> This perceived backwardness and deliberate humiliation brought the need for reform to the fore, and a group of Samurai disgruntled by these negative developments ended the Tokugawa Dynasty in a bloody coup

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<sup>223</sup> Kenichi Ohno, *The History of Japanese Economic Development*, (London: Routledge, 2018), 35; Özer Ozankaya, "Japonya'nın Modernleşme Denemesi", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Vol.20, (1965), 297.

<sup>224</sup> Marius B. Jansen, *The making of modern Japan*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 64, Kenichi Ohno, 61-62; Hakkı Büyükbaş, "Japon Modernleşmesi Üzerine (1868-1912)", *Bilimname*, No.3,(2003), 70-71.

<sup>225</sup> Marius B. Jansen, 277-278.

at the beginning of 1868. These reformist samurai united under the authority of Emperor Meiji (1812-1912) and took the first steps toward modern Japan.<sup>226</sup>

The Meiji period was characterized by the persistent grievance that the Western concessions deprived Japan of full independence and limited its own burgeoning trade possibilities, now it was open to the world. The government launched an extraordinary diplomatic mission to reconsider these unequal agreements. Under the chairmanship of Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883), this delegation consisted of ministers, scientists, and students. Departing from Yokohama Port in December 1871, this delegation visited twelve countries, including the USA, the UK, France, Russia, and the Netherlands, returning in September 1873.<sup>227</sup> The main objectives of the Iwakura Delegation was to achieve recognition of the new Imperial regime in the West, to initiate the renegotiation of unequal agreements with Western powers, and to observe the political, economic, commercial, and technological achievements of the West. The most important of these goals was to identify how Western societies had achieved their political, economic, commercial, and technological successes. The delegation wanted to learn how these achievements were achieved and set a new roadmap for Japan.<sup>228</sup>

In order to encourage the start of the modernization process in Japan, the delegation, which observed and analysed the West's economy, technology, military systems, and many other things such as education, culture, history, religion, and philosophy, produced a report. The Japanese government published this report as a five-volume book, which sheds light on the development path of the Japanese administration and people and examines Western and Eastern cultures comparatively.<sup>229</sup> This encyclopaedia, entitled "*The Iwakura Embassy*,

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<sup>226</sup> Herschel Webb, *An Introduction to Japan*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 20; Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) ,58-59.

<sup>227</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003*, (Boston: Brill, 2005), 3-4; Kume Kunitake, *Japan Rising The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871-1873*, edited by Chushichi Tsuzuki R. Jules & Young,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xv.

<sup>228</sup> Olive Checkland, *Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868- 1912*, (London: Macmillan, 1989), 109; Mohamad Firdaus Mansor Majdin, "Meiji Japan's Pursuit of a Modern Nation state: An Interpretation", *Asian Journal of Research in Education and Social Sciences*, Vol.4, No.1, (2022), 188-189.

<sup>229</sup> F. G. Notehelfer, & Igor R. Saveliev, & W. F. Vande Walle, "An Extraordinary Odyssey: The Iwakura Embassy Translated", *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 59, No. 1, (2004), 84.

*1871-73: A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation Through the United States of America and Europe*", was one of the cornerstones of Japanese modernization. According to the mission report, Japan needed reforms to catch up with Western states, therefore it should emulate the technological and commercial power of Western civilization. However, while taking the West as an example, it should never break away from its own essence and culture.<sup>230</sup>

According to the Iwakura Delegation, the most pressing need for Japan's modernization was to increase the country's exports. According to their research, the volume of exported goods was so small that it did not meet latent foreign demand, but the transport of goods was unsafe, and a regular presence in foreign markets for Japanese wares had not yet been established. Moreover, transportation within Japan itself was also very weak; the delegates noted that the transportation cost of a few kilometres in Japan was higher than the transportation cost of thousands of kilometres in the USA. Thus, it was underlined that an important pillar of Japan's modernization should be the expansion and development of the railway network.<sup>231</sup>

While Japan met all its military needs from foreign countries, from warships to rifles and even uniforms, this situation changed completely after 1900.<sup>232</sup> Although Japan mainly relied on Britain for its naval training and warship production (and Germany to train its officers), basic needs such as firearms and uniforms were largely met by domestic production. With the establishment of Western-style factories, the silk and cotton industry developed, and by 1914 silk had reached a level that accounted for approximately one-third of Japanese exports. In addition, the increase in production because of these major developments in the field of industry revealed the inadequacies in infrastructure in transportation and communication, and prompted the government to urgently start

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<sup>230</sup> Kenichi Ohno, 44; Hasan Fatih Seval, "Japon Kalkınmasının Temel Taşı: Meiji Resterasyonu ve Iwakura Heyeti", *İş ve Hayat*, Vol.3, No.5, (2017), 106-107.

<sup>231</sup> F. G. Notehelfer, Igor R. Saveliev, and W. F. Vande Walle, 95.

<sup>232</sup> Yuhkici Fukuzawa, *An Outline of Theory of Civilization*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 253.

infrastructure work. In conclusion, the telegraph and telephone network spread throughout the country, and by 1906 the Japanese state had 8,000 kilometres of railways.<sup>233</sup>

As seen in this example, the Mission followed the industrial developments in the West and pioneered the radical modernization process of Japan. The delegation made its observations with a critical point of view, not with admiration for the West, because no matter how developed the West is, every good thing in the West, could not have produced the same positive results in Japan. Therefore, Japan's own internal dynamics and traditions while making reforms. For this reason, the Japanese adopted an understanding that they described as a "harmonious solution" in the development process. This new understanding was a synthesis of the Japanese spirit and Western science. With this synthesis, a collective reform movement started and progressed rapidly in a very wide area from education to military, from industrialization to commercial regulations and improvement of logistics infrastructure.<sup>234</sup> This synthesis created and implemented by Japan by taking the technology of the West and blending it with its own culture has been very successful. In a time that can be considered short for states such as forty years, Japan, its region, has even become one of the world's most important powers.<sup>235</sup>

Many non-Western states that came into contact with the West adopted Western institutions and culture to survive or by their own choice. However, while Japan has benefited from external factors for change and growth since the Meiji period (1868-1912), it has implemented foreign ideas and systems not in their original form, but with changes appropriate to local needs.<sup>236</sup> Japanese modernization was also galvanized by the characteristic features of the Japanese people. They increased their national income, which

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<sup>233</sup> Janet Hunter, *The Emergence of Modern Japan*, (Australia: Horwitz Publications, 1977) 159-161-366.

<sup>234</sup> Curtis Andressen, *A Short History of Japan: From Samurai to Sony*, (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 87; Li Narangoa, Japan's Modernization: The Iwakura Mission to Scandinavia in 1873, "*KONTUR: Culture, History, Politics - Tidsskrift for Kulturstudier*" (2000), 18; Şeyma Nalbant Ayhan, XIX. Yüzyılı Japonya'sında Siyasi Düşünce: "Shiron" ve "Bunmerion No Gairyaku" Eserlerinde İdeoloji, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Ankara University, 2013, 4-5.

<sup>235</sup> Andrew Gordon, 94; Hasan Fatih Seval, 106; Metin İşçi, *Genel Olarak ve Türkiye'de Siyasal Değişme*, (İstanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1998), 75.

<sup>236</sup> Kenichi Ohno, 7-8.

was USD 10 billion in 1950, by working 6 days a week, saving 20% of their earnings, and dedicating nights to science and education. From starvation and ruin in 1945, Japan rose to become the world's third largest economy in the 1970s. The main reason for the success of Japan, which recorded the fastest development rate in the world, was the application of the latest production opportunities provided by technological innovations and modernization to daily life and the implementation of policies encouraging investment. In 1974, they increased their national income 40 times, to USD 400 billion dollars, breaking all world records in terms of economic indicators.<sup>237</sup>

As can be seen, Japan began its modernization in the nineteenth century, and this process was further accelerated after WWII, when it modernized with the slogan of catching up and surpassing Europe and America, and becoming a great power both economically and culturally. Thus, after its attempt to create a modernized, European-style colonial empire in Asia failed in WWII, Japan became a role model for Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia as an economic power.<sup>238</sup>

### **2.5.3.3 Malaysia**

Malaya gained independence in 1957 after being under British colonial domination since the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. After the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Singapore (the traditional maritime locus of trade) ceded in 1965, and Malaysia was left as a predominantly agricultural nation with limited industrial production. It needed to produce a modernization programme to and a sense of national identity, and Islam was seen as the best option to distinguish Malaysian from Western modernization.<sup>239</sup> This is because the majority

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<sup>237</sup> Chalmers A. Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, (United State: Stanford University Press,1982) 6-8; İsmail Giritli, "Japonya'nın Modernleşmesi ve Atatürkçü Modernleşme", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol.2, No.5, (1986), 368-369.

<sup>238</sup> Hisao Furukawa, "Meiji Japan's Encounter with Modernization", *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, No.3, (1995), 234; Nakaruma Katsumi, "The Modernization of Japan", *Keio Economic Studies*, Vol.5,( 1968),36.

<sup>239</sup> Izzati Aziz, "Rethinking Modernity: The Construction of Modern Malaysian Society", *JOMEK Journal*, Vol.16, (2021), 96.

indigenous population (the Malays) were *de jure* Muslim (as subjects of the Malay Sultans under the previous colonial regime), thus Islam had an obvious strong influence on the establishment of the Malay worldview and culture<sup>240</sup>, and had been a means of resisting modern colonial oppression, especially in the intellectual and political sphere (albeit many Christians and others were prominent in Malayan independence).<sup>241</sup>

Scholars of modernity prior to recent decades assumed that the way to progress in modern institutions such as economy, politics, and industry was only possible with Western modernity, as discussed previously. However, Malaysia was an outlier, showing that it is possible to have modern, contemporary institutions while remaining consistent with indigenous traditions.<sup>242</sup> Malaysia's modernization process started with the "New Economic Policy" that it started in the early 1970s to create its own brand. With this policy, industrial development and social restoration strategies were created under the leadership of the state. The growth in the modernization mission of the Malaysian state accelerated during the reign of Malaysia's fourth prime minister, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (b. 1925).<sup>243</sup> He is known as the father of Malaysian modernization, known for his achievements in modernizing Malaysia in his own style.<sup>244</sup> He wanted Malaysia to modernize as quickly as possible.<sup>245</sup> Thus, he introduced two important policies to the

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<sup>240</sup> Mohammed Ajmal Bin Abdul Razak Al-Aidrus, *Islam Hadhari Bridging Tradition and Modernity*, in Baharudin Ahmad, *The Meaning of Civilization as Perceived by Malays*, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 2009), 74.

<sup>241</sup> Alparslan Onbasi, (2021, March). The Effect of Islamic Tradition on Resist Colonial Mind-Set in Malaysia, Paper Presented at Seminar Contemporary Islam in the Malay World: Relationship between Malay Ethnicity and Islamic Religiosity Revisited, Organized by IIIT East and Southeast Asia Office Kuala Lumpur, 2; Alparslan Onbasi & Esra Polat Onbasi, "Non-Western Modernization: Modernization Experience in Malaysia During the Era of Tun Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad (1981 – 2003)", *Journal of Islam In Asia*, Vol.21, No.3 (2024), 237.

<sup>242</sup> Alparslan Onbasi, 3.

<sup>243</sup> Joel S. Kahn, "Anthropology and Modernity", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 42, No. 5, (2001), 652-653; Teik, Khoo Boo, *Malaysian Politics and its Discontents*, (London; Zed Books, 2003), 24.

<sup>244</sup> Mashitah Mohd Udin & Rusdi Omar & Kamarul Azman Khamis & Kamarul Zaman Hj Yusoff, "Tun Dr Mahathir's Leadership Patterns and the Success Story of Malaysia", *Test Engineering and Management* Vol. 82, (2020), 1293; Khairul Azman Mohamad Suhaimya & Nurul Aimi Razalib & Lutfan Jaesc & Muhamad Helmy Sabtu, "Development of Nation State of Malaysia Based on Mahathir Mohamad's Leadership Model Framework", *Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education*, Vol.12 No.2 (2021), 736.

<sup>245</sup> Syed Husin Ali, *The Malays Their Problems and Future*, (Malaysia: The other press, 2008), 141.

public; the “Look East Policy” and the inculcation of “Islamic Values”.<sup>246</sup> These policies he introduced were both contrary to Western values and aimed at increasing local economic growth.<sup>247</sup>

Mahathir’s Look East Policy aimed to transform the mindset of Malaysian society, encouraging them to achieve success like their East Asian neighbours, Japan, and South Korea. This policy was unveiled by Mahathir on 8 February 1982, during the 5th Joint Annual Conference of the Malaysia-Japan Economic Association (MAJECA) and Japan-Malaysia Economic Association (JAMECA) at the Hilton Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. Essentially, the policy proposed that the government conduct analysis and research to identify values, work ethic, and positive examples from Japan and Korea.<sup>248</sup> It specifically aimed to encourage Malaysians to learn Japanese business ethics, business management techniques, and technology. In addition, establishing investment and trade cooperation with Japan and South Korea was among the goals of this policy.<sup>249</sup>

The main reason why Mahathir brought Malaysia closer to its East Asian neighbours with his Look East policy is that Western societies see their own values, political and economic systems as superior to other societies, and try to impose their own systems on non-Western societies. For Mahathir, who opposes this understanding, “European values are European values; Asian values are universal values”. As Asian and Muslim civilizations begin to emphasize the universal importance of their cultures, Westerners will begin to

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<sup>246</sup> Abdul Rahman Abdul Aziz, “The State and Modernization Perspectives Development Planning”, *Demokrasi*, Vol.6, No.2, (2005), 6.

<sup>247</sup> S.Sigit, “Malaysia, and Mahathir in The Global Challenge”, *Faculty of Social and Political Science of the University of Pelita Harapan*, Vol. 12. No. 23, (2020), 43-44.

<sup>248</sup> Khadijah Md Khalid & Ayame Suzuki & Jason Loh Seong Wei, “Three decades of Malaysia-Japan Relations (1981-2011): Crossed interests and missed opportunities”, *Journal of Asia Pacific Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, (2015), 79-80; Faridah Binti Jaafar & Saiyid Radzuwan & Soijah Likin & Nazarudin Zainun, International Economic Relations under Mahathir’s Period, *International Conference on Multidisciplinary Research*, January 2018, 343-345; Sivamurugan Pandian & Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid & Paramjit Singh Jamir Singh & Saiyid Radzuwan Syed Sopi, “Look East Policy After 35 Years From Social Sciences Perspectives: A New Paradigm for Japan-Malaysia Relations 1982-2017”, *Cogent Social Sciences*, Vol.7, No.1, (2021), 2.

<sup>249</sup> R.S.Milne & Diane K.Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir*, (London: Routledge, 2002), 55; Khadijah Md. Khalid, *Malaysia-Japan Relations: Explaining the Root Causes for the Pro-Japan Orientation of Malaysia in the Post-1981 Period*, (London: University London Press, 1999), 309; Noureddine Rashid & Hüsamettin İnaç, “Malezya’nın Ekonomik Kalkınmasının Temel Parametreleri”, *Holistic Economics*, Vol., No.1, (2022), 43.

appreciate this connection and see the virtues of a pluralistic world.<sup>250</sup> Mahathir explained his thoughts on this issue as follows:

They still consider their values and political and economic systems as better than any others. It would not be so bad if it stopped at that; it seems, however, that they will not be satisfied until they have forced other countries to adopt their ways as well. Everyone must be democratic, but only according to the Western concept of democracy; no one can violate human rights, again according to their self-righteous interpretation of human rights. Westerners cannot seem to understand diversity, or that even in their own civilization values differed over time.<sup>251</sup>

Within the scope of the Look East Policy, an education agreement covering industrial and technical training was signed between South Korea and Malaysia. The first group of 53 students was sent to Korea at the beginning of 1983 to receive training provided by Hyundai company. By 1993, the Malaysian Government sent approximately 294 trainees to Korea for short-term courses. Additionally, the Korean language was offered to Malaysian students as an elective course in higher education institutions such as the University of Malaya, National University of Malaysia, and MARA University Institute. Students also had the opportunity to go to Korea for exchange programs or summer courses with the support of the Korea Foundation, the Korea Research Foundation, and some Korean companies.<sup>252</sup> Additionally, under this policy, many Malaysian young people were sent to Japan for education through the Overseas Technical Scholarship Association program. In this context, a Japanese language education centre was established at the University of Malaya to prepare Malaysian students for Japanese language courses.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> Mahathir Mohamad & Shintaro Ishihara, *The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century*, (Tokyo: Kodansha Press, 1995), 75; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, 41.

<sup>251</sup> Mahathir Mohamad & Shintaro Ishihara, *The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century*, (Tokyo: Kodansha Press, 1995), 75.

<sup>252</sup> Evaely Sabet Saribu Raja and In-Won Hwang, "The Second Wave of Malaysia's Look East Policy (LEP): Bringing New Continuity, Change, and Challenges", *East Asian Studies* Vol.36, No.1, (2017), 173-208.

<sup>253</sup> Jomo Kwame Sundaram, *Japan and Malaysian Development: In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, in *Japanese Cultural Images in Malaysia: Implications of the "Look East" Policy* by Wendy A. Simit, (London: Routledge, 1994), 336; Frank Kiong, *The Look East Policy: Its Impact in Promoting Japanese Management Techniques to Manufacturing Firms in Malaysia*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Stirling United Kingdom, 2000, 193.

Following innovations in Japan with his Look East policy, Mahathir collaborated with Japanese companies in the automotive industry such as Mitsubishi, Toyota, Honda, and Kawasaki to help produce Malaysia's national car, Proton.<sup>254</sup> Since Malaysia was the first country in Southeast Asia to have a flagship national car, Proton's presence became a symbol of Malaysia's progress at that time. Additionally, large quantities of Proton units were produced to be sold to neighbouring countries. Also, to strengthen the country in terms of infrastructure, he built and implemented the project of public vehicles such as Mass Rapid Transit, and Light Rail Transit and trains connecting many major cities in the Malay Peninsula.<sup>255</sup> In addition, Mahathir created a Multimedia Super Corridor south of Kuala Lumpur, the local version of Silicon Valley, and produced projects to strengthen the national ICT industries.<sup>256</sup> Moreover, in the context of modernization policies, Mahathir initiated and completed Malaysia's mega projects such as the North-South Expressway, Petronas Twin Towers, and the construction of Kuala Lumpur International Airport.<sup>257</sup> Also under the Look East Policy, some changes were planned to improve the organizational structure and employee behavior in the public sector. In this context, the Japanese-style time management system was taken as an example, and the timecard (Punch Card System) was introduced in government offices, courthouses, and other public institutions to record the hours employees came to and went from work to make employees more disciplined and committed to their duties. This way, employees who did not come to work or arrived late could be identified and punished. In addition, morning meetings were encouraged in public institutions before starting work. More importantly, an open office system was planned to be implemented to reduce discrimination between civil servants and other employees.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Takakazu Ogawa, *40 Years of Look East Policy (1982-2022)*, (Tokyo: Japan Malaysia Association, 2022), 36.

<sup>255</sup> Wan-Ping Tai & Samuel C. Y. Ku, "State and Industrial Policy: Comparative Political Economic Analysis of Automotive Industrial Policies in Malaysia and Thailand", *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2013), 61; Alparlan Onbasi & Esra Polat Onbasi, 240; S.Sigit, 44.

<sup>256</sup> Barry Wain, *Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189.

<sup>257</sup> Choy Yee Keong, "Behind Malaysia's "Miracle": A Veblenian Perspective on Mahathir's Era of Economic Modernization", *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 40, No.4, (2006), 865- 864.

<sup>258</sup> Chamil Wariya, *Dasar Luar Era Mahathir*, (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1989), 72-73.

Within the framework of these policies, the Japanese hygiene policy known as 5S was tried to be implemented. The meanings of 5S are as follows; *Seiri* (isolation): isolating or removing unnecessary items from the workplace. *Seiton* (arrange as required): to keep necessary items in an orderly manner and ready for use. *Seiso* (cleanliness): to clean machines and appliances so that they are free of dust. *Seiketsu* (hygiene maintenance): to maintain a constantly improving standard of maintenance and organization of the workplace. *Shitsuku* (training employees to follow the rules) to train employees to always follow the rules of organization and cleanliness.<sup>259</sup> The main purpose of these administrative reforms was to ensure that Malaysia's public sector developed industrially and that the country had quality civil servants and workers.<sup>260</sup>

As can be seen, Mahathir shifted Malaysia's policies from the West to the East with his Look East Policy, thus creating an alternative to the West, which sees its own values, and political and economic systems as superior to other societies. Another pillar of Mahathir's modernization policy was "Islamic Values". Mahathir's main goal in this policy was to make Islam in Malaysia synonymous with economic progress and modernization.<sup>261</sup> For Mahathir, three things were necessary for Malaysia to attain advanced modern status: money, technology, and moral values. Moral values were critical in the fight against Westernization.<sup>262</sup> Mahathir explained what it means to be an advanced modern nation:

we had to define what we meant by "developed country". Does the term refer simply to a per capita income of at least US\$16,000, or does it also imply stability and solid cultural values? All these factors have to be considered, but it is clear that wealth alone does not constitute development. No country is really developed, for instance, if it has money but no technology.... Nor is a country developed, in our sense of the word, if it has money and technology

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<sup>259</sup> Nor Azlina Endut & Rohaini Amin, "The Implementation of the Look East Policy and its Impact on the Community Development in Malaysia: An Analysis," *Akademika Isu Khas*, 9, no.1 (2021):45.

<sup>260</sup> Mashitah Mohd Udin & Rusdi Omar & Kamarul Azman Khamis & Kamarul Zaman Hj Yusoff, "Tun Dr Mahathir's Leadership Patterns and the Success Story of Malaysia", *Test Engineering and Management* Vol. 82, (2020), 1290-129.

<sup>261</sup> Osman Bakar, "Identifying the Islam Policies of the Predecessors of the Najib Administration: Has He Abandoned Tradition", *ICR Journal*, Vol.2, No.4, (2011), 725.

<sup>262</sup> Christopher A. Furlow, "Malaysian Modernities: Cultural Politics and the Construction of Muslim Technoscientific Identities", *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 1, (2009), 203.

but lacks firm moral values. Many Western societies, for example, are morally decadent. There is diminishing respect for the institutions of the family and marriage, and some even permit same-gender marriages. To us, that is not development. You must maintain cultural and moral values. We do not want to be just a rich country.<sup>263</sup>

As seen in the example above, the basic principle of the government under Mahathir was to modernize without sacrificing Islamic and moral values. According to him, when Islam is properly understood and its true commandments are followed, the government achieves progress and prosperity. The secret to Malaysia's success is its adherence to the fundamental teachings and practices of Islam.<sup>264</sup> In this context, Mahathir implemented the “*Dasar Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam dalam Pentadbiran*” (Islamic Values Inculcation Policy) to instill Islamic values in public administration. This policy aimed to integrate Islamic values such as excellence in all work (*al-itqan*), development (*al-tajdid*), and innovation (*al-ibda*) into society and improve the quality of work and productivity required for modernization.<sup>265</sup> In addition, this policy aimed to eliminate the biggest obstacles to Malaysia's development; bad elements such as poverty, corruption, ignorance, etc., which always threaten the unity and solidarity efforts of the people. When evaluated objectively, these Islamic values that are planned to be implemented for Malaysia to achieve its advanced modern status are values that can be adopted and practiced by all Malaysians, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and there is no single reason to deny that these values based on the Islamic religion are generally suitable for the development of Malaysian society.<sup>266</sup> Moreover, Islam has appealed to all of humanity since the day it emerged and

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<sup>263</sup> Mahathir Mohamad & Shintaro Ishihara, 20; Majid Daneshgar & Peter Riddell & Andrew Rippin, *The Qur'an and science in Malaysia, The Qur'an in the Malay-Indonesian World: Context and Interpretation*, in *Intersections of Qur'an and Science in Contemporary Malaysia* by Christopher A. Furlow, (London: Routledge, 2016), 244.

<sup>264</sup> Sven Schottmann, *Mahathir's Islam: Mahathir Mohamad on Religion and Modernity in Malaysia*, (United States: University Hawaii Press, 2018), 1; Virginia Hooker & Norani Othman, *Malaysia Islam, Society And Politics in The PAS-BN Conflict in the 1990s Islamism and Modernity* by Amrita Malhi, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 245.

<sup>265</sup> Wan Liz Ozman Wan Omar, *Pengurusan Islam abad ke-21: Revolusi Pengurusan Untuk Keunggulan Sektor Awam dan Korporat*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors, 1996), 1-15.

<sup>266</sup> [https://www.pmo.gov.my/dokumenattached/Dasar/10DASAR\\_PENERAPAN\\_NILAI.pdf](https://www.pmo.gov.my/dokumenattached/Dasar/10DASAR_PENERAPAN_NILAI.pdf)

has created a strong bond of brotherhood among the members of a multi-ethnic society, the like of which has never been seen or can be seen in any other religion.<sup>267</sup>

He emphasized the importance of “Islam” in modernization as follows:

If we are going to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, we should pause now and take stock. And having done that calmly and dispassionately we should then set out to plan for our future; not the next year, not the next decade, but the whole century and more for that is how long it will take to achieve any degree of success. First of all, we must go back to the true teachings of Islam, to the al-Quran and the Hadith. These teachings had obviously converted the ignorant desert Arabs into a brave and talented people who were able to build in less than 100 years a huge empire extending from Spain in the West to China in the East, to build the greatest civilisation the world had ever seen. If Islam could do these for the jahiliah, the ignorant ones, there is no reason why it cannot do the same for us now. We are not as ignorant as those feuding Arab tribes.<sup>268</sup>

According to Mahathir, who emphasizes that the Islamic religion brings wisdom to societies and improves them, there should be a synthesis of Islam and modern methods of study and research. This synthesis will inspire both Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslim academics must master all modern disciplines and fully understand them. But this is only the first prerequisite. They must then integrate the new knowledge into the corpus of the Islamic heritage by reinterpreting and adapting it according to the worldview and values of Islam.<sup>269</sup> Accordingly, he aimed for Malaysian young people who were sent to Japan for education within the framework of modernization policies to study Japan and to harmonize Islam with modernity and development with the data obtained.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, 101.

<sup>268</sup> Sven Schottmann, 132.

<sup>269</sup> Teik, Khoo Boo, *Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 169.

<sup>270</sup> Abdul Rahman Abdul Aziz, “The State and Modernization Perspectives Development Planning”, *Demokrasi*, Vol.6, No.2, (2005), 6; Manjurul Hossain Reza & Nilufar Yasmin, “Development of Malaysia under the Leadership of Mahathir Mohamad: Turned Malaysia into a Rich Country”, *PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences*, No.5, Vol.1,(2019), 503; Fumitaka Furuoka, “Malaysia-Japan Relations under the Mahathir Administration: Case Studies of the “Look East” Policy and Japanese Investment in Malaysia”, *Asian Survey*, No.47, Vol.3 (2007), 513.

Again, within the framework of this policy, Mahathir opened the International Islamic University of Malaysia. He also gave importance to Islamic banking<sup>271</sup> and Islamic insurance activities and expanded the powers of the Malaysian Islamic Development Department. Additionally, internationally recognized institutions such as the Islamic Economics Foundation, Asia Pacific Mosque Council, Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding and Islamic Thought and History Institution, Islamic Thought and Civilization Institute, Islamic Studies program, and Malaysian Islamic University College were been launched.<sup>272</sup> With these practices advocating modernity, not Westernization, Mahathir became the epitome of the modern leadership paradigm that Muslim-majority countries need.<sup>273</sup> With the policies it implemented, the government was trying to show that a modern state could be created with Islam and Asian culture.

According to the Deputy Prime Minister of the time, Musa Hitam (b. 1934), the Malaysian government, with its policies, showed that Islam was modern, dynamic, and adaptable to today's needs, and that it was not a backward religion.<sup>274</sup> The best example of this was the decrease in poverty in the country. After independence in 1957, almost half of Malaysian people were extremely poor. However, with the modernization policy implemented in Malaysia, Malaysia's economic growth became resilient with a growth rate of 7.6 percent in the period 1970-2012. Compared to the region, this growth rate is one of the highest growth rates. Durable economic growth in Malaysia was supported by strong investment activity, with the average investment-to-GDP ratio reaching around 30 percent

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<sup>271</sup> The most important contribution to the popularization of Islamic ideas, social programs and institutions among non-Muslims in the country was the introduction of Islamic banking services. Initially viewed with suspicion by non-Muslim communities, Islamic banking products and services have become so universally accepted that non-Muslim Chinese now benefit more from the wide range of facilities offered by the Islamic banking system than Malay-Muslims. The expansion and widespread acceptance of the Islamic banking system has been the greatest testimony to the success of Malaysia's Islamization policy, which was pursued in a multi-religious and multi-cultural context. See, Mohammed Ajmal Bin Abdul Razak Al-Aidrus, *Islam Hadhari Bridging Tradition and Modernity*, in Osman Bakar, *Environmental Health and Welfare as an Important Aspect of Civilizational Islam*, 142-143.

<sup>272</sup> Norshahril Satt, *Islam in Southeast Asia in Competing Discourses Among Malaysian Muftis: Still a Case of Arabization?* by Norshahril Satt, (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018), 41-42-43.

<sup>273</sup> Anthony S. K. Shome, *Malay Political Leadership*, (London: Routledge, 2002), 128.

<sup>274</sup> Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 56, No 4, (1983), 636.

during the 1970-1990 period. High and sustainable growth, supported by strong investment activities, created new employment and business opportunities. As a result, the unemployment rate fell from 7.4 percent in 1970 to approximately 3.0 percent in 2012.

Compared to other countries, the unemployment rate in Malaysia is relatively low compared to regional economies. The unemployment rate in Malaysia is lower than in many developed countries. For example, in 2012, unemployment rates in OECD countries and high-income countries were around 8.0 percent; this was more than double that in Malaysia.<sup>275</sup> Additionally, despite facing challenges such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Malaysia has maintained an upward economic trajectory, averaging a growth rate of 5.4% since 2010.<sup>276</sup> Based on this, it can be said that the modernization of Malaysia has progressed positively because of the policies implemented by Mahathir.

Many non-Western societies envied the economic prosperity, technological development, military power, and political integrity of Western societies, and they sought the secret of this success in Western practices and traditions. They sought to Westernize their society to modernize it, considering the West to be the best model. However, East Asians today attribute their economic development not to their importation of Western culture, but to their adherence to their own culture. That is, they claim to be successful not because they resemble the West, but because they remain different from the West.<sup>277</sup> As noted above, Mahathir observed that “European values are European values; Asian values are universal values”. As Asian and Muslim civilizations begin to assert the universal importance of their cultures, Westerners may begin to appreciate this connection and see the virtues of a pluralistic world.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> [https://www.ekonomi.gov.my/sites/default/files/2020-02/Malaysia\\_Success\\_Story\\_In\\_Poverty\\_Eradication.pdf](https://www.ekonomi.gov.my/sites/default/files/2020-02/Malaysia_Success_Story_In_Poverty_Eradication.pdf)

<sup>276</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/overview>; Endi Haryono & Patrick Ziegenhain, “Mahathir Mohamad in Public Policy and Politics of Malaysia”, *Populasi*, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2022), 126;

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, 37-38.

<sup>278</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “The West Unique, Not Universal”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, Vol. 75,(1996), 41.

We see that this model of East Asians is successful in the example of Japan and Malaysia. Both countries, it has achieved success by rejecting the culture of the West, and with the modernization theories, they have created their own culture and values. The success of these two countries proved that it is possible to modernize without Westernization.

## **2.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This chapter highlighted the concepts of modernization and Westernization are two separate concepts. Modernization, which is a concept that originally arose in the West, is the reflection of the results of the great changes that took place in the West, such as the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, which shaped the historical development of Western countries. As a result of these great changes that took place in the West, Western countries increased their economic, military, and political power, including their imperialist domination of non-Western societies around the globe. The latter, which could not achieve natural modernization spontaneously, wanted to modernize to have the economic, military, and political power of the West.

However, non-Western societies that wanted to modernize typically confused the concepts of modernization and Westernization, including Türkiye. Non-Western societies thought that they could reach the economic and political power of the West by imitating Western values and superficial forms. This is because Westernization is the imitation of Western values by non-Western societies. In other words, the focus of Westernization is culture, while the focus of modernization is technology and industry.

Another important subject emphasized in this chapter is different theories of modernization. According to classical modernization theorists, modernization is a gradual process, that all societies will inevitably experience. August Comte, one of the classical

theorists, systematized this with his famous law of three states. Mythologies and legends guide societies in the archaic tribal period; then, in the traditional period, they enter the phase directed by metaphysical rationalism. Finally, positivism/secularism dominates in the modern period. According to those who equate modernization with Westernization, this progress is a necessary process for every society, like the immutable laws of matter. According to them, societies are characterized as advanced/developed or backward/underdeveloped.

According to classical modernization theorists, non-Western societies need to mould their modernization processes into the same pattern as in Europe to reach the level of development of the West. However, since it is not possible for mankind to operate simultaneously and in the same way in all areas, it is not possible for every society to go through the same process. Also, each country's historical processes are different, so it is impossible for each country's modernization experience to be the same. As a result, the concept of non-Western modernity emerged as a counterargument to these claims of classical theorists.

According to the concept of non-Western modernity, society does not need to be put into the same mould as the West to modernize. Non-Western societies may choose the path of modernization by adapting their own structures to the concepts brought by the West, instead of imitating the West as it is and applying everything that comes from there without question. There are two countries that prove this model to be a viable coherent path. These countries are Japan and Malaysia. The last important issue in this section is the non-Western modernization theory applied by these two countries. Japan and Malaysia are exemplary countries that break the stereotypes of modernist thinkers who assume that the way to progress in modern institutions such as economy, politics and industry is only possible with Western modernity, and show that it is possible to have modern and contemporary institutions.

In this context, there is no single path for non-Western societies that want to modernize. They can modernize without going through the modernization process of the West and without accepting the cultural values of the West, that is, without being westernized. They can produce local and national alternative modernization methods in line with their own traditions, cultures, and beliefs.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

# **MODERNIZATION PROGRESS IN THE OTTOMAN STATE AND THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE**

### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

Unfortunately, there are very few academic studies of the history of Turkish modernization that would be considered objective to general readers, due to the many and diverse political interests in the issue, both within Türkiye itself and the world in general. For this reason, it is necessary to critically reconsider and examine Turkish modernization, which resulted in widespread feelings of alienation and exclusion experienced by many Turkish people, who are mostly Muslim, in the face of the great social and political reforms carried out by the state in the last two centuries.<sup>279</sup> Thus, this chapter focuses on the modernization process over the long term, encompassing both the Ottoman State and the RoT.

### **3.2 PIONEER OF MODERNIZATION IN THE OTTOMAN STATE: SELIM III (R. 1789-1807)**

#### **3.2.1 Background**

The Ottoman State began as a tribal confederation from Central Asia who had emerged as a small principality by the beginning of the fourteenth century, defending Muslim lands from Crusader aggression. Their presence and authority gradually began to spread to Anatolia and the Balkans, and they later established sovereignty over the Arab world and assumed leadership of the Muslim ummah as a whole. At its peak, the Ottoman State

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<sup>279</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997), 16-21.

governed a wide and culturally heterogeneous area stretching from Central Europe and North Africa to the Indian Ocean, and from the Crimea to Yemen, maintaining the balance of power with Europe and the most powerful state of the Islamic world.<sup>280</sup>

Prior to the Renaissance period, the Ottoman State did not feel inadequate in the field of science and technology. The Ottomans were able to produce basic solutions to the problems that arose with their science and technology, and certainly felt no need for the science of European countries, which they viewed as essentially backward and primitive.<sup>281</sup> During the first centuries of their establishment, the Ottomans saw themselves as spiritually and materially superior to the Europeans. The reason for this was that the Ottomans were in a stronger position militarily and economically than the European states and other Muslim states at that time, in addition to the spiritual values of their civilization and state. Having rich mineral deposits, controlling trade routes, and being victorious in all the battles they engaged in, they both became economically stronger and saw themselves in a sense of psychological superiority over Europe.<sup>282</sup> As a result of the modernization process that started with the Renaissance, this situation began to change. Western states began to be increasingly advanced technologically and (crucially) militarily.<sup>283</sup>

The progress of the West in the economic and technological field changed the balance of power in the world, and Western societies rose to a position whereby they dominated and ultimately destroyed hitherto more advanced early modern civilizations (notably in the cases of China, India, Persia, and the Ottoman world itself).<sup>284</sup> The Ottoman State, which was certainly one of the most significant military and economic powers in the world in the early modern period, appeared to be slipping behind the military and technological developments in the West, certainly from the early seventeenth century

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<sup>280</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2022), 355.

<sup>281</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, "Ottomans and European Science", *Science and Empires*, Vol.136, (1992), 37.

<sup>282</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, 36.

<sup>283</sup> Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 253.

<sup>284</sup> Halil Inalcik & Suraiya Faroqhi & Bruce McGowan & Donald Quataert, & Sevket Pamuk, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 639.

onwards. As a result, the military superiority of the Ottoman State and the apparent military invincibility of its forces began to weaken.<sup>285</sup>

From this century onwards, the Ottoman State came to be seen in the eyes of Western states as a weak state that could not keep up with the technology of the West, and which began to lose its superiority; consequently, they coveted the low-hanging fruit of the rich and cosmopolitan territories under the authority of the Ottomans.<sup>286</sup> In the eighteenth century, the supremacy of the Ottoman State came to an end in a series of conflicts, the most significant of which was the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774. This failure made military modernization inevitable.<sup>287</sup> Thus, in the eighteenth century, the military superiority of the West was accepted, and the idea of transferring the vehicles that provided this superiority to the Ottoman State emerged.<sup>288</sup>

The modernization movements in the Ottoman State officially started with Selim III (1761-1808), who ascended the throne towards the end of the eighteenth century. He is known as the pioneer of the modernization movement of the Ottoman State,<sup>289</sup> and the first reformer and pioneering sultan who wanted to obtain the superior techniques of Europe, often against the disparagement of traditional Ottoman elites (including Christians and Jews) who viewed the West as essentially backward and barbarous.<sup>290</sup> During this period, the “iron curtain” separating the Ottoman State from the West did not completely disappear, but it began to break, as Selim III closely followed the military, technical, political, and economic achievements of Europe.<sup>291</sup> The biggest reason for him to follow Europe was his upbringing and education, which differed from his predecessors.

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<sup>285</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2001), 58.

<sup>286</sup> Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilization*, translated from French by Richard Mayne, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 123.

<sup>287</sup> Bernard Lewis, 59.

<sup>288</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 10.

<sup>289</sup> Robert E. Ward & Dankwart A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 34.

<sup>290</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 164.

<sup>291</sup> Shaw Stanford, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 180.

Sultan Selim III grew up in a freer environment than the princes before him. His father, Mustafa III (1717-1774), appointed foreign teachers for him, so that he would be aware of the developments in Europe and could learn French (the language of diplomacy in Europe).<sup>292</sup> While Selim was still the Crown Prince, he corresponded with the French monarch Louis XVI (1754-1793), discussing reforms that could be made. Thus, he was brought up to adhere to the reformist traditions that would mark the eighteenth century, and to consider diverse and pioneering initiatives.<sup>293</sup>

### 3.2.2 Nizâm-ı Cedîd (New Order)

The renewal attempts made by Selim III to find a remedy for the irregularities in the military and administrative fields are collectively referred to as *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order).<sup>294</sup> Selim, from the moment he ascended the throne, reviewed many problems of the state and tried to find solutions to them.<sup>295</sup> Thus, he first asked the leading figures of the period to prepare *lâyiha* (reports) on this subject in order to develop reforms.<sup>296</sup> Also, he stated that in these reform movements, the reports given by Ebubekir Ratib Efendi (d. 1799) were to be given priority in the deliberations of court officials.<sup>297</sup> He was sent as an ambassador to Vienna, the capital of Austria, to get to know Europe better.<sup>298</sup>

On the order of the Sultan, 22 counsellors were assigned to prepare the *lâyiha*, two of whom were European Christians in Ottoman service. One of them was a French officer

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<sup>292</sup> Ibid, 121-122.

<sup>293</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı'da 18. Yüzyıl Düşünce Dünyasına Dair Notlar*, in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014,) 39.

<sup>294</sup> Shaw Stanford, "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 37, No. 3, (1965) 292.

<sup>295</sup> Shaw Stanford, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807*, 95.

<sup>296</sup> Roderic H. Davison, *Turkey: A Short History*, (Florida: Eothen Press, 1981), 51.

<sup>297</sup> This was the first detailed study of the military, administrative, and financial organization of Europe by official visitors from the Ottoman State. Ratib Efendi wrote a 490-page book during his eight-month travels, detailing military, financial, and technical observations observed in Europe. See, Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2008), 158-161.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

named Brentano, who served in the Turkish army, and the other was D'ohsson, an officer of the Swedish Embassy.<sup>299</sup> Among the reports presented to Sultan Selim, the most important one was by Tatarcik Abdullah Efendi (1730-1797). According to him, in response to the development of the enemy in the war industry, the Ottoman State needed to have a European-style trained army in this direction. Another remarkable report was authored by Koca Yusuf Pasha (1730-1800). Like Abdullah Efendi, he stated that Ottoman soldiers should receive training under European conditions.<sup>300</sup> When evaluated in general, the common point where these reports met was the necessity of military reform.<sup>301</sup> This perhaps reflects the overriding anxiety about the Ottoman elite about their military position, rather than concern about underlying areas of reform *per se*.

When Sultan Selim evaluated the reports he decided to innovate the military system. Since it would not be possible to reform and eliminate the *Yeniçeri Ocağı* (New Soldier), the existing military system of the state, Selim decided to establish a new Western-style army, the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* army.<sup>302</sup> Unlike traditional Ottoman forces, this army was trained by French instructors in special (separate) barracks.<sup>303</sup> Also, Sultan Selim provided the newest materials from Europe to be used in the production of cannons, rifles, mines, and gunpowder for the army.<sup>304</sup> He hired naval engineers from France and Sweden to improve the shipyards and the construction of new ships. As a result of the work of these experts, 15 shipyards, whose operations had been partially or completely stopped, were reactivated, and many new fleets were built.<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>299</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), 64.

<sup>300</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (United Kingdom: Routledge, 1999), 89-90.

<sup>301</sup> Bernard Lewis, 67.

<sup>302</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, (London: Profile Books, 2011), 219.

<sup>303</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi: Toplum Kuramsal Değişim Ve Nüfus*, (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 2002), 85.

<sup>304</sup> Edward C. Clark, "The Ottoman Industrial Revolution", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 5, No.1, (1974), 66.

<sup>305</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 69.

Sultan Selim decided to carry out the renewal method in the military field for education and training as well.<sup>306</sup> In this direction, Selim opened the first Turkish Technical School by establishing the *Mühendishane-i Berrî-i Hümayûn*, (Imperial School of Military Engineering) in 1794. This school is aimed to train the military personnel needed by the state. Using this school, it was aimed to carry out some improvement works in the structure of the Ottoman navy, and it was planned to give a new impetus to the state.<sup>307</sup> The first state printing house, *Matbaa-i Âmire*, was opened inside the *Mühendishane-i Berrî-i Hümayûn*. In this way, works from various countries were translated and published so that students would not fall behind in the technical courses taught in Europe. A library was created to house these published works and disseminate their knowledge to official students.<sup>308</sup>

During this period, no students were sent to Europe, but embassy officials were sent to the capitals of European states, and were ordered by the Sultan to learn foreign languages and subjects that enabled them to develop. Therefore, Sultan Selim decided to establish regular and permanent Ottoman Embassies in major European capitals.<sup>309</sup>

### **3.2.3 The Failure of the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* and the Dethronement of Selim III**

*Nizâm-ı Cedîd* marked the beginning of modernization in Ottoman history and attempts to restructure the Ottoman State. It played an important role in its political, military, bureaucratic, and economic reorganization.<sup>310</sup> However, this modernization movement attempted and largely implemented by Sultan Selim did not achieve complete success as desired. According to some analysts, this modernization movement required the presence

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<sup>306</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi (V.Cilt)*, (Ankara:Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011), 68.

<sup>307</sup> Tuncay Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy*, (New York: I. B. Tauris Publishing, 2008), 102-104.

<sup>308</sup> Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged*, (London: Routledge Press, 2007), 214.

<sup>309</sup> Bernard Lewis, 62.

<sup>310</sup> Fatih Yeşil, "How to be (come) an Ottoman at the End of the Eighteenth Century", *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, Vol.44, (2014), 133.

of powerful and innovative statesmen and intellectuals committed to its success, but a critical mass of the Ottoman elite remained aloof from engaging seriously with the Sultan's policies.<sup>311</sup> For instance, ambassadors sent to Europe, such as Mehmet Sait Halet Efendi (1761-1822), who served as an ambassador in Paris from 1803 to 1806, kept his distance from the innovations coming from the West. The most important reason for this was that the customs, traditions, and religion of the West did not comply with those of the Ottoman State.<sup>312</sup>

When evaluated in general, it is quite natural to encounter these opposite attitudes as a result of the creation of reform movements that largely reflect the influence of Western traditions and institutions in a society that attaches importance to its traditional values such as the Ottoman State.<sup>313</sup> In this period, especially with the influence of foreign experts brought from Europe to implement the reforms, the spread of the European lifestyle in the capital caused Sultan Selim and *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* reformers to be accused of favouring alien and antithetical elements by the public (i.e., of favouring non-believers).

The Ottomans, who were mostly Muslims, did not want the state to enter the path of "modernization" that they perceived to be directly challenging their traditions and religion. Therefore, they took a stand against the modernization movements.<sup>314</sup> Another reason why Ottoman society was against innovations was that they thought that Sultan Selim was wasting state resources. This is because while Western-style institutions were included in the Ottoman system, the old traditional institutions were not abolished, although they were never used. As a result of this, innovation movements were an extra burden on the state, which negatively affected the economy, as well as causing the traditional and modern institutions to clash.<sup>315</sup>

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<sup>311</sup> Rıfat Uçarol, *Siyasî Tarih (1789-1994)*, (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1995), 109.

<sup>312</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Tanzimattan Evvel Garplılaştırma Hareketleri*, (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 15.

<sup>313</sup> Anthony Dolphin Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, (United States: Greenwood Press, 1982), 45.

<sup>314</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *جوہت تاریخ*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1874), 122-123.

<sup>315</sup> Shaw Stanford, *Some aspects of the aims and achievements of the nineteenth-century Ottoman reformers*, in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.) *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), 37.

As a result, with the *Kabakçı Mustafa Rebellion* (Ottoman coups of 1807–1808), which was supported by popular agitation against innovation movements, Selim III was deposed, and the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* army was put to an end.<sup>316</sup>

### 3.3 A RADICAL REFORMIST: MAHMUD II (R. 1808-1839)

#### 3.3.1 Background

After Selim III was deposed, the janissaries became the main force in the central government, and they briefly placed Mustafa on the throne. However, after a short time, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (1765-1808), with the support of the old reformers in the centre, dominated İstanbul and enthroned Mustafa IV (1779-1808), who was known to support Selim III's reforms.<sup>317</sup> Mahmud II started a large-scale modernization work, believing that there was no other choice but to take the West as a model, to save Ottoman State from collapse.<sup>318</sup> According to Stratford Canning (1786-1880), who was ambassador to the Ottoman State for many years, Mahmud's greatest virtue was his determination to innovate. He became a statesman who researched the changing conditions and tried to keep up with the requirements of the time.<sup>319</sup>

Because of this determination, the innovations of Mahmud II's reign in the Ottoman State were more comprehensive and programmed than those carried out in previous periods, expanding in scope beyond purely military reforms to encompass more diverse social and cultural targets of reform.<sup>320</sup> He formed the cornerstones of the transition from a conservative-dominated administration to a reformist-dominated direction in general Ottoman policy, due to innovations in the socio-cultural field. In addition, his period was

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<sup>316</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Tanzimattan Evvel Garplılaşma Hareketleri*, 15.

<sup>317</sup> Hailil İnalçık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu" *Belleten Dergisi*, Vol:128, No:112, (1964), 603.

<sup>318</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Tanzimattan Evvel Garplılaşma Hareketleri*, 28.

<sup>319</sup> Stanley Lane Poole "Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning Viscount Stratford De Redcliffe", (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888), 89.

<sup>320</sup> Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd Publisher, 1993), 51.

the first formation of the reformist and secular elite (mainly in public services) that later germinated the RoT. Therefore, understanding the developments in this period is the key to evaluating Atatürk and later periods.<sup>321</sup>

### 3.3.2 Sened-i İttifak (Charter of Alliance)

During this period, *Ayan* (locally notables) gained more devolved power in their regions, to the extent that some of them were emboldened to oppose the Sultan's orders, and fight against and defeat the central army. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (1765-1808), himself a former *Ayan* in Ruse, wanted to find a middle ground between the state and the *Ayan*, so he invited the notables to İstanbul.<sup>322</sup> Notables representing local administrations came to İstanbul with their military forces, because they did not trust the central administration. However, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha (1740-1822) and Kavalali Mehmet Ali Pasha (1769-1849), who are considered the most important among them, did not accept this invitation. The decisions taken because of the meetings held between the *Ayan* and Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, who attended the invitation, were bound to a protocol called "*Sened-i İttifak*".<sup>323</sup>

While the first four articles of the *Sened-i İttifak* reiterate the authority of the Sultan, the fifth emphasizes the importance of mutual trust of the notables to the state and statesmen to the notables. It also requested that the notables be secured against the arbitrary behaviour of the state.<sup>324</sup> The sixth article is interesting in that it allows for the failure of state authority to function adequately. According to this article, in the event of a revolt of the military corps in the capital, all the notables will be able to disperse the military units without

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<sup>321</sup> Halil İnalçık, Nejat Göyünç, Heath W. Lowry, İsmail Erünsal, Klaus Kresier, A. Atilla Şentürk, *The Journal of Ottoman Studies XXI*, in Mustafa Gökçek, *Centralization During the Era Of Mahmud II*, (İstanbul: Enderun Kitapevi ,2001), 238.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid., 241.

<sup>323</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977), 27.

<sup>324</sup> Halil İnalçık, "*Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hattı Hümayinü* ",607.

permission, and those who attempt this work will be executed by the notables. In the seventh and last article of the act, the notables were warned not to oppress the people in their regions with undue taxes.<sup>325</sup>

There is no consensus among historians about the purpose and effect of the *Sened-i İttifak*. Some of them think that this document ensured the Ayan's obedience to the sultan and the state,<sup>326</sup> while others consider that it represents the converse, as an indicator of the dominance of the gentry.<sup>327</sup> Almost all modern historians agree that the *Sened-i İttifak* took place against the will of the Sultan.<sup>328</sup> Because Mahmud II was aware that the *Sened-i İttifak* was a great danger to his authority, he also knew that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha would become even stronger after his alliance with the notables. This thought made the Sultan very uncomfortable.<sup>329</sup> However, the Sultan, who owed his reign to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, had to accept his request.<sup>330</sup>

Some authors, such as the Dutch Turcologist Jan Zürcher, liken *Sened-i İttifak* to Magna Carta, emphasizing that it is not compiled in the form of a code of citizen's rights, but a contract between the ruler and his lords. Also, he states in the text that the notables were officially recognized as partners of the state, and with this document, the influence of the notables in the state reached its highest point of success.<sup>331</sup> On the other hand, American historian Stanford J. Shaw does not find it appropriate to compare this document with the Magna Carta. Because the Sultan, who did not want to limit his sovereign power, avoided signing the document but had to. In addition, only four of the notables signed the document, while the others did not sign it because it would limit their independence. Contrary to Magna Carta, *Sened-i İttifak* was not used to advance the cause of constitutionalism in the

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<sup>325</sup> Feridun Server, *Anayasalar ve Siyasal Belgeler*, (İstanbul: Aydın Güler Kitabevi, 1962), 1-3; Suna Kili & A.Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri*, (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 3-7; Server Tanilli, *Anayasalar ve Siyasal Belgeler*, (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1976), 3-8.

<sup>326</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 148.

<sup>327</sup> Halil İnalcık, "*Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hattı Hümayünü* ", 608.

<sup>328</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *جوہت تاریخ*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1874), 7.

<sup>329</sup> Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *الوقوعات نتائج*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1877), 245.

<sup>330</sup> Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı -Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), 41.

<sup>331</sup> Eric J. Zürcher, 54.

Ottoman State. Thus, it had a very limited impact and significance in reality, despite its interest as an indicator of relations between the central and provincial authorities in the Ottoman State.<sup>332</sup>

### **3.3.3 Radical Reform Movements Before the Tanzimat (1826-1839)**

#### ***3.3.3.1 Military Reform Movements***

Mahmud II knew that he could not be victorious in any direct battle with the Janissary Corps, which had been highly instrumental in overthrowing Sultan Selim III (and frustrating his military modernization), and indeed in installing him on the throne. However, while the Janissaries were effective in manipulating Ottoman politics for their own ends, they were by the nineteenth century an ineffective military force, which lacked military training. For this reason, the Sultan decided to start his own reforms by holding talks with the top officials on how to modernize the army. They decided to form a modernized and disciplined unit of professional Janissaries, keeping their historical name while giving them effective modern military training and functions, whereby the new unit of *Eşkınciler* (active Janissaries) was formed.<sup>333</sup> Mahmud II wanted the traditional Janissary Corps to be completely abolished. However, fearing that the Janissaries would revolt, he decided to gradually transform them into a modern army, instead of destroying them outright.<sup>334</sup> Three days after the new army started the drills, the Janissaries went to *Etmeydanı* to begin demonstrations. Taking the ulama with him, Mahmud II called the people to fight against the Janissaries.

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<sup>332</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, 27.

<sup>333</sup> Mustafa Gökçek, 246.

<sup>334</sup> Avigdor Levy, "The Eshkinji Project -An Ottoman Attempt at Gradual Reform, 1826", *Abr-Naharain*, Vol.14, (1974), 39.

The Janissary barracks in *Etmeydanı* were set on fire and the Janissary Corps was officially abolished on 16 June 1826,<sup>335</sup> in events dubbed *Vaka-i Hayriyye* (the Auspicious Event).<sup>336</sup> With the abolition of the Janissary army, one of the biggest obstacles to Mahmud's reform attempts was removed, and he accelerated his attempts to establish a new army. In place of the abolished army, a new army named *Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye* (Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad) was established.<sup>337</sup> Ağa Hüseyin Pasha (1776-1849) was appointed as the first commander of the army. However, Hüsrev Pasha (1769-1855) subsequently took his place, because he was not deemed open enough to new ideas and techniques.<sup>338</sup> The army under the command of Hüsrev Pasha tried to be modernized by taking the example of the French army.<sup>339</sup>

### 3.3.3.2 Educational Reform Movements

Sultan Mahmud believed in the necessity of raising generations who would understand and defend his reforms. For this reason, it has decided to make education compulsory.<sup>340</sup> Mahmud II, who took the West as an example in his reforms, made primary education compulsory, just like the West. In this direction, he published an edict in 1824 and declared to the public that "primary education is compulsory for every citizen".<sup>341</sup> This was partly tied to the need for military modernization. After the Janissary corps was abolished, the biggest problem was the lack of trained officers for the new army. Despite actively recruiting European military experts,<sup>342</sup> mutual hostility with the West and the low wages given to officers often resulted in inexperienced officers taking training positions, with

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<sup>335</sup> Avigdor Levy, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-39", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.2, No.1, (1971), 21.

<sup>336</sup> Mustafa Gökçek, 247.

<sup>337</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, 24; Bernard Lewis, 81.

<sup>338</sup> Mustafa Gökçek, 248.

<sup>339</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, 51.

<sup>340</sup> Necdet Hayta & Uğur Ünal *Osmanlı Devletinde Yenileşme Hareketleri*, (Ankara: Başak Matbaacılık, 2003), 162.

<sup>341</sup> Esad Efendi, *Vak'a-Nüvis Es'ad Efendi Tarihi*, (Ed.Ziya Yılmaz), (İstanbul: Enes Matbaacılık, 2000,) 364; Necdet Hayta & Uğur Ünal, 109.

<sup>342</sup> Necdet Hayta & Uğur Ünal, 110.

limited practical success.<sup>343</sup> For this reason, it was decided to open a military academy and the “*Mekteb-i Harbiye*” (Ottoman Military College) was established near *Beşiktaş* to train the officers for the *Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye* army.<sup>344</sup> The first modern medical school, *Tıbhane-i Amire* (Army Medical School), was opened in 1827 to train doctors and surgeons to serve in the *Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye* army.<sup>345</sup>

Sultan Mahmud also wanted to introduce Western music, and in this context, *Mizika-i Hümayun Mektebi* (Imperial School of Music) was established in 1826, to provide Turkish and Western music education.<sup>346</sup> After the establishment of the music school, the *Mehterhane-i Hümayun* (Ottoman Military Band) was abolished, because it did not fit the structure of *Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye*, an army of European standards with modern clothes, and the *Mizika-i Hümayun* Band was established in its place.<sup>347</sup> Mahmud brought the Italian musician Giuseppe Donizetti (1788-1856) to İstanbul to establish the *Mizika-i Hümayun Band*. Donizetti started his Western music education for the first time, and trained students in this field.<sup>348</sup>

When we evaluate the education reforms of Mahmud II in general, the most important of the education reforms is the establishment of the “*Mekteb-i Harbiye*” (Ottoman Military College) and *Tıbhane-i Amire* (Army Medical School).<sup>349</sup> Both of these institutions later played a significant role in the secularization process in Türkiye. These schools had very important effects on the entry of Western Enlightenment thought and

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<sup>343</sup> Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826-39”, 24.

<sup>344</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi Nizam-ı Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), 160.

<sup>345</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 149; Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, 48.

<sup>346</sup> Osman Ergin, *Türk Maarif Tarihi I-II*, (İstanbul: Eser Matbaası, 1977), 369.

<sup>347</sup> Tayyâr-zâde Atâ, *Osmanlı Sarayı Tarihi Târih-i Enderûn, III*, (ed. Mehmet Arslan), (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2010), 149.

<sup>348</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, 79; Yılmaz Öztuna, *Türk Halk Musikisi Ansiklopedisi Cilt.1*, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi 1969), 170.

<sup>349</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi Nizam-ı Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri*, 161.

political understandings into Türkiye, and these effects played a major role in the subsequent secularization activities of the state.<sup>350</sup>

### 3.3.3.3 Dress Reform Movements

The most obvious of the reforms made by Mahmud II is the one made on the dress. The Sultan made himself a direct example to introduce innovations in clothing to the public. He started to appear in public dressed like Western monarchs, bereft of his turban, fur, and crest, with a shortened beard. The royal court and elites, and thence the general public, imitated the royal style.<sup>351</sup>

The Dress Regulation of 1828 prohibited the wearing of the turban (an esteemed practice in Islam), quilted turban, and kaftan. Instead of these, the rule of wearing jackets, trousers, and tarboush/ fez was introduced.<sup>352</sup> In 1829, the fez became an official, compulsory headdress.<sup>353</sup> The fez, which was previously worn only by the soldiers, was soon adopted by the civilian population, and the turban and robe remained permissible only for the clergy.<sup>354</sup> Another change that was wanted to be made in the field of attire was to make it compulsory for soldiers and civil servants to wear suit and Western-style trousers (i.e., tight-fitting trousers rather than the traditional baggy *sirwal*), which was met with great outrage. To measure the reaction of the citizens to this innovation, Hasan Bey and Avni Bey went to the bazaar wearing trousers, and were beaten by the public.<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>350</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 180-183; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi Nizam-ı Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri*, 161-162.

<sup>351</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 173-194-195.

<sup>352</sup> Ahmed Lütü Efendi, *Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütü Efendi Tarihi*, (İstanbul :Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 425; Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 13; Mohamad Firdaus, Turkey and Japan: The Quest of Modernism in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, *International Journal of Modern Trends in Social Sciences*, Vol.3, No.13,(2020), 18.

<sup>353</sup> Donald Quataert, "Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 29, No.3, (1997), 413.

<sup>354</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, 80.

<sup>355</sup> Ahmed Lütü Efendi, *Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütü Efendi Tarihi*, 439; Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya-Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar-*, (İstanbul: Kırıl Matbaası, 1984), 430; Necdet Aysal, "Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Giyim ve Kuşamda Çağdaşlaşma Hareketleri", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No. 10, Vol. 22, (2011), 7.

Mahmud wanted to make these new Western style clothes visible and normalized. Therefore, in the early 1830s, he had a portrait of himself made in a western-style military uniform, and in 1835 such portraits of the Sultan were hung in schools and official buildings, including in army barracks, and they were saluted by the troops as if Mahmud II were personally present.<sup>356</sup> Furthermore, official sheiks would bless the photos before their placement in government offices and other public places, marking an egregious taboo against the traditional prohibition of making images of humans in Islamic law.<sup>357</sup> Mahmud even gave his portrait to Shaykh al-Islam Abdülvehhab Efendi (1758-1833), publicly violating Ottoman Muslim customs that forbade any depiction of human beings. This was a deliberate provocation and authoritarian exercise of power by the Sultan. The Shaykh al-Islam's fierce opposition to portraits soon led to his dismissal and the appointment of a permanent portrait artist in the palace service.<sup>358</sup>

#### ***3.3.3.4 Changes in Social Life***

Mahmud II's reign was a period of change in many ways, including in the eating and drinking culture and daily lifestyle. The observations of the American zoologist James Ellsworth De Kay (1792-1851), who was in İstanbul between 1831-1832, shed light on the nature of such transition:

After some conversation with our host, who speaks a little Italian, we were ushered into the next room, where we found the dinner served up in as handsome style as it has ever been our lot to witness in Europe or America. The knives, forks, and plates were of English manufacture and the costliest

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<sup>356</sup> Darin Stephanov, "Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the First Shift in Modern Ruler Visibility in the Ottoman Empire", *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, Vol.1, No.2, (2014), 137; Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II", in *Scripta Hierosolymitana: Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*, Vol. 9, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1961), 70.

<sup>357</sup> Selim Deringil, *The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, 22; İrfan Gündüz, *Osmanlılarda Devlet-Tekke Münasebetleri*, (Ankara: Seha Neşriyat, 1984), 150-151.

<sup>358</sup> Darin Stephanov, 137; Tuncer Baykara, *Osmanlılarda Medeniyet Kavramı ve on dokuzuncu Yüzyıla Dair Araştırmalar* (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1992), 55.

kind; the table was set off by cut glass of exquisite workmanship, French wines of the most delicate flavour made their appearance, and in short, nothing was wanting to satisfy even the fastidiousness of an English exclusive. We should hardly have supposed ourselves in Turkey, had it not been for the venerable beards of some of our neighbours, and the armed and scarlet-dressed attendants who stood behind our chairs.<sup>359</sup>

Another striking social change during the reign of Mahmud II was the participation of state officials in balls. For example, many officials from the Ottoman State attended the ball held on the Blonde Frigate hosted by the British Ambassador Sir Gordon, to celebrate the peace treaty signed between Russia and the Ottoman State. Among those who attended the ball from the Ottoman State was Seraskier Hüsrev Pasha (1769-1855), Mustafa Behcet Efendi (1774-1834), and Abdülhak Molla (1786-1854).<sup>360</sup> Some of the Ottomans who attended the ball for the first time danced and drank publicly. What happened at the ball was the kind of development that would draw the reaction of the conservatives, who made up the vast majority of the population. Moreover, at the end of the night, Hüsrev Pasha announced to all the participants that he wanted to give a ball in his palace.<sup>361</sup>

As can be seen, with the arrangements brought by Mahmud II, the Ottomans began to resemble Western civilizations in form and life, and break away from their traditions and cultures. These reforms made by Mahmud II went beyond mere superficial formalism, and actively challenged the foundations of Islamic law and mores. However, his stunts did not bring any technological or military advantages to Ottoman society, and no amount of balls and wine parties empowered Ottoman society to reach the technological, military, and economic power of the West. These formalist reforms made by Mahmud II were apprehended and critiqued as shallow and ineffective by many observers, the most

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<sup>359</sup> James Ellsworth De Kay, *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832*, (New York J. & J. Harper, 1833), 324; Yunus İnce, "II. Mahmud Devri Reformlarının Tebaa Tarafından Algılanışı", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, Vol.32, No.2,(2017), 443.

<sup>360</sup> Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, 108-109; Abdülhak Molla, *Tarih-i Liva Sultan II.Mahmud Portresinden Farklı Bir Kesit*, edited by Mehmet Yıldız, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 443-444.

<sup>361</sup> Sir Adolphus Slade, *Records of travels in Turkey, Greece, etc.: and of a cruise in the Black Sea with the Capitan Pacha*, (London: Saunders and Otley, 1854), 248-254; Abdülhak Molla, 108-112.

important of whom were Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895).

Von Moltke, who came to İstanbul at Mahmud II's invitation, stated that most of his reforms consisted of shapes, names, and projects. According to him, the clothes and titles of the army and statesmen were changed, but the men in these positions remained the same incompetents.<sup>362</sup>

According to Cevdet Pasha, the reforms were ersatz; instead of strengthening the foundations of the building, the external appearance of the building was given importance.<sup>363</sup> In addition, Cevdet Pasha stated that it was wrong to imitate the West with such formalist reforms instead of merely taking science and industry from the West.<sup>364</sup> Interestingly, the British diplomat Sir Adolphus Slade (1804-1877), who was in İstanbul during the reign of Mahmud II and rose to the rank of pasha, even considered that the reforms had counterproductively undermined Ottoman military strength, due to blind imitation of actually inferior European methods:

In no one thing did Sultan Mahmoud make a greater mistake than in changing the mode of mounting the Turkish cavalry, which before had perfect seats, with perfect command over their horses, and only required a little order to transform the best irregular horse in the world into the best regular horse. But Mahmoud, in all his changes, took the mask for the man, the rind for the fruit. – European cavalry rode flat saddles with long stirrups; therefore, he thought it necessary that his cavalry should be the same. European infantry wore tight jackets and closed caps; therefore, the same. Were this blind adoption of forms only useless, or productive only of physical inconvenience, patience; but it proved a moral evil, creating unbounded disgust.<sup>365</sup>

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<sup>362</sup> Helmuth Von Moltke, *Moltke'nin Türkiye Mektupları*, translated from German by Hayrullah Örs, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 1969), 272-285; Abdülkadir Özcan, "II. Mahmut ve Reformları Hakkında Bazı Gözlemler", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, Vol. 10, (1995), 24.

<sup>363</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 40-Tetimme* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991), 218; Osman Turan, *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Meşkuresi Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1999), 611.

<sup>364</sup> Ümid Meriç, *Cevdet Paşa'nın Cemiyet ve Devlet Görüşü*, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1975), 123.

<sup>365</sup> Sir Adolphus Slade, 379.

As can be seen, Mahmud's reforms in the social field were criticized by both the Ottoman public and foreign intellectuals.

### 3.4 TANZIMAT ERA (1839-1876)

The main characteristic of the *Tanzimat* period, which was a continuation of the reforms made in the Mahmud period, was "Western imitation". Reformist intellectuals of the *Tanzimat* period typically admired the West and viewed it as superior to their own society, and sought to directly imitate its institutions and lifestyles.<sup>366</sup> Prominent intellectuals of this type who played a role in the declaration and implementation of the *Tanzimat* Edict included Mustafa Reşit Pasha (1800-1858), A. Cevdet Pasha, (1822-1895), Ali Pasha (1815-1871), and Fuad Pasha (1815-1868).<sup>367</sup>

The first contacts of these intellectuals with Western societies were within the scope of diplomatic relations. For example, Mustafa Reşid Pasha worked in Paris from 1834 and later in London. After him, Fuad Pasha served in London in 1840.<sup>368</sup> While this founding quartet of the *Tanzimat* who served in the West transferred the military and administrative structure of the West to the Ottoman State, they also transferred the daily culture of the West to the Ottoman society.<sup>369</sup> Such intellectuals of the *Tanzimat* period spoke Western languages, used Western-oriented value norms, lived and thought like Westerners, and were the "cultural satellites" of the West.<sup>370</sup> In other words, they viewed modernization as Westernization without reflection, and wholeheartedly embraced the imitation of those they viewed as their superiors.

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<sup>366</sup> Ercüment Kuran, *Türkiye'nin Batılılaşması ve Milli Meseleler*, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1994), 21; Kemaleddin Taş, "Tanzimat ve Batılılaşma Hareketlerine Sosyolojik Bir Yaklaşım", *Fırat Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 7,(2001), 89.

<sup>367</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2006), 226.

<sup>368</sup> Bernard Lewis, 88-89.

<sup>369</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 11-13; Kemaleddin Taş, 89.

<sup>370</sup> Orhan Türkdoğan, *Sosyal Şiddet ve Türkiye Gerçeği*, (Ankara: Mayaş, 1985), 69.

### 3.4.1 *Tanzimat Fermanı* (Edict of *Gülhane*)

Before Sultan Mahmud II's death, Mustafa Reşid Pasha presented a reform program concerning the development of the Ottoman military, agriculture, and economy; on the advice of the Sultan, the principle of equality of all Ottoman subjects was added. These formed the basis of the Edict of *Gülhane*.<sup>371</sup> In 1839, Sultan Mahmud II died and his eldest son Abdülmecid I (1823-1861) took the throne, and signed the Edict of *Gülhane* into force.<sup>372</sup> The Edict was read in a solemn ceremony in the presence of the highest officials, clergy, foreign diplomats, and visitors (including Prince de Joinville (1818-1900), third son of King Louis Philippe (1773-1850) of France).<sup>373</sup> After that Sultan Abdülmecid I declared the *Tanzimat Fermanı* on 3 November 1839.<sup>374</sup>

The *Tanzimat Fermanı* provided equal rights to all citizens of the Ottoman State, including Muslims and other religious community members, regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds.<sup>375</sup> In addition, the edict promised new laws that would guarantee the right to life and property, prohibit bribery, regulate taxes, and regulate the duration of conscription and military service.<sup>376</sup> Moreover, it aimed to spread the idea of *Ottomanism*,<sup>377</sup> which considered everyone living within the borders of the Ottoman State

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<sup>371</sup> Seçil Akgün, "The Emergency of Tanzimat in The Ottoman Empire", *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol. 2, No.2, (1991), 12; Harold Temperley, "British Policy Towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830–1914)", *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1933), 159.

<sup>372</sup> Frederick F. Anscombe, *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman Post- Ottoman Lands*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 87.

<sup>373</sup> Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, (New Jersey: Princeton, 2010), 72; Jakub Mazanec, "The Ottoman Empire at the Beginning of Tanzimat Reforms", *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations*, Vol. 2, (2016), 37.

<sup>374</sup> Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Ottomans: Dissolving Images*, (New York: Viking Penguin, 1993), 167.

<sup>375</sup> Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: History, 1789-2007* (London: Yale University Press, 2010), 45.; Alan Palmer, *The Decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire* (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd, 1995), 107.

<sup>376</sup> Metin Heper & Sabri Sayarı, *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey*, in Şükrü Hanioglu, *Modern Ottoman Period*, 18.; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 214; Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, 78.

<sup>377</sup> The idea of Ottomanism emerged during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) to unite all inhabitants of the empire under one political identity. Ottomanism sees all the different religious and ethnic groups living in the Ottoman Empire as members of one united Ottoman nation. This means that everyone living in the Ottoman Empire was considered an Ottoman citizen, regardless of their religion, language, or race. The main purpose

to be equal citizens, regardless of race, religion, or language.<sup>378</sup> This was in direct imitation of the concept of nationalism and national identity that had emerged with the French Revolution.

Minorities living in the Ottoman State lands began to demand independence, and were actively incited in secessionist activities by European states. To prevent the nationalist movements initiated by ethnic minorities, the *Tanzimat* edict was declared, and the idea of *Ottomanism* was emphasized.<sup>379</sup> However, *Tanzimat Fermanı* was not appreciated by either Muslims or non-Muslims. Muslims were uncomfortable being seen as equal to “infidels”, and that this signalled a further erosion of the Ottoman State’s Islamic identity. Additionally, non-Muslims considered that this concession was in preparation to conscript them into military service, alongside Muslims. It was even noted that the Greek Patriarch, after observing Mustafa Resid Pasha rolling up the *Tanzimat Fermanı* upon the completion of his recital, and tucking it in his belt, remarked: “I hope it will never leave the case it is now tucked in”.<sup>380</sup>

### **3.4.2 Industrial Developments in the Ottoman State During the *Tanzimat* Period**

The nineteenth century was a period in which Europe appeared to be ahead in every field, and it increasingly dominated the rest of the world, invading the markets and commanding the resources and peoples of countries that could not succeed in developing their industrial and military capabilities. The Ottoman State was apparently unable to leverage its rich material resources, and was increasingly enslaved to European bankers (largely to subsidize military expenditure and court extravagance), which underpinned increasing capitulations

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of this ideology was to unite all citizens within the framework of a common imperial ideal. Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlıdan Günümüze Kimlik ve İdeoloji* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 49.

<sup>378</sup> David, Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908* (London: Routledge Press, 1977), 15; Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, 36.

<sup>379</sup> Carter Vaughn Findley, 45.

<sup>380</sup> Seçil Akgün, 13; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi (V.Cilt)*, 187; İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 115.

to European demands.<sup>381</sup> The need for a collective industrial program was clearly evident by the 1840s.<sup>382</sup>

With the proclamation of the *Tanzimat Fermanı*, it was planned to develop the country economically and to revive the resources. Therefore, state factories and enterprises were established in 1847-1848, with flagship projects including the *Zeytinburnu* Iron Factory, *İzmit* Cotton Fabric Factory, and *Hereke* Fabric Factory.<sup>383</sup> Almost all of the machinery for these industries had to be imported from Europe, and some of these were so new that they had not yet been tested in production. Some were bought in bits and pieces. In addition, most of the skilled foremen, journeymen, and skilled workers required to set up, operate and repair factories and equipment came from Europe.

Previously, most of these foreigners were English; later, they were mostly rented from Belgium, France, Italy, and Austria.<sup>384</sup> These factories were equipped with steam engines and factory materials (machinery, engines, etc.) purchased from Europe. This practice reflects the consumerist attitude of the Ottomans towards the transfer of industry and technology from the West – it was thought that they could *buy* Western modernization. In this period, Ottoman industrial establishments equipped with Western technology were largely dependent on foreign labour.<sup>385</sup> The following statement of a Belgian worker working in a fabric factory in Izmit in 1843 reveals how dependent the Ottomans were on Europe:

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<sup>381</sup> A. Haluk Ülman, *1. Dünya Savaşı'na Giden Yol ve Savaş* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2002), 20; Halil İnalçık & Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat* in Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayi (1839-1876)*, 713; Rıfat Önsoy, “19 Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sanayileşme Teşebbüsü”, *Milli Kültür*, Vol.2, No 3-5, (1980), 71-74.

<sup>382</sup> Donald Quataer, *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, (New York: the State University of New York Press, 1994), 29.

<sup>383</sup> Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, in Tevfik Güran, *Tanzimat Döneminde Devlet Fabrikaları*, (Ankara :Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992,) 236.; “Mehmet Emin Yardımcı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Özel Teşebbüsler Sağlanan Devlet Destekleri: Karamürsel Çuka, Şayak Ve Fes Fabrikası Örneği”, *Kastamonu Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.12, (2016), 411.

<sup>384</sup> Charles Mac Farlane, *Turkey and Its Destiny, Vol. 2 of 2: The Result of Journeys Made in 1847 and 1848 to Examine into the State of That Country*, (London: Forgotten Books, 2018), 404-433.

<sup>385</sup> Donald Quataer, *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, 29-30; Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, 376.

“Considering that we have the best English and French machines, the best wools are imported from Saxony, and similar wool-producing countries via Italy, and they are processed by the French and Belgians, it would be very strange if we did not produce quality products. However, I cannot say that this fabric is Turkish fabric. This is a fabric woven by Europeans in Turkey with European machines and European materials”.<sup>386</sup>

These factories, which were established at great expense, remained dependent on the outside in terms of machinery spare parts, engineers, qualified personnel, operators, and experts. Although the administrators of the *Tanzimat* era wanted to encourage exports and limit imports to maintain the foreign trade balance<sup>387</sup> they could not implement it. This is because the state has started technology transfer and industrialization quite late.<sup>388</sup> Moreover, in these reform movements that have been going on since Mahmud II, we see that the science and technology developed in Europe are transferred in the form of “translation” and “purchasing”. Science and technology products that would reduce dependency on the West could not be followed.<sup>389</sup> As a result, *Tanzimat* reformers made great efforts for the development of industry in the Ottoman State, with the thoughts aroused in them by the extraordinary development of the “Industrial Revolution” in Europe. However, they were not successful.<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>386</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlılar ve Batı Teknolojisi*, in Edward C. Clark, *15-19. Yüzyılları Arasında İstanbul'da İmalathane ve Fabrikalar*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1992), 51; Mehmet Emin Yardımcı, 412.

<sup>387</sup> Tefik Güran, 30.

<sup>388</sup> Donald Quataer, *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, 10.

<sup>389</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, 380.

<sup>390</sup> Halil İnalçık & Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat* in Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Sanayi (1839-1876)*, 728.

### 3.4.3 Intellectual Developments in the Ottoman State During the *Tanzimat* Period

Reviewing the *Tanzimat* period, one can sense the increasing feeling of capitulation to the West. Prior to *Tanzimat*, the Ottoman State thought that it had a spiritual superiority over the West, despite any incidental setbacks on the battlefield. However, during the *Tanzimat* period, large cohorts of Ottoman society, particularly its ruling elites, completely surrendered any sense of superiority and eagerly embraced anything and everything identified with the West. Intellectually, the most obvious example of this is the spread of Western-based materialist views among Ottoman intellectuals, causing them to hate the spiritual norms of traditional Turkish society.<sup>391</sup>

In particular, European-style educational institutions appeared, led by institutions such as the Ottoman Military Collage, *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye* (Imperial School of Medicine), and *Mekteb-i Sultani* (Galatasaray High School), which played an important role in the introduction of materialism to the Ottoman State.<sup>392</sup> The *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye* was egregiously atheist in its pedagogical orientation, to the extent that it shocked a British observer.<sup>393</sup> Charles MacFarlane (1799-1858) visited the Faculty of Medicine in 1847, and relates what he saw as follows:

We were invited into an elegant saloon, set apart for the use of the doctors and the young Turks their assistants. A book was lying open on the divan. I took it up. It was a copy of a recent Paris edition of the Atheist's manual, "Systeme de la Nature" (System of Nature) with the name of Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789) on the title page as the author [a notorious atheist]. The volume had been much used; many of the striking passages had been marked, especially those which mathematically demonstrated the absurdity of believing in the existence of God, and the impossibility of believing in the immortality of the soul. As I laid down the volume, one of the Turks said to me [in French]: "C'est un grand ouvrage! C'est un grand philosophe! Il a toujours raison". (It is a great work! He is a great philosopher! He is always right)".<sup>394</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>392</sup> Mehmet Akgün, *Materyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi*, (Ankara: Elis Yayınları 2014), 11.

<sup>393</sup> Süleyman Hayri Bolay, *Osmanlılarda Düşünce Hayatı ve Felsefe*, (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2005), 290.

<sup>394</sup> Charles Mac Farlane, 301; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 228.

The spread of such materialistic ideas, which emerged because of contact with the West and the efforts of modernization by imitating it, caused the erosion of spiritual consciousness in elite society, and a general change in mentality in elite and official institutions.<sup>395</sup>

#### **3.4.4 *Islahat Fermanı* (The Imperial Reform Edict) and Education Reforms**

The Crimean War, which broke out in 1853 between the Ottoman State and Russia, tightened the diplomatic, political, military, and cultural contacts between the Ottomans, France, and Britain, and led to a closer relationship that had ever been seen before between the Ottomans and European allies.<sup>396</sup> The Ottoman State became politically indebted to France and England, who provided diplomatic and military support to it in the war.<sup>397</sup> Therefore, with the pressures of France and Britain, Sultan Abdulmecid II was induced to declare the Reform Edict in 1856,<sup>398</sup> which purported to be more comprehensive than the *Tanzimat Fermanı* in theory and implementation.<sup>399</sup> In essence, the *Islahat Fermanı* emphasized Ottoman politics and aimed to create an Ottoman citizen identity. The understanding of Ottomanism was to be strengthened, especially through education. To realize the understanding of Ottomanism, mixed schools were established, where Muslims and non-Muslims were educated together. *Mekteb-i Sultani* (Galatasaray High School), founded in 1868, is one of the best examples of these schools, with a European curriculum. Despite opposition from Greek Orthodox leaders, Spanish Jews, and the Pope, 341 students were enrolled in this school.<sup>400</sup>

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<sup>395</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, 119-120.

<sup>396</sup> Halil İnalçık & Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat* in Selçuk Akşin Somel, *Kırım Savaşı, Islahat Fermanı ve Osmanlı Eğitim Düzeninde Dönüşümler*, 692.

<sup>397</sup> Butrus Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century 1826 - 1876*, (Gorgias: Pr Llc, 2011), 114.

<sup>398</sup> Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (New York: Gordian Press, 1973), 80.

<sup>399</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 216-217; Bilal Eryılmaz, *Tanzimat ve Yönetimde Modernleşme*, (Ankara: İşaret Yayınları, 2010), 141-143.

<sup>400</sup> Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, 16-18.

In 1869, the *Maarif-i Umumiye* Regulation (Ordinance of General Education) was issued, which abandoned Ottoman madrasah education, and a new education regulation was prepared for the first time.<sup>401</sup> The architect of the General Education Regulation was Sadullah Pasha (1838-1891), the head of the state's science department. He established this order by examining the experience and practices of the French education system from the French Revolution of 1789 to the present. In other words, the French influence in this regulation is quite obvious.<sup>402</sup> The remarkable thing about this regulation was that the madrasahs, which had an important place in Ottoman education and scientific life for centuries, were not included. This was a manifestation of the new-old conflict that emerged in the Ottoman State. In other words, the old traditional structures were no longer rehabilitated or a synthesis was not established between the old and the new. New ones were being built directly in place of the old institutions. The fact that madrasahs were not improved and religion is not included in the educational institutions established in their place is an indicator of secularization in education.<sup>403</sup>

In addition, the responsibility of not being able to reach Western science and technology until this period was attributed to the ulama. For example, according to Sadrettin Celâl Antel (1890-1954), madrasahs were centres of ignorance, bigotry, and strife that prevented all kinds of innovation. It was the madrasah teachers who prevented European science and technology from entering the country. Because of them, during the *Tanzimat* period, the mentality and method, science, and technique of the West could not enter the country.<sup>404</sup> However, such bigoted attempts by apologists for the increasingly evident failure of *Tanzimat* to blame the ulama and madrasahs were not totally unchallenged. The educator Ali Suavi (1839-1878), who was born and died in the *Tanzimat* period, received education and training both in madrasahs and in new-method schools. As an open-minded and forward-thinking person, he considered that he had benefited in his ideas and

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<sup>401</sup> Ibid., Sadrettin Celal Antel, *Tanzimat Maarifi*, (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940) ,449.

<sup>402</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, 93.

<sup>403</sup> Ibid., 95, Hamza Altın, “ 1869 Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamiyesi ve Öğretmen Yetiştirme Tarihimizdeki Yeri”, *Fırat Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 13, No. 1, (2008), 275.

<sup>404</sup> Sadrettin Celal Antel, 444-445.

foresight from his religious-based education. According to him, being hostile to the new is not enjoined by Islam.<sup>405</sup> As Suavi said, Islam has never been against science and innovation; on the contrary, it has tried to reconcile religion with reason and philosophy.<sup>406</sup>

In other words, the reason for not being successful in innovations is neither religion, madrasah, nor ulama: it is the handling of innovations in terms of operation and form. As a result of this, Ottoman intellectuals presented innovations that were culturally different and completely outside the reality of the society they came from and conflicted with it. Thus, studies that would provide the establishment and institutionalization of real science (i.e., the production and accumulation of deep and detailed knowledge based on observation, experience, and research) could not be started in the *Tanzimat* Period.<sup>407</sup>

### **3.5 WESTERNIZATION DEBATED IN THE I. MESRUIYET (FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL ERA), 1876-1878**

Under the influence of reformist initiatives gaining traction since the *Tanzimat* period, late Ottoman intellectuals started to recognize the liberal ideas that had become widespread in the West, and they wanted to carry these thoughts to the Ottoman State. In this context, the Young Ottomans,<sup>408</sup> which was established as an intellectual movement, wanted a parliament to be established in the Ottoman State, and the administration to be responsible to the people.<sup>409</sup> The Young Ottomans aimed to save the Ottoman State and protect order by reforming the existing system, in order to prevent social unrest and revolutionary ruptures. They can be considered as a political structure that criticized

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<sup>405</sup> Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1992), 87.

<sup>406</sup> Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Katip Çelebi ve Fikri Hayatını, Katip Çelebei Hayati ve Eserleri Hakkında İnceleme*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1957), 183.

<sup>407</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İlk Adımlar Teknoloji, Bilim ve Eğitim*, 116-120.

<sup>408</sup> The term “Young Ottomans” was used to express the community formed by some Ottoman intellectuals who struggled for the establishment of a constitutional government. See, İsrail Kurtcephe & Aydın Beden, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, (Konya: Eğitim Yayınevi, 2015), 41.

<sup>409</sup> Tefik Çavdar, *İttihat ve Terakki*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 1991,10-15.

*Tanzimat* practices, and reform movements that continued to draw from the wellspring of *Tanzimat*. They considered it appropriate to move to the path of legitimacy by following a path compatible with traditional values and structures.<sup>410</sup>

According to the Young Ottomans, the modernization project should be reconsidered, and they clearly acknowledged that blind imitation of the West should be avoided. They felt the reformist vision had to be redeveloped, taking into account the characteristics of the existing geography and society. In addition, reforms should be made taking into account social needs and cultural realities of real people, and they opined that better educational opportunities should be offered to the people within the scope of these reforms, rather than imposing top-down restrictions on traditional cultural practices. They called for literacy rates to be increased, and agriculture and industry to be advanced. According to the Young Ottomans, the required breakthroughs in these diverse areas were held back due to autocracy. They felt the Ottoman administration was a moribund obstacle to economic and scientific progress. In other words, the Young Ottomans propose a wholesale change of administration, and they thought a democratically elected government would be a panacea to drive change.<sup>411</sup>

They understood that it was necessary to mobilize the people for this system, which they thought would save the state. For this reason, the first way the Young Ottomans sought to influence and shape public opinion was through publishing newspapers, such as *Hürriyet* (Liberty), *Muhbir* (Informer), and *Ulum* (Injustice).<sup>412</sup> They were successful in this work, and the ideal of constitutional government, which was first discussed among the intelligentsia, spread among the whole people in a short time. By May 1876 the word “constitution” was in every mouth, and the concept of democratic government had become a hot topic everywhere. Many people (particularly urban elites) wanted the Sultan to be dethroned, and this discourse spread widely among the people, to the extent that even the

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<sup>410</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 95.

<sup>411</sup> Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, 236.

<sup>412</sup> Yusuf Tekin, “Osmanlı’da Demokrasi Tartışmalarının Miladı Olarak Meşrutiyet Öncesi Tartışma Platformu”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.55, No.3,(2000), 157.

boatmen on the Bosphorus were talking about the need for the abdication of the Sultan and the election of a democratic government.<sup>413</sup> The combination of the propagation of anti-regime political agitation and adverse economic circumstances combined in a febrile proto-revolutionary milieu that encouraged the Young Ottomans to carry out a coup, whereby Sultan Abdulaziz (1830-1876), who was thought to be an obstacle to legitimacy, was dethroned on the morning of 31 May 1876.<sup>414</sup>

Abdul Hamid II (1842-1918), who was enthroned after Abdulaziz's dethronement, was forced to declare the Constitutional Monarchy, due to both internal and external factors, particularly the need to appease the foreign countries that had been the driving force in the calls for a constitutionalizing process. The external problems that started with the Bosnia and Herzegovina rebellions began to attract the attention of the whole of Europe after a while, and created confusion with the uprising of the Bulgarian people. Therefore, it was claimed that the Ottoman State was persecuting the Balkans, as the European powers sought to lever the Ottomans out of coveted territories ripe for domination by Western European interests. As a result of all these factors, the Ottoman State was compelled to establish a legal system and political order according to the Europeans' demands.<sup>415</sup>

Abdul Hamid II established a commission of 28 people under the chairmanship of Said Pasha (1838-1914) to prepare a new constitution directly based on the translation of the French Constitution,<sup>416</sup> and the First Ottoman Constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*) was proclaimed on 23 December 1876. Thus, the First Constitutional Era period began. With the Ottoman constitution of 1876 Ottoman State turned into a constitutional monarchy, and

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<sup>413</sup> Harold Temperley, "British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey 1830-1914", *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol.4, No.2, (1933), 172.

<sup>414</sup> Şeyma, "Sultan Abdülaziz'in Tahttan İndirilmesinin Ekonomik ve Siyasi Sebepleri", *Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol.5, No.14, (2018) 630-632.

<sup>415</sup> Sinan Akşin, "Birinci Meşrutiyet Meclis-i Mebusan", *Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.25, No.1, (1970), 20; Gökmen Kantar, "Modernleşme Kuramı ve Osmanlı İdari Yapısında Modernleşme Süreci Hakkında Bazı Tespitler", *Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol.3, No.3, (2019), 375.

<sup>416</sup> Erhan Afyoncu, *Sorularla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2016), 541.

the state was governed by constitutional principles.<sup>417</sup> As a result, with the proclamation of the First Ottoman Constitution, the transition to constitutional government, which was one of the goals of the Young Ottomans, was achieved; however, this situation did not last long. Shortly after Abdul Hamid II came to power, the Russo-Turkish War took place, and the Young Ottomans were dispersed and most of them were exiled, on the grounds of the political developments experienced due to the war.<sup>418</sup> Also, due to the purported need for national unity during the emergency of the Russo-Turkish War, Abdul Hamid II dissolved the Assembly indefinitely in 1878.<sup>419</sup>

### 3.6 ABDÜL HAMİD II'S (R. 1876-1909) MODERNIZATION POLICIES

Although he clearly had little regard for the Young Ottomans and their abortive representative assembly, Abdül Hamid II was a dedicated modernizer, but he called for an indigenous basis for reform, rather than simply imitating the West. The Sultan himself observed that *Western* civilization was a product of Christianity, whereby it was not directly applicable to non-Western countries such as the Ottoman State. He argued that the Ottomans should modernize within the framework of their own history and civilization. In line with these thoughts, the Sultan's modernization policy was to focus on the material strengths of the West, without compromising on the spiritual and cultural values of Ottoman peoples.<sup>420</sup> Abdül Hamid II openly criticized the cultural reforms made during the Tanzimat period,<sup>421</sup> and tried to carry out tradition and modernity together while strongly opposing the mere imitation of the West.<sup>422</sup>

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<sup>417</sup> Yahya Akyüz, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi, (Başlangıçtan 1997'ye)*, (İstanbul: Kültür Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997), 1-2.

<sup>418</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 34.

<sup>419</sup> Bernard Lewis, 180; Yılmaz Kızıltan, "I. Meşrutiyetin İlanı ve İlk Osmanlı Meclis-i Mebusan'ı", *Gazi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vo. 26, No.1, (2006), 270.

<sup>420</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 45.

<sup>421</sup> Kemal Karpat, Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi: Toplum Kuramsal Değişim Ve Nüfus*, 103.

<sup>422</sup> Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2016), 157.

In line with these policies, he gave great importance to the railway and telegraph networks, which he felt would develop trade and unity among the peoples of the Ottoman realms. The most important network symbolizing the railways built in this period was the Baghdad Railway, followed by the Hejaz and the Anatolian Railways. Ottoman railways spanned 5,883 kilometres in total by 1908, tripling since Abdül Hamid II's accession in 1876. Highway infrastructure underwent analogous development.<sup>423</sup>

Abdül Hamid II also who gave great importance to education, and he opened around 400 primary schools every year, making a particularly notable contribution to provincial development. Tanzimat reforms, including institutional establishments, were uniformly focused on İstanbul, with no regard for the lives of the majority of Ottoman citizens. However, after 1878, national education services were rolled out widely to every corner of the Ottoman State.<sup>424</sup> He also intensified religious education in schools, to address the negligible religious and ethical component of the *Tanzimat* education system. Abdül Hamid gave importance to religious lessons because he tied the future of the state to the power of İslam and the broader Muslim world.<sup>425</sup>

Abdül Hamid II tried to follow the scientific developments in the world very closely. Especially by following the innovations in France, he made an effort not to create a gap between the Western civilization and the Ottoman State. For example, when the Sultan learned of the development of the rabies vaccine, he set up a delegation in 1886 and sent it to Paris for training.<sup>426</sup> In a scientific meeting held in Budapest in 1894, it was reported that diphtheria serum was found, and only three months after its discovery, the serum began to be produced in İstanbul.<sup>427</sup> Clearly the Sultan actively modernized and developed Ottoman

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<sup>423</sup> Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 278-279.

<sup>424</sup> Bayram Kodaman, *Abdulhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi*, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1991), 79.

<sup>425</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye'si in İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme ve Ulusçuluk Sürecinde Eğitim* by Mehmet Alkan, 80-81.

<sup>426</sup> Aykut Kazancigil, *Osmanlılarda Bilim ve Teknoloji*, (İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2000), 286-287.

<sup>427</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Medeniyeti Tarihi Cilt.I*, in *Osmanlı Eğitim ve Bilim Kurumları* by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, (İstanbul: Yildiz Matba, 1999), 353.

capabilities by utilizing Western scientific breakthroughs, while safeguarding Ottoman culture, which was essentially the opposite of the *Tanzimat* paradigm.<sup>428</sup> The direction adopted by Sultan Abdül Hamid II represented the same kind of approach adopted in Meiji Japan, and indeed the Sultan viewed Japan as a civilization managing to successfully modernize without giving up their beliefs and traditions.<sup>429</sup>

Abdül Hamid tried to rally the disintegrating state with his successful policies. He wanted to break the influence of positivist and materialist ideas that had settled in society, especially by giving importance to religious lessons in education. However, anti-Ottoman ideas were continually pumped into the country by books and newspapers brought from Europe, and published by Western-backed political factions within. As a result of this, a group called Young Turks emerged that formed the main opposition against Abdul Hamid II and the existing order. They formed an organization called the *İttihat ve Terakki* (the Committee of Union and Progress) in 1889, and started a systematic and secret opposition against the Sultan, whom they ultimately dethroned on 13 April 1909. Sultan Abdül Hamid II was the last *de facto* Sultan, and his successors in that office were titular figureheads dominated by the Young Turks).<sup>430</sup>

### **3.7 WESTERNIZATION DEBATED IN THE II. MESRUIYET (THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL ERA), 1908-1920**

Intellectuals during this period sought to find ways to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman State in the face of increasing Western colonial encroachment, and the ethos of simply imitating the West in order to pre-emptively avoid being dominated by them came to be their default position. Some actively argued that it was necessary to become

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<sup>428</sup> Bayram Kodaman, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası*, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1987), 24.

<sup>429</sup> Mustafa Armağan, *Abdülhamid'in Kurtlarla Dansı*, (İstanbul: Ufuk, 2006), 178.

<sup>430</sup> Satılmış Gökbayır, *Gizli Bir Cemiyetten İktidara: Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin 1908 Seçimleri Siyasi Programı*, *Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol.3, No.1,(2012), 60-61-62.

completely Westernized in order to save the state, while others argued for partial and selective Westernization (i.e., what we might call modernization).

According to those who support the idea of total Westernization, the scientific, intellectual, moral, and aesthetic values of the West should be taken as an example to be followed in all respects.<sup>431</sup> Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) was a very important advocate of total Westernization. According to him, laws should be secularized, and Latin script and Western clothing should be adopted.<sup>432</sup> He argued that the laws of religion cannot lead a society to civilization, and that only the guidance of biological materialism could create a cultural structure to bring real freedom to people and carry the social structure to a contemporary civilization.<sup>433</sup> For him, Europe (which in his narrow understanding meant atheist French secularism) was the teacher, and to love Europe was to strengthen the Turks materially and spiritually. For him and those like him, there was only one “Civilization”, and it meant European civilization, which must be grasped fully, rose and thorn.<sup>434</sup>

For Cevdet, women wearing a piece of cloth on their heads (hijab) was a major obstacle to the development of civilization. While he was starting some discussions to solve the problems of Muslims in his magazine titled *İçtihad* (opinion), published in Geneva, a French man of letters made the following proposal to solve the problem: “shut the Qur’an, open the Women!” Cevdet was greatly influenced by the words of the French writer, and with a minor change, he changed his slogan to “open the Qur’an and women!”<sup>435</sup>

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<sup>431</sup> Bernard Lewis, 319.

<sup>432</sup> Bayram Ali Çetinkaya, “Modern Türkiye’nin Felsefi Kökenleri”, *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.6, No. 2, (2002), 76.

<sup>433</sup> Ekrem Işın, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Cilt II*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 367.

<sup>434</sup> Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 357-359.

<sup>435</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 390; Şefika Kurnaz, *Osmanlı Kadının Yükselişi (1908-1918)*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2013), 61; Düccane Cündioğlu, *Başörtüsü Risalesi*, (İstanbul: Tibyan Yayınları, 1995), 11-12; Topçu, “II. Meşruyet Dönemi Batıcı Aydınların Tesettür Algısı”, *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol.12, No. 63,(2019), 382.

One of the advocates of total Westernization was Kılıçzade Hakkı (1872-1960), according to whom the fez should be completely removed, and a new headdress (i.e., “Western” hat) should be adopted in its place. The absurdity of this “Westernization” model of modernization can be surmised from the fact that the fez itself has been an earlier compulsory modernization under the Dress Regulation of 1828 (as explained previously), seeking to get rid of the turban, which was then supposed to be the issue holding the Ottomans back. After less than a century, the fez itself was blamed for preventing scientific progress. Hakkı also insisted that women and girls should mix freely with men with no clothing requirements. In addition, madrasas, dervish lodges, and tombs should be removed, and the Latin alphabet should be used instead of the Ottoman one.<sup>436</sup> Kılıçzade Hakkı, like Abdullah Cevdet, saw the hijab as an obstacle in the construction of civilization.<sup>437</sup>

The writers in Ottoman science journals, who advocated total Westernization, urged their compatriots to abandon outdated traditions that could not be reconciled with the modern lifestyle. They denounced Islamic rules and customs, such as giving alms and hospitality, as “rules and regulations set in the desert 1,300 years ago that are no longer valid today”. Some thinkers went so far as to attack Muslims’ basic rituals (e.g., performing the ritual prayers of Islam) on the grounds that a modern man cannot waste his precious time on one religious practice five times a day.<sup>438</sup>

In short, the advocates of total Westernization argued that all the values and systems of the West should be adopted to prevent the Ottoman State from collapsing and to progress and develop. However, the path they chose was ultimately of no use other than to increase

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<sup>436</sup> Peyami Sefa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar*, (Ankara: Atam Yayınları, 1996), 34; Ünal Acar, “Meşruyet Dönemi Düşünce Akımları ve Günümüze Yansımaları”, *Türkiye Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol.23, No.2,(2019), 419; Selami Kılıç, “ II. Meşrutiyet Devri Aydınlarının Atatürk Üzerindeki Etkileri”, *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, No. 25, (2000), 19-20.

<sup>437</sup> Ramazan Altıntaş, “Batılılaşmış Bir Doğulu: Kılıçzade Hakkı ve Projesi”, *Eski Yeni Dergisi*, No.8, (2008), 99; Mine Topçu, 383-384.

<sup>438</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk, An Intellectual Biography*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), 59.

the resemblance of Ottoman citizens to Westerners in outward forms and lifestyles, doing nothing to bring any technological and military success to Ottoman society. This is because it is out of the question for a society to survive and progress merely by its members adopting different configurations of cloth on their heads and other lifestyle changes.

Other intellectuals were less motivated by their sense of the inferiority of their own heritage and they criticized radical Westernization advocates while partially defended “Westernization” *per se*. One of the leaders of this movement was Celal Nuri (1877-1939). While criticizing the radical pro-Westerners, he especially emphasized that to achieve modernization, the positive traditional structure and social content of Islam should be utilized.<sup>439</sup> According to him, as described by Bernard Lewis:

Civilization is of two kinds, technical, and real. The West had reached the highest peak of technical civilization, but had not achieved and never would achieve any “real” civilization. Technical civilization could be transferred and borrowed from one country to another; real civilization could not, and the Ottoman reformers had made a great mistake in confusing the two. Instead of limiting their borrowings to technical matters, they had tried to copy the West in a field in which Islam was, in fact, superior.<sup>440</sup>

Celal Nuri supported this view with the example of Japan.<sup>441</sup> Furthermore, some argued that Europe and the Christian world had never advanced in terms of real civilization, and that only a technical civilization had arisen in the West in relatively recent times, thus only this technical phenomenon was worthy of being adopted, as exhibited by Japan. However, Nuri claimed that the Ottoman State did not understand this, and its out-of-touch cosmopolitan elites were simply obsessed with imitating Western Europe, and they

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<sup>439</sup> Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 363; Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyet Tarihi, Cilt II*, in Orhan Okay “*Batılılaşma Devri Fikir Hayatı Üzerine Bir Deneme*”, (İstanbul: IRCICA Yayınları, 1998), 214.

<sup>440</sup> Bernard Lewis, 244.

<sup>441</sup> The fact that the Japanese-Russian war in 1905 ended in favor of Japan excited the Ottoman intellectuals. With the effect of the Japanese defeating the Russians, the idea of blending traditional values with a modern civilization began to come to the fore. See, Niyaz Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011), 68; Tufan Gündüz, *Osmanlı Tarihi El Kitabı*, in İbrahim Yılmazçelik, *Çöküş*, (Ankara: Grafiker Yayınları, 2012), 561.

themselves usually lacked any technological, scientific, or industrial knowledge and experience.<sup>442</sup> In summary, Celal Nuri emphasized that the science and technique of the West should be adopted, with no compulsion to jettison traditional culture.<sup>443</sup>

Ziya Gökalp (1826-1924) was one of those who advocated partial Westernization. According to him, modernization meant being able to build and use warships, automobiles, and planes like the Europeans, without the need to resemble Europeans in shape and life. Gökalp believed that every nation has its own civilization, and that it should never simply imitate the civilization of another nation, and should protect its own authentic culture as its *raison d'être*.<sup>444</sup> He also observed that the Japanese took the technology of the West by preserving their religion and culture, and argued that the Ottomans could follow this path as well.<sup>445</sup>

In short, those who advocated partial Westernization argued that while taking the technology and science of the West as an example, it was not necessary or effective to simply imitate the culture and lifestyle of the West, and that there was nothing to be ashamed of in the great cultural and religious heritage of the Ottomans.

### **3.8 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE**

In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman State was described by the Russian Tsar Nicolas I (r. 1825-1855) as the “Sick Man of Europe”. By the beginning of the twentieth century, it had been weakened by continual wars in the Balkans and elsewhere. The

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<sup>442</sup> Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversiteleri Yayınları, 2004), 70.

<sup>443</sup> Tufan Buzpınar, “Celal Nuri'nin Batılılaşma ve İslam Arayışları Üzerine Notlar”, *Muhafazakâr Düşünce*, No.16–17, (2008), 220.

<sup>444</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, (ed. Mustafa Özsarı), (İstanbul: Bordo Siyah Klasik Yayınları, 2006), 11-12; Çağatay Özdemir, *Türkiye'de Sosyoloji* in Serdar Sağlam, *Ziya Gökalp*, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınları, 2008), 161-219; Funda Arslan Bilgin, “Ziya Gökalp ve Batı Algısı”, *Medeniyet ve Toplum Dergisi*, Vol.4, No.1, (2020) 106.

<sup>445</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007), 65-66.

exceptional genius of Abdül Hamid II had halted the apparently irreversible decline for decades, but his removal paved the way for the final collapse. During WWI it lost its Arab provinces to the Allies, and Türkiye itself was threatened (having successfully fought off the ferocious Allied Dardanelles Campaign in 1915-1916). On 15 May 1919, the Greek army, protected by British, French, and American warships, occupied İzmir, then proceeded to the central Anatolian region to occupy Anatolia. The Turkish people's reaction to the Greek invasion was violent; large protests were organized by the public in İstanbul, and national resistance movements started.<sup>446</sup>

Mustafa Kemal Pasha (as he was then referred to; he is more commonly referred to as “Atatürk”, the “Father of Turks”, an official surname he adopted in 1934) was sent by the government to Samsun to deploy military forces in the East. However, he had been preparing the basis of the Independence Wars, and news of his subversive actions caused him to be recalled to İstanbul.<sup>447</sup> Kazım Karabekir (1882-1948), who was a senior commander controlling the majority of the army, sided with Atatürk. On 23 July 1919, they organized a congress in Erzurum to reject the mandate and to seek national independence. In addition, *Heyet-i Temsiliye* (Delegation Committee) was established under the chairmanship of Atatürk at the congress. During this period, Atatürk and his comrades continued their activities in Ankara. On 16 March 1920, the Allied states officially occupied İstanbul and arrested leading Turkish politicians and members of parliament, sending them to exile in Malta. Other members of parliament came to Ankara from İstanbul upon Atatürk's invitation, and established the GNA with a Delegation Committee on 23 April 1920. After much negotiation, the GNA declared the Republic on 29 October 1923, whereupon Türkiye was recognized as an independent state by the international community.<sup>448</sup> The Independence Wars accordingly resulted in the establishment of the

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<sup>446</sup> Bernard Lewis, 240-242.

<sup>447</sup> Findly, 220-221.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid, 223-226.

RoT in 1923, and Atatürk became its first President.<sup>449</sup> The British writer Andrew Mango (1926-2014) described Atatürk and the structure of the state he founded as follows:

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is one of the most important statesmen of the twentieth century. He established and shaped the Turkish Republic, today the strongest state between the Adriatic and China in the broad Eurasian land belt south of Russia and north of the Indian subcontinent. He influenced the history of his country's neighbours [...] Atatürk is usually known today as a radical modernizer and westernizer [...] the cultural revolution he wrought was genuine and wide-ranging. Secularism was central to it. True, the secularization of the Turkish ruling class and of the state in which it ran had started in the nineteenth century [...] But it was Atatürk who decided that religion should have no say at all in government.<sup>450</sup>

### **3.9 MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK'S ERA MODERNIZATION REFORMS**

#### **3.9.1 Overview**

Every nation has two civilizations. One is the official civilization, and the other is the civilization designed by humans during the modernization progress. In other countries other than Türkiye, there may not be much inequality between the two. However, this situation shows itself immediately in Türkiye. The reason for this dichotomy is that Türkiye actively abandoned its own indigenous culture and institutions, and adopted foreign cultures and institutions. Instead of creating their own authentic institutions by developing them themselves, through a process of critical reflection and democratization, political elites simply imposed European-style institutions on Türkiye. The Turks borrowed the institutions of foreign peoples and produced an artificial civilization from them.<sup>451</sup> While many at the time considered drastic changes necessary to resist European colonialism, it is

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<sup>449</sup> Anne Marisa Schon, "The Construction of Turkish National Identity: Nationalization of Islam & Islamization of Nationhood", *National and Regional Identities in an Age of Globalization* (2013), 6.

<sup>450</sup> Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (New York: Overlook Press, 2002), xi; Soner Cagaptay, *The New Sultan, Erdogan and The Crisis Of Modern Turkey*, (London: I.B.Tauris &Co. Ltd, 2017), 6.

<sup>451</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp*, edited by Niyazi Berkes, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1959), 89.

clear with the benefit of hindsight, when reconsidering the course of Turkish modernization, that unnecessarily abrasive and even oppressive policies were adopted in some cases. The rapid and abrupt changes implemented imposed an artificial and foreign civilization on Türkiye. To understand this strange experiment, it is necessary to examine the intellectual structure of Atatürk and the personnel who founded the RoT.

In this context, Atatürk and the cadre who founded the Republic thought that the reason for the superiority of the West was rationality. Therefore, according to them, to modernize, a secular and rational culture had to be created first. According to this conception of modernity originating from positivism, the first condition for modernization was the enlightenment of society. That is, they looked at the phenomena of “modernization” and “progress” not as economic, social, and political progress, but essentially as a movement for cultural change.<sup>452</sup> According to Atatürk, who was in favour of total modernization and an absolute rupture with the Ottoman past, the people of the RoT who say “I am civilized” have to show and prove that they are civilized with their Western mentality. Modernization was expressed by Atatürk with the concepts of “being human”, reaching the level of contemporary civilizations and Westernization.<sup>453</sup>

Atatürk’s adoption of European civilization meant the eradication of local cultural elements that his movement considered to be in conflict with their “Western” understanding of modernity, and tradition and Islam were fundamental to such elements.<sup>454</sup> To compete with the modern world, the Turkish nation had to cut itself off from its recent past, especially from Ottoman history. Atatürk and the cadre who founded the Republic thought

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<sup>452</sup> Kemal Karpaz, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Leiden: Brill Publisher, 2004), 172.

<sup>453</sup> Halil İnalçık, *Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2020), 39-40; Gürçan Bozkır, “İzmir Basınında Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün Kastamonu Gezisi”, *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol.9, No.20-21, (2010), 117; Hülya Baykal, “Atatürkçü Çağdaşlaşma Yönünden Türkiye’nin Avrupa Topluluklarına Tam Üyeliği”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol.4, No. 12, (1988), 742.

<sup>454</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk, An Intellectual Biography*, 204.

that the new values to be gained were superior and more acceptable than anything inherited from the past and defined as old.<sup>455</sup>

Thus, in the early years of the Republic, Atatürk made a series of reforms to create a modern and secular state. These reforms marked a radical transformation for Türkiye, and the traditions of the Ottoman State were completely and systematically erased.<sup>456</sup> Atatürk's reforms sought to restore the salvific mission begun under Tanzimat, and to restore a Turkish national vision on the ashes of the Ottoman State. He believed that for this state to survive, society had to reach the level of contemporary civilization, and undertook the religious, educational, and cultural and historical reforms he considered necessary to achieve this goal.<sup>457</sup>

### 3.9.2 Religious Reforms

In Atatürk's words, "With the abandonment of Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, the advancement of all humanity in experience, knowledge and thought, and the establishment of a world religion" was the ultimate ideal. Therefore, existing religions needed to be reformed to the extent of "abandonment", and with this underlying aim Atatürk and the cadre who founded the Republic attempted to reform religion.<sup>458</sup> The most fundamental political reforms of Atatürk intersected with religious reform in the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, and of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924.<sup>459</sup> According to Atatürk,

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<sup>455</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, 15-16.

<sup>456</sup> Carter Vaughn Findley, 215.

<sup>457</sup> Bülent Daver, "Atatürk ve Sosyo-politik Sistem Görüşü" ü, (İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 247; İsmet Gönülal, "Atatürk İnkılabının Gereğesi", *Erdem*, Vol.5, No.12,(1988), 913.

<sup>458</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *The Speech*, Translated from Turkish Language by Kurt Köhler, (Ankara: Ataturk Research Center, 2020 ), 712; M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk, An Intellectual Biography*, 157.

<sup>459</sup> Frederick F. Anscombe, 188-189; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 350; Timothy Roberts & Emrah Şahin, "Construction of National Identities in Early Republics: A Comparison of the American and Turkish Cases", *The Journal of the Historical Society*, Vol.10, (2010), 516; N.A Baloch, "Mustafa Kemal's Unique Role in the World History", *Erdem*, Vol. 11, No, 31, (2010), 53.

Islam was the force that could prevent the modernization of the RoT,<sup>460</sup> and said the following about the institution of the Caliphate:

Turks were a great nation before they accepted Islam as their religion. However, after accepting this religion, the national feelings of the Turkish nation disappeared. Religion numbs the national excitement of the Turks.<sup>461</sup>

He stated in a *Nutuk* (Speech) that:

Our nation has been moved from this absurd viewpoint for centuries. But what happened? Millions of people died everywhere. Do you know the number of Anatolian children who died in the desert of Yemen? How many people have died to protect Syria and Iraq, do you know that?<sup>462</sup>

Thus, the abolishment of the Caliphate was the beginning of secularization for Atatürk. He created a board in 1924 to remove the religious law system that has been utilized since the Ottoman period. Lawyers began to prepare a new civil law to replace religious law, ostensibly according to the needs of the Turkish people (although in reality this merely sought to translate Swiss civil law into Turkish). After that, a new civil law was passed in Türkiye.<sup>463</sup> In 1925, Islamic lodges and mausoleums were closed, for the rationale expounded by Atatürk himself:

Gentlemen, you, and the whole nation must know, and know well, that the Republic of Turkey cannot be the land of şeyhs, dervishes, disciples, and lay brothers. The straightest, trusted way (tariqat) is the way of civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what civilization requires.<sup>464</sup>

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<sup>460</sup> Anne Marisa Schon, 6.

<sup>461</sup> Afet İnan, Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, edit by Neriman Aydın (İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 2010), 44.

<sup>462</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, edited by Nejat Bayramoğlu & Kurtuluş Güran (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 542.

<sup>463</sup> Bernard Lewis, 271; Ahmet Mumcu, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Dönemlerinde Laiklik", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol.1, No.2, (1985), 519.

<sup>464</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Devrimcilik Üzerine*, edited by Doğu Perincek, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2019), 222; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam Cilt 3*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 1995), 245; Celal Şengör, *Dahi Diktatör*, (İstanbul: İnkilap Kitabevi, 2018), 36.

Religious concepts were requested to be translated into Turkish. The Qur'an ayahs and *hadiths* of the Prophet (ﷺ) were immediately translated into Turkish from the original Arabic versions. Moreover, in 1928 the clause of the initial Turkish State Constitution declaring the State's religion to be Islam was removed. Even the *adhan* was ruled to be read in Turkish, and the Ankara Conservatoire composed a melody for the Turkish *adhan*.<sup>465</sup> On 29 January 1932, the *adhan* was recited in Turkish by Hafiz Rifat Bey (1820-1888).<sup>466</sup> Hence, in the new Republic founded by Atatürk, traditional Islamic elements were completely effaced within a few years.<sup>467</sup>

Atatürk and his followers, ardent defenders of European thought and lifestyles, adopted the Swiss Civil Code for the Turkish Republic. They also adopted penal codes from Italy. Consequently, Atatürk established a solid security wall between religion and the state, and Türkiye became one of the most ideologically secular Muslim-majority states in the twentieth century. Atatürk, who regulated the relationship between religion and politics on the basis of secularism, limited religion to the private sphere, and then mandated independence from religion in government, education, and public policy.<sup>468</sup>

### 3.9.3 Educational Reforms

*Madrasahs* (Muslim religious schools) were closed by the new government, and the institutions providing religious education became linked to the Ministry of National Education and its politically correct, ideological curriculum<sup>469</sup>. Religious schools were an

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<sup>465</sup> Bernard Lewis, 411- 288.

<sup>466</sup> Osman Nuri Ergin, *Türk Maarif Tarihi Cilt V*, (İstanbul: Eser Kitapevi, 1977), 1942.

<sup>467</sup> Bernard Lewis, 411- 288.

<sup>468</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *The New Sultan, Erdogan and The Crisis Of Modern Turkey*, (London: I.B.Tauris &Co. Ltd, 2017), 20-21.

<sup>469</sup> According to M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Atatürk took a personal interest in religious and historical subjects in educational textbooks, and he reflected this point of view about Islam. To support this claim, he gives an example from the history books prepared under Atatürk's guidance. A chapter in the high school textbook prepared under his supervision alluded to the: "Arab-Turkish struggle", in which "torrents of Bedouins overflowing from the Arabian deserts moved toward cultivated and prosperous [Turkish cities] through Iranian valleys". As he later explained in more straightforward terms, Islam was an Arab faith and a vehicle

obstacle to being modern and Western for the government. Instead of religious schools, the government opened schools where modern sciences and secular worldviews were taught.<sup>470</sup> In November 1928, the Arabic letters used by the entire Islamic world were removed and replaced with Latin letters. The government replaced Arabic and Persian words with purely Turkish words taken from dialects, other Turkic languages, and ancient texts.

Words of European origin remained intact, and more were imported to fill in the gaps left by their Arabic and Persian equivalents. With the change of the alphabet, there was rapid progress in the translation activity. The journal *Tercüme* (Translate) was first published in 1940, under the auspices of the state-supported Translation Bureau, in order to introduce the best of world literature to the readership. Although the publication of translations based on Western models had continued since the mid-nineteenth century, this was the first time it became part of government policy. The aim of this policy was to contribute to the development of both language and national culture by conveying the universal humanist values of European literature to a wider audience.<sup>471</sup> To justify the idea of alphabet reform, Atatürk argued that it was difficult to read and understand the Arabic letters. However, as Bernard Lewis observed, the main purpose of this reform was to create a modern and Western society and to cut the ties of Turkish people with their Islamic past.<sup>472</sup>

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for Arab domination: “The Turks, too, had been a great nation before accepting the religion of the Arabs”. However, the “Arab religion... loosened the national ties of the Turkish nation” and “benumbed national feelings and enthusiasm for the nation, because the aim of the religion established by Muhammad prompted an Arab nationalist policy... Those who accepted Muhammad’s religion had to suppress their identities and devote their lives to the exaltation of the name of Allah everywhere... Under these circumstances, the Turkish nation resembled those who commit the Qur’an to memory without – understanding the meaning of a single word of it – and thus become senile”. See, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk, An Intellectual Biography*, 131-132.

<sup>470</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge Press, 2006), 23.

<sup>471</sup> Laurence Raw, *Exploring Turkish Cultures: Essays, Interviews and Reviews*, (Cambridge: Cambridge: Scholars Publishing, 2011), 23.

<sup>472</sup> Bernard Lewis, 277; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 351-352.

### 3.9.4 Cultural and Historical Reforms

Atatürk implemented several reforms in the cultural sphere as well. On 25 November 1925, the fez hat was banned by Atatürk; as explained previously, this had been introduced under Ottoman modernization efforts in the nineteenth century to replace the turban, but it was already considered to be an icon of the Islamic tradition by the 1920s. The Hat Law passed in 1925 made it compulsory for all men to wear Western-style hats.<sup>473</sup> Atatürk organized meetings to explain these Westernization reforms to the public. For example, he said in a public meeting with a community in İnebolu on 28 August 1925 that:

Gentlemen, the Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic are civilized; they are civilized in history and reality. But I tell you as your brother, as your friend, as your father, that the people of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must show and prove that they are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of living.<sup>474</sup>

Also, in 1927 he said:

Gentlemen, we should not wear the fez, which is the enemy of ignorance, heedlessness, bigotry, and progress. Instead of fez, we should wear the hat worn by the civilized world and thus show that the Turkish nation is civilized.<sup>475</sup>

Atatürk, with his public statements, affirmed his belief that wearing a hat with a brim was an integral part of being a civilized human being, and he wanted to convince the public that the legal requirement for them to do likewise was rational and necessary.<sup>476</sup>

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<sup>473</sup> M.Naeem Qureshi, *Ottoman Turkey, Atatürk, and Muslim South Asia, Perspective, Perceptions, and Responses*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 219; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 182.

<sup>474</sup> Bernard Lewis, 268; Halil İnalçık, "Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Modernleşmesi", *Bellekten*, Vol. 52, (1988), 988.

<sup>475</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, edited by Nejat Bayramoğlu & Kurtuluş Güran, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 644.

<sup>476</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II (1906-1938)* edited by Nimet Unan, (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1952), 213.

However, the fez had gained deep-rooted religious and cultural connotations in Turkish society, and had become a symbol that distinguished Muslims from non-Muslim Westerners. In a society governed by a strictly enforced dress code for centuries, for a Muslim, wearing a Western hat meant apostasy.<sup>477</sup>

Women were key political actors in the modernization project of the Republic.<sup>478</sup> In the first years of the Republic, the images that best reflected the modernization regime of the new state were the images of women performing in shorts and school gowns or dancing in ballroom dresses.<sup>479</sup> However, these visual images of the 1920s and 1930s were remote and unrealistic for the vast majority of their rural women, who had to be stripped in the march toward progress.<sup>480</sup> Atatürk organized a public gathering in Kastamonu on 30 August 1925 and criticized the *çarşaf* (veil) as he had the fez:

In some places, I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a towel or something like it over their heads to hide their faces, and who turn their backs or huddle themselves on the ground when a man passes by. What is the meaning and sense of this behaviour? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation adopt this strange manner, this barbarous posture? It is a spectacle that makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at once.<sup>481</sup>

Such views and radical reforms of Atatürk angered the public, who were predominantly Muslim and socially conservative. Following the abolition of religious law and the prohibition of the fez, public rebellions become more severe. Atatürk enacted the Law of *Takriri Sükun* (Law on the Maintenance of Order) on 4 March 1925 to prevent such upheavals. From March 1925 to March 1926, *İstiklal Mahkemeleri* (Independence Courts)

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<sup>477</sup> Şerafettin Turan, *Kendine Özgü Bir Yaşam ve Kişilik Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2004), 473; M. Şükrü Hanioglu, 207.

<sup>478</sup> Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, *Woman-Nation- State*, in Deniz Kandiyoti, *Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolic Pawns?*, (Londra: The Macmillan Press, 1988), 127.

<sup>479</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* in Deniz Kandiyoti, *Gendering the Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity*, 125.

<sup>480</sup> Sarah Graham-Brown, *Images of Women*, (Londra: Quartet Books, 1988), 215.

<sup>481</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II (1906-1938)*, 220, Bernard Lewis, 271; Mehmet Baytimur, Aziz Demircioğlu, Hasan Çelikoğlu, *Atatürk'ün Kastamonu Gezisine Şapka Devrimi*, (Kastamonu: Kastamonu Valiliği, 1981), 5.

issued 138 execution orders, and approximately 20 death sentences were passed about revolts against the Hat Law.<sup>482</sup> After these executions, the public was cowed and remained silent.

As can be seen, in the Turkish modernization process, the distinction between what is considered “civilized” and what is considered “uncivilized” is quite clear. “European”, that is, anything that appears to be in a European style, is considered appropriate and valuable, while “Ottoman”, that is, Ottoman style, is seen as negative and inferior. In this respect, wearing a hat whose edge extends out from the head for a few inches is one of the quintessential indicators that define a civilized person.<sup>483</sup>

By the 1930s, Atatürk was engaged in creating a new ethno-nationalist historiography for the Turks and Türkiye. Atatürk established the *Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Turkish Historical Institution) for this purpose, seeking to airbrush anything to do with Islam and the Ottomans from Turkish historical consciousness.<sup>484</sup> According to the new identity, Turks were portrayed as the founders of civilizations in Anatolia and the Aegean.<sup>485</sup> The Turkish Historical Institution published a book called *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (Main Lines of Turkish History), convening a large congress to introduce the book to all teachers and educators of the nation. In this congress, this book was introduced to the audience and the anthropological characteristics of the Turkish race were explained. Thus, because of this book, all Turkish students were expected to have a sense of nationalism.<sup>486</sup>

As can be understood from the reforms made the country’s founder, Atatürk used his complete control of the state to shape Türkiye from the top down and in his own

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<sup>482</sup> Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (New York: Overlook Press, 2002), 421.

<sup>483</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* in Nilüfer Göle, *The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity*, 119-122.

<sup>484</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi, 1800 – 2012* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012), 126.

<sup>485</sup> Çağla Gül Yesevi, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu, Yükselişi ve Siyasal Yansımaları* (Ankara: Kripto Yayınları, 2018), 187.

<sup>486</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?*, 82.

European and secularist image.<sup>487</sup> When we evaluate these reforms aimed at the modernization of Türkiye, we can easily say that “modernization” of Türkiye, we can easily say that these reforms are not only modernization reforms .<sup>488</sup> This is because the understanding of modernization in Türkiye was not limited to the technology and industry of the West but also affected the whole life in cultural terms.<sup>489</sup>

In summary, under the name of modernity, the Islamic elements in the Turkish culture were eliminated by force, and an anti-religious cultural revolution intervening in personal privacy and choice was applied in the guise of a civilizing secularism mission, which was adopted as the main direction of the state.<sup>490</sup> Atatürk created a new Türkiye from the ruins of the Ottoman State and embarked on a great effort to Westernize it. By taking this path, Atatürk rejected the cultural heritage of the Ottoman State and the Islamic past. This rupture naturally made Türkiye, with its deep-seated Muslim religion, heritage, traditions, and institutions, a “torn country”.<sup>491</sup> Both modernization and Westernization were synonymous and desirable for Atatürk, because the latter was considered indispensable to achieving the former.<sup>492</sup> Atatürk expressed this concept as follows:

Countries are different, but civilization is one, and for the progress of a nation, it is necessary to participate in this unique civilization... We want to modernize our country. All our work is to create a modern and western government in Turkey. What nation is it that desires to enter civilization but does not favour the West?<sup>493</sup>

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<sup>487</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *The New Sultan, Erdogan and The Crisis Of Modern Turkey*, 7.

<sup>488</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp*, 75.

<sup>489</sup> Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teaching of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Harvill Press, 1950), 96.

<sup>490</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlıdan Günümüze Kimlik ve İdeoloji*, 36.

<sup>491</sup> Countries that try to replace the cultures of their societies with Western culture in order to modernize consciously tear themselves between their own tradition and the ideal to which they aspire. In the 1920s, Türkiye began to become a fragmented country, because Türkiye, to join the West, began rejecting traditional Islamic and Ottoman culture and importing Western culture. See, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 189-195.

<sup>492</sup> *Ibid.*, 92-93.

<sup>493</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1961), 68; Suna Kili, *Dünya ve Türkiye Açısından Atatürk*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996) 76.

In this vein, Atatürk tried to Europeanize Türkiye by importing civilization. However, non-Western societies can modernize without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions, and practices; this manifest reality had already been noted by many Turks during the nineteenth century, who saw Japan doing just that. According to Huntington, political leaders who think they can fundamentally reshape the culture of their communities are doomed to fail. While they may introduce elements of Western culture, they cannot permanently suppress or eliminate core elements of their indigenous culture. They only produce torn countries.<sup>494</sup>

### 3.9.5 Long-Term Impacts

As can be seen, Turkish modernization took its inspiration from the West; indeed, it was not a coherent or nuanced political programme at all, but merely a campaign of trying to imitate the West.<sup>495</sup> Although many of the defeated and exhausted people of Anatolia in the first years of the Republic adopted modernization reforms, whether willingly or by coercion, tentative introspection and revision began to emerge by the late 1960s, and by the late 1970s the word “modernization” was even perceived with some negative connotations. By the 1980s, society began to criticize the Kemalist modernization program. Turkish people got tired of the “bright and prosperous tomorrows” discourse, which had failed to deliver scientific and technological progress on its own terms, and began to question their history, past institutions, beliefs, identity, and culture.<sup>496</sup> The reason for this pessimism in society, was the identification of the concepts of modernization and Westernization.<sup>497</sup> However, if the policy of modernization without Westernization was implemented in

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<sup>494</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 96-97-195.

<sup>495</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* in Çağlar Kayder, *Whiter to Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s*, 54; Çağlar Keyder, “The Dilemma of Cultural Identity on the Margin of Europe”, *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, Vol.16, No.1,(1993), 23.

<sup>496</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* in Reşat Kasaba, *Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities*, 25-26.

<sup>497</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* in Çağlar Kayder, *Whiter to Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s*, 55-56.

Turkish society, the latter could achieve socio-economic development without breaking with its Turkish-Islamic tradition. Moreover, with this policy, the state and society can meet on a more peaceful common ground in harmony, and without conflict with each other.

### **3.10 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

Prior to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman State was in a position to produce solutions to the problems that arose with the current science and technology. However, as a result of the modernization process that started with the Renaissance, Western states began to outperform the Ottoman State militarily and technologically, and the Ottoman State could not follow the military and technological developments in the West in this process. Official solutions to this problem began to be sought after Selim III acceded to the throne at the end of the eighteenth century. With the collective reform program called Nizam-ı Cedid, many innovations were attempted, especially in the military field, but real radical reforms were made during the reign of Mahmud II. He thought that the Ottomans could modernize by adopting the socio-cultural values of the West, beginning the trend of conflating modernization with Westernization in Turkish political discourse.

In this context, Mahmud II tried to transform Ottoman society into a Western society with the innovations he made in the socio-cultural field. He imitated the West in everything from clothing to eating and drinking culture and wanted Ottoman society to be like this. This “Imitation of the West” ethos that started in the period of Mahmud II continued in the Tanzimat period, during which attempts made in the field of industry to catch up with the West were not very successful because the science and technology that developed in Europe were transferred in the form of “translation” and “purchasing”. In addition, another reason for the failure is that the state started technology transfer and industrialization quite late. After the state started these initiatives, it remained largely dependent on foreign labour, and science and technology could not be produced to reduce dependency on the West. However, the state could have paid more attention to industrialization, which is one of the most

important elements of modernization, and could have made industry and science the main subject of modernization reforms instead of culture and clothing.

When it came to the Constitutional era, the Ottoman State was transformed into a constitutional monarchy by declaring its First Ottoman Constitution and the State began to be governed according to constitutional principles. In addition, two main streams of ideas emerged in this period for the salvation of the state: complete and partial Westernization. Those who advocated complete westernization believed that by culturally resembling the West the country would be saved. According to them, the entire way of life of Ottoman citizens had to be made purely Western. However, those who advocated partial Westernization believed that there was no need to take a culture from the West, it was enough to take the science and technology of the West. They gave the example of Japan, which modernized without Westernization, as proof that this was a successful project.

In the Republican era, it was aimed to establish a modern nation state and to raise Türkiye to the level of contemporary civilizations. The founder of the state, Atatürk, believed that a secular and rational culture should be created first, and he initiated a series of cultural reforms in this direction. For him, to modernize meant to become Westernized. Therefore, all modernization reforms sought to directly imitate Western forms. This is the basic principle of all reforms undertaken to “modernize” the RoT. These reforms marked a radical transformation for Türkiye.

The modernization reforms carried out by Atatürk in the Republican period were in the same spirit as those of Mahmud II, as both focused more on superficial imitation of Western clothing and culture rather than actively seeking to develop Western science and technology. This continuity of spirit is most clear in the case of the fez, which people were forced to wear by Mahmud II to modernize and replace their backward turbans, while the very same accessory was considered an indicator of backwardness that had to be replaced in order to modernize by Atatürk. Both equated modernization with Westernization.

However, Westernization is not necessary for modernization. Non-Western societies can modernize by adopting Western science and technology by adhering to their own culture and values. Moreover, they can produce domestic and national technology by preserving their own culture and values. In addition, the modernization policies implemented with Western imitation have never satisfied Turkish society, which is connected to the Turkish Islamic culture. In every period, it has created a conflict between society and the state.

The results of Kemalist policies extended far beyond the period of Atatürk's rule (1923-1938), and the problems that began during his regime have continued to the current day. The most obvious manifestation of these simmering tensions are the intermittent military coups and attempted coups that have plagued Türkiye when apparently Islamic (or otherwise non-Kemalist) popular democratic movements have threatened the status quo. Such military interventions (notably in the 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, have always been premised on defending the Constitution (i.e., "Western values") from the threats of popular democracy. Thus, attempts by the Turkish people to change their governance by democratic means were stifled over the decades.

To prevent this society-state conflict that has been going on since the Ottoman State, a modernization policy without Westernization can be applied as an alternative modernization theory that preserves its values and culture that is more compatible with the society. In this way, society and the state can develop more harmoniously and peacefully.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **ATTILA İLHAN AND HIS VIEWS ON TÜRKİYE’S MODERNIZATION PROCESS**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter analyses Attila İlhan’s views on Türkiye’s modernization process. İlhan, one of the important intellectuals of the Republican period, examined Türkiye’s modernization process in depth and made important studies on this subject. He thought that the main mistake made in the Turkish modernization process was the perception and implementation of modernization as “Westernization”, due to which Türkiye’s modernization process has been an imitative and distorted one. Instead of this wrong modernization, he proposed an alternative model of “national synthesis”. This chapter discusses how İlhan identified the mistakes in the modernization process, and analyses the national synthesis model he presented as a solution in detail.

#### **4.2 INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY**

##### **4.2.1 Educational Background**

İlhan was born on 15 June 1925, in İzmir. His father was Muharrem Bedreddin İlhan (1891-1965), and he had two siblings, Cengiz İlhan (1927-2011) and Çolpan İlhan (1936-2014). His family were distinguished, with his grandfather being a Muslim judge, and his grandfather’s father being a mufti.<sup>498</sup> Although Muharrem Bedrettin İlhan was from a family of ulama, he raised his children with a democratic understanding and never gave his

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<sup>498</sup> Selim İleri, *Nam-ı Diğer Kaptan- Attila İlhan’ı Dinledim*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2002), 19; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan’ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, (Ankara: Phoenix, 2012), 43.

children a religious education. He had already adopted the Western lifestyle, and his social and professional circles were populated by people who had adopted the Western lifestyle.<sup>499</sup> Attila's mother, Perihan İlhan, had an interest in artistic activities, which played an important role in Attila's life. He wrote his first poem, "İlkbahar" (Spring), when he was in the third grade of primary school.<sup>500</sup>

In 1935-1936, shortly after completing his primary education, he experienced the first of two significant interruptions in his formal education. When his father was appointed as the governor of the Ilgın district of Konya, a small town in Anatolia, the family could not find a suitable school in the vicinity where İlhan could go; consequently, he could not go to school for a year.<sup>501</sup> An important event in high school in 1941 left a permanent mark on his life and caused the second major education interruption. In the 1940s, the communist poet Nazım Hikmet Ran<sup>502</sup> (1902-1963) was imprisoned and his works were banned in Türkiye, but people bought and read his works through the underground pamphlet network. İlhan, who was very impressed by Hikmet's poetry, described himself as a communist, in his youthful enthusiasm.

Later, he corresponded with a girl from the class and included the poems of the banned poet in his correspondence, which led to his first arrest at the age of sixteen on the charge of possessing and distributing communist propaganda and being a member of a communist organization.<sup>503</sup> İlhan was taken to İzmir Prison after his arrest and interrogation. After he spent about a month in prison, his lawyers applied to the court for

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<sup>499</sup> Attila İlhan, *Söyletme Kötüyü!.., Röportajlar-2 (1983-1987)*, edited by Belgin Sarmaşık, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2005), 19-22.

<sup>500</sup> Serhat Işık, *Attila İlhan ve Batı*, (İstanbul: Milena Kitap, 2016), 3.

<sup>501</sup> Burcu Alkan & Çimen Günay-Erkol, *Dictionary of Literary Biography (vol. 373): Turkish Novelists Since 1960*, in Burcu Alkan, *Attila İlhan*, (United State: Gale, 2013), 116.

<sup>502</sup> Nazım Hikmet became an ardent and lifelong communist after he went to study in Moscow in 1922, from whence he returned to İstanbul in 1928. He was imprisoned for his political views (i.e., spreading communist propaganda) for more than 14 years, and spent the last 13 years of his life in exile, mainly in Russia, traveling widely through Europe and further afield. See, Mariya Leontiç, "Nazım Hikmet'in Hayatı ve Şiirleri", *Bal-Tam Türklük Bilgisi*, No.17, (2012), 265-268.

<sup>503</sup> Burcu Alkan & Çimen Günay-Erkol, 116; Merve Akıncı Almaz, *Attila İlhan'ın Romanları ve Şiirlerinde Hapishane ve Tutukluluk Teması*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2016, 6; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, (Ankara: Phoenix, 2012), 52-53.

his release, on the grounds that he was sick and had psychological depression. Since there was no specialist doctor in İzmir, he was transferred to Manisa Mental Hospital and stayed there for a while. After he left there, he was not sent back to prison due to a medical reasons.<sup>504</sup> However, during this process, İlhan was banned from education, until 1943, when his father managed to facilitate his enrolment in *Işık* (Light) High School, from which he successfully graduated. Even though he had little interest in the subject, İlhan followed in the footsteps of his father and enrolled in the Faculty of Law of İstanbul University in 1948.<sup>505</sup> After finishing his first year there, he went to Paris and joined the activists seeking the release of Hikmet from prison.<sup>506</sup>

#### 4.2.2 Paris Years

France (particularly Paris) occupies a unique place in the Turkish cultural imagination. As explained in the previous chapter, the French Revolution and French secularism formed the ideological bedrock of the most radical reformers during the decline and disintegration periods of the Ottoman State, and Francophilia is clearly imprinted on Türkiye's military, political, and social life.<sup>507</sup> İlhan also admired Paris in his youth. Partly because of this factor, and partly because of his efforts to save Hikmet, he went to Paris three times in total.<sup>508</sup> The years he spent here can be considered a process of “self-questioning and development” for him.<sup>509</sup> When he arrived in Paris for the first time in 1949, he was deeply disappointed in France and French society, as expressed below:

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<sup>504</sup> Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, Unpublished M. A Thesis, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2010, 24; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 54; Cengiz Demir, *Attila İlhan'ın Bıçağın Ucu Adlı Romanının Dil İncelemesi*, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Kocaeli Üniversitesi, 2020, 3.

<sup>505</sup> Selim İleri, 82; Hakan Reyhan, 62-63. Gizem Yeni, *Attila İlhan'ın Ben Sana Mecburum Adlı Şiir Kitabının Söz Dizimsel İncelemesi*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Pamukkale Üniversitesi, 2019, 15.

<sup>506</sup> Zeynep Ankara, *Yalnız Şövalye Attila İlhan*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), 18-19; Duygu Köksal, *The politics of cultural identity in Turkey: Nationalist perspectives in the writings of Kemal Tahir, Cemil Meric and Attila İlhan*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1996, 8.

<sup>507</sup> Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, 19. *Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1997), 37-73; Serhat Işık, *Attila İlhan ve Batı*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Ege Üniversitesi, 2006, 9-10.

<sup>508</sup> Serhat Işık, 10.

<sup>509</sup> Sema Özher, *Romancı Kimliğiyle Attila İlhan*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Fırat Üniversitesi, 2008,5.

I was faced with two great disappointments in France: One of them is France itself. France and the French were not what I expected. I thought of them very differently. I dreamed little. I have judged them according to their books, pictures, and films. But the French are not such people. If this is the country and its people that I call “civilized”, and “developed”, there is nothing special about it. Second, my faith in socialism is very deep and strong and I thought I would do my best in socialism here. But the situation of the socialist movement was not very different here either.<sup>510</sup>

When I went there, I thought that Paris is a centre of culture and art, a free country that respects everyone’s rights. However, the result was disappointing. For one thing, they are tough, stingy, cold-blooded, selfish, and cynical people. They have nothing to do with culture either...<sup>511</sup>

İlhan faced many troubles in the first days he went to Paris. For example, he could not find a place to stay, and more importantly, he was not accepted at the university. He described these difficulties as follows:

So, the Paris adventure began penniless, and with no residence permit. My desire to go to Sorbonne University did not come true. The hotel I stayed in is terrible, there is no heating and toilet in the room. It is not clear who entered and exited the hotel...<sup>512</sup>

However, he did not give up in the face of these challenges, and he contacted the *İleri Jön Türkler*<sup>513</sup> union to save Hikmet. İlhan and the other members established the Hikmet Rescue Committee together, and he was one of its most active members, preparing brochures and written documents to be sent to Türkiye to save Hikmet.<sup>514</sup>

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<sup>510</sup> Zeynep Aliye, *Mavi Adam- Attila İlhan’la Söyleşiler*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2001), 82; Serhat Işık, 28.

<sup>511</sup> Atilla İlhan, “*Açtırma Kutuyu!*”.. *Röportajlar-1 (1946-1983)*, edited by Belgin Sarmaşık, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2004), 360; Serhat Işık, 29.

<sup>512</sup> Selim İleri, 109; Hakan Reyhan, 72.

<sup>513</sup> In March 1949, students and intellectuals founded this union in a cafe called Saint-Jacques Gallimard in Paris. This group advocates political ideas based on communism. See, Aclan Sayılğan, *Türkiye’de Sol Hareketler*, (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2009), 242-245; İrşad Sami Yüce, “Demokrat Parti Döneminde Sivil Bir Muhalif Örgüt Örneği: İleri Jön Türkler Birliği”, *Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi*, Vol.4, No, 12, (2017), 79.

<sup>514</sup> Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan’ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 73.

İlhan's first Parisian adventure came to an end with the expiration of his residence permit. As a result of his trip to Paris and the experiences he gained, there were serious changes in İlhan's thoughts, particularly with regard to his perceptions about Westerners and the West. Under the influence of the idealised "Western" understanding prevailing in Türkiye, he regarded Western culture as the representative of an extremely humanistic and benign culture, but in Paris, he saw that the situation was not at all as it was described or thought, and he encountered the systematic bigotry and racism of French imperialist ideology.<sup>515</sup> When he was leaving Paris, the Nazım Hikmet Rescue Committee assigned İlhan to meet with Hikmet.<sup>516</sup>

When İlhan returned to his hometown, he learned that Hikmet was released from prison and tried to make contact with him by contacting Hikmet's close friend Kemal Tahir (1910-1973) and explaining the situation to him. However, Hikmet said that this meeting could not take place in İstanbul. Moreover, he said he had to go to Paris and wait there; while this meeting never happened, İlhan did return to Paris for the second time in 1951.<sup>517</sup> During this sojourn he tried to stay away from the old Parisian environment and his old comrades, and expanded his reading beyond Marxist pamphlets to consider theoretical books in almost every field of social sciences. As his reading intensified, he saw that socialism developed differently in theory and practice, and he became uncomfortable with this realization.

His more nuanced and mature political understanding was contrary to the increasingly militant orientation of his friends within the Turkish Communist Party, who were seeking closely alignment with the USSR, and who essentially wished to have a

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<sup>515</sup> Ibid., 79; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 40-41.

<sup>516</sup> Selim İleri, 135; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 80; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 42.

<sup>517</sup> Mert Kızıltepe, *Attila İlhan'da Erken Cumhuriyet Algısı: Toplum ve Politik Hayatın Dönüşümü*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2015,13; Elif Altın, *Attila İlhan'ın Eserlerinde Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyet*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Trakya Üniversitesi, 2020,19; Selim İleri, 135.

communist revolution in Türkiye.<sup>518</sup> With his burgeoning change of mind, İlhan decided to leave Paris and return to Türkiye, and he focused on literature. During this period he published his first novel, *Sokaktaki Adam* (The Man on the Street). After that, he published his poetry books called *Sisler Bulvarı* (The Boulevard of Fogs) and *Yağmur Kaçağı* (The Fugitive of Rain).<sup>519</sup> After these studies, he decided to join the military in 1956, during which he continued his literary studies.

It was there that he began to work on his novel *Kurtlar Sofrası* (The Dining Table of the Wolves). He also continued to write his poetry, including the anthology *Ben Sana Mecburum* (I Have to You).<sup>520</sup> After his military service, İlhan turned to cinema with a view to seeking a livelihood.<sup>521</sup> He had been interested in the cinema since his childhood years, and he started going to the movies regularly in the first grade of secondary school. Also, by reading magazines and newspapers about cinema, he gradually began to have comprehensive information about cinema's art.<sup>522</sup> In addition, when he went to France, he understood the importance of cinema more deeply and became a member of cinema clubs; he even attended cinema classes at Sorbonne University.<sup>523</sup> As a result of all these experiences, he wrote the scripts of many movies, including *Yalnızlar Rıhtımı* (The Lonely Ones' Quay) directed by Ömer Lütfi Akad (1916-2011). Moreover, the films *Şoför Nebahat* (Nebahat the Driver) and *Ver Elini İstanbul* (İstanbul Give Me Your Hand) are among the important films he worked on.<sup>524</sup>

Staying away from politics and literature during this period, İlhan mainly focused on cinema, but he was disturbed by this situation and planned to go to Paris to focus on his

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<sup>518</sup> Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 88-89.

<sup>519</sup> Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 45.

<sup>520</sup> Zeynep Aliye, 23.

<sup>521</sup> Beyza Dülger, *Attila İlhan'ın Şiirlerinde Sinematografik Özellikler*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2021,36; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 51.

<sup>522</sup> Attila İlhan, *Sisler Bulvarı*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2003), 148; Selim İleri, 34.

<sup>523</sup> Zeynep Ankara, *Yalnız Şövalye Attila İlhan*, in Barbaros Altuğ, *Edebiyat Çevresinin Aksine, Okurlarım Hep Yanımda Oldular*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları 1996) ,96-105.

<sup>524</sup> Beyza Dülger, 37-38-39; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 51; Elif Altın, 14; Mert Kızıltepe, 22.

political studies again.<sup>525</sup> During this period, when he was considering going to Paris, there was a military coup in May 1960 against the Democratic Party government.<sup>526</sup> He was thoroughly demoralized by this political turmoil in the country and now he decided to return to Paris, where he went for the third and last time in 1962.<sup>527</sup> He claimed that the main purpose of this visit was to learn French completely, which gave him an excuse to cut off contact with his old Turkish comrades, and he became completely fluent in French.<sup>528</sup> After staying in Paris for three years, he left in 1965, never to return.<sup>529</sup>

### 4.2.3 İzmir, Ankara, and İstanbul Years

After returning from Paris, he worked as the editor-in-chief of the *Democrat İzmir Newspaper* for eight years. He married Biket İlhan (b. 1944) in 1968, and they were married for sixteen years.<sup>530</sup> He left journalism and accepted an offer to be an editor at the Bilgi Publishing House, whereupon he settled in Ankara. In 1973 he published *Bıçağın Ucu* (The Tip of the Knife), the first novel of the *Aynanın İçindekiler* (Contents of the Mirror) series. Three books in the series were published in the 1970s, two in the 1980s, and the last two in the 2000s.<sup>531</sup> İlhan directly explored Turkish society's admiration for French culture in the *Bıçağın Ucu* (The Tip of the Knife) and *Dersaadet'te Sabah Ezanları* (The Morning Prayers in Dersaadet) books in this novel series.

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<sup>525</sup> Bilgehan Bilgin, *Milliyetçilik Kuramları Açısından Atilla İlhan*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Atatürk Üniversitesi, 2017, 46.

<sup>526</sup> The Democratic party ended its 27-year single-party period on May 14, 1950, and remained in power for 10 years (1950-1960). The most crucial reason for the Democratic Party to gain power (i.e., the most critical 1950 election issue) was that Adnan Menderes promised to restore religious freedom in Türkiye. However, this situation disturbed the army, known for its adherence to Atatürk's principles and revolutions. As a result, the army decided to seize the government. On 27 May 1960, soldiers organized the National Unity Committee and staged a successful military coup, which was a triumph for secular nationalists. See, Esra Polat, Syed Ahmet Arvasi's (1932-1988) Critique of Turkish Nationalism, Unpublished M.A Thesis, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2021, 37-38-39.

<sup>527</sup> Selim İleri, 196; Hakan Reyhan, *Atilla İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 94; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Atilla İlhan*, 52-53.

<sup>528</sup> Selim İleri, 210; Mert Kızıltepe, 17; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Atilla İlhan*, 55.

<sup>529</sup> Sema Özher, 6; Bilgehan Bilgin, 46.

<sup>530</sup> Zeynep Ankara, 23.

<sup>531</sup> Atilla İlhan, "Açtırma Kutuyu!".. *Röportajlar-1 (1946-1983)*, 127; Burcu Alkan &, Çimen Günay-Erkol, 120-122; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Atilla İlhan*, 61.

For İlhan's characters, Paris and the French culture it represents is the symbol of modernity and development.<sup>532</sup> The series explores Türkiye's cultural alienation and socio-economic problems. As a solution, he proposed to create a national cultural synthesis by using the technological methods of the West, without rejecting Turkish traditional culture.<sup>533</sup> During his years in Ankara, he received a job offer from the newly established *Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu* (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation). In 1976, İlhan anchored a talk show, *Çalar Saat* (Alarm Clock). This programme was the first "talk show" on Turkish television, and it had a major impact. He also wrote a screenplay called *Paranın Kiri* (The Dirt of Money), which was later adapted as a six-part series by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, and which won him widespread popularity beyond the world of letters.<sup>534</sup>

İlhan was mainly making a living from his job at Bilgi Publishing House, and his editing role was taking up more and more of his time, so he could not spare time for other projects and writing. For this reason, he decided to leave Ankara and settle in İstanbul. While he was leaving Ankara, the 12 September 1980 military coup<sup>535</sup> took place.<sup>536</sup> İlhan analysed the atmosphere of fear and oppression that prevailed in the country after this coup in book *Korkunun Krallığı* (The Kingdom of Fear), and openly criticized this military coup. The first poem in this book, *Ağır Kan Kaybı* (Heavy Blood Loss) is loaded with connotations of fear and loneliness. The words "blood, bone, fear, weapon, cold, and dark"

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<sup>532</sup> Pei-Lin Li, Attila İlhan'ın Romanlarında Doğu-Batı Meselesi, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2007, 159-160-161.

<sup>533</sup> Gönülden Esemeli Söker, *Attila İlhan'da Kültür Sorunsalı*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2002), 390.

<sup>534</sup> Atilla İlhan, "Açtırma Kutuyu!".. *Röportajlar-1 (1946-1983)*, 127; Burcu Alkan &, Çimen Günay-Erkol, 120-122; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 61.

<sup>535</sup> On 12 September 1980, the Turkish army staged a military coup and took over the government. The National Security Council seized all legislative and executive powers, suspended all political parties, and detained their leaders. In the words of the coup leader, General Kenan Evren (1917-2015), "The administration was seized to strengthen Atatürk's principles, whose influence was gradually decreasing". See, Esra Polat, Syed Ahmet Arvasi's (1932-1988) Critique Of Turkish Nationalism, 51-70. However, İlhan argues that the intervention of the army in the administration should not be considered *Atatürkçülük* (Atatürkism). This is because Mustafa Kemal was against the military's involvement in the government and politics. See, Attila İlhan, *Hangi Sol*, (İstanbul: İş Kültür Yayınları, 2003), 190.

<sup>536</sup> Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 63; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 109.

in this poem reflect both the social tension and the pain and fear of the individual in the “12 September” period.<sup>537</sup>

He moved to İstanbul in 1981 and wrote articles for many magazines and newspapers in İstanbul. He started to publish a magazine called *Sanat Olayı* (Art Case) and at the same time continued to write articles for *Milliyet* (Nationality) newspaper. Between 1993-1996, he wrote articles for *Meydan* (Arena) newspaper.<sup>538</sup> In 1993 İlhan began another talk show on television named *Attila İlhan'la Zamanın İçinde Yolculuk* (A Journey in Time with İlhan). This program covered topics mainly concerning literature and society. He worked as a columnist for *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) newspaper between 1996-2005.<sup>539</sup> He passed away in 2005 at his home in İstanbul due to a heart attack.<sup>540</sup>

## 4.3 WORKS

### 4.3.1 Poetry Books

İlhan was interested in poetry from his childhood, and the biggest factor in his early interest was his family ambience. His father, Bedri İlhan, was also interested in poetry, and he himself wrote many poems, some of which were published in magazines. Attila started writing poetry in the third grade of primary school. He was particularly impressed by three poems he read: Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel's (1898-1973) *Han Duvarları* (Walls of In), Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's (1904-1983) *Otel Odaları* (Hotel Rooms), and Mehmet Akif Ersoy's (1873-1936) *Asım* poem.<sup>541</sup> Additionally, he was introduced to Hikmet's poems in the

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<sup>537</sup> Attila İlhan, *Korkunun Krallığı*, (İstanbul: İş Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 27-111.

<sup>538</sup> Murat Görkem Görür, *Nesillerine Göre Attila İlhan'ın Düşünce Dünyası*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Trakya Üniversitesi, 2019, 9; Mert Kızıltepe, 20; Zeynep Aliye, 25; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 113.

<sup>539</sup> Burcu Alkan & Çimen Günay-Erkol, 125-126; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 114-117.

<sup>540</sup> Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi*, 120; Murat Görkem Görür 10; Mert Kızıltepe 20.

<sup>541</sup> Selim İleri, 33.

second grade at Balıkesir High School and was very impressed, which was how his admiration for Hikmet and his political positions began.<sup>542</sup>

İlhan collected the poems he wrote disparately in his anthologies: *Duvar* (Wall) (1948), *Sisler Bulvarı* (The Boulevard of Fogs) (1954), *Yağmur Kaçağı* ( The Fugitive of Rain) (1955), *Ben Sana Mecburum* (I am Compelled to You) (1960), *Bela Çiçeği* (Flower of Trouble) (1962), *Yasak Sevişmek* (Forbidden Love) (1968), *Tutuklunun Günlüğü* (The Diary of the Prisoner) (1973), *Böyle Bir Sevmek* (Such a Loving) (1977), *Elde Var Hüzün* (What We Have Is Sorrow) (1982), *Korkunun Krallığı* (The Kingdom of Fear) (1987), *Ayrılık Sevdaya Dahil* (Separation is Included in Love) (1993), and *Kimi Sevsem Sensin* (Whoever I Love It's You) (2002).

### 4.3.2 Novels

#### 4.3.2.1 Overview

According to İlhan, the novel defines society. For this reason, the author should evaluate society deeply and reflect society deeply in his novels.<sup>543</sup> İlhan conveyed the political and social problems he identified in society to the reader through the heroes of his novels.<sup>544</sup> He examined the Tanzimat Period, Second Constitutional Era, and RoT periods in depth in his novels. touching upon the events and political crises that **Türkiye** experienced during these tumultuous years. He also examined the coups and their deep impacts on Turkish society after the establishment of the RoT.<sup>545</sup> His novels are examined below in three parts. İlhan's three novels, namely *Sokaktaki Adam* (The Man on the Street), *Zenciler Birbirine Benzemez* (Negroes Don't Look Alike), and *Kurtlar Sofrası* (Table of Wolves) constitute

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<sup>542</sup> Zeynep Ankara, *Yalnız Şövalye Atilla İlhan*, in Zeynep Ankara, *Edebiyat, Hayat Bilgisine Dahildir*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), 31.

<sup>543</sup> Belgin Sarmaşık, Atilla İlhan: "Açtırma Kutuyu!".. *Röportajlar-1 (1946-1983)*, 151.

<sup>544</sup> Şeyma Balıkcıgil, Atilla İlhan'ın Aynanın İçindekiler Roman Serisinde Toplumsal Değişme, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2019,92.

<sup>545</sup> Yakup Çelik *Atilla İlhan Armağanı: Kaptan'a Saygı ile*, in Tülin Arseven, *Atilla İlhan'ın Romanları ve Romancılığı*, (Ankara: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2006), 233.

the first part. In these three novels, the Turkish intellectual's struggle between his own culture and Western culture is depicted.

#### **4.3.2.2 *Sokaktaki Adam (The Man on the Street, 1953)***

“The Man on the Street” is the first novel published by İlhan in 1953. In 1995 it was adapted into a movie and released in cinemas. The film was directed by Attila İlhan's ex-wife Biket İlhan.<sup>546</sup> The plot revolves around a fur smuggling ring involving several sailors and their friends. In this novel, the author focuses on the mood of the main character, Hasan. He is an intellectual with a Western, contemporary mindset, and he feels lonely in Turkish society. His life is full of constant questioning, not finding his place, and losing himself. He does not have a sense of belonging even towards the people he loves and values. He is an indecisive character who does not know what he wants to do. For this reason, he dropped out of his university education and started working as a cabin boy on a ship.

On-board, Hasan meets and befriends Yakup, who works on the ship, and they start fur smuggling together. Hasan does this illegal job to spice up his monotonous life. His smuggler friends introduce Hasan to a prostitute, Meryem. She loves and falls in love with Hasan, and he is also attracted by her, but he is disgusted by her lifestyle. In this process, Hasan meets his old friend from university, Ayhan. She is a single, beautiful, and successful young girl who started her academic life after university. Hasan loves Ayhan but does not feel like she belongs to him. Caught in the middle of these dilemmas, Hasan gets involved in a street fight and loses his life on the street.<sup>547</sup>

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<sup>546</sup> Burcu Alkan, 126.

<sup>547</sup> Attila İlhan, *Sokaktaki Adam*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003).

#### ***4.3.2.3 Zenciler Birbirine Benzemez (Negroes Don't Look Alike, 1957)***

This novel is İlhan's second, written in 1957. The novel describes the period spent in Paris by the main character, Mehmet Ali, who has problems belonging to the society in which he grew up and questions his own values. The word "negroes" in the novel's name represents the people from different geographies, different nations, and cultures that Mehmet Ali met in Paris. He represents the intellectual class called the first generation of the post-RoT period, which has identity problems due to wrong cultural policies. The main character, Mehmet Ali, fell into existential anxiety in Paris. His main problem is the conflict between Eastern and Western identities. He could neither remain Eastern nor Western. He is a young man without parents. Mehmet Ali grew up in an orphanage and studied at a boarding school and therefore feels lonely and unloved. He started to believe in God to ease the pain of his parents' absence. He thought that the price for the pain he suffered would be paid greatly in the afterlife and that he should be patient.

However, Mehmed Ali lost his belief in God after his friend Sadettin who was also an orphan died. He becomes someone who denies religion and does not hesitate to do all kinds of things. He experienced all kinds of poverty and went to Paris after he started earning money, mainly to seek experience and cultural knowledge. He thought that these experiences would help create an intellectual typology for Türkiye. Despite the poverty and difficult social conditions, Mehmet Ali continues to stay in Paris and there he becomes friends with many people (mainly immigrants) who are alienated from society, like himself, most of whom are "negroes".

Thanks to these friendships, he began to question the marginalizing attitude towards negroes in France due to their race and colour. According to the French, all these people are considered the same because they are negroes. However, these people, who seem to be the same at first glance, are fundamentally different people who do not resemble each other as one homogeneous type; each of them has different thoughts and lives. As a result of these experiences, he does not feel like he belongs in Paris. Mehmet Ali, who could not

find what he was looking for in İstanbul, could not find what he was looking for in Paris either.<sup>548</sup>

#### **4.3.2.4 *Kurtlar Sofrası (Table of Wolves, 1963)***

This novel was published in 1963 when İlhan was in Paris. In it, he tries to explain the new era that started with the Democrat Party coming to power in Türkiye. Also, he emphasized the economic and cultural changes that began to be seen in Turkish social life. More importantly, he talked about the developing assembly industry in Türkiye and the endemic corruption within the country. The events in the novel begin with the murder of Mahmut Ersoy, one of the reporters of *Birlik* (Unity) Newspaper, for his attempts to reveal construction corruption in Türkiye. He is a journalist who investigates corruption in Türkiye with the ideal of a strong, independent Türkiye based on social democracy and local economy. He is also against the West and Westernization. According to him, the West is trying to impose its own culture and values to exploit underdeveloped countries.

The characters representing the Western-imitating businessmen community in the novel are Zihni Keleşoğlu, Asım Taka, and Seyit Sabri. They serve to dispose of national resources by opening Türkiye to foreign investments. Their political connections are provided by the Democrat Party deputy Recai Bey. The common feature of these people is their passion for money and their alienation from their national and spiritual culture and values. With these characters, İlhan reveals how Western culture affects and corrupts Turkish culture. Ümit, the daughter of Zihni Keleşoğlu, one of these characters, begins to investigate the death of the journalist Mahmut, her boyfriend. She learns that those who caused Mahmut's death were his father, Zihni Keleşoğlu, and his father's friend, Nazım, and reports them to the police.

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<sup>548</sup> Attila İlhan, *Zenciler Birbirine Benzemez*, (İstanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 1987).

Ümit represents the type of intellectuals in Türkiye who are alienated from their own culture and values, but who are freed from this by researching the facts. She, who grew up with Western culture and values and then went to Paris, returns from Paris to İstanbul. While investigating the death of her lover Mahmut, she breaks away from Western culture and values and discovers her own culture and values. Generally evaluated, this novel aims to warn society against the wrong course of events and to preserve the national culture.<sup>549</sup>

The second wave of İlhan's novels include the *Aynanın İçindekiler* (Contents of the Mirror) series: *Bıçağın Ucu* (The Tip of the Knife) (1973), *Sirtlan Payı* (Share of the Hyena) (1974), *Yaraya Tuz Basmak* (Rubbing Salt into the Wound) (1978), *Dersaadet'te Sabah Ezanları* (The Morning Prayers in Dersaadet) (1980), *O Karanlıkta Biz* (Us in that Darkness) (1988), *Allahın Süngüleri* (Bayonets of Allah) (2002), and *Gazi Paşa* (Ghazi Pasha) (2005). İlhan decided to write this book series after the military coup of 27 May 1960, to explain the processes starting from the collapse of the Ottoman State and the establishment of the RoT until the military coup of 27 May 1960.<sup>550</sup> Also, he discussed Türkiye's development and modernization process from a realistic perspective in this novel series, charting how Türkiye became Westernized and the difficult struggle of Turkish culture with Western influences.

#### **4.3.2.5 *Bıçağın Ucu* (The Tip of the Knife, 1973)**

This novel is the first of İlhan's *Aynanın İçindekiler* (Contents of the Mirror) series. It was published in 1973, and was written to describe the military coup that took place in Türkiye on 27 May 1960 and the social and political events that took place before it. When we look at the political life in Türkiye before the 1960 coup, the most important event was the 1950 elections, in which the 27-year-old Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party) (CHP), founded by Atatürk, lost the election, and the multi-party era began in Türkiye. The

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<sup>549</sup> Attila İlhan, *Kurtlar Sofrası*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012).

<sup>550</sup> Attila İlhan, *Bıçağın Ucu*, (İstanbul: İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2014), 6.

1950 elections were a turning point in Turkish politics and society, and the CHP led by İsmet İnönü transformed from the ruling party into an opposition force. Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) became Prime Minister in the Democratic Party government. The most important reason why the Democratic Party came to power was that Adnan Menderes promised to restore religious freedom in Türkiye.<sup>551</sup>

Against this backdrop, the novel contains important details about domestic and foreign policy, as it is about the transition from the single-party period to multi-party political life. İlhan's focus is on elements such as the functioning of the Democratic Party, its emergence, activities, acceptance by the public, and commitment to religious sensitivities. He often criticizes the steps taken by the Democratic Party regarding its religious sensitivities, due to which he criticizes the current situation of the country as follows:

Turkey had become a revolutionary and secular country, but today, turn on the radio and listen to the call to prayer, the Quran, and the Mawlid every two days! Is in it that a bit much? They stopped building schools in Anatolia, they are building mosques.<sup>552</sup>

Additionally, İsmet İnönü's accusations against the Democratic Party and its leader Adnan Menderes are also included in detail in the novel. For example, he claimed that the Democratic Party started to use all kinds of pressure to win the elections through illegitimate means.<sup>553</sup> The character Colonel Ferid in the novel also has similar thoughts to İsmet İnönü. The author conveys criticisms against the Democratic Party administration to the readers with the character Colonel Ferid in the novel. According to him, Menderes increased his voting rate because he used religion. Therefore, reactionary activities increased in the country. This idea expresses a view that was common among the soldiers of the Turkish armed forces at that time. As a result, the novel ends with the army, which

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<sup>551</sup> Esra Polat, 37-38.

<sup>552</sup> Attila İlhan, *Bıçağın Ucu*, 210.

<sup>553</sup> Attila İlhan, *Bıçağın Ucu*, 2.

emphasizes its commitment to Atatürk's principles and reforms, seizing power, citing the increase in reactionism in the country.

#### ***4.3.2.6 Sırtlan Payı (Share of the Hyena, 1974)***

Attila won the Yunus Nadi Novel Award, one of the culture and arts awards that started to be given in memory of Yunus Nadi Abalıođlu (1879-1945), Turkish journalist and the founder of the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* in 1946, with his novel titled *Sırtlan Payı*.<sup>554</sup> The novel is based on retired colonel Ferid, who is dissatisfied with Türkiye's political situation in 1960, questioning Türkiye's historical and political process. The main protagonist, Ferid, finds the 27 May military coup in Türkiye justified because it overthrew the Democrat Party government. This is because the government accepted America's aid and supported the businessmen who cooperated with them. Therefore, he sees the May 27 military coup as a revolution and believes that this revolution will cause innovations in society.

Engineer Ahmet Ziya, one of the characters of the novel, opposes the military coup and does not see it as a revolution, and is also not satisfied with the new government established after the coup. According to him, the new government supported foreign dependence in the economy and cooperated with America. The newspaper article titled "*America Gives 6 Million Dollars for the Muş - Tatvan Railway*"<sup>555</sup> supported his thoughts. Another newspaper article that supports his idea is as follows:

Head of State and Government, General Cemal Gürsel, received the US Ambassador today. During the meeting, which lasted about half an hour, Ambassador Warner told General Gürsel that the government program was positively received by the American government.<sup>556</sup>

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<sup>554</sup> Attila İlhan, "*Açtırma Kutuyu!*" .. *Röportajlar-1 (1946-1983)*, edited by Belgin Sarmaşık, 127.

<sup>555</sup> Attila İlhan, *Sırtlan Payı*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 45.

<sup>556</sup> *Ibid.*, 274.

Ferid, who saw the military coup as a revolution at the beginning of the novel, now agrees with Ahmet Ziya. When his friend Ahmet Ziya came to visit him, he expressed that he was right: “... *It turns out that you were right from the ground to the sky, it turns out that this revolution was not a revolution*”.<sup>557</sup> As a result, after the coup, which he defended with great hopes and saw as a revolution, he saw that Atatürk’s reforms were not followed, and Western capitalism (i.e., exploitation) was supported by the government.

#### ***4.3.2.7 Yaraya Tuz Basmak (Rubbing Salt into the Wound, 1978)***

This novel covers the period of 1950-1960, one of the most painful periods of the RoT in political, economic, and social terms, and conveys to the reader the period starting from the Korean War until the 27 May military coup. The main character is Captain Demir Çukurcalı, who was sent to fight in Korea with the promise of defending his country on overseas borders, but who began to question the war and military service in Korea. The reason for this is the information he learned in military school, which imparted that the only purpose of fighting was to save his land; however, Korea is not his, and there is no compelling reason for Turkish soldiers to fight there. The person who led him to these interrogations was his friend Captain Cevdet. This is because, according to him, they were shedding blood on a land that did not belong to them, for a cause that did not belong to them.

Moreover, he thought that the Korean people did not support them. He sees Adnan Menderes as responsible for all this mistake. According to him, Türkiye participated in the Korean War because America wanted it to. Demir’s first disappointment with military service was the Korean War. The second disappointment was the 27 May military coup. This is because this coup served America’s interests, not those of Türkiye. His second disappointment was so great that he could not recover anymore.<sup>558</sup>

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<sup>557</sup> Ibid., 491.

<sup>558</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yaraya Tuz Basmak*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1987).

#### 4.3.2.8 *Dersaadet'te Sabah Ezanları (The Morning Prayers in Dersaadet, 1981)*

This novel describes the period of the War of Independence, which started with the occupation of Izmir by the Greeks in 1919. The main conflict in the novel is between those who defend the independence of the country and those who support the colonial mentality of the West. In the novel, the patriotic people who are committed to the national culture see the salvation of the country in national independence, and support it. They comprise Münif Sabri, Neveser, Ahmet Ziya, Hüsnü Faik, Zerefsan and Halıcızade İsmail Efendi. Those who are considering handing over the country to Mandate rule are Bacaksız Abdi, Rosa Mizrahi, Gülistan Satvet, Ziya, and Neveser. For example, one of these characters, Gülistan Satvet, sees herself as a Westerner, because she lived in France for a while, and does not believe that Turks can govern themselves. For this reason, she thinks that France, her second homeland, should rule the Ottoman State.

Abdi, who did not hesitate to cooperate with the British for the sake of financial interests and lacked national values, argued that the Mandate was necessary to protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State, just like Gülistan Satvet; it is also stated in the novel that propaganda was made to the public through newspapers that Mandate rule was the best way. For example, a news article Abdi read from the newspaper contains the following statements: “*Americans support for the mandate issue is based on how a country will be governed and its people, without pursuing any interests*”.<sup>559</sup>

However, on the other hand, some opposed the idea of a Mandate, and they were trying to explain to the public that there was no other option than full independence. The most important of these is Münif Sabri. He is a patriot who defends absolute independence. He writes articles in line with this idea in *Birlik* (Unity) newspaper, and it raises public awareness of this issue. He expressed at every opportunity that it was necessary to fight against the enemy and that victory would be won. As a result, the efforts of the supporters

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<sup>559</sup> Attila İlhan, *Dersaadet'te Sabah Ezanları*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 46.

of the national struggle gave positive results and most of the supporters of the mandate gave up their ideas and pinned their hopes on Anatolia.

#### **4.3.2.9 *O Karanlıkta Biz (Us in that Darkness, 1988)***

This novel is about the efforts made by Türkiye to stay out of the Second World War, and the balanced policy it tries to establish. The focus of the novel is the years 1940-1942, when İsmet İnönü was in power in Türkiye. This period is also called the *Milli Şef* (National Chief) period. In the novel, this period is depicted as a socially and politically dark one, mainly in economic terms. The novel explains in depth how Türkiye paid the price of not having a strong economy, with poverty reflected in daily life; the economic difficulties of the period are revealed in the novel. To overcome these economic difficulties, the state increased taxes and put the burden on the shoulders of the people. Therefore, this period was an onerous one for the Turkish people in every respect.

The novel posits that the country could be saved this darkness by Turkish intellectuals, who oppose the intellectual and economic exploitation of the West, and manage to gather the people around common values. In this context, the word “us” in the name of the novel refers to Turkish intellectuals who have these values. The person who represents this Turkish intellectual in the novel is the main hero, Ahmet Ziya. He is not satisfied with the social and political situation in Türkiye. He is a character who defends the economic independence of the country, and thinks that the domestic industry should be strengthened. Additionally, he criticizes İsmet İnönü for not following Mustafa Kemal’s footsteps. With this novel, İlhan criticized the policies of the İsmet İnönü period government and revealed the social, economic, and political darkness in Türkiye.<sup>560</sup>

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<sup>560</sup> Attila İlhan, *O Karanlıkta Biz*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003).

#### **4.3.2.10 Allahın Süngüleri (Bayonets of Allah, 2004)**

In this novel, the person referred to as “Reis Pasha” is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In this novel, İlhan talks about the resistance called *Kuva-yi Milliye* (Nationalist Forces), which was launched under the leadership of Atatürk against the occupation of Anatolia, and how the resistance gained a political identity with the opening of the GNA. Important characters who contributed to the War of Independence, such as Halide Edip Adivar (1884-1964), İsmet İnönü, Ali Fuat Cebesoy (1882-1968), Adnan Adivar (1882-1955), Fevzi Çakmak (1876-1950), and Refet Bele (1881-1963) are included in the novel. For example, Halide Edip represents the Turkish intellectual who undertook the theoretical guidance of the armed struggle in the War of Independence.

Halide, who first defended the Mandate, later defended the idea of national struggle. In this context, he translated articles published in foreign media about the War of Independence into Turkish. He also contributed to the establishment of the Anadolu Agency. The most important event in the novel is the opening of the GNA and the election of Atatürk as the head of both the parliament and the government. Another important thing is that Atatürk’s emotional world is included in detail, such as his love affair with Zeynep Fikriye Özdiñer (1887-1924) is included in detail, along with his feelings of loneliness. As a result, İlhan presents the War of Independence and Atatürk’s emotional world to the reader in detail with this novel.<sup>561</sup>

#### **4.3.2.11 Gazi Paşa (Ghazi Pasha, 2006)**

This novel is the continuation of the novel *Reis Pasha*. It is also the last novel of the *Aynanın İçindekiler* (Contents of the Mirror) series. He completed this novel just before his death, and it was published posthumously. The novel includes the Second Battle of İnönü,

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<sup>561</sup> Attila İlhan, *Allahın Süngüleri*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006).

the Battle of Sakarya, and the Great Offensive. There are also negotiations such as the Ankara Agreement signed with Moscow and the London Conference that will provide ammunition aid to Anatolia. The novel, which describes the War of Independence chronologically, ends with the entry of the *Kuva-yi Milliye* troops into Izmir and the subsequent recapture of Thrace.<sup>562</sup>

The third part of his novels consists of two books: *Fena Halde Leman* (Awfully Leman) (1980), and *Haco Hanım Vay* (Mrs Haco Oh My) (1984). In fact, he wanted to add a book called *İclal* to this series, but he gave up writing it.<sup>563</sup> These books were highly criticized by Turkish society, mainly because of the way in which homosexuality is a prominent subject in both books. İlhan responded to the criticism as follows after publishing his novel *Fena Halde Leman*:

Actually, I was writing a social novel. But I was doing something that other socialist novelists did not do: I was including the dialectics of nature. This is the first time I've brought up sexual dialectics. I was aware that I was writing a novel that would receive great reactions, and indeed it did. But they did not say a decent word either.<sup>564</sup>

#### **4.3.2.12 *Fena Halde Leman* (Awfully Leman, 1980)**

The main character of the novel is Leman Korkut, whose real name is Jeanne Courtine. She is a Jewish refugee from Germany who settled in Paris. In her youth, she had a physical relationship with an old English woman in exchange for money. She meets Ekrem Korkut, who came to Paris for education, and they marry. They later settled in Izmir, and Jeanne took the name Leman after getting married. Leman, who marries Democratic Party Izmir Deputy Ekrem, quickly gets used to her new life full of wealth and prosperity. However,

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<sup>562</sup> Attila İlhan, *Gazi Paşa*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005).

<sup>563</sup> Attila İlhan, *Fena Halde Leman*, (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1991), 281.

<sup>564</sup> Selim İleri, 239; Elif Altın, 25.

she has a physical relationship with Ekrem's mother, Haco Hanım. Their relationship continues secretly without Ekrem's knowledge.

After Ekrem's escape to France and his suspicious death there, Leman becomes a businesswoman. She gained a lot of respect and increased her success, especially thanks to the joint work she did with the French. However, she travels to France to uncover the mystery behind her husband's death. When she goes to France, she learns about the different life Ekrem lives without her knowing, and gets involved in that life. The sexual experiences he had there literally split his soul in two. There are literally two women in one body. The novel ends with Leman solving the murder finding her husband's murderer, and returning to Izmir.<sup>565</sup>

#### ***4.3.2.13 Haco Hanım Vay (Mrs Haco Oh My, 1984)***

In this novel, İlhan tells the youth of Haco Hanım, the mother-in-law of Leman, one of the characters in the novel *Fena Halde Leman*, and how she got married. The historical time discussed in the novel is the years of WWI. One of the main characters of the novel is Feridun Hakkı, whose father died at a young age, after which he was raised by his uncle Hulusi. To pay his debt of loyalty to his uncle, he married his uncle's daughter, Maide, and becomes a doctor. However, Feridun does not like Maide and considers her very different from himself. According to him, Maide is an insensitive woman who lacks national feelings and does not understand him.

However, when he went to Damascus during the war, he saw Haco and fell in love with her. She is a young girl living alone in Izmir. One day, he attracts the attention of Müzeyyen, one of Emrullah Raci's wives, and Haco becomes one of Emrullah Raci's wives. Meanwhile, he has another wife named Salise Nalan. Also, she is aware of

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<sup>565</sup> Attila İlhan, *Fena Halde Leman*.

Müzeyyen's real purpose and that is why she said the following when she first saw Haco: "So you are the new victim? Oh dear, you are so small".<sup>566</sup> The main purpose of the Müzeyyen is to have a physical relationship with Haco.<sup>567</sup>

#### 4.3.3 Essay and Memoir Series

İlhan collected his travel writings in *Abbas Yolcu* (Abbas Traveller) (1957), and *Yanlış Kadınlar Yanlış Erkekler* (Wrong Women Wrong Men) (1985) is essentially a memoir, but can also be considered an essay, and is also considered in this category.

#### 4.3.3 Memoir and Heartbreak Series

This category is an essay series consisting of İlhan's eight books in total. These essays are as follows: *Hangi Sol* (Which Left?) (1970), *Hangi Batı* (Which West?) (1972), *Hangi Seks* (Which Sex?) (1976), *Hangi Sağ* (Which Right?) (1980), *Hangi Atatürk* (Which Atatürk?) (1981), *Hangi Edebiyat* (Which Literature?) (1991), *Hangi Laiklik* (Which Laisism?) (1995), and *Hangi Küreselleşme* (Which Globalization?) (1997).

#### 4.3.5 Notebook Series

This category is an essay series consisting of İlhan's nine books in total. These essays are as follows: *Faşizmin Ayak Sesleri* (Footsteps of Fascism) (1975), *Gerçekçilik Savaşı* (War of Reality) (1980), *Batının Deli Gömleği* (The Straitjacket of the West) (1981), *İkinci Yeni Savaşı* (War of the Second New) (1983), *Sağım Solum Sobe* (My Right, My Left, You're It) (1985), *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı* (National Culture War) (1986), *Sosyalizm Asıl Şimdi*

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<sup>566</sup> Attila İlhan, *Haco Hanım Vay*, (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1984), 371.

<sup>567</sup> Attila İlhan, *Haco Hanım Vay*.

(Socialism Now) (1991), *Aydınlar Savaşı* (War of Intellectuals) (1991) and *Kadınlar Savaşı* (War of Women) (1992).

#### 4.3.6 Republic Talks Series

*Bir Sap Kırmızı Karanfil* (A Single Red Carnation) (1988), *Ufkun Arkasını Görebilmek* (To See Beyond the Horizon) (1999), *Sultan Galiyef* (2000), *Dönek Bereketi* (The Abundance of Turncoats) (2002) and *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak* (Star, Moon and Calpack) (2004).

#### 4.3.7 Short Story

In 1999, İlhan published a single-story book called *Yengecin Kısıkaçı* (The Pincer of the Crab). There are four stories in this book. The first of these, *Geceleyin Rüya Görürüz* (We Have Dreams at Night), focuses on the inner world of the individual. The second, *Hizip* (Faction), is about a workers' strike, and describes the perspectives of businessmen and politicians about industrial action. The third story is *Dr. Cemile is Ceyda*, which takes place in İstanbul in 2794 (it can be considered in the science fiction category). In the story, there are buses and automobiles flying over the Marmara Sea, and robots that people fall in love with. This story also mentions issues of sexual orientation, gender, and reproduction. The last story is the story gives its name to the book, and explores corruption in media and politics.<sup>568</sup>

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<sup>568</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yengecin Kısıkaçı*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012).

### 4.3.8 Translations

İlhan has translated three works from French into Turkish. *Les Conquérants* (The Conquerors) and *L'Espoir* (Man's Hope) were by the French writer Georges André Malraux (1901-1976). The last book he translated is *Les Cloches de Bâle* (The Bells of Basel) by Louis Aragon (1897-1982).

### 4.3.9 Movie Scripts

As explained previously, İlhan was interested in cinema from his childhood. The Turkish journalist and writer Oktay Akbal (1923-2015) explained his interest in cinema as follows:

In every cinema I went to, Attila would appear in front of me with his huge bag in his hand, his scarf around his neck and his charming smile. Whatever movie actor I was talking about, Attila was more knowledgeable than me. He kept telling me about the latest movies, about British, French and Italian cinema. Especially those old movies of the past years... He remembered them better than me.<sup>569</sup>

İlhan's travels to France influenced his thoughts on cinema, as in many other subjects. His travels to France caused him to focus more seriously on cinema. When he went to France, he realized the importance of cinema and conducted in-depth research on the art by becoming a member of many cinema clubs there.<sup>570</sup> The most important thing that İlhan noticed about cinema when he returned to Türkiye was the great influence of Western cinema, especially Hollywood, on Turkish cinema. According to him, Hollywood cinema has influenced the lives of Turkish people. For example, Turkish people formerly had no knowledge of desire for cola or hamburgers, but they were rapidly disseminated in

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<sup>569</sup> Oktay Akbal, *Şair Dostlarım*, (İstanbul: Elif Yayınları, 1964), 88.

<sup>570</sup> Zeynep Ankara, *Yalnız Şövalye Attila İlhan* in Barbaros Altuğ, *Edebiyat Çevresinin Aksine, Okurlarım Hep Yanımda Oldular*, 96-105.

Turkish society by the influence of cinema. Thus, American fast food stores proliferated in Türkiye instead of local restaurants.<sup>571</sup>

In 1958, he entered the cinema community thanks to his movie star sister Çolpan İlhan (1936-2014). During this period, he met the producers and wrote his first script, *Yalnızlar Rıhtımı* (Lonely Dock) in 1959.<sup>572</sup> Then he wrote the following sensors, respectively: *Ateşten Damla* (Drop from Fire) (1960), *Şoför Nebahat* (Driver Nebahat) (1960), *Devlerin Öfkesi* (Wrath of Giants) (1960), *Rıfat Diye Biri* (Someone Called Rifat) (1962) and *Ver Elini İstanbul* (Give Your Hand İstanbul) (1962).

#### 4.3.10 Television Series Scripts

As a result of his television scripts for the works adumbrated below, İlhan received the “Loyalty Award” within the scope of the “2023 Presidential Culture and Arts Grand Award”: *Paranın Kiri* (The Dirt of Money) (1979), *Sekiz Sütuna Manşet* (The Headline on Eight Pillars) (1982), *Kartallar Yüksek Uçar* (Eagles Fly High) (1983), *Yarın Artık Bugündür* (Tomorrow is Today) (1987), *Yıldızlar Gece Büyür* (Stars Grow at Night) (1991), *Tele-Flaş* (Tele-Flash) (1992) *Yanlış Saksının Çiçeği* (Flower in the Wrong Pot) (1997) and *Baykuşların Saltanatı* (Reign of the Owls) (2000).<sup>573</sup>

### 4.4 POLITICAL THOUGHTS

#### 4.4.1 Views on Nationalism

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<sup>571</sup> Attila İlhan, *Sultan Galiyef*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2000), 187-188.

<sup>572</sup> Selim İleri, 183-197.

<sup>573</sup> <https://tilahan.org/duyurular/cumhuriyetin-100-yilinda-attila-ilhana-cumhurbaskanligi-kultur-ve-sanat-vefa-odulu/>

İlhan evaluated nationalism in terms of the homeland, not race. For him, Turkish identity is not an identity based on race, but rather an identity based on culture and homeland. In other words, the people living in Türkiye (and other Turkish countries) are Turks, albeit they may be of various ethnicities. Also, being a Turk, a Kurd, an Armenian or a Greek is not a source of racial privilege, which he views as blatant fascism.<sup>574</sup> Moreover, he considers that racism poses serious dangers for societies, creating distinctions between the people who make up the nation and dividing the nation accordingly.<sup>575</sup>

He states that nationalist movements in the Ottoman State did not occur spontaneously, but were fomented under the influence of external forces. According to him, various peoples in the Ottoman State were deluded by the slogans of freedom, equality, and fraternity of the French Revolution to work for imperialist interests, which divided the Ottoman peoples into races such as Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Arab, armed them, and made them rebel for so-called freedom. However, the West sought to dominate every newly independent nationality it chiselled out of the Ottoman State, as client states loyal (and subservient) to Western empires, in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East region. For example, in Europe, Bulgaria was an agent of Russia, while Greece was an agent of the UK and France, and the Middle East was infamously divided between Britain and France as per the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

İlhan claims that these trends did not change during the Republic period, and he considers that Kurdish nationalism was deliberately fomented in order to separate Mosul (in Iraq) from Türkiye, in order to enable the Europeans to control oil and northern Mesopotamia.<sup>576</sup> Therefore, İlhan claims that racism is an invention of Westerners.<sup>577</sup> He also states that Atatürk thought the same way about nationalism as he did. According to him, there is no racial element in Atatürk's nationalism, and the homeland element predominates. The nationalism at the core of the Republic is humane, comprehensive, and

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<sup>574</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010), 97-372-373.

<sup>575</sup> Attila İlhan, *Gerçekçilik Savaşı*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2004), 124.

<sup>576</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?* 253- 257-369.

<sup>577</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Laiklik?* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2004), 75.

based on the combination of homeland, history, and interests.<sup>578</sup> Also, he states that the phenomenon of nationalism cannot be considered together with conservatism.<sup>579</sup> This is because nationalism also means secularization. The European societies of the Middle Ages, which were proud of Christianity, have turned into secular, positivist societies in the modern age, emphasizing their national characteristics. In Muslim societies, the solution is the same: Muslim communities must abandon pan-Islamic “Ummah” society. However, while doing this, it is necessary to preserve and benefit from the benefits of the Ummah period, while having a secular social order and a national culture.<sup>580</sup>

#### 4.4.2 Views on Secularism

İlhan argues that there can be no technological development without secularism. This is because the West could only reach civilization and technology after becoming secular; that is, after accepting scientific development and applying positive sciences to production technology. In a sense, after leaving Christian law and religious thought to the conscience of the individual, the West attained civilization *after* secularization. Consequently, the formula for success according to him begins with secularism.<sup>581</sup> Therefore, the RoT needs a secular social configuration in order to develop.<sup>582</sup> For this reason, the reforms made by Atatürk are very necessary for the establishment of secularism in **Türkiye**, especially the abolition of the Caliphate.<sup>583</sup>

However, he emphasizes that the most important thing to adopt to preserve this social order is to understand that secularism and irreligiousness are not the same thing. Otherwise, people cannot live in tolerance. Therefore, the concept of secularism must be

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<sup>578</sup> Ibid., 163-164.

<sup>579</sup> Attila İlhan, *Aydınlar Savaşı*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2005), 70.

<sup>580</sup> Attila İlhan, *Sağım Solum Sobe*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2006), 369-370.

<sup>581</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?*, 256.

<sup>582</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Laiklik?*, 120.

<sup>583</sup> Attila İlhan, *Dönük Bereketi*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2002), 85.

understood and implemented correctly.<sup>584</sup> İlhan argues that the principle of secularism also has a function that will prevent the Turkish nation from becoming culturally Arab, from being influenced by Arab culture in the name of religion, and in a way ensure that the true meaning of Islam is understood.<sup>585</sup> Therefore, he states that the goal of the reforms made in the name of secularism during the Republic period was never to destroy Islam. However, İlhan distinguishes the İsmet İnönü period, because the practice of secularism was not used for its intended purpose.

During the İnönü period, people could not practice religion freely due to extreme secularism practices.<sup>586</sup> During this period, religious and political books that were deemed contrary to secularism were banned and confiscated. Articles criticizing secularism were not allowed to be published in newspapers.<sup>587</sup> Many mosques and masjids all over the country, including İstanbul, were either completely demolished, closed, or used for purposes other than worship.<sup>588</sup> Moreover, police departments also closely followed anti-secularism. Criminal complaints were filed against those who taught Arabic, those who did not wear Western hats.<sup>589</sup>

İnönü aimed to encourage the adoption of Western culture and mentality, especially among younger generations, as an alternative to Islamic identity and culture, so that the principle of secularism could be established in society.<sup>590</sup> For this purpose, people tried to get used to secular life through *Halk Evleri* (Community Houses) and *Köy Enstitüleri* (Village Institutes). Through both institutions, secular thought spread to the remotest corners of the country.<sup>591</sup> As a result, according to İlhan's assessment, İnönü is responsible for the wrong secularism practices. As can be seen, secularism practices were not correctly

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<sup>584</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Laiklik?*, 120.

<sup>585</sup> Attila İlhan, *Dönek Bereketi*, 250.

<sup>586</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?* 50.

<sup>587</sup> Süleyman Beyoğlu & Ali Satın, *Modern Türkiye Tarihi* in Hasan Hakan Ulutin, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamaları*, (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014), 397.

<sup>588</sup> Mehmed Şevket Eygi, *Yakın Tarihimize Cami Kıyımı*, (İstanbul: Tarih ve İbret Yayınları, 2003), 18.

<sup>589</sup> Hasan Hakan Ulutin, 397.

<sup>590</sup> Bernard Lewis, 561.

<sup>591</sup> Hasan Hakan Ulutin, 397.

understood and implemented in this period. In this direction, society was forcibly ruptured from its indigenous religion and culture.

#### 4.4.3 Views on Turkish Education

Education is one of the most important ideological tools used to impose the basic principles of states on society. Through education, states aim to integrate and integrate the thoughts and values of the entire population within a policy of melting them down.<sup>592</sup> This situation is also valid for the RoT. Atatürk (and others) founded the RoT in 1923 with the aim of bringing modernism and Westernization to the country.<sup>593</sup> He thought that, for this new state to thrive, Western institutions and lifestyles should be adopted by severing all ties with the Islamic-Ottoman past. This would enable the country to go beyond the state of modern civilization and provide younger generations with access to a more modern and secular education.<sup>594</sup> Thus, madrasahs inherited from the Ottoman State were closed by the new government, and on 3 March 1924, the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* (Law on Unification of Education) was accepted and all educational institutions in the country were connected to the Ministry of Education.<sup>595</sup>

İlhan, who examined the Turkish education system in depth, defended the necessity of the Law on Unification of Education on the grounds that it was necessary due to the cultural duality that emerged during and after the *Tanzimat* period. According to him, there was a duality of opposing cultures in the Ottoman State after the *Tanzimat*. On the one hand, lodges, madrasahs, and *zawiyas* raised intellectuals for the ummah; on the other hand, missionary schools of various Christian sects provided education in foreign languages that raised pro-Western intellectuals. Therefore, there was a problem with the current order. According to him, the *Tanzimat* and Constitutional Monarchy periods of the Ottoman State

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<sup>592</sup> Cyril E. Black, *Dynamics of Modernization*, (New York: Harper, 1966), 114.

<sup>593</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2001), 240-242.

<sup>594</sup> Erol Kapluhan, *Türkiye Cumhuriyet’inde Atatürk Dönemi Eğitim Politikaları (1923 – 1938) ve Coğrafya Eğitimi*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of İstanbul, Turkey, 2011, 6.

<sup>595</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?*, 23.

could not succeed due to the conflict between these two types of intellectuals, who could not realize the synthesis of contemporary and national culture. For this reason, he argued that unity in education was achieved with the Unification of Education Law.<sup>596</sup>

According to him, this law was designed to raise contemporary intellectuals of for the democratic and secular Republic.<sup>597</sup> However, in the 1940s, this law was violated. In these years, education fell into a situation like the *Tanzimat* period. On the one hand, Graeco-Roman civilization was included in education while religious education opportunities were also provided. Moreover, foreign schools began to proliferate again all over the country. As a result, national education has moved away from being *national* after 1941.<sup>598</sup> After 1950, when *İmam Hatip* schools (religious schools) at the vocational school level were converted into high schools, the educational unity provided by the Republic was disrupted. Later, the government announced that the language of education in high schools would be a foreign language, and education would be given in a foreign language. Thus, the state, as in the past, helped raise intellectuals who were alienated from their country and culture.<sup>599</sup>

The problems in education were not limited to this. Many colleges that provided education in foreign languages, including English, began to be established in Türkiye after WWII. In addition, unqualified and low-quality universities were opened as foundation universities, instilling American-style education in Turkish students. İlhan regarded teaching in a foreign language to be one of the reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman State, and ruefully observed that Atatürk had closed all of these, yet they were re-emerging after WWII. İlhan stated that as a natural result of this situation, growing children would seek their future in the countries where they received their education.<sup>600</sup>

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<sup>596</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?*, 402-405.

<sup>597</sup> Attila İlhan, *Bir Sap Kırmızı Karanfil*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2005), 67.

<sup>598</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı?* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 2002), 302.

<sup>599</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?*403.

<sup>600</sup> *Ibid.*, 379.

He also emphasized that serious changes occurred in the Turkish education system after İsmet İnönü came to power. While the education system had focused on the culture, literature, and art of Anatolia, it changed to focus on Western/ Graeco-Roman culture during the İnönü period. At this point, İlhan drew attention to an often overlooked issue, that Graeco-Roman culture essentially alludes to the heritage of the Romano-Germanic empire (i.e., the Holy Roman Empire of the early modern period), in which context it is jarring that the Turks were disregarding their own culture to adopt that of their traditional Christian foes, which is the core of Westernization. For İlhan, this is exactly how Westernization began in Türkiye.<sup>601</sup>

The opinions of İnönü's cultural consultant Nurullah Ataç (1898-1957) are very important for understanding the cultural studies carried out in this period. According to him, the purpose of this cultural revolution is to make this country like Western countries. In this context, what Türkiye lacked was not knowing Greek and Latin. Since Türkiye had not gone through the European education system, it cannot become European no matter how hard it tries. The way to get rid of this is to learn Greek and Roman literature, and read Plato, Aristophanes, Euripides, Horatius, and Vergillius; the necessary cultural revolution could only happen this way.<sup>602</sup> In this context, Greek and Latin classics were published by the state in Turkish and were distributed to high schools, and were used as supplementary resource books.<sup>603</sup>

As a result, according to İlhan's evaluation, the basis of the problems in the education system started in the İnönü period. As can be seen, education policies in this period were far from Turkish culture and history. In this direction, society has moved away from its own culture. Moreover, Graeco-Latin culture was actively imposed on society through education.

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<sup>601</sup> Hulki Cevizoğlu, *Bütün Kaleler Zaptedilmedi: Attila İlhan'la Birkaç Saat*, (Ankara: Cevizkaşuğu, 2006) ,22.

<sup>602</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?*, 62-64.

<sup>603</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Edebiyat*, 286.

#### 4.4.4 Views on *İmam Hatip* Schools (Religious Schools)

In November 1928, the Arabic letters used by the entire Islamic world were removed and replaced with Latin letters in Türkiye. The government replaced Arabic and Persian words with purely Turkish ones taken from Western European languages, dialects, other Turkic languages, and ancient texts. Later, it was prohibited to open schools or courses to teach the Arabic language without obtaining permission from the government. Citizens' freedom to receive religious education was allowed on the condition that it did not hinder school education; that the education of these institutions was supervised by the Ministry of National Education; and that it was free of charge.<sup>604</sup>

In 1949, ten-month courses were opened in Ankara and İstanbul to train imams. In addition, fourth and fifth graders were allowed to give two hours of religious studies lessons per week as extracurricular and elective courses.<sup>605</sup> In 1951, the first *İmam-Hatip* school was opened by the *İlim Yayma Cemiyeti* (Science Dissemination Society), which was founded by philanthropic businessmen.<sup>606</sup> In 1956 religion lessons were included as an elective course in secondary schools. In 1959, the Higher Islamic Institute was established to train vocational teachers for *İmam Hatip* schools and religious teachers for secondary schools.<sup>607</sup>

According to İlhan, *İmam Hatip* schools and Quran courses were born out of an understandable and acceptable need. Since Türkiye is a secular country, not an avowedly atheist one, the state of the RoT needs to train imams and preachers to serve the people. In this respect, there is no problem with the existence of such schools *per se*. However, according to him, as a result of the transformation of *İmam Hatip* schools into *İmam Hatip* high schools, and the placement of these high school graduates in universities, more

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<sup>604</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 534.

<sup>605</sup> Esra Bal Esen, 79.

<sup>606</sup> <https://iyc.org.tr/tarihce>

<sup>607</sup> Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 6 İslamcılık in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğitim Tartışmaları*, by Osman Kafadar, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2005), 354.

religious intellectuals began to proliferate in the country, which he considered to violate the Law on the Unification of Education was violated.<sup>608</sup> *İmam Hatip* schools were opened based on Article Four of the Law on the Unification of Education, the purpose of which was to train religious clergy (as civil servants). In other words, it pertained to training students to become imams in mosques, and such schools were not intended to be used for general religious education, or any other purpose.<sup>609</sup>

According to him, the future of *İmam Hatip* high school graduates should be limited to the faculty of theology, and they should be banned from furthering their studies at university departments other than the faculty of theology. The most realistic solution according to him was to open just enough *İmam Hatip* and vocational schools to meet Türkiye's need for *İmam Hatip* teachers.<sup>610</sup>

#### 4.4.5 Views on the Language Revolution

The language reform of the RoT was carried out in 1928 by removing the Arabic letters used by the entire Islamic world and replacing them with Latin letters. This revolution became even stronger with the establishment of the Turkish Language Association on 12 July 1932.<sup>611</sup> İlhan attributed the reason for the establishment of the Turkish Language Association to the need to create a national language. Ottoman Turkish was a rich and eclectic language combining elements of Turkish, Persian, and Arabic, reflecting the historical accumulation of Ottoman peoples and experiences. However, this heterogeneous milieu was anathema to the Kemalist vision of a homogenous nation state, which required a national language (like French for France). For this reason, the Turkish Language Association was established. Also, according to him, with the Language Revolution, the

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<sup>608</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Laiklik?*, 189.

<sup>609</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı?*, 281.

<sup>610</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ufkun Arkasını Görebilmek*, (İstanbul; İş Kültür Yayınları, 1997), 263.

<sup>611</sup> Mustafa Öner, "Atatürk, Türkiye Cumhuriyet ve Türkçe Devrimi", *Balıkesir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol.17, No.1, (2007), 76-79.

language barriers between the intellectuals who spoke and wrote in various languages and the people, urbanites, and villagers would be overcome, thus the enlightenment of the Turkish people would be much easier.<sup>612</sup>

The Language Revolution was thus considered a justified, appropriate, and necessary step for İlhan. This is because, to become a nation, the nation must separate its own language from the language used during the “Ummah” period.<sup>613</sup> Therefore, Atatürk tried to consolidate the independence and nationalization of the RoT with the Language Revolution.<sup>614</sup> However, İlhan also clarifies a very important issue here: He emphasizes that we should not ignore the Ummah period in the transition from the language of that era to the language of the nation. Just as Western languages do not try to eliminate words from Latin and Greek, the Turks should not stop using words from the Ummah period.<sup>615</sup> For this reason, he frequently used Ottoman Turkish idioms and words in his novels. Therefore, although he was criticized for acting contrary to the Language Revolution, he took a stand to preserve the richness and history of the Turkish language itself.<sup>616</sup> He also celebrated the linguistic and literary richness of Ottoman Turkish, expressing his thoughts on the subject as follows:

Even now, when making some translations from the West, new terms are applied, but if you put it in Ottoman Turkish, it fits immediately. In that regard, I do not accept the statement that Ottoman Turkish is inadequate. Ottoman Turkish is a beautiful language that is proficient and extremely nuanced.<sup>617</sup>

For him, the demand for the complete abandonment of Ottoman Turkish terms by doctrinaire Kemalists was a demand that emerged during the İsmet İnönü period.<sup>618</sup> While efforts were made to simplify the language with pure Turkish words during the Atatürk

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<sup>612</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?* 372- 374.

<sup>613</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006). 225.

<sup>614</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak*, (İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 195.

<sup>615</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı*, 266.

<sup>616</sup> Mert Kızıltepe, 87.

<sup>617</sup> Attila İlhan, *Aydınlar Savaşı*, 95.

<sup>618</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak*, 195.

period, Western-origin words were openly preferred instead of Arabic and Persian words that had already been nativized in Ottoman Turkish, but which were deliberate deracinated from officially improved Turkish during the İnönü period.<sup>619</sup> İlhan strongly opposed these attempts by the state to regulate and police language, and he claimed that these efforts undermined national education and culture. As a result of this influence, the Turkish education system shifted to a non-national Graeco-Roman cultural synthesis.<sup>620</sup> This is because the Turks deliberately abandoned their own linguistic heritage in the pursuit of political correctness. According to İlhan, every simplification in the language seeking to efface Ottoman culture impoverished the works of important intellectuals who contributed to the historical development of Turkish culture, thereby achieving the goals of Western cultural imperialism.<sup>621</sup>

As a result, although he was not against the Language Revolution *per se*, he was against misunderstanding this revolution, making the Turkish language incomprehensible, and separating the Turkish people from their history and culture.

## **4.5 THOUGHTS ON THE WEST AND WESTERNIZATION**

### **4.5.1 In General**

For İlhan, the most important problem of the RoT, which was established from the remains of the Ottoman State, was modernization. Evaluating the Turkish modernization process, İlhan stated that the main mistake of the modernization process was to confuse modernization with Westernization. According to him, the beginning of this error was rooted in the *Tanzimat* period. The mistakes in Turkish perceptions of the West and Westernization started during this period, and continue to form the basis of today's problems. İlhan's thoughts on the West became clear when considering his experiences in

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<sup>619</sup> Bilal Elbir & Ömer Karakaş, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatında Hümanizmin Etkileri", *Turkish Studies*, No.4, Vol.2, (2007), 384.

<sup>620</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak*, 195.

<sup>621</sup> Attila İlhan, *Faşizmin Ayak Sesleri*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005 ), 152.

Paris, during which he made important observations about the West. As a result of these determinations, he primarily focused on the colonial identity of the West.<sup>622</sup>

After this evaluation, İlhan took an anti-imperialist stance. He acquired his first serious knowledge of imperialism from his African friends in Paris. There, he learned the consequences of France's actions in African countries, and began to look at this event from a multi-faceted perspective. He saw the Westernization of Africa as the same as the Westernization of Türkiye. According to him, African culture was being actively destroyed, and its past was erased. The result was a generation of indigenous people in Africa who spoke and wrote French, and who were deracinated from their own heritage. The difference is that while this deculturation was done by France there, it was done by the Turkish republican regime in Türkiye.<sup>623</sup>

According to İlhan, Western colonial countries state that they have formed a type called "comprador" in the countries they want to exploit. This type is chosen by the exploiters from among the indigenous people, and through these people, their own culture and values are imposed on the indigenous people.<sup>624</sup> İlhan benefited from Jean Marie Albertini's (1929-2014) *Mécanisme du sous développement et développement* (The Mechanism of Underdevelopment) in his discussion of the impacts of the colonial powers on the development process of the indigenous people and the cultural problems they created. In this work, Albertini argues that the colonial power de-cultures the indigenous people, which refers to the alienation or even complete disappearance of a group from its own culture as a result of its relationship with another culture. The main subject of this work is that the Europeans always see the natives as inferior beings, and European civilization as manifestly superior to other civilizations. Moreover, there is nothing more

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<sup>622</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı*, 55.

<sup>623</sup> Selim İleri, 273; Serhat Işık, 50.

<sup>624</sup> Attila İlhan, *Aydınlar Savaşı*, 46.

beautiful than looking like a European. Therefore, Western civilization should replace inferior cultures.<sup>625</sup>

Another important person that İlhan takes as a reference on this subject is Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890-1938). He argues that the secret desire of the Europeans is to make the peoples of the world forget their own culture by being de-identified. In this way, European culture will easily voice its claim to universality, and regard other cultures as second-class.<sup>626</sup> As can be seen, as a result of his research, İlhan concluded that the colonial powers always saw themselves as superior, and wanted the rest of the world to accept their own cultures and lifestyles. As a result of such activities, İlhan evaluated the West as disrespectful and colonialist towards other cultures. He cited two examples that typify this view.

Firstly, İlhan gives an example of an interview broadcast on French television with a prosecutor living in Pondicherry, which was a French colony that later joined India. This prosecutor knew the French classics very well and spoke French, but despised his own people, self-identifying himself as being closer to Western culture, albeit he knew he could never be French due to his race, even though he felt French and completely adopted that culture. On the other hand, although he was of Hindu origin, he stated that he does not feel at all Hindu. Second, İlhan cites the an example of a Black book writer who came to France from the Antilles who faced the same dilemma, feeling French but without any possibility to be French due to his race, which is viewed as manifestly inferior by the *bona fide* French people with whom he identifies; therefore, he admitted that he was in an identity crisis.<sup>627</sup>

İlhan explains as follows that he is against the West being the only and superior civilization:

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<sup>625</sup> Ibid., 72-73.

<sup>626</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak*, 112.

<sup>627</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 24-25.

What is the West? ... Colonialism, world wars, and environmental pollution!... We, Easterners, have always thought of Europe as the last word of civilization; ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, etc. It is just one of the civilizations. Europe is not a definitive criterion for “modernity”. It is a bad and wrong prejudice to think that this happened, it is a prejudice that needs to be discussed, from the times when the European imperialist powers dominated the earth!<sup>628</sup>

As can be surmised from the above excerpt, İlhan strongly opposed seeing the West as a unique, superior, and universal culture, and the necessity of other societies to abandon their own cultures and adopt that of the West (i.e., Westernization). İlhan stated that the Ottoman State also made this mistake and followed a policy that directly transferred the institutions and values of Europe through imitation. Therefore, he claimed that the Ottoman State had failed.<sup>629</sup> This is because to reach the modernity and power of the West, it is not enough to be like the West and to do the same by imitating what it has done. There is an important economic, social, and political process under the level of modernity and prosperity seen in the West.<sup>630</sup>

İlhan determined the beginning of these wrong policies in our country as the *Tanzimat* period.<sup>631</sup> According to him, the main mistake of the Turks was to think of taking a foreign culture and transferring it to Turkish culture as development, without realizing industrialization, which he equates to starting to build a house from the roof.<sup>632</sup> İlhan thinks that this error stems from the fact that Turkish intellectuals equate “modernization” with “Westernization”, with intellectuals confusing *method* with *synthesis*. While they wanted to reach the level of the West (i.e., to modernize), they focused on the cultures of the West and became Westernized, instead of focusing on the scientific techniques of the West.<sup>633</sup>

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<sup>628</sup> Attila İlhan, *Aydınlar Savaşı*, 127.

<sup>629</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 11.

<sup>630</sup> Mert Kızıltepe, 70.

<sup>631</sup> Attila İlhan, *Sultan Galiyef*, 84.

<sup>632</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 15.

<sup>633</sup> Durmuş Hocaoğlu, “Attila İlhan ile Çağdaşlaşma Üzerine Soruşturma”, *Yeni Toplum Dergisi*, No.1, (1992), 15.

For İlhan, the essence of modernization is in a single concept: industrialization. He explains this thought as follows:

Why could not we name industrialization? For a Western country, progress means industrialization, there is no such thing as Westernization! Why did we combine these two? Why haven't we grasped the meaning of industrialization for two hundred years and only focused on civilization?<sup>634</sup>

In other words, İlhan argues that when we focus only on Western civilization and do not see Westernization as an economic and social modernization, we throw our own culture and values into the background. However, non-Western Japan, which was analogous to the Ottomans in the mid-nineteenth century, reached and surpassed Western levels of development without changing anything from their traditional culture (e.g., suppressing their religion), but by creating their own economic and technological development process. The result, as observed by İlhan, is that the Turks became a nation that listens to Western music, reads translated novels, and dresses like Westerners, but which is not Western. Conversely, the Japanese write like the Japanese, live like the Japanese, and surpass the West technologically and economically. The Turks followed a path like the former French and British colonies in Africa, and also could not become Westerners.<sup>635</sup>

According to its malfunctioning “development” path of Westernization, İlhan considers that the Turkish people have begun to see our own culture as worthless in the face of Western culture. According to him, under the prevailing “Westernization” educational paradigms, modern Turkish students would be more familiar with Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1512), Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), and Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750) than with equivalent geniuses who made great contributions to human civilization, such as Mirar Sinan (c.1488/1490-1588), Jalal al-Din Muḥammad Rumi (1207-1273), and

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<sup>634</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 13.

<sup>635</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17.

Buhurizade Mustafa Itri (1640-1712). Consequently, the Turks tossed away their own culture with their own hands.<sup>636</sup>

İlhan gives an example of this cultural corruption from the life of the Sultans. The anthems of Sultan Mahmud II and Sultan Abdülmecid I were composed by the famous Italian musician Donizetti. Another example on the subject is that, during the banquet given in honour of the British delegation sent to the Ottoman State, Turkish music was played, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Rifat Pasha (1807-1857) was very angry, as he considered that Turkish music should not be played to a European delegation. As we can see, these examples are the best examples of our values being put aside or even seen down.<sup>637</sup> İlhan criticizes this Western admiration with these words.

...They are almost ashamed of dealing with the East and the Islamic World. Is it worth looking to the East or thinking about it when there is a civilized Europe? Then God forbid that Europeans would say to us that you are not European, that you cannot escape from barbarism and bigotry...<sup>638</sup>

In other words, İlhan considers that the Turks unwittingly implemented a colonial agenda of the West by separating themselves from their religion and language, then gradually changing their tastes and lifestyles to become imitators and slaves, calling this progressiveness and modernization, while actually effacing themselves and their culture.<sup>639</sup> İlhan criticized the *Tanzimat* period not only in terms of culture but also in terms of economy. According to İlhan, with the Edict of *Gülhane*, the Ottoman State became a completely open market.<sup>640</sup> After the *Tanzimat* period, foreign capital had an exceptional place in the country and the state did nothing but protect foreign capital. European goods were entering the country in abundance and cheaply through customs gates, and domestic goods were becoming insignificant. Workshops producing domestic goods were closed

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<sup>636</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>637</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Sağ*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 46-47.

<sup>638</sup> Attila İlhan, *Aydınlar Savaşı*, 83.

<sup>639</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 301.

<sup>640</sup> Ibid., 232.

over time, and shops selling European goods were opened instead.<sup>641</sup> For example, a Belgian merchant paid a five percent tax on goods sold in the Ottoman State, while an Ottoman merchant paid a twelve percent tax on goods exported to foreign countries, and even on goods to be transported from one province to another within the country.<sup>642</sup>

#### 4.5.2 In the Republican Period

While evaluating the Westernization policies of the RoT, İlhan evaluated Atatürk's period separately. According to him, Turkish intellectuals evaluate Atatürk's modernization policies within the "Westernism trend that has been going on since the *Tanzimat*". However, according to İlhan, there is no similarity between Atatürk's Westernism and *Tanzimat* Westernism, but a "contrast". This is because, during the *Tanzimat* period, "Westernization policies proposed by the West were being implemented", while Atatürk "made the Westernization policies with Western methods, but in his way".<sup>643</sup> İlhan was influenced in this opinion by the Turkish Cypriot sociologist Niyazi Berkes (1908-1988), who argued that there was a radical break in the transition from the Ottoman State to the RoT, not seeing the modernization moves in the Republican era as a continuation of what had happened since the *Tanzimat*.

Berkes stated that the essence of the revolutionary changes that wanted to realize was not based on the principles of Western civilization as in the *Tanzimat* and Constitutional periods, but on the "social development principles forced by backwardness".<sup>644</sup> İlhan agreed with this perspective, and considered that the reason why Atatürk fixated on the West in his modernization paradigm was that the Western countries represented the "highest level of civilization" at that time. Atatürk's method was that

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<sup>641</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Küreselleşme*, (İstanbul :Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003), 174-177.

<sup>642</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968), 52; Attila İlhan, *Hangi Küreselleşme*, 178.

<sup>643</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 90.

<sup>644</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007)143.

Türkiye, despite being Western, remained a “Turkish society”, resembling the Turkish nation only to itself. Either, as Niyazi Berkes advocated, it was to develop and advance Turkish evolution in a direction suitable for contemporary civilization.<sup>645</sup>

İlhan drew a definite line between Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, and claimed that their periods were quite different from each other. According to İlhan, Atatürk’s goal of modernization was to reach the “level of contemporary civilization”, which was axiomatically represented by the Western world at the time. However, to resemble the Western world and become Westernized was not the main goal in itself.<sup>646</sup> However, İnönü, instead of Atatürk’s “contemporary” ideal, adopted the “Westernization” of the society, which uncultured and destroyed the Ottoman State.<sup>647</sup> According to İlhan, what showed that Atatürk’s main aim was not to become Westernized was the importance he gave to industry and the economy. While Atatürk gave special importance to the fields of economic development and full independence during his administration, only “cultural development” was given importance during the İnönü period.

According to İlhan, the main building block of this cultural development was the West, which tried to transform the Turkish national personality into a Western culture within the framework of “cultural mobilization”. İnönü defended Westernizing Turkish culture with this policy. Instead of evaluating the development of that country as economic, technological, and industrial development, and ensuring progress in these areas, he made Western education compulsory, opened opera houses, gave importance to Western music, and included Greek and Latin culture in education.<sup>648</sup> He did not give any place to industrialization and economic policies according to İlhan, who expressed this as follows:

Look at devastated Japan after the war, and imagine how much more advanced it is than us! Are you going to dominate them by importing even

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<sup>645</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 12-13-91-92.

<sup>646</sup> Li, Pei-Lin, 268.

<sup>647</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 227.

<sup>648</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk*, 144; Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 228; Yaşar Özkandaş, Attila İlhan’ın Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Çözümlemesi, “Akademik Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi”, No.90, (2019), 207.

the pin and playing European-style music on the radio? Or by closing the opposition newspaper and dragging the one who opened his mouth in prison, while half of the people are being hurt by lice?...<sup>649</sup>

Also, in response to those who consider Atatürk's modernization (i.e., cultural, historical, educational, and religious reforms) to be the same as İnönü's, İlhan argues that Atatürk's main aim was not to Westernize the country, but to raise the level of contemporary civilization, and that these reforms were not fundamental. According to him, these reforms are auxiliary measures, devised to facilitate reaching the level of contemporary civilization. According to İlhan, Atatürk gave importance to the economy and industry to reach the level of contemporary civilizations, therefore, he argues that Atatürk's revolutions should not be reduced to hat and letter reforms.<sup>650</sup>

According to İlhan, there is a deep line between Atatürk and İnönü in terms of applying modernization policies. For him, Atatürk temporarily became an "authoritarian"<sup>651</sup> leader because of the necessary conditions to implement modernization policies. However, he claims that İnönü had a "totalitarian" and "fascistic" attitude, even though he had no pressing need for authoritarianism. He claimed that İnönü's understanding of politics gave birth to an oligarchy, which was born from the domination of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, and this oligarchic structure still has its influence

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<sup>649</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yaraya Tuz Basmak*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi 1982,), 144.

<sup>650</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk*, 95; Hakan Reyhan, *Attila İlhan'ın Siyasal Düşüncesi Türkiye'de Ulusalcılığın Kökenleri*, 183.

<sup>651</sup> According to İlhan, Atatürk was an "authoritarian" leader, but never a "dictator". However, Atatürk was deliberately referred to as a dictator, especially by Westerners, during his lifetime. With his studies on the Turkish revolution, the British-American historian Bernard Lewis argued that Atatürk was not like Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin, although he thought that he was a dictator to some extent under the conditions of Atatürk's period. He expresses this as follows: "...Kemal Atatürk was a man of swift and decisive action, of sudden and often violent decisions. A tough and brilliant soldier, a hard drinker and winner, he was in all things a man of immense will and abounding vitality. By his contemporaries, he was often called a dictator, and in a sense he certainly was. But in saying this one must remember that his rule was very different from that of other men, in Europe and the Middle East yesterday and today, to whom the same term is applied. An autocrat by personal and professional bias, dominating and imperious by temperament, he yet showed respect for decency and legality, for human and political standards, which is in astonishing contrast with the behavior of lesser and more pretentious men. His was a dictatorship without the uneasy over-the-shoulder glance, the terror of the doorbell, and the dark menace of the concentration camp. Force and repression were certainly used to establish and maintain the Republic during the period of revolutionary changes, but no longer..." See, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 290.

on Turkish political life.<sup>652</sup> According to İlhan, Atatürk dismissed İsmet İnönü as Prime Minister<sup>653</sup> and replaced him with Celal Bayar in 1937 because İnönü was seeking to emulate the practices of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin, which symbolized the golden age of totalitarianism, and abolished classical liberal democracy. In this way, Atatürk found a solution to stabilize the regime of the country, which he observed shift from an authoritarian regime to totalitarianism.<sup>654</sup> However, a “totalitarian” government emerged during the presidency of İsmet İnönü (1938-1950), who came to power at the request of the army immediately after Atatürk died in 1938, and after the coups that followed.<sup>655</sup> In the era of İnönü’s “totalitarian” government, modernization policies were applied in the wrong way in the form of Westernization imposed on the public by the force of the state.<sup>656</sup>

During the İnönü period, reforms became stricter, with a more fanatical interpretation of laicism. Any religious behaviour and speech were deemed an action against secularism, and thus the state; consequently, many people were prosecuted due to relatively innocuous anti-secular attitudes or utterances.<sup>657</sup> The Turkish people acted with their national sensitivities and turned to the “religious” parties in protest against the reactionary characterization of their living culture by Westernism. In other words, İnönü’s understanding of “Westernization policies” had a great influence on the Turkish people’s tendency towards parties that take religious references in elections when they wish to protest against the military-secular establishment.<sup>658</sup>

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<sup>652</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 227; Hakan Reyhan, *Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Attila İlhan*, 117.

<sup>653</sup> The reason for President İnönü’s dismissal was the signing of the new party charter and program prepared by Republican People’s Party Secretary General Recep Peker, (1889-1950) inspired by the fascist regime in Italy, by İnönü. See, Attila İlhan, *Dönek Bereketi*, 20.

<sup>654</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ufkun Arkasını Görebilmek*, 119.

<sup>655</sup> Attila İlhan, *Yıldız, Hilal ve Kalpak*, 65.

<sup>656</sup> Attila İlhan “...Neden, ‘Hep ‘Böyle’ Oluyor?!”...Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 05 April 2004.; <https://tilahan.org/neden-hep-boyle-oluyor/>

<sup>657</sup> Esra Polat, 37.

<sup>658</sup> İlyas Doğan, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, (Ankara: Astana Yayınları, 2018), 260; Attila İlhan “...Neden, ‘Hep ‘Böyle’ Oluyor?!” ...; <https://tilahan.org/neden-hep-boyle-oluyor/>

The public was not satisfied with the government and its oppressive policies under İnönü, which was reflected in the Presidential elections in 1950, when the Kemalist CHP lost its majority to the Democratic Party, founded by Celal Bayar (1883-1986).<sup>659</sup> In the Democratic Party government, Bayar became the President and Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) was the Prime Minister. The most crucial reason for the Democratic Party to gain power (i.e., the most critical 1950 election issue) was that Adnan Menderes promised to restore religious freedom in Türkiye.<sup>660</sup> After the Democratic Party won the elections, the Quran was read on state radio, and the government permitted reciting the adhan in Arabic. Also, Adnan Menderes allowed the opening of the tombs of the Ottoman Sultans and generals to visitors.<sup>661</sup>

The public breathed a sigh of relief at this juncture, as the suppression of their religious practices abated. However, since the soldiers in Türkiye see themselves as the pioneers of modernization, they did not respect the lifestyle, dressing style, and traditions of the people, and interfered with the will of society.<sup>662</sup> We can easily understand the bigotry that underlay this from the following words of Colonel Alparslan Türkeş (1917-1997), a member of the National Unity Committee, who carried out the consequent coup in 1960:

Atatürk's reforms declined during the Democrat Party period. Have you ever been to Anatolia recently? Women with *Kara Çarşaf* (black abaya) are everywhere. Turkish women wander everywhere with these embarrassing clothes. Turkish nationalism and the Turkish language also declined in the society. The Turkish language is one of Atatürk's greatest and most useful gifts. The Quran should be read in Turkish, not Arabic. The Democratic Party betrayed Turkish nationalism and the Turkish language by allowing the Quran to be read in the Arabic language in the Turkish mosque.<sup>663</sup>

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<sup>659</sup> Bernard Lewis, 306.

<sup>660</sup> Esra Polat, 38.

<sup>661</sup> Kemal. H Karpat, *Turk's Politics the Transition to a Multi-Party System*, (United States of America: Princeton University Press, 1959), 284.

<sup>662</sup> Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekinil *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 3, Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, edited in Özgür Gökmen, *28 Şubat: Bir Batılılaşma Resterasyonu mu?* (İstanbul :İletişim Yayınlar, 2007), 347.

<sup>663</sup> Rıfat Atay, "27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi'ne Sebilürreşad Dergisi'nin Bakışı", *Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi*, Vol.7, No.3, (2018), 202.

As can be understood from the words above, because of the Westernization created in the İnönü period, the religious beliefs, clothing, and traditions of the society were forcibly challenged by military intervention. The army intervened in politics, saying that society was turning away from Atatürkism, and blaming the democratically elected government. As a result, İsmet İnönü became the Prime Minister again from 1961-1965. During this period, all Democratic Party laws that allegedly opposed Atatürk's thoughts were cancelled. The army and the CHP achieved their goal.<sup>664</sup> While İlhan especially emphasized Atatürk's opposition to the junta and his closeness to democracy, he also criticized the juntas/coups that were said to have been made in the name of Atatürk. This is because, in Atatürk's policy, the army ought not to interfere with the political administration. However, after the May 27 coup, the intervention of the army in the administration was counted as Atatürkism, but no one could explain how it was associated with Atatürkism. Nobody can explain this anyway, because according to Atatürk, military intervention in politics is never an acceptable thought.<sup>665</sup>

After the 1960 coup, subsequent coups took place in 1971, 1980, and 1997, and were in each case premised on defending the Constitution (i.e., Western values). The cultural, traditional, and religious values of the society as reflected in democratic elections were not respected, especially in terms of religion. Belief in the religion of Islam has been seen as the biggest obstacle to modernity by the secular-military establishment. İlhan considered this to be epitomized in the military coup of 28 February 1997, when an air of "Sharia danger" was created in the media, and the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) (RP)<sup>666</sup> an Islamic party founded by the popularly elected Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), was removed from power for this reason. However, according to İlhan, the concept of a transition to Sharia in Türkiye is an absurd dream. Even if the RP, which was overthrown

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<sup>664</sup> Esra Polat, 40.

<sup>665</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Sol*, 190-191.

<sup>666</sup> The Welfare Party challenges the core features of the existing secular system and its secular, modernization ideology. See, Cengiz Dinç, *Debating Islamism, Modernity and The West in Turkey: The Role Of Welfare(Refah) Party*, (Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 2018), 1.

from power for this reason, had a goal of establishing a Sharia order, it would be impossible to achieve, albeit he considered that there is room for parties like the RP in Türkiye's democratic regime. According to İlhan, the RP and similar parties can take their place in the political spectrum, just like socialist and communist parties, as a "Muslim Democrat" party, while remaining loyal to the basic principles of the Republic.<sup>667</sup>

As can be seen, at the end of this process, the RoT was expected to be equal to the civilized nations of the West. However, by the early 1980s, Türkiye was lagging in the economy and was dealing with social problems. These problems arose from the conflict between the old and the new (traditional and modern).<sup>668</sup> As a result, the modernization policies that started in the Tanzimat period could not be connected to a synthesis. Moreover, they caused a duality (East-West, old-new, *alafranga-alaturca*<sup>669</sup>) in society. Turkish society could not find a way to modernize without losing its own culture and tradition. While trying to modernize society with the policies it implemented on the way to modernization, it westernized it. İlhan proposed the policy of "national synthesis" as a solution to this mistake.<sup>670</sup>

#### 4.6 VIEWS ON MODERNIZATION AND NATIONAL SYNTHESIS

According to İlhan, Türkiye has gone through an abortive modernization process. While trying to modernize, Türkiye has instead become Westernized, by focusing on Western culture, with the policies it has implemented. The way out of this situation is "national synthesis". İlhan's claim of a false understanding of modernization is not a new one, and

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<sup>667</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ufkun Arkasını Görebilmek*, 166.

<sup>668</sup> Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, in Reşat Kasaba, *Kemalist Certainties, and Modern Ambiguities*, the University of Washington Press, 1997, 30

<sup>669</sup> Wearing jackets, trousers, shirts, and ties, trimming a beard, going to the theatre using French words, dancing, wearing a low-cut, and wearing a hat was called "*alafranga*" (Europeanism/ European style) at that time. While everything in the European style was called "*alafranga*", everything in the Turkish and Ottoman styles was called "*alaturca*". See, Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekinçil *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 3, Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, in Seçil Deren, *Kültürel Batılılaşma*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlar, 2007), 386.

<sup>670</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 125.

has existed in Türkiye since the nineteenth century, as described in the previous chapter. Within the scope of this discussion, there are two separate groups: those who equate modernization with Westernization, and who thus advocate full Westernization; and those who consider modernization and Westernization separately, and accept partial Westernization.

Those who partially accept Westernization, such as İlhan, agree that only technological and scientific techniques should be adopted wholesale. Prominent advocates of this view include Tarık Zafer Tunay (1916-1991)<sup>671</sup> who thought that Westernization would be nothing but a synthesis.<sup>672</sup> Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924)<sup>673</sup> who argues that Türkiye should enter Western civilization while preserving Turkishness and Islam<sup>674</sup> and Payami Safa (1899-1961)<sup>675</sup> who thought that Western science and technique should be combined with those of Türkiye.<sup>676</sup>

Evaluating the modernization process of the West, İlhan stated that the West did not give up its culture and values in the modernization process. According to İlhan, different nations in the West lived the feudal era in the course of history and then passed into the industrial era. At this stage, they “*mixed the principles coming from the Latin culture with*

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<sup>671</sup> Tarık Zafer’s most important claim about modernization in Türkiye is that related policies are made *despite* popular will. People have been forced to change their own culture. According to him, Turks have an ancient civilization, and the West can only be a tool for us on the way to modernization. See Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekingil *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 3, Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, in Seçil Deren, *Kültürel Batılılaşma*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlar, 2007), 383.

<sup>672</sup> Tarık Zafer Tuanaya, *Batılılaşma Hareketleri-1*, (İstanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı Basım ve Yayıncılık ,1999), 121-126.

<sup>673</sup> Ziya Gökalp gives the Japanese an example in this regard, and according to him, the Japanese entered Western civilization by preserving their religion and nationality. In this way, they came to the same level as the Europeans in every respect. By doing this, the Japanese did not lose anything from their religion and national culture, and Türkiye can take them as an example in this regard. By preserving their culture and religion, Turks can successfully modernize like Japan. See, Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekingil *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 3, Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, in Ayli Özmen, *İsmail Hakkı Batlıacıoğlu*, 80.

<sup>674</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türkcülüğün Esasları*, (Ankara: Elips Kitap 2006), 39.

<sup>675</sup> Peyami Safa, like Ziya Gökalp, opined that necessary lessons should be taken from Japan about Turkish modernization. According to him, the Japanese preserved their culture and traditions very well while modernizing. They did not even change their very complex alphabet in the name of modernization, because they did not consent to the destruction of their own national culture and national identity. See, Safa, Peyami, *Doğu-Batı Sentezi*, (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 1963), 52.

<sup>676</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

*the principles coming from their roots as a nation, and they reached a Western synthesis*". Therefore, Western civilizations are civilizations that exist separately and differ from each other in their national characteristics. For example, a French civilization emerged differently from a German or English civilization.<sup>677</sup> İlhan examined the nation-building process in France to explain this issue a little more. According to İlhan, French society built its new national values "on top of its old values". The French government did not transfer rationalization, secularization, and individualization from a different culture, or bring "another foreign culture and institution" to its country by giving up pre-revolutionary cultural values.

In addition, thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Montesquieu (1689-1755), and François-Marie Arouet Voltaire (1694-1778), who were key figures in the French Enlightenment, developed their own cultures without imitating other nations. Therefore, France's music, literature, philosophy, and all institutions are national.<sup>678</sup> The Western countries that Turkish modernizers take as examples did not themselves give up their own cultures while carrying out their modernization processes. İlhan thinks that the reason Turks misjudged the appropriate trajectory was because they "misjudged the West". According to him, Turks should focus on the scientific development of the West.<sup>679</sup> In other words, he opposes the expression of modernization as Westernization.

According to İlhan, Türkiye's problem is not a problem of Westernization *per se*, but rather a problem in finding the right way to modernization.<sup>680</sup> Therefore, according to İlhan, *Tanzimat* was the period of "copyright", Constitutionalism was the period of "imitation", and the Republic was the period of "nationalism". However, İlhan emphasized that the influences of the copyright and imitation cultures were also felt during the

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<sup>677</sup> Attila İlhan, *Gerçekçilik Savaşı*, 67.

<sup>678</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı*, 16-17.

<sup>679</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>680</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı?*, 97.

Republican period.<sup>681</sup> In other words, as we have seen, a synthesis has never been created by giving up copyright and imitation culture and preserving Turkish national culture.

Religion (Islam) is one of the most important elements to create a national synthesis in Türkiye. This is because the ground on which Western nations realize their national synthesis is the ground of religion (Christianity). According to İlhan, Turkish intellectuals could not reach a unique national synthesis because they overlooked this fact. The ground on which Western nations synthesized was Christianity, and Türkiye's national synthesis should be formed with Islam.<sup>682</sup> For İlhan, “*denying the cultural heritage of Islam has as pathetic a result for Türkiye as cutting off half of one's body*”.<sup>683</sup> However, the proponents of modernization saw Islam as the reason for the weakness of Türkiye in the face of the West and tried to adapt Turkish society to Western culture and values by breaking away from the Turkish-Islamic tradition. The development of technology and industry, which are the elements of modernization, were set aside, and a policy of alienation from religion and changing culture was adopted instead.

İlhan claimed that this was the wrong solution, and that it had damaged Turkish culture and society. According to him, it is also irrational to believe that a society can be isolated from its centuries-old culture and move to another civilization circle, and such a thing is against objective conditions. A society cannot be “modernized” by demeaning its religion and culture. The solution to modernizing society is to focus on scientific methods, and to create a national synthesis by protecting its religion and culture.<sup>684</sup> With this national synthesis, a strong and independent Türkiye can be created. In this context, a national and independent economy is essential.<sup>685</sup> For İlhan, “One of Türkiye's biggest mistakes is to

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<sup>681</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı*, 174.

<sup>682</sup> Atilla İlhan, “*Açtırma Kutuyu!*”.. *Röportajlar-1 (1946-1983)*, 89.

<sup>683</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk ?*, 58.

<sup>684</sup> Attila İlhan, *Dönek Bereketi*, 124-125.

<sup>685</sup> İlhan claimed that Türkiye has turned into a comprador economy (as explained previously) thanks to the common market system (i.e., the International Monetary Fund and World Bank). See, Attila İlhan, *Hangi Batı*, 305. The most important element of being a modern country is the independent national industry. According to İlhan, industry alone is not enough, it must be complemented with a national cultural composition. Western societies also became industrialized industrial societies and produced a national

think that development is a cultural problem”.<sup>686</sup> Furthermore, economic development takes place with a robust industry, and as noted previously, İlhan fundamentally criticized İnönü for neglecting this dimension of modernization.<sup>687</sup>

Another important factor for Turks to create their own culture within the framework of national synthesis is the Ottoman State, which İlhan argues cannot be simply ignored when attempting to achieve a Turkish national synthesis. It is necessary to consider the past represented by the Ottoman State as a part of modernization. The Ottoman past should be understood as the most important part of the creation of Turkish modernity. He argues that Türkiye should move away from the approach that rejects what belongs to the Ottoman State, and acknowledge that the Ottomans realized a great cultural synthesis with the Seljuk state before them. With this synthesis, the Ottoman lifestyle came into existence, and the result was so strong that the Ottoman State was not destroyed for centuries. However, the Turks, who are the true owners of that inheritance, have considered it ingenuity to eradicate this powerful culture.<sup>688</sup> According to İlhan, to protect the culture inherited from the Ottoman State, it is necessary to teach Arabic, Persian, and therefore Ottoman Turkish, which is the main basis of our culture, instead of Latin.

As a noted modern literary figure, İlhan observed that Ottoman Turkish is a very advanced language compared to the artificial Turkish produced by the Turkish Language Institution, and it is in no way inferior to Western languages. He also considered that Turkish intellectuals cannot do Turkish science authentically unless they learn Ottoman language and their history. İlhan also strongly criticized Turkish intellectuals who ignored Ottoman Turkish by emphasizing its core importance for Turkish culture.<sup>689</sup> İlhan observed

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synthesis suitable for new conditions without ignoring their history and culture. Real modernization and real progress are not found in “imitation”. He argued that “synthesis” methods must be applied to current conditions, to produce an original synthesis that is suitable for Türkiye’s identity and past, and which will secure its future. See, Attila İlhan, *Aydınlar Savaşı*, 12.

<sup>686</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı*, 96.

<sup>687</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk?*, 188.

<sup>688</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Laiklik*, 24.

<sup>689</sup> Attila İlhan, *Söyletme Kötüyü!...*, *Röportajlar-2 (1983-1987)*, 26-27-94.

that modern children in the West can read and understand works written in the sixteenth century in their own languages, while Turkish children were being systematically deracinated from their own linguistic and literary heritage. He thus argued that Ottoman Turkish should be taught as a compulsory course in all high schools, and that Arabic and Persian should be taught as an elective courses. He claimed that without this practice, Turks would not be able to read any written document about the past of the Turks within a few decades.<sup>690</sup>

Ottoman civilization is a unique and major component of global history. The architecture of Sinan, the poetry of Baki (1526-1600), the music of Buhurizade Mustafa Itri, the humour of Nasreddin Hodja (1208-1284), the ecstatic spirituality of Yunus Emre (1238-1328) and Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rumi (1207-1273) are essential aspects of world heritage, and the main cultural foundation of the Turkish nation. Not knowing the Ottoman language separates modern Turks from them and their works, and the cultural distance introduced between modern Turks and their forbears represents the success of Western cultural imperialism.<sup>691</sup>

As İlhan observed, this impasse was reflected in all fields, including in gastronomy, music, literature, and art. While other nations such as the Greeks appropriate Turkish cuisine as their own, Turkish people themselves have little conceptualization of the wonders of Ottoman palace cuisine, but eagerly sought to adopt Western cuisine and dishes to modernize after the Republic. The same is true for clothing; instead of developing and creating their own fashions, Turks copied the clothing of the West. Anatolian women do not need Western fashion designers to develop the clothes they have been wearing for millennia, nor Paris and London for their dressing styles. If they are modernized, they must be able to create their own clothing culture, reflecting their our own culture and values.<sup>692</sup>

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<sup>690</sup> Esra Bal Esen, Attila İlhan'a Göre Kültür, Dil ve Eğitim, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2015,68.

<sup>691</sup> Attila İlhan, *Faşizimin Ayak Sesleri*, 152-153.

<sup>692</sup> Attila İlhan, *Hangi Sağ*, 38-39-63.

However, İlhan knew that Turkish intellectuals considered that modernization consisted of imitating Western countries.<sup>693</sup> Examples included Turkish people listening to the music of François Chopin (1810-1849) or Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756-1791), and reading the novels of Balzac (1799-1850), whether in French or Turkish translations. Moreover, according to them, Turkish women should dress like Parisian women, as this reflects the universal culture of “Civilization”.<sup>694</sup> This is the ideal society, and the whole world should have this national culture. Conversely, according to İlhan, the idea of “universal culture” is a deception, and merely alludes to Western culture. İlhan claimed that this “culture” is glorified by non-Western intellectuals who say and even believe that they are defending a universal culture.<sup>695</sup>

According to İlhan, Turks should not accept this culture imposed on them by the West as a universal culture, not should they accept the scholasticism of the East simply because they are against the cultural imperialism of the West. He argued that the best solution is a national synthesis, drawing on traditional structures, culture, and civilization, with its method manifesting scientific thought.<sup>696</sup> Otherwise, erroneously conflating the culture of the West with the universal culture of “Civilization” makes the West the only universal modernization model. However, by protecting their own culture and using the science and technique hitherto associated with the West, they can produce their own modernization model. As we can see, the approach that İlhan proposed to modernize Türkiye without Westernization is a national synthesis that references the East as a point of cultural origin and the West as a source of method.

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<sup>693</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ufkun Arkasını Görebilmek*, 21.

<sup>694</sup> Attila İlhan, *Ulusal Kültür Savaşı*, 19.

<sup>695</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>696</sup> Atilla İlhan: “*Açtırma Kutuyu!*” .. *Röportajlar-1 (1946-1983)*, 132.

## 4.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter explored İlhan's critique and thoughts on Turkish modernization. İlhan was one of the foremost intellectuals of the Republican era, and an important Turkish writer. Due to his upbringing, he was imbued with a Western and secular lifestyle, and he had a great interest in cinema and literature from his childhood, and he wrote many books and poems from his earliest years. This background, combined with his extensive sojourns in Paris, gave him insights in the West that were inaccessible to most Turkish people, including most of the political leadership driving "modernization".

It was a trip to Paris that changed İlhan's ideas and life. Before going to Paris, İlhan himself viewed Paris as the best and ideal society, modernized and developed in every sense, reflecting the "Westernization" perception prevailing in Türkiye at that time. Turkish intellectuals considered the West, especially France, as the ideal developed modern society that Turkish society should imitate in order to modernize. However, he was disappointed in Paris, where he went with great excitement and hope, based on his deep observations about French society and the environment he lived in.

First of all, İlhan found that France was not as civilized or developed as he thought, nor was it the free and humanistic idyll that he had expected. On the contrary, it was a country that colonized the world, and which viewed other races as inferior. İlhan got the first information about imperialism from his African friends in Paris, and learned the consequences of French colonialism and cultural destruction. He formed the view that Western societies such as France promoted their societies as universal ideals, and thereby sought to impose their culture and values on non-Western societies, aided and abetted by pro-Western native intellectuals. Therefore, İlhan realised that the Westernization of Africa was being replicated in the Westernization of Türkiye, despite the latter not being colonized.

According to İlhan, Turkish intellectuals were unable to apprehend this, and despised their own society and people while valorising and imitating the hostile Western imperialists. İlhan strongly opposed this idea, and he increasingly appreciated the ancient provenance and cultural achievement of the Turks, as well as appreciating other non-Western cultures being suppressed by the rush towards Westernization. Examining the modernization policies of the Ottoman State, İlhan claimed that they had initiated the conflation of modernization and Westernization, and that the State had ultimately collapsed as a result of the Westernization policies it implemented. According to him, while the Ottoman State, which wanted to modernize, tried to make the country an economically and industrially developed country, it became a country that imitated the West, and suppressed its own culture and values to adopt those of the West. İlhan stated that the Ottoman example demonstrated that societies that do not see modernization as economic and social development and put their own culture and values in the background are doomed to either colonization or destruction.

İlhan also critiqued the Republican period, which he divided into the periods of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, which he regarded as quite different from each other. İlhan claimed that Atatürk's modernization policies were not confused with Westernization. He claimed that Atatürk's dress and alphabet reforms were not innovations of a Westernization revolution, but would have taken place anyway in the course of modernization.

When evaluated in general, Atatürk's modernization policies can be considered to be Westernization policies. Atatürk thought that, to reach the level of contemporary civilizations, the institutions and values of the West should be adopted, and he was in favour of total modernization, which thus meant Westernization. According to Atatürk, the people of the RoT who say "I am civilized" have to show and prove that they are civilized in every way. For this reason, the Turkish nation had to break away from its recent past and culture, and especially from Ottoman history, to enter the modern world. Therefore, his modernization policies were Westernization policies. Therefore, his modernization policies can be evaluated within the scope of Westernization policies.


However, İlhan claimed that “Westernization” as he understood it primarily took place during the reign of İsmet İnönü. According to him, İnönü focused only on Western culture, and tried to transform Turkish culture into Western culture without focusing on industrialization and economic development, which are the main elements of real modernization. Under İnönü, İlhan considered that the regime merely sought to imitate Western culture and institutions, as reflected in compulsory Western education, opening opera houses, and propagating a Graeco-Roman cultural paradigm of civilization in education.

The situation continued in the same way after İnönü. Since the Westernization policies implemented under the name of this modernization were not suitable for the most conservative Turkish people, serious problems arose between the people and the state. The people who have lived with Turkish culture and Islamic tradition for centuries were compelled to adopt a secular Western style. The people, who did not want to accept this, showed their reaction to the transition to multi-party life and overthrew the İnönü government when able to do so in democratic elections. However, the army, which defined itself as the pioneer and guardian of Atatürk’s modernization, did not listen to the people’s decision, and staged a series of coups whenever they thought democracy was threatening their “modern” state, in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. In all of these cases, military interventions to subvert Turkish democracy were always premised on defending the Constitution (i.e., Western values).

As a result, Turkish society became a Westernized society while trying to modernize. İlhan put forward the idea of national synthesis as a liberation from this. Under his synthesis model, Westernization and modernization policies should not be confused with each other, and with the right synthesis, a modern Türkiye with its own culture and institutions can emerge in every sense. According to him, there is no universal culture as the West claims, and every society has its own culture. Türkiye has an ancient culture of

its own, and all it requires from the West is technical information, which can be integrated into its indigenous culture and institutions to create a national synthesis.

Ilhan cites non-Western Japan as an example that modernization has nothing to do with Western culture. The Japanese have managed to modernize by preserving their own culture and values. If modernization needed to imitate Western culture, the Japanese could not. Japan showed us that a society can modernize by preserving its culture. According to İlhan, Turkish society does not have to be like the West for economic prosperity, technological development, and military power. Turkish society should create its national synthesis by taking technological developments from the West and blending them with its own culture. If Turkish society implements this model, it will have a strong domestic and national economy and industry, which is the most important element of modernization. Moreover, it will be a strong state in the political and social fields.



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **NECMETTİN ERBAKAN AND HIS VIEWS ON TÜRKİYE’S MODERNIZATION PROCESS**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter analyses the views of Necmettin Erbakan on Türkiye’s modernization process. Erbakan, who was the prime minister of the RoT from 1996 to 1997, was an important politician, engineer, academician, and intellectual, and the first devout prime minister in the history of the RoT. He studied the problems in Türkiye throughout his life and tried to produce solutions. In this context, he examined Turkish modernization, which he saw as one of the most important problems of Türkiye, and made important studies on this subject. He thought that the main mistake made in the Turkish modernization process was to “imitate the West”. Therefore, he thought that while Türkiye wanted to modernize, it became Westernized, that is, modernization and Westernization were falsely conflated in Türkiye’s political discourse and modernization programme. Erbakan believed that a national modernization model could be produced to redress the existing paradigm, based on its erroneous assumptions about modernization. This chapter explains how Erbakan identified the mistakes in the modernization process, and analyses the national model he presented as a solution in detail.

#### **5.2 EARLY LIFE AND CAREER**

##### **5.2.1 Educational Background**

Erbakan was born on 29 October 1926 in Sinop, near the Black Sea. His father, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, was one of the last Islamic judges of the Ottoman State. His grandfather was Hüseyin of the Kozanoğulları tribe, who were local notables of the Adana region.

Erbakan's mother was Kamer Erbakan, whose Her family roots went back to Sheikh Shamil (1797-1871), the hero of the Caucasus. Erbakan had four brothers and a sister, all of whom qualified as healthcare professionals or engineers.<sup>697</sup> He attended primary school in Kayseri and Trabzon, and then entered İstanbul Erkek Lisesi (İstanbul Boys High School), from which he graduated in 1943 with first place.<sup>698</sup> During his high school years, he took regular lessons in Fiqh, Kalam, Quran, Hadith, and Arabic from the imam of the Iskender Pasha Mosque.<sup>699</sup>

Having graduated from high school with first place, he had the right to enrol directly in the university, but he chose to sit the university entrance exam, and won a place at the İstanbul Technical University Department of Mechanical Engineering. He graduated from the university in 1948, and he began studying as a research assistant at the Vehicles Master Program at the same faculty.<sup>700</sup> İstanbul Technical University sent him to Rhine-Westphalia Technical University of Aachen in Germany for his doctoral studies in 1951, and he submitted three theses in two years in Germany. He received his doctoral degree and was invited to conduct research in the Klockner Humboldt Deutz Motor factory, which was working for the German army. Erbakan worked on the engine system of Leopard tanks at the Deutz Engine Factory. During the same period, he took part in the delegation of the German Ministry of Economy to research the factories in the Ruhr region and participated in the research.<sup>701</sup> Erbakan became the first Turkish scientist to work at German universities after World War II.

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<sup>697</sup> Metin Hasırcı, *Bitmeyen Mücadele Erbakan*, (İstanbul: Yeni Dünya Yayınları, 2006), 21; Abdul Kadir Macit, *Çağa İz Bırakan Önderler Necmettin Erbakan*, (İstanbul :İlke Yayıncılık, 2018), 20.

<sup>698</sup> Fehmi Çalmuk, *Selamun Aleyküm Komutanım*, (Ankara: Kim Yayınları, 2000), 10; Ömer Baykal & Ömer Çaha, "Politik Aktör Olarak Necmettin Erbakan'ın Türk Siyasetindeki Yeri", *Akademik Hassasiyetler*, Vol.4, No.8,(2017), 5; Kemal Akın, *Millî Nizam'dan 28 Şubat'a Olay Adam Erbakan*, (İstanbul: Birey Yayınları, 2000), 42.

<sup>699</sup> Mehmet Cemal, *Muhterem Başkan Erbakan*, (İstanbul: Kayıhan Yayınları, 1991), 22.

<sup>700</sup> Ahmet Akgül, *Dünya'nın Değişimi ve Erbakan Devrimi*, (Konya: Milli Çözüm Yayınları, 2007), 64-65; Mehmet Ali Koçer, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Nişantaşı Üniversitesi, 2019, 3.

<sup>701</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, edited by Yusuf Aktaş, (İstanbul: Aktaş Yayınları, 2020), 6-7; Abdul Kadir Macit, 25-26; İrfan Ersin, *Necmettin Erbakan'ın Ekonomik Söylem ve Uygulamaları*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi, 2015, 6.

In 1953, Erbakan returned to Türkiye to gain an associate professor degree from İstanbul Technical University, becoming the youngest associate professor up to that time at the age of 27. After becoming an associate professor and returning to Germany, Erbakan Hodja<sup>702</sup> worked at Deutz Engine Factory as a principal research engineer for six months.<sup>703</sup> Due to his successful studies in Germany, he received many offers to conduct industrial and academic research, but he chose to return to Türkiye in November 1953, seeking to help industrialize Türkiye and strengthen its economy (i.e., to promote modernization). For Erbakan, developing German tank engines was not a worthwhile career; he wanted to serve his country and establish a Turkish motor industry as soon as possible.<sup>704</sup> Additionally, he registered for his compulsory military service between 1954 and 1955, and after six months of basic training he was appointed a Lieutenant in the Maintenance Department.<sup>705</sup>

### 5.2.2 Intellectual Biography

Erbakan was personally religious and devoted to Islam, and he was a member of the Naqshbandi school<sup>706</sup> (specifically, he was a member of the Gümüşhanevi Dervish Lodge<sup>707</sup>) during his university years. He met Sheik Abdülaziz Bekkine (1895-1951)<sup>708</sup> and

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<sup>702</sup> The term “Erbakan Hodja” is used for Erbakan, who has been a teacher throughout his life as well as his academic life. This is because Scholar Yörükzade Fevzi (1874- 1957) addressed him as “Necmettin Hodja” during his visit to Erbakan in 1952. After this date, everyone started to address “Erbakan as Hodja”. See, Yahya Oğuz, *Erbakan'ın Misyonu*, (İstanbul: Değişim Yayınları, 1993), 21.

<sup>703</sup> Ekrem Kızıldaş, Herkesin Hocası Erbakan, (İstanbul: Hayat Yayınları, 2011), 32; Abdul Kadir Macit, 26.

<sup>704</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Erbakan Külliyyatı Cilt 1*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MG V Yayınları, 2014), 10.

<sup>705</sup> Ekrem Kızıldaş, 34; İrfan Ersin, 6.

<sup>706</sup> Brent E. Sasley, “Turkish Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Lobbying for European Union Membership”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2012), 555.

<sup>707</sup> The lodge of Ahmed Ziyaeddin from Gümüşhane, one of the representatives of the Naqshbandi tradition. This dervish lodge was established in İstanbul during the last period of the Ottoman State. Upon Sheik Bekkine’s death, the Mehmet Zahit Kotku was appointed Sheikh of the dervish lodge. See, Necdet Yılmaz, “Gümüşhanevi Dergahı’nda Ramuzü’l-Ehadis İcazeti Geleneği ve Mehmed Zahid (Kotku) Efendi’nin Ramuz İcazeti”, *Tasavvuf İlmî ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi*, Vol.21, No.41 (2017), 77-83.

<sup>708</sup> Erbakan loved Abdülaziz Bekkine very much, and kept him informed of everything he did. For example, he informed Bekkine by writing a letter describing his experiences and observations while he was in Germany. See, Necmettin Erbakan, *İslam Birliği*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MG V Yayınları, 2022), 186.

attended his lectures. Upon Sheik Bekkine's death, Erbakan became a student of Mehmet Zahit Kotku (1897-1980),<sup>709</sup> who frequently criticized Türkiye's economic dependence on foreigners. This is because the historical mission of the Gümüşhanevi Dervish Lodge was to prevent the Islamic world from being a captive market of the West.<sup>710</sup> They wanted Türkiye to be industrialized enough to meet its basic needs and be economically and politically independent. Mehmet Zahid advised Erbakan that Türkiye's industry should always be developed. In line with this purpose, the foundations of the Gümüş Motor (Silver Engine) Factory<sup>711</sup> which produced Türkiye's first domestic engine, were laid in 1956 with the contributions of Erbakan.<sup>712</sup>

Due to Erbakan's outstanding academic achievements in the field of engineering, and his practical experience in Germany, he was appointed the general manager of Gümüş

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<sup>709</sup> Mete Gündoğan, *Erbakan*, (İstanbul :Destek Yayınları, 2019), 22-28.

<sup>710</sup> The Gümüşhanevi lodge was against the Marshall Plan, the US economic aid programme for European political and economic reconstruction after WWII, which included aid to Türkiye between 1948 and 1952. In other words, they were against the West's financial domination over Türkiye. See, Mete Gündoğan, 33. This is because Türkiye was included in the Marshall Plan on the condition of accepting to be the granary of Europe, and giving up the development of its heavy industry. See, Bilgehan Bülbül, *Marshall Planı ve Türkiye'de Uygulanışı 1948-1957*, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Dicle Üniversitesi, 2006, ii. As an industrial expert, Erbakan was keenly aware that the "help" of the West in terms of importing machinery, ships, and cars, etc. would render Türkiye absolutely dependent on the West. He knew that it was possible to manufacture motor vehicles in Türkiye, and if Germany could industrialize in a very short time after being utterly devastated in the war, Türkiye was in a better position. Erbakan expressed these ideas and introduced the production of the Silver Engine at the Industry Congress held in Ankara, explaining that Türkiye had sufficient labour and resources to produce automobiles. He gave the example that even Brazil produced hundreds of thousands of automobiles per year. However, the government did not accept Erbakan idea; a government official who listened to his presentation remarked that "we are a backward country, we cannot do it". See, Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 15-16.

<sup>711</sup> There are two different views on why the factory was named Gümüş (Silver). The first opinion is that the name "Silver" was given to the factory by Erbakan since İstanbul Technical University is located in the Gümüşsuyu (Silver Water) district of İstanbul. The second opinion is that Erbakan used this name because he belonged to the Gümüşhanevi Dervish Lodge, which was very important for the Naqshbandi order. The second possibility is stronger, because this company was founded by the order of Mehmet Zahit Kotku, the Sheik of the Gümüşhanevi Dervish Lodge. See, Soner Yalçın, *Erbakan: Eziyet Edilerek Yalnızlığa Yükseltilen İnatçı Bir Siyasal Liderin Portresi*, (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2013), 27. During the establishment of the factory, Mehmet Zahit Kotku provided financial assistance to Erbakan and became a shareholder in the factory. See, Mete Gündoğan, 35.

<sup>712</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 9-10; Ersin Nazif Gürdoğan, *Görünmeyen Üniversite*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık 2011), 93; Abdul Kadir Macit, 27- 28.

Motor, which was Türkiye's first engine factory.<sup>713</sup> When the prototype of the Gümüş Motor was built, Erbakan faced many bureaucratic obstacles. The government did not allow it to be produced on the pretext that it did not comply with European standards. However, all difficulties were overcome, and mass production was started in 1960.<sup>714</sup> According to Erbakan, the government was deliberately creating these difficulties, because the ministers of industry and foreign affairs of the period were against domestic production in order to appease the West. We can clearly understand the reason for this from the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the period: "When we start to produce domestically, the countries we import from will resent us".<sup>715</sup> Ahmet Tahtakılıç (1909-2000) Minister of National Education at the time, stated that it was a faulty production attempt. In addition, according to Kemal Kurdaş (1920-2011), Minister of Finance at the time, Türkiye was "a backward country", and it was unable to produce simpler things than an engine.<sup>716</sup>

Gümüş Motor produced domestic and national models of engines with a market value of 7000 Turkish Lira, and offered them for sale at 5000 Turkish Lira. While imports should have been stopped under these conditions, imports were increased, and foreign engines began to be sold for 4000 Turkish Lira in the market. Gümüş Motor, which was in a difficult situation, reduced its prices to 3500 Turkish Lira, whereupon imported engines began to be sold for 2800 Turkish Lira. Eventually, the Gümüş Motor enterprise collapsed because of the hostile competition of vehicle importers.<sup>717</sup> Erbakan tried to keep up with the competition, and so he registered the İstanbul Chamber of Industry in 1959. He decided to continue fighting for the industrial development of Türkiye in the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges. Erbakan, who became a professor in 1965, became the Union of Chambers President of the Department of Industry in 1966. He became the general

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<sup>713</sup> Sinem Ulutürk Cinbiş, Leaders' Reactions to Exogenous Political Shocks: An Analysis of Necmettin Erbakan's & Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Leadership Traits and Styles, Unpublished PhD Thesis's Bilkent University, 2023, 77.

<sup>714</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 8.

<sup>715</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>716</sup> Kemal Şamlıoğlu, *İman- Feraset -Heyecan -Necmettin Erbakan*, in *Genç Erbakan* by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara :EPA-MAT Basım Yayın, 2021,) 210.

<sup>717</sup> Ekrem Kızıldaş, 40-44; Işıl Arpacı, Türk Siyasal Yaşamına Etkileri Bakımından İslamcılık ve Necmettin Erbakan, Unpublished PhD Thesis, İnönü Üniversitesi, 2012, 192; Mete Gündoğan, 37-38.

secretary of **Türkiye** in the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges in 1967.<sup>718</sup> In the same year, he married Nermin Saatçioğlu Erbakan (1943-2005),<sup>719</sup> who served in the Union of Chambers.<sup>720</sup>

While Erbakan was the Secretary General of the Union of Chambers, he drew attention to his defence of small traders and industrialists in Anatolia against large industrialists and merchants.<sup>721</sup> This is because almost all of the loans given by the Union of Chambers were disbursed to the big importers in İstanbul, so the traders in Anatolia suffered from serious foreign exchange problems, whereby they could not realize their development goals. For Erbakan, the reason for this was the existence of forces that did not want Türkiye's industrialization and development.<sup>722</sup> According to Erbakan, the Union of Chambers was completely "comprador – Mason" works as a minority agent. The Union of Chambers was under the absolute control of comprador commerce and industry, who did not want Anatolian merchants to develop.<sup>723</sup> Due to such political thoughts and statements, Erbakan was unlawfully dismissed by the Union of Chambers, with police harassment.<sup>724</sup>

### 5.3 WORKS

We can divide Erbakan's works under two main groupings: academic books, and books on social and political issues. Erbakan conducted academic studies on the principles of

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<sup>718</sup> Ahmet Akgül ,29; İrfan Ersin, 7.

<sup>719</sup> Their first daughter Zeynep was born in 1968. Their second daughter Elif was born in 1974. Their son Muhammed Fatih was born in 1979. See, Mashitah Sulaiman & Mohammad Redzuan Othman, "Kenaikan dan Kejatuhan Parti-parti Berlandaskan Islam di Turki, 1970 – 2002", *Jurnal Kinabalu*, Vol.21, (2015), 50; Soner Yalçın, 34.

<sup>720</sup> Mete Gündoğan, 47.

<sup>721</sup> Çetin Demirhan, *Milli Nizamdan Refah'a Erbakan Nereye Koşuyor*, (İstanbul: Tempo Kitapları.1994), 7.

<sup>722</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 16; İrfan Ersin, 84.

<sup>723</sup> İsmail Cem, *Türkiye Üzerine (Araştırmalar)*, (İstanbul: Cem Yayıncılık, 1970), 57; Ruşen Çakır, *Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994), 22-23; Muammer Yenilmez, *Türkiye'de Mühendisler ve Siyaset*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2007,155.

<sup>724</sup> Mehmet Ergin, *Asrın Lideri Erbakan*, (İstanbul: Ravza Yayınları, 2015), 45-49; Ahmet Akgül, 29; Abdul Kadir Macit, 30.

combustion of engines and fuels, and wrote books in this field before his political life, but after he officially entered politics in 1969, and wrote books on social and political issues.

### 5.3.1 Academic Books

Erbakan's major academic books comprised *Dizel Motorlarda Ateşleme Gecikmesi Üzerine Yeni Araştırmalar* (New Research on Ignition Delay in Diesel Engines) (published by the Technical University Press in 1957), *Motorlarda Tutuşma* (Ignition in Engines) (1959), *Motor Maksatlarına Göre Yakıtların Tutuşma Özelliklerinin Tayini Hakkında Alıv Metodu* (Alıv Method on the Determination of Ignition Properties of Fuels According to Engine Purposes) (1962), *Aehnlichkeitstheorie und Dimensionlose Kenngrößen bei der: Aerothermochemie* (Similarity Theory and Dimensionless Parameters in Aerothermal Chemistry) (in German, in 1964), and *Isı Yayılımı* (Heat Transport) (written together with Hulki Erem in 1964).

### 5.3.2 Social and Political Books

#### 5.3.2.1 *Müsbet İlim ve İslam (Positive Science and Islam, 1969)*

This book contains Erbakan's speeches given at the conference he gave at Erzurum Public Education Center in 1969. It was compiled by Remzi Çetinkaya and republished in 2013 under the name *İslam ve İlim* (Islam and Science). The main subject of the book is that all sciences such as mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, physics, medicine, and history, which are popularly considered to belong to the West in Türkiye, were actually pioneered by Muslims. Moreover, the way for positive sciences to reach further than where they have reached today is through Islam and the Quran.<sup>725</sup>

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<sup>725</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Müsbet İlim ve İslam*, (Konya: Konya Denizkuşları Matbaası, 1970).

### **5.3.2.2 Mecliste Ortak Pazar (Common Market in Parliament, 1971)**

In this book, which was first published in 1971, Erbakan explained that Türkiye should not enter the common market. According to him, if Türkiye enters a common market with the West, it will lose its national sovereignty and national industry in the political field and become a *de facto* colony of the West. According to him, there are great differences between Türkiye and Western countries in terms of economic level. Therefore, a common market with the West would pave the way for Türkiye to become a colony of Western countries. Based on his experience of how Western industrial exporters worked hand-in-glove with the political establishment within Türkiye to prevent industrialization, it was clear to him that Europe envisaged Türkiye as an exporter of cheap food and importer of expensive industrial products.

Consequently, Erbakan argued that Türkiye's main aim should be to create a common market with Eastern countries, with which it shared historical and cultural ties, and with which it had relative balance and parity in terms of economic and technological development. As a result, Erbakan emphasized in this book that Türkiye should re-establish relations with Eastern countries instead of European countries to improve commercial and cultural relations, offering an economic rationale for the opposite approach to the Eurocentric "modernization" paradigm of the government.<sup>726</sup>

### **5.3.2.3 Sanayi Davamız (Our Industrial Cause, 1973)**

This book includes Erbakan's speech at the İstanbul conference he went to as the guest of *Milli Gazete* (Nation Gazette). In this book, published in 1973, Erbakan emphasized why Türkiye should industrialize. According to him, Türkiye's industrialization was a necessity, and he claimed that the "heavy industry move" should be initiated to save our country from

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<sup>726</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Mecliste Ortak Pazar*, (İzmir: Tek Yol Neşriyatı, 1973).

underdevelopment and to open business areas. The plans and projects of large factories across the country should be prepared with the vision of local and national production in all aspects, not just assembly. Otherwise, Türkiye would be a backward country vulnerable to economic exploitation and cultural invasion. Therefore, to avoid these problems, Türkiye must have a local and national industry to become a developed country.<sup>727</sup>

#### **5.3.2.4 Milli Görüş (National Outlook, 1975)**

In this book, published in 1975, the *Milli Görüş Hareketi* (National Outlook Movement) (MGH) established by Erbakan was explained. The basic principle of this movement is to revitalize the great civilization of the Turkish nation, which in former times shed light on all humanity. Additionally, the MGH is a movement established to get rid of the “imitator mentality”. For this purpose, individuals with the National Vision ideology seek to protect Türkiye’s national culture and values, and are against Western imitation. They know that the capitalist, exploitative, usury system of the West cannot bring happiness to humanity. As a result, for Erbakan, Türkiye’s biggest problem is “the problem of imitation”. This problem is also the biggest obstacle to Türkiye’s development. To get rid of this problem, it is necessary to eliminate the “imitative mentality” and replace it with the idea of a “National Outlook”.<sup>728</sup>

#### **5.3.2.5 Millet Meclisi Konuşması: Materyalizm ve Maneviyatçılık (Speech to the National Assembly: Materialism and Spiritualism, 1976)**

This book detailed Erbakan’s speech about materialism and spirituality delivered in the GNA. In his speech, he emphasized that the spirituality of Turkish youth should be developed by the state. According to Erbakan, the Turkish education system is based on

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<sup>727</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Sanayi Davamız*, (İstanbul: Mili Gazete Yayınları, 1973).

<sup>728</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975).

materialism, which he considered the root cause for the increasing prevalence of anarchic events in society. He argued that police measures would not be sufficient to maintain order, and that addressing underlying issues with education was the only way to eliminate these social problems. He argued that the education system should be based on Turkish national and spiritual values, and not materialism. For example, with the materialist education system, students do not learn why they should not rob banks; they can only learn this in a spirituality-based education system. For this reason, Erbakan emphasized the importance of giving importance to spiritual education for a more just world order.<sup>729</sup>

#### **5.3.2.6 Körfez Krizi - Emperyalizm ve Petrol (Gulf Crisis - Imperialism and Oil, 1991)**

Erbakan described the Gulf crisis in this book, including the high-level political meetings he held with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Muslim countries for 22 days and 22 nights, together with the Muslim Community Union, within the scope of the Gulf peace operation. However, he emphasizes that despite all these efforts, then-President Turgut Özal (1927-1993) acted together with US President George Bush (1926-2018) and sided with Israel, and his efforts were inconclusive. According to Erbakan, most of the Turkish nation did not want war between Muslim countries; on the contrary, they wanted peace. However, Özal approached the issue as if he wanted war to break out in the Gulf as soon as possible. He took steps that violated the existing constitutional order and caused great material and moral damage to the country. As a result, Türkiye did not contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis among Muslim countries.<sup>730</sup>

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<sup>729</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Millet Meclisi Konuşması: Materyalizm ve Maneviyatçılık*, (Ankara: Başbakan Yardımcılığı Basın Müşavirliği, 1976).

<sup>730</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Körfez Krizi - Emperyalizm ve Petrol*, (Ankara: Rehber Yayıncılık, 1991).

### ***5.3.2.7 Erbakan Açıklıyor: Kenan Evren'in Anılarındaki Yanılgılar (Erbakan Explains: Misconceptions in Kenan Evren's Memoirs, 1991)***

Erbakan wrote this book as a response to the book *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* (Memoirs of Kenan Evren), published in 1990 by Kenan Evren (1917-2015), the leader of the 12 September 1980 Military Coup. Evren made many accusations against Erbakan in his book, in which he described the pre-coup and preparations for the coup. Erbakan, wrote a book in response to Evren's claims and revealed and rebutted contradictions and mistakes in Evren's work one-by-one. For example, one of Erbakan's answers was about heavy industry.

According to Evren's claim, Erbakan laid the foundations of the factories without any plan, program, or feasibility study, just to increase voting potential. As shown by Erbakan, these allegations were unfounded and were meant to mislead the state and the nation, and Evren himself attended the opening ceremonies of some of Erbakan's heavy industry investments such as Polatlı Construction Equipment Factory and Çankırı Heavy Industry and Equipment Factory. Moreover, in his opening speeches, he stated that he was proud of these factories' contribution to the Turkish nation. Another example is related to the Cyprus peace operation. He explains that Evren presented the ceasefire in his book as if he had prevented it, but this is not true. As a result, Erbakan responded to many more unfounded claims like these examples from this book.<sup>731</sup>

### ***5.3.2.8 Adil Ekonomik Düzen (Fair Economic Order, 1991)***

In this book, Erbakan describes the Fair Economic Order, which is the economic model of the MGH. According to him, the main problem of the economic order and policies in Türkiye is interest, and a more balanced, more humane economic order can be possible by

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<sup>731</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Erbakan Açıklıyor: Kenan Evren'in Anılarındaki Yanılgılar*, (Ankara: Rehber Yayıncılık, 1991).

abolishing it. In the Fair Economic Order, individuals can come together to form partnerships and combine their savings to engage in economic activities. There are both ways of partnerships, the first of which is to come together and produce a product in a facility and sell it with profit, and to divide the profit among the partners. The other is to establish a facility as a partner, to make a profit by producing and selling the goods produced in this facility, or to make a profit by selling the facility and to divide the profit among the partners (in other words, to be a partner in both the facility and its production and profit). Thus, a person uses the opportunity to consume more than he saves from his production for a temporary period, under certain conditions. In the use of this system, neither interest nor inflation will naturally occur. As a result, if the Fair Economic Order is implemented, Türkiye will no longer be a country left behind due to heavy foreign debts and interest.<sup>732</sup>

#### ***5.3.2.9 Türkiye'nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri (Türkiye's Issues and Solutions, 1991)***

In this book, Erbakan focused on Türkiye's basic issues and solutions. Erbakan thinks that Türkiye's main obstacle to development is its attempts to imitate the West ("the problem of imitation"). To get rid of this problem, it is necessary to eliminate the "imitative mentality" and replace it with the idea of "national vision". If this mentality is not overcome, the nation will completely lose its own identity. An imitative nation cannot have advanced technology and industry, so it lags behind other societies. It is very natural for a backward nation to be economically exploited and culturally invaded by foreign cultures. As a result, that society is doomed to lose its independence. For this reason, Türkiye should protect its own culture and values and stay away from Western imitation.<sup>733</sup>

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<sup>732</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, (Ankara: Semih Ofset Matbaa, 1991).

<sup>733</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye'nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri*, (Ankara: Semih Ofset Matbaacılık, 1991).

### **5.3.2.10 *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri (Türkiye's Main Issues, 1991)***

In this book, Erbakan focused on the underlying problems facing Türkiye, particularly Türkiye's application to join the EU, which he criticized, due to Türkiye not having Western values, whereby he claimed that it does not need to unite with the Westerners. Instead, he argued that such a union should be established among Muslim nations, with whom Türkiye shares common historical and cultural heritage, which would better serve Türkiye's economic interests and future safety and security. Another important problem that Erbakan focused on is the "imitation problem", as alluded to previously. To get rid of this problem, he explained that the "imitator mentality" must be eliminated and replaced with the idea of "national vision". An imitator nation cannot have advanced technology and industry, so it falls behind other societies. As a result, Türkiye's problems cannot be solved by following and cooperating with the West.<sup>734</sup>

### **5.3.2.11 *Milli Şahlanış: 1. Çağrı (National Resurgence: 1st Call, 2002)***

This book includes Erbakan's speeches at the press conference held on 22 August 2002. The main goal of the meeting was to ask for votes from the voters for the elections of 3 November 2002. Recalling the services, he provided to the nation during his time in power, Erbakan emphasized how he saved Türkiye from economic crises and depressions in a short time and how he raised the welfare level of the people to an unprecedented level. On the other hand, he emphasized that those who came after him did not cause material and moral destruction in Türkiye in five years. He asked for votes from the Turkish people to end this situation.<sup>735</sup>

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<sup>734</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri*, (Ankara: Rehber Yayınları, 1991).

<sup>735</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Şahlanış: 1. Çağrı*, Ankara: Milli Gazete, 2002).

### **5.3.2.12 *Türkiye ve Ekonomi (Türkiye and Economy)***

This book contains the speeches of Erbakan delivered at a conference at İstanbul Lütfi Kırdar International Congress Centre on 27 April 2001. In these texts, Erbakan touched upon the economic troubles in Türkiye and the associated sociological problems arising from them. He showed the economic situation of Türkiye by putting economic news in all the newspapers of the period. For example, according to official statistics it was revealed that there are 22 million poor people in Türkiye, and he also mentioned that local and foreign investors are deterred from investing in the country due to economic instability. In line with the news, he compiled from the newspapers of the period, he revealed the fact that many civil servants and employees committed suicide due to financial difficulties. Referring to how he strengthened the economy during his time in power, Erbakan proposed a Fair Economic Order, which is the economic policy of the MGH, as a solution to these problems.<sup>736</sup>

### **5.3.2.13 *Erbakan Konuşuyor: Türkiye'nin Kurtuluş Yolu (Erbakan Speaking: The Path to Türkiye's Salvation, 2005)***

Some reformist members, including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (b. 1954) who was previously a member of Erbakan's *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party) (FP), founded a new party called the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) (AKP) and won the elections of 3 November 2002. After this election, Uğur Dündar (b. 1943), the producer of the political program called Arena, invited Erbakan to his program and asked him to express his opinions about this event. This book contains Erbakan's speeches in the program called Arena in which he participated on 28 November 2002. The speeches in that program were compiled and turned into a book in 2005.<sup>737</sup>

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<sup>736</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye ve Ekonomi*, (Ankara: Milsan Basın, 2002).

<sup>737</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Erbakan Konuşuyor: Türkiye'nin Kurtuluş Yolu*, (İstanbul: Milli Gazete, 2005).

#### **5.3.2.14 İslam - Batı Diyalogu ve Geleceđi (Islam - Western Dialogue and Its Future, 2006)**

This book includes Erbakan's speeches at the Riyadh Conference titled "Islam-West Dialogue and Its Future", which he attended as the guest of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd bin Abdulaziz (1921-2005) in 2001. The speeches at that conference were compiled and turned into a book in 2006. In the book, Erbakan talked about the history of Islamic Civilization and the contributions of Muslims to the world of science. He also talked about the "Developing Eight Organization for Economic Cooperation" (D-8) and the main philosophy of the MGH.<sup>738</sup>

#### **5.3.2.15 Yeni Bir Dünya ve Adil Düzen (A New World and Fair Order, 2021)**

This book, published posthumously, is an updated complement to Erbakan's *Fair Economic Order*. In this book, Erbakan claimed that a more balanced, more humane economic order would be possible by abolishing interest. He emphasized that the current usury capitalist economic system is doomed to gradual collapse, and he claimed that Türkiye should establish a new fair order by establishing an interest-free economic system and developing local and national technology.<sup>739</sup>

#### **5.3.2.16 Milli Görüş İktidarı: Niçin ve Nasıl (National Outlook Power, Why and How?, 2016)**

This posthumous collection contains Erbakan's speeches delivered at the last conference he attended at the Economic and Social Research Center in Ankara on 8 December 2010.

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<sup>738</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *İslam - Batı Diyalogu ve Geleceđi*, (İstanbul: Milsan, 2006).

<sup>739</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Yeni Bir Dünya ve Adil Düzen*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MG V Yayınları, 2021).

The book was prepared by Üzeyir Türk after Erbakan's death, and was published in 2016. In this book, Erbakan focused on the dangers of Zionist forces and the "Slave Order" created by imperialism and Zionism in the world. He specified that this order is maintained in Türkiye through "imitative parties", who surrendered to the West by borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and entrenched the Slave Order in Türkiye. Among other global objectives, he considered that this was the Zionists' plan to destroy Türkiye and keep it in a state of permanent weakness and subjugation. According to this plan, Türkiye will become poorer, unemployment will increase, and it will become increasingly and irredeemably indebted to the IMF. Moreover, Türkiye will move away from religion, and the people will be divided into groups, rendering it easy to dominate by the Zionists. To avoid this situation, he argues that economic and cultural policies of the MGH should be implemented.<sup>740</sup>

#### **5.3.2.17 *Davam (My Case, 2020)***

This posthumous tract was republished in 2020 by Aktaş Publishing under the name *Davamız* (Our Case). In the book, Erbakan's life is first told in his own words. Information about where and in which year he was born, what kind of education he received, and which community he belongs to is shared with the reader. Later, Erbakan expressed his ideas under several headings. The most important of these is the title "Our Cause of Civilization", in which he emphasized that the Turkish nation has its own ancient civilization, which should not be considered inferior to Western civilization. Again, in this context, he strongly opposed the idea that Türkiye should imitate the West to develop. In the section "Our Industrial Situation", he emphasized that the most important thing in industrialization is to establish a local and national industry. In other words, he expressed the necessity of being a country with production facilities rather than being an assembly industry country. As a result, Erbakan emphasized in this book that there is no need to imitate the West to become

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<sup>740</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş İktidarı: Niçin ve Nasıl*, edited by Üzeyir Türk (Ankara: MG V Yayınları, 2022).

an independent, strong, developed, and modern country; on the contrary, Türkiye needs to be “local and national” in every field.<sup>741</sup>

### **5.3.2.18 İslam Birliđi (Islamic Union, 2022)**

This book was prepared for publication by Tacettin Çetinkaya after Erbakan’s death. It includes Erbakan’s conference speeches on Islamic unity, in which he emphasized the importance of political and economic unity among Muslims in the Islamic world. In this context, he also mentioned in the book the D-8 community (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Türkiye), which he established to improve and strengthen the situation of developing countries. According to him, Türkiye should cooperate with such Muslim countries in order to develop a new global political formation to mutually develop and resist imperialism.<sup>742</sup>

### **5.3.3 Translations**

In 1957, Erbakan translated Peter Schuler’s book “New Developments in Large Ship Diesel Engines” from German into Turkish, and later translated the same author’s book “Development Directions of Diesel Engines Used in Railway Vehicles”. In 1958, two conferences given by Emil Flatz, general manager of Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz factories, one of Germany’s leading factories, at İstanbul Technical University were translated into Turkish by Erbakan. The first of these is the “Birthplace of the Engine”. This translation was published in the 9th issue of İstanbul Technical University Motors Institute Publications. It was also printed by İstanbul Alpaslan Printing House. The other translation is “The Little Philosophy of Technical Construction”. In 1959, he translated Josef Bradik’s book “Technology of Circlips” from English into Turkish. In 1964, he translated Otto

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<sup>741</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, edited by Yusuf Aktaş, (İstanbul: Aktaş Yayınları, 2020).

<sup>742</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *İslam Birliđi*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MGV Yayınları, 2022).

Cordier's book, "Special Problems in the Construction of Air-Cooled Diesel Engines", from German into Turkish. In 1965 he translated Otto Kraemer's book, "Engine Construction and Calculation" from German into Turkish.

Also in the same year, he translated Arno Beckers's book, "Investigation of the Self-Ignition Properties of Fuels in a Compression Apartment", from German into Turkish. In the same year, he translated Albrecht W. Hussmann's books "Fuel Spray Distribution into an Air Vortex: Stratified Charge Engines" and "Development Studies of an Air-Cooled Two-Stroke Diesel Engine" from English into Turkish.

Finally, he translated some non-technical works into Turkish, including Maxime Rodinson's (1915-2004) book "In the Footsteps of Muhammad" in 1973, printed at Özdemir Printing House. This work was originally in French, but it was subsequently translated into 25 languages; it is unclear from which language Erbakan translated it into Turkish, but it seems likely he would have translated it from the German version, given his proficiency in that language.

## **5.4 POLITICAL LIFE**

### **5.4.1 Early Activities**

One of the important reasons why Erbakan entered into politics was his wish for Türkiye to achieve industrialization and political independence from imperialism. He entered politics to develop domestic and national industry with the encouragement of the Gümüşhanevi Dervish Lodge, of which he was a member, and his teacher Mehmet Zahit Kotku.<sup>743</sup> Erbakan, who left the Union of Chambers, applied to be a Konya deputy candidate from the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party) in 1969. However, Justice Party members

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<sup>743</sup> İrfan Ersin, 309.

İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (1908-1993), İsmet Sezgin (1928-2016), and Mustafa Gülcügil (1917-2008) did not want Erbakan to join the party because he was religious.<sup>744</sup>

After being rejected by the Justice Party, Erbakan became an independent parliamentary candidate from Konya, where he held a major rally on 8 October 1969.<sup>745</sup> Important attendees included Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983)<sup>746</sup> and Mustafa Yazgan (1940-2021). Erbakan subsequently won the seat in the 1969 elections and became an independent deputy from Konya.<sup>747</sup> However, the democratic election outraged Türkiye's modernists, who could not denounce Erbakan as a backward village *hodja* because of his industrial and scientific prestige. One of these was Ümit Yaşar Oğuzcan (1926-1984), who published the following vitriolic vituperative against Erbakan:

...You reinvented reactionism, professor... You unleashed bigotry,  
Professor... Your name and your title/ You screwed up, Professor...<sup>748</sup>

Erbakan consulted with many important scholars in the country, such as Mehmet Zahit Kotku, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, and Bayburtlu Paşa Dede (1884-1974). In line with these consultations, he founded his first political party, the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) (MNP), on 24 January 1970.<sup>749</sup> The MNP was a socially conservative, centre-right, liberal political party that favoured a revived Islamic consciousness.<sup>750</sup> This party

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<sup>744</sup> Oral Çalışlılar & Tolga Çelik, *İslamcılığın Üç Kolu*, (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2006), 34.

<sup>745</sup> Muhammed Khan Kayani, *Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey & His political Thoughts*, (İstanbul: The Ummah, 1996), 18; Mustafa Peköz, *İslamcı Cumhuriyete Doğru*, (İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2009), 377; Ahmet Akgül, 29; Sinem Ulutürk Cinbiş, 78.

<sup>746</sup> Necip Fazıl supported Erbakan to help Türkiye get rid of the “Western imitation”. He also supported Erbakan for the development of national industry, which is one of the most important elements of being a modern country. Necip Fazıl was strongly against blindly imitating the West. Necip Fazıl has always criticized that raw materials and tools are brought from the West and operated here. He claimed that this made Türkiye an assembly industry. According to him, unless domestic and national industry develops in Türkiye, it will not be able to avoid imitating the West. See, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Türkiye'nin Manzarası*, (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 1985), 65.

<sup>747</sup> Abdul Kadir Macit, 31-32.

<sup>748</sup> Soner Yalçın, 48.

<sup>749</sup> Sebahattin Uçar, *Savunan Adam*, (İstanbul: Yasin Yayınevi, 2000), 93.

<sup>750</sup> Henri Barkey, “Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question”, *World Policy Journal*, Vol.13, No.1,(1996), 46.

was the first party established in the RoT based on “Islamic references”.<sup>751</sup> The most important proof of this is the open support of Eşref Edib (1882-1971) and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, the pioneers of the Islamist movement in Türkiye, to the MNP. Moreover, it was Eşref Edib who gave the party its name, and its emblem of a hand pointing to the heavens in an Islamic manner.<sup>752</sup> However, due to Erbakan’s Islamic-referenced discourse, a lawsuit was filed against the Party claiming that it was violating the constitutional framework. The MNP was dissolved on 20 May 1971 because it was against the “secular state nature and the principles of protecting Atatürk’s reformism”.<sup>753</sup>

Erbakan, who attended the court on behalf of the MNP in the party closure case, declared in his defence that the purpose of the establishment of the MNP was to eliminate social and moral deficiencies, and moreover claimed that the reason for the supposed backwardness of Turkish society was Western imitation. According to him, the only reason why Türkiye were “backward” in national education, industry, science, and the economy was “Westernization” itself. Erbakan’s defence did not work, and the Constitutional Court officially decided to dissolve the party.<sup>754</sup> Saddened by this situation, Erbakan fell ill and went to Switzerland for treatment, and did not return until the 1973 general elections.<sup>755</sup> However, he continued his political activities in Switzerland, where in 1970 he established Milli Görüş Teşkilatı (National View Organization), to gather support among expatriate Turks in Europe.<sup>756</sup>

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<sup>751</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *The New Sultan, Erdogan and The Crisis Of Modern Turkey*, (London: I.B.Tauris &Co. Ltd, 2017), 40.

<sup>752</sup> Süleyman Arif Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl*, (Ankara: MGV Yayınları, 2015), 169; Hüsamettin Ertem, *Yaşayanların Dilinden Milli Görüş*, (İstanbul: Ravza Yayınları, 2015), 29.

<sup>753</sup> Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan Türkiye’de İslami Oluşumlar*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995), 231; Ekrem Zahid Boyraz, Necmettin Erbakan’ın Eğitim Anlayışı, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi, 2019, 36; Abdul Kadir Macit, 33.

<sup>754</sup> Işıl Arpacı, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamına Etkileri Bakımından İslamcılık ve Necmettin Erbakan*, 203.

<sup>755</sup> Ekrem Zahid Boyraz, 36; Ömer Baykal & Ömer Çaha, 6.

<sup>756</sup> Birol Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party”, *Turkish Studies*, No. 3, Vol.1, (2007), 73.

#### 5.4.2 *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party)

Following the MNP's closure, Erbakan established the *Milli Selamet Partisi*<sup>757</sup> (National Salvation Party) (MSP) On 11 October 1972<sup>758</sup>. However, since Erbakan was banned from politics, he did not take an active role in the establishment of the party and continued his political life independently for a while. Therefore, Süleyman Arif Emre (1923-2019) became the MSP's chairman.<sup>759</sup>

In the 1973 elections, the MSP received 11.8 percent of the votes and became the third-largest party in the GNA.<sup>760</sup> Erbakan returned to Türkiye in October, a week after the 1973 elections, and became the leader of the MSP. However, according to the election results, neither party had the votes to form the government alone.<sup>761</sup> On 17 October, the parties began negotiations for the formation of a coalition government. After long negotiations, the CHP<sup>762</sup> and MSP's leaders Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006) and Erbakan made mutual concessions and agreed on a coalition, and a coalition government was formed.

This alliance was an extremely difficult and unstable alliance from the very beginning. The MSP was associated with Islamic and Ottoman values and the principles of respect for tradition, and being in coalition with such a party caused extreme discomfort in

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<sup>757</sup> The National Order Party was closed, but the people who supported this party, giving importance to spirituality and industrialization, demanded the establishment of a new party. In this direction, the National Salvation Party was established, which prioritizes national and spiritual values and also aims to develop the national industry. See, Mete Gündoğan, 66.

<sup>758</sup> Jacob M. Landau, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey", *Asian and African Studies*, Vol.11, No.1, (1976), 6.

<sup>759</sup> Fahrettin Poyraz, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Milli Görüş Hareketi*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2006, 106.

<sup>760</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, (London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 331-335.

<sup>761</sup> Soner Yalçın, 80-81; Fahrettin Poyraz, 108-109.

<sup>762</sup> The Republican People's Party is the party founded by Atatürk in 1923. It was the only party that ruled Türkiye for 27 years until the multi-party system. See, Esra Polat, Syed Ahmet Arvasi's (1932-1988) Critique Of Turkish Nationalism, Unpublished M.A Thesis, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2021, 37.

the CHP, which positioned it as the heir to the political tradition of Kemalism.<sup>763</sup> However, despite all these negativities, an alliance was formed and Bülent Ecevit became the prime minister, with Erbakan as his deputy in the new cabinet.<sup>764</sup> Both sides had good reasons for this partnership. The CHP found the MSP's point of view on economic problems logical, and decided to go into a coalition partnership. Thanks to this coalition government, the MSP would have the opportunity to introduce its party to the nation and get it accepted. More importantly, the MSP would have the opportunity to take part in the bureaucracy.<sup>765</sup>

However, entering into a coalition with the CHP caused Erbakan to lose many supporters, and there was a deep division and disintegration among the party members. Important supporters and patrons who had supported Erbakan withdrew their support.<sup>766</sup> The most significant of these was Necip Fazıl, who withdrew his support for Erbakan and his party.<sup>767</sup> The conditions demanded by Erbakan to form a coalition with the CHP were as follows:

1. National ethics lessons will be included in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools. In addition, İmam Hatip school secondary schools will reopen. More importantly, İmam Hatip school graduates will be able to enter universities.
2. Historical foundations and mosques will be allowed to be used for their intended purpose.
3. An industry incentive law will be enacted, and interest-free profit partnership-based loans will be given. More importantly, heavy industry will be established.
4. The Ministry of Agriculture will become the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock, and the Ministry of Industry will be established.<sup>768</sup>

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<sup>763</sup> Rustam Alkhazurovich Tovsultanov & Malika Sharipovna Tovsultanova & Galimova Liliya Nadipovna, Cyprus Problem In Domestic Political Life Of Turkey In 1960-1970's, International Scientific Conference, Social and Cultural Transformations in the Context of Modern Globalism, 2021,1555.

<sup>764</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (London: Routledge, 1994), 216.

<sup>765</sup> Nilay Kazdal, *Türkiye'de 1970 Sonrası Kurulan Koalisyon Hükümetlerinde Demokrasi Anlayışı*, Unpublished M.A Thesis Maltepe Üniversitesi, 2020, 25.

<sup>766</sup> Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme Din ve Parti Politikası: Milli Selamet Partisi Örnek Olayı*, (İstanbul: Alan Yayınları, 1985) 167; Sinem Ulutürk Cinbiş, 79; Abdul Kadir Macit, 34.

<sup>767</sup> Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Raporlar 3/ 4, (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 2009), 121.

<sup>768</sup> Soner Yalçın, 90-91.

Perhaps the most challenging of these stipulations for Kemalists was Erbakan's demand that *İmam Hatip* school graduates be allowed to enter universities, which was something İlhan had opposed, as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, Erbakan ensured that the diplomas of those studying in Muslim countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia were considered valid. The heavy industry initiative he initiated sought to save Türkiye from systematic underdevelopment (which he had experienced personally when attempting to introduce domestic industrial production), and to open up business areas. The plans and projects of 200 large factories across the country were prepared with the vision of "domestic and national production in all aspects, not assembly".<sup>769</sup>

As can be seen, Erbakan's wishes were to pave the way for domestic and national industrialization, which is the most important pillar of modernization. In addition, breaking the dominance of Western culture entailed necessary demands for acknowledgement of the existence and validity of Turkish citizens' religion and culture. Between these coalition partners with opposing ideologies, frictions continued due to internal politics. These problems reached their climax with the Cyprus problem,<sup>770</sup> which ultimately caused the coalition to fall apart on 17 November 1974.<sup>771</sup> The Justice Party, MSP, Republican Reliance Party, and Nationalist Movement Party came together and formed a new coalition, and formed the 39th Government on 31 March 1975. However, this coalition did not have

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<sup>769</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 184-185.

<sup>770</sup> There was a disagreement between the coalition government on whether to intervene in the occupation of Cyprus by the Greeks. See, Abdul Kadir Macit, 35. As a solution to this issue, Ecevit decided to go to the UK and was thinking of meeting with the British Prime Minister, but Erbakan thought that this would be a waste of time, as the British government would never give Ecevit the support he wanted anyway. See, Fadime Tosik Dinç, "Necmettin Erbakan ve Kıbrıs Barış Harekati", *ESAM Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol.3, No. 1, (2022), 130-131. Despite the decision of Ecevit and his supporters, Erbakan made a big attempt and decided to operate in Cyprus on 20 July 1974. Despite Britain's refusal and the United Nations ceasefire decision, Erbakan was successful in this move. See, Abdul Kadir Macit, 35. Necmettin Erbakan explained the necessity of intervening in Cyprus as follows: "Cyprus, Turkey's integrity is insurance. Cyprus means Türkiye. Cyprus is of great importance for the peace of the Middle East, the peace of the Islamic world and the protection of Türkiye". See, Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 160. The success of the Cyprus Peace Operation is undoubtedly Erbakan's, but all credit was attributed to Ecevit and his party in the Turkish mainstream media. For this reason, there was tension in the relations between the Republican People's Party and the National Salvation Party. See, Muzaffer Ayhan Kara, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında 1961 Sonrası Bir Olgu Demokrasi Ve Uzlaşma Kültürü Açısından Koalisyonlar*, (İstanbul: Otopsi, 2004), 128.

<sup>771</sup> Ezel Erverdi, *Nurettin Topçu Dünden Kalanlar ve Geleceğe Umutlar*, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2019), 475.

a long life, and for various political and economic reasons, it was decided to hold early elections on 5 June 1977. A majority could not be achieved in this early election and the parties had to form a coalition again.

The Justice Party, the MSP, and the Nationalist Movement Party came together to form a new coalition.<sup>772</sup> On 21 June 1977, this coalition, which took office, disintegrated in a short time of five months. Then the CHP, the Republican Reliance Party, and the Democratic Party, together with the independents, formed yet a new short-lived coalition on 5 January 1978.<sup>773</sup> Bülent Ecevit resigned due to many reasons, such as not being able to find a solution to the economic and social problems in the country. With the support of the MSP and Nationalist Movement Party from outside, Süleyman Demirel (1924-2015), on 12 November 1979 formed the new government.<sup>774</sup>

In the 1980s, religious and ethnic conflicts became intensified, and these conflicts were also reflected in politics. Türkiye was in complete chaos at the parliamentary and public levels. In September 1980, the army made another military coup and took over the government. The National Security Council assumed all legislative and executive powers, and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was removed from his position, with General Kenan Evren (1917-2015) becoming President. All political parties were terminated and their leaders were detained.<sup>775</sup> On the morning of September 12, Erbakan, together with other leaders, was detained. While Ecevit and Demirel were released after about a month of detention, Erbakan was subjected to a military tribunal (Mamak) for questioning. On 15 October, 1980, Erbakan and a group of MSP executives and party members were arrested and charged with anti-secularism and illegality. They were released in July 1981 and were acquitted of all charges in 1983. However, he and some of his close friends were banned from politics, like other party leaders.<sup>776</sup>

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<sup>772</sup> Sebahattin Uçar, 145-146.

<sup>773</sup> İrfan Ersin, 10-11.

<sup>774</sup> Ekrem Kızıldaş, 222.

<sup>775</sup> George S. Harris, "Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960–1980", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.12, No.2, (2011), 212; Esra Polat, 40.

<sup>776</sup> Ekrem Kızıldaş, 229-230-233-255.

### 5.4.3 *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party)

The biggest reason why Erbakan took part in coalitions was that he wanted to develop industry and technology in Türkiye. In the coalitions formed within this, the Ministry of Industry and Technology was always given to Erbakan's party. This was the reason why Erbakan entered politics anyway. He wanted to develop Türkiye's industry and thus make it a modern developed country.<sup>777</sup> Erbakan never gave up on this case. Thus, Erbakan decided to establish a new party. Erbakan founded the *Refah Partisi* (RP) with his former party mates in 1983, and after his political ban was lifted in 1987, Erbakan was elected party leader.<sup>778</sup> In the general elections of 20 October 1991, Erbakan took place in the parliament as a deputy of *Konya*. In the 1994 local elections, the RP won a majority in metropolitan cities such as *Ankara* and *İstanbul*.<sup>779</sup> 24 December 1995 RP Chairman Erbakan achieved the most important success of his political life. In the general elections, the RP became the first party to receive the most votes with 21.37 percent.<sup>780</sup>

Erbakan established a coalition cabinet with Tansu Çiller (b. 1946) the chairman of the *Doğruyol Partisi* (True Path Party) on 28 Jun 1996 and Erbakan became prime minister of Türkiye.<sup>781</sup> With the economic policies implemented by Erbakan, the government's demand for borrowing from the markets decreased and the borrowing interest of the treasury decreased since 1997. January 1997, civil servant salaries were increased by 30% and then an additional 25%. The minimum wage was 182 American Dollars in 1995 when the National Vision came to power the minimum wage was subjected to a 20% real increase and reached 210 American Dollars. This increase was equivalent to an increase of about 10% in terms of Turkish Lira value. The average monthly gross wage in the public sector

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<sup>777</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Arkasındakilerle ve Türkiye'nin Kayıplarıyla Darbe*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MGV Yayınları, 2021), 23;

<sup>778</sup> Hakan Yavuz, *Modernleşen Müslümanlar :Nurcular, Nakşiler, Milli Görüş ve Ak Parti*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005, 13; Fahrettin Poyraz, 118-119; Abdul Kadir Macit, 35.

<sup>779</sup> Alessio Chiriatti & Ozgur Tufekci, *Domestic and Regional Uncertainties in the New Turkey*, in *The Trajectory of Political Islam in Turkey*, in *The Trajectory of Political Islam in Turkey* by Necati Anaz & Mustafa Cuneyt Ozsahin, (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 59.

<sup>780</sup> Tuncer Günay, *Mukaddes Kavgam*, (Ankara: Andaç Yayınları, 2014), 19-20.

<sup>781</sup> Sevket Kazan, *Refah Gerçeği I*, (Ankara: Kesif Yayınları, 2004), 144-149.

was 655 American Dollars in 1996; it increased to 993 American Dollars in 1997. *Bağ-Kur* (pension fund for the self-employed) retirees' pensions were increased by 300% in 6 months.

Erbakan managed to contribute 13 billion dollars to the budget by implementing four different resource programs. It also increased the income and purchasing power of peasants, workers, civil servants, and retirees. Thus, there was a great “abundance period” in the economy.<sup>782</sup> More importantly, in 1997, Erbakan proposed the creation of an economic group consisting of eight emerging economies from the Muslim world. D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation was launched by Erbakan.<sup>783</sup> The aim of D-8<sup>784</sup> is to develop trade and cooperation between member states under the leadership of **Türkiye**. It is also to make concrete joint projects around economic development to provide better living conditions. More importantly, improving the situation of developing countries in the world economy is to strengthen.<sup>785</sup>

Alongside Türkiye, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan the organization is based in İstanbul. These breakthroughs of Erbakan and the shifting of the country's foreign policy from the West to the East disturbed Western countries.<sup>786</sup> Some circles in the West, and especially in America, expressed their open

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<sup>782</sup> Ghazala Shahnaz & Obaidullah Fahad, “Religious Reforms and Revival in Turkey: A Study of Erbakan”, *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol.25, No.2, (2020), 68; Fahrettin Poyraz, 135; İrfan Ersin, 258-260.

<sup>783</sup> Sevket Kazan, *28 Subat Posmodern Bir Darbenin Anatomisi*, (Ankara: MGV Yayınları, 2013), 274.

<sup>784</sup> Too many disadvantages and traps emerged to destroy the D-8. Political instability and turmoil were experienced in most of the member states, including Türkiye. Necmettin Erbakan, the architect of the D-8, was first removed from power and then removed from politics. Malaysia's former deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, was jailed on numerous charges. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was also removed from power in a military coup, and Indonesian President Suharto was forced to resign amid a combination of internal opposition and international pressure. See, Berdal Arar, “An Inquiry into the D-8 Experiment: An Incipient Model of an Islamic Common Market?”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No.1&2, (2005), 90; Işıl Arpacı, *Türk Siyasetinde Erbakan*, (İstanbul: Kopernik Kitap, 2017), 317; 318.

<sup>785</sup> Bülent Alan, *D-8: Yeni Bir Dünya*, (İstanbul: Yörünge Yayınları, 2001), 180.

<sup>786</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, (London: Routledge, 2103), 228; Sevket Kazan, *28 Subat Posmodern Bir Darbenin Anatomisi*, 274.

hostility to the D-8, which they saw as unacceptable hostility towards the West.<sup>787</sup> Where Erbakan viewed the Muslim world as Türkiye's natural ally, the military saw itself as the guardian of Türkiye's pro-European and pro-Western aspirations.<sup>788</sup>

Because of these breakthroughs, Erbakan was exposed to months of propaganda. Thus, the establishment of the D-8 became the long-sought evidence of Erbakan's Islamist and anti-Western tendencies. Shortly after the establishment of the D-8, many people in Türkiye overthrew Erbakan in a "post-modern military coup staged on 28 February 1997" designed by the joint efforts of the military and various other groups and institutions in Türkiye.<sup>789</sup> In general, the Turkish people were accustomed to military coups that took place every ten years, as in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Turkish society was punished and reformed with a coup every ten years by the secular army and bureaucracy. However, there was a delay after the 1980 military coup. However, although there was a delay after the 1980 military coup, the situation was no different. The nation was plunged into chaos with the unknown murders, and with these developments, the ground for a coup was created. As a result, a postmodern coup was carried out by the military in 1997.<sup>790</sup> The National Security Council that carried out the coup accused the Erbakan government with the following allegations:

1. Atatürk's principles of secularism were not taken into account.
2. Contrary to Kemalist principles, *Dergah* publications increased their activities.
3. The education policies of the state are not by the law. *Imam Hatip* high schools and faculties of theology became centers of reaction.
4. Sects established radio and television channels and broadcasts against secularism through these channels.
5. The number of mosques and Quran courses has increased considerably.

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<sup>787</sup> Berdal Arar, 100.

<sup>788</sup> Shadi Hamid, "From Erbakan to Erdoğan: The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.6, No.1, (2004), 114.

<sup>789</sup> Berdal Arar, 101.

<sup>790</sup> Abdurrahman Babacan, *28 Subat Süreklilik ve Kopuş "Bin Yılın Sonu Cilt 1"*, (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2012), 346-347.

6. It has been determined that the dress code is not followed and even those who violate this law are protected.<sup>791</sup>

After the 28 February 1997 coup, Türkiye entered the biggest economic crisis in its history. During this crisis, interest rates saw the highest levels in the history of the world and jumped to 7500%. Exchange rates increased by eight percent in one day, the Turkish nation became poor by half. Again in this process, thousands of people were dismissed because of their political views or religious-ideological preferences. There were even those who were prevented from being rehired. Many innocent people lost their jobs because of their clothes.

The 28 February process dealt a blow to the country's human resources. While one of the country's most important economic problems was the shortage of qualified personnel, students were deprived of their right to education with the headscarf ban, uninterrupted education law, and the coefficient barrier with the strict positivist secularism understanding.<sup>792</sup> As can be seen, the Turkish economy, which was improved by the economic policies implemented by Erbakan, fell into pieces as a result of the coup. Türkiye was dragged into a great depression both financially and socially. Consequently, the civilian and military bureaucracy attempted to curb the influence of Islamist power with a soft military coup, or, for some, a postmodern coup, on 28 February 1997.

As a first step, the *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (National Security Council) demanded that the RP take certain measures to overcome the Islamization of society. As a second, step the Council, a myriad of civil society organizations, and economic enterprises assumed to be associated with the RP were closed down. *İmam Hatip* schools<sup>793</sup> which were designed to

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<sup>791</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Arkasındakilerle ve Türkiye'nin Kayıplarıyla Darbe*, 144.

<sup>792</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>793</sup> *İmam Hatip* high school students were among those most affected by the sanctions of the official ideology during the February 28 Process. For example, with a decision taken by the government in 1998, *İmam Hatip* high school students automatically had reduced exam scores when they wanted to study in any faculty other than the faculty of theology. This practice was successful as desired by the official ideology, and the rate of *İmam Hatip* graduates entering faculties with four-year education decreased from seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent. The decline in the university education rate of *İmam Hatip* High School graduates is also closely related to the headscarf ban in universities and the political pressure exerted by university

teach positive and Islamic sciences, were bypassed by a change in the regulation relating to the duration of elementary school. Eventually, accused of being the centre of anti-secular activities, the RP was banned from politics.<sup>794</sup> In this process, the RP was officially closed by the Constitutional Court on 16 January 1998 as a result of the closure case filed by the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor.<sup>795</sup>

#### **5.4.4 Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)**

After the RP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court, Erbakan ordered his lawyer İsmail Alptekin (b. 1943) to form a new party, FP, in December 1997. Recai Kutan (b. 1930) became the new leader of the party.<sup>796</sup> However, a closure case was filed against the RP, claiming that it was a continuation of the FP.<sup>797</sup> Thus, the FP was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, and was then banned on 22 June 2001 for violating the secularist articles of the Constitution.<sup>798</sup>

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administrations on religious students. Immediately after 28 February, the scope of the headscarf ban in universities expanded, and investigations and sanctions against students who did not comply with the ban intensified. Rectors, deans, and institutional administrators who refused to implement this ban were dismissed. In this process, women wearing headscarves were exposed to the pressure of the system, some of them were expelled from school, and some of them were absent due to not being able to attend classes with a headscarf. Many students were exposed to violence, insults, and psychological pressure, and their education rights were taken away because of wearing a headscarf. See, Naciye Bakırtaş, *Milli Görüş Hareketinde Bir Kırılma Noktası Olarak 28 Şubat Süreci*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Necmettin Erbakan University Turkey, 2021, 52-53.

<sup>794</sup> Alessio Chiriatti & Ozgur Tufekci, 59; Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 162-164.

<sup>795</sup> Sevkett Kazan, *28 Şubat Posmodern Bir Darbenin Anatomisi*, 427; Soner Cagaptay, *The New Sultan, Erdogan and The Crisis Of Modern Turkey*, 81.

<sup>796</sup> Hakan Köni, *Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Causes and Effect*, (United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2018), 65-66; Ekin Kadir Selcuk, "Evolution of Political Islam: From the Welfare Party to The Virtue Party", *Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi İletişim Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol.1, No.2, (2011), 27; Hakan Özdemir, "28 Şubat Süreci Arifesinde Ve Ertesinde İki Milli Görüş Partisi: RP, FP", *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. 2, (2015), 171.

<sup>797</sup> R. Quinn Mecham, "From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (2004), 348; Abdul Kadir Macit, 38; Ghazala Shahnaz & Obaidullah Fahad, 63.

<sup>798</sup> Hakan Özdemir, 183-184.

#### **5.4.5 Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)**

The Felicity Party was founded on 20 July 2001, after the FP was banned by the Constitutional Court. The founding chairman of the party was Recai Kutan. In the First Ordinary Congress held on 11 May 2003, Erbakan was elected as the chairman. However, in 2003, Erbakan had to resign from his party membership and chairmanship. On October 17, 2010, Erbakan became the chairman of the Felicity Party again and served as the chairman of the party until his death.<sup>799</sup> Türkiye's first Islamist Prime Minister, Erbakan, passed away on 27 February 2011.<sup>800</sup>

### **5.5 FOREIGN POLICY**

#### **5.5.1 Overview**

According to Erbakan, foreign policy should not only contribute to the strengthening of Türkiye, but should also serve for the peace and salvation of humanity. In this context, Erbakan established his foreign policy goals based on four basic principles.

1. **Strong Foreign Policy:** Erbakan emphasized that Türkiye should follow a foreign policy in line with its own values, culture, and history. He argued that Türkiye's own identity and uniqueness should be preserved in international relations.
2. **Protection of Rights:** Erbakan stated that the main purpose of foreign policy is the protection of human rights. He emphasized that a foreign policy that is fair, egalitarian, and respectful of human rights should be followed. This principle is Türkiye's commitment to justice and human rights both domestically and internationally. It aims to be a country where human rights are respected.

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<sup>799</sup> Soner Yalçın, 344-345; Müslim Yarıcı, *Milli Görüş Hataketinin Fikri Temelleri*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Konya Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi, 2017, 75-76.

<sup>800</sup> Abdul Kadir Macit, 39; Mete Gündoğan, 198.

3. Leading Role of Türkiye: Erbakan stated that Türkiye should be a leading country in international relations.
4. Cooperation: Erbakan stated that Türkiye should encourage cooperation in the international arena. He argued that common interests should be observed, and an active role should be taken in international relations by cooperating with other countries in economic, political, and cultural fields.

These four basic principles formed the basis of Erbakan's understanding of foreign policy. According to him, foreign policy should be achieved through Türkiye's strengthening, protection of human rights, becoming a leading country, and cooperation. It must serve the peace and salvation of humanity.<sup>801</sup> Erbakan became Prime Minister in 1996 by establishing a coalition cabinet with *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party) leader Tansu Çiller (b. 1946). This Erbakan-led coalition had two opposing foreign policy orientations: a pro-Western orientation promoted by Foreign Minister Çiller, who cemented ties with Western countries including Israel, the USA, and the EU; and an eastward-oriented policy advanced by Erbakan that sought to strengthen ties with the Arab and Islamic worlds.<sup>802</sup> In this context, he moved away from Europe-centred cooperation and turned towards Islamic countries during his years in office. According to him, it was more beneficial for Türkiye to cooperate with Islamic countries than to cooperate with the West.<sup>803</sup>

Therefore, Erbakan planned his first trip abroad in this direction. Within the scope of this travel plan, he would first visit Iran and Pakistan, two key countries of the Islamic world. Then he would visit Malaysia and Indonesia, which are rapidly developing in Southeast Asia and constitute the best synthesis of Islam and economic development. He

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<sup>801</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Erbakan Külliyyatı Cilt 4*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MG V Yayınları, 2014), 415; Fatih Keles & Yıldırım Turan, Adil Düzen Kavramı Bağlamında Necmettin Erbakan'ın Dış Politika Anlayışı, *Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol. 9, No.2, (2023), 45.

<sup>802</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 135.

<sup>803</sup> Hakan Köni, *Transformation of Politic Islam in Turkey: Causes and Effect*, (United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2018),50; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası (1991-2015)*, (İstanbul: DER Kitabevi, 2016), 87; Merve Naz Abanozoğlu, Why Does Turkey Prioritizes Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Cooperation in Southeast Asian Relations? Unpublished M.A Thesis Middle East Technical University, Turkey, 2022, 15.

also added Singapore, an Asian country of European standards, to his travel plan.<sup>804</sup> In addition to ministers and journalists, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, formed by Islamist businessmen, also participated in this trip.<sup>805</sup>

### 5.5.2 Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia Trips

Erbakan made his first international visit to Iran in August 1996, where he advocated for improved relations. During this visit, a natural gas agreement worth USD 23 billion was signed, according to which the existing natural gas pipeline in Tabriz, Iran, would be upgraded and extended to Doğubeyazıt-Erzurum-Kayseri-Adana-Ankara, to be connected to Türkiye's existing natural gas network. Thus, Türkiye would have a second important source after Russia, from which it sourced most of its natural gas.<sup>806</sup> This gas agreement was made to meet Türkiye's increasing energy needs, which are essential for industrialization (which remained a key underlying concern for Erbakan). However, the Western press emphasized that establishing friendly relations with Iran could lead to dissatisfaction in the USA, and the economic interests of the state were not emphasized much. Erbakan was criticized by Western governments and Western supporters for the gas agreement with Iran.<sup>807</sup>

After he visited Iran, Erbakan visited Pakistan as the second stop of his foreign trip. During his contacts in Pakistan, he met with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (b.

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<sup>804</sup> Ihsan Dagi, Kimlik, *Soylem ve Siyaset: Dogu-Bati ayriminda Refah Partisi Gelenegi*, (Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1998), 119; Önder Çakır, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014, 164; Saban Taniyici, "Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey Islamist Welfare Party's Pro-EU Turn", *Party Politics- Sage Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 4, (2003), 473;

<sup>805</sup> Hakan Akpınar, *28 Şubat Postmodern Bir Darbenin Öyküsü*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2001), 84.

<sup>806</sup> Ömer Bolat, *Başbakan Necmettin Erbakan'ın Doğu Asya Gezisi (10-20 Ağustos) ve MÜSİAD'ın Bosna-Hersek gezisi (7-11 Ağustos 1996) Raporu*, (İstanbul: Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, 1996), 16; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Son On Yıllarda Türk Dış Politikası*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2016,) 186-187; Brent E. Sasley, 558.

<sup>807</sup> Philip Robins, *Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan*, *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 2, (1997), 90-91; Fatih Keleş, *Necmettin Erbakan'ın Adil Düzen Yaklaşımı ve Dış Politika Anlayışı*, Unpublished M.A Thesis Sakarya University Turkey, 2023, 114.

1953) on the morning of 13 August.<sup>808</sup> As a result of the negotiations, an agreement was reached with Pakistan to eliminate customs costs for the use of Turkish engines. An agreement was also reached on Türkiye's sale of 700 military vehicles to Pakistan and Türkiye's export of engines and engine parts to Pakistan.<sup>809</sup> After Pakistan, Erbakan went to Singapore for a three-day visit on 14 August.<sup>810</sup> Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (b. 1941) organized a dinner for Erbakan's visit.<sup>811</sup> At the dinner, the Prime Minister of Singapore said that Türkiye and Singapore enjoy warm and friendly relations, and that he was delighted to host Erbakan and the Turkish delegation in Singapore. He also noted that just as visitors from Türkiye want to learn more about Singapore, Singaporean businessmen are also keen to learn about the business potential in Türkiye.<sup>812</sup>

As a result, the negotiations held during this visit, it was aimed to increase the trade volume between the two countries to USD 2.5 billion within three years. It was decided to sign the agreement on mutual promotion and protection of investments between the two countries as soon as possible. It was decided that Singaporean tourists would be encouraged to visit Türkiye on holiday, and a mutual military ammunition supply would be established.<sup>813</sup> Additionally, areas of cooperation such as the training of Singapore's F-16 pilots in Türkiye and the development of Trabzon and İskenderun ports were emphasized.<sup>814</sup>

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<sup>808</sup> İsmail Akbaş, Türkiye Pakistan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Gelişimi, Unpublishe PhD Thesis, Dokuz Eylül University Turkey, 2012, 290.

<sup>809</sup> Ömer Bolat, 28.

<sup>810</sup> Turkish PM Arrives Today, *The Straits Times*, 14 August 1996, 2  
<https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/article/straitstimes19960814-1.2.7.4>

<sup>811</sup> [https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdffdoc/19960815\\_0001.pdf](https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdffdoc/19960815_0001.pdf);

Ravi Velloor, Singapore Offers to Help Turkey Forge Business Link for Asia, *The Straits Times*, 16 August 1996, 2 <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/page/straitstimes19960816-1.1.2>

<sup>812</sup> Press Release, Release No: 41/AUGUST 15-1/96/08/16, National Archive Singapore.

<sup>813</sup> Ömer Bolat, 41; Alparslan Onbasi & Esra Polat Onbasi, "Economic and Cultural Bridges: Necmettin Erbakan's Southeast Asia Trip (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia)", *Al- Risalah Journal*, Vol.8, No. 2, (2023), 13.

<sup>814</sup> Işıl Arpacı, *Türk Siyasetinde Erbakan*, (İstanbul: Kopernik Kitap, 2017), 316.

After he visited Singapore, Erbakan visited Malaysia on 16 August 1996 for economic and political talks.<sup>815</sup> At the dinner organized for Erbakan, Prime Minister Mahathir expressed his pleasure that Erbakan chose Malaysia as one of the first countries he visited abroad. He also announced that in their meeting in the morning, Malaysia and Türkiye agreed to continue strengthening their relations, especially in economy and trade. More importantly, he announced that they aim to work more closely with Türkiye to increase and enhance their economic and trade relations.<sup>816</sup> As a result of the negotiations, Türkiye and Malaysia agreed to strengthen the activities of the Islamic Development Bank. It was agreed that Malaysia's oil company (Petronas) would invest in Türkiye, and the countries would cooperate in the automotive, high technology, and electronics industries. In addition, it was decided to import 60-70,000 skilled workers from Türkiye to close the workforce supply gap, which was hampering Malaysia's rapid economic development.<sup>817</sup> In addition, during his visit to Malaysia, Prime Minister Erbakan visited the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia, and received information about the university from Rector Dato' Dr. Abdul Hamid Ahmed Abu Suleiman and Vice-Chancellor Prof. Dr. Mohd. Kamal Hasan. He also gave a lecture to approximately 1,000 students who filled the University's Melik Faisal Hall and met with Turkish students studying in Malaysia.<sup>818</sup>

The last stop of Erbakan's trip was Indonesia, where he arrived on 18 August.<sup>819</sup> Erbakan had previously participated in The First Conference of the International Islamic

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<sup>815</sup> Lawatan Rasmi TYT Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, Perdana Menteri Republik Turki ke Malaysia - 16.08.1996-18.08.1996, National Archive of Malaysia, 356 1999/0025650; Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, (İstanbul: Küre Publishing, 2001), 282.

<sup>816</sup> Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Jamuan Makan Malam Meraikan TYT Professor DR. Necmettin Erbakan, Perdana Memteri Republik Turki, 17-08-1996, National Archive of Malaysia.

<sup>817</sup> Ömer Bolat, 50.

<sup>818</sup> Protocol Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Malaysia, Official Visit by His Excellency Necmettin Erbakan Prime Minister of Turkey to Mahathir Muhammed 16-18 August 1996, National Archive Malaysia.

<sup>819</sup> Keven Sullivan, Turkey offers to be S'proe's springboard to Central Asia, *The Business Times*, 17 August 1996, 2 <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/article/biztimes19960817-1.2.9.7?qt=erbakan&q=erbakan>

Forum for Science, Technology, and Human Resources Development held in Indonesia. In this conference held in Jakarta from 6th to 8th December 1996, Erbakan talked about overcoming the economic crises faced by Muslim countries. He called for the development of an Islamic Economic System based on cooperation. He emphasized that the West was facing a crisis of civilization due to ignorance of the spiritual aspects of human life and that the West was only interested in materialistic development.<sup>820</sup> During this visit, which was his second visit to Indonesia, Erbakan visited Indonesia's aircraft factory, which he admired and appreciated technologically.<sup>821</sup>

Despite all the obstacles raised by Western countries, Indonesia produced the CN235 model transport and passenger aircraft under the Spanish CASA license. It also managed to produce the N 250 aircraft with a capacity of eight passengers. More importantly, it produced these aircraft 20% cheaper than the West. Seeing this success of Indonesia in the aviation field, Erbakan was very impressed by Indonesia's aviation sector, and wanted to cooperate in its development. As a result of the official meetings, it was planned that the Minister of Research and Technology Development, Yusuf Habibi, would come to Ankara within a month to develop economic cooperation in all areas. In addition, it was agreed to develop tourism trips related to Hajj and Umrah to encourage Indonesian tourists to come to Türkiye.<sup>822</sup> However, these political relations and collaborations of Erbakan were not possible, because a new government replaced the Erbakan administration because of the military coup that took place on 28 February 1997.<sup>823</sup>

### **5.5.3 Erbakan's Trip to Africa and Libya**

After his trip to Pakistan, Singapore, Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia on 10 August 1996, Erbakan planned to go to Nigeria and Egypt in October. Libya was also included in the

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<sup>820</sup> Syed Serajul Islam, International Islamic Forum for Science, Technology and Human Resources Development, *Intellectual Discourse*, Vol. 5, No.1, (1996), 82.

<sup>821</sup> Yavuz Donat, *Öncesi ve Sonrasıyla 28 Şubat*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yaynevi, 1999), 263.

<sup>822</sup> Ömer Bolat, 63.

<sup>823</sup> Abdul Razak Baginda, *Malaysia and the Islamic World*, in *Malaysia and Turkey: Comparative Experiences and Bilateral Relations* by Sabri Orman, (London: ASEAN Academic Press, 2004), 147.

African trip at the last minute. Thus, the route of this trip, which started on 2 October 1996, and ended on 8 October 1996, was Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria.<sup>824</sup> The reason why Libya was added to this trip at the last minute was that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (1942-2011) did not assist Turkish contractors to recover debts owed to them by Libya. Governments before Erbakan's rule did not go to Libya due to wanting to signal their loyalty to the USA and Israel. A request was made for the solution of this problem by the contractors' union, which suffered from the fact that this problem is not solved.<sup>825</sup> As a result, Libya was included in Erbakan's Africa Trip upon the request of contractors doing business in Libya to collect their uncollectible receivables accumulated over the years.<sup>826</sup>

As part of this trip, he first went to Egypt on 2 October, where he presented the cotton union project prepared by MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association) to the Egyptian Prime Minister Hosni Mubarak (1928-2020) and achieved positive results. In addition, an agreement was reached on the development of mutual investments during official visits.<sup>827</sup> Erbakan left Egypt on 4 October and went to Libya. This trip was criticized by many ministers in **Türkiye**. For example, before Prime Minister Erbakan made his trip to Libya, the Minister of Internal Affairs Mehmet Ağar (b. 1951) made statements to the public that Erbakan should not make this trip. However, Erbakan did not give up despite all the objections, and still went on a trip to Libya.<sup>828</sup> The Turkish contractor problem was resolved in the meetings held between the official delegations of the two countries, and it was agreed to seek to diversify and increase the trade volume between the two countries.<sup>829</sup>

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<sup>824</sup> Sevket Kazan, *Refah Gerçeği-2*, (Ankara: Keşif Yayınları, 2006), 262; Şamil Tayyar, *Kıt'a Dur! 28 Şubat'tan 27 Nisan'a İktidar Kavgası*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 29; Philip, Robins, 90-92.

<sup>825</sup> Serdar Cam, Müsiad'ın Afrika ve İngiltere İş Gezi Raporları, (İstanbul: Müstakil İş Adamları Derneği, 1997), 27.

<sup>826</sup> Sevket Kazan, *Refah Gerçeği-2*, 262.

<sup>827</sup> Serdar Cam, 10-11.

<sup>828</sup> Şamil Tayyar, 36-37.

<sup>829</sup> Serdar Cam, 27.

However, this trip was marred by Muammar Gaddafi's accusatory statements against Türkiye, which Gaddafi said had forgotten Islam and was under occupation by Western powers, apparently alluding to its membership of NATO. Also, he said that Türkiye's future lay not with NATO, US bases, and repressing the Kurds, but in returning to its noble past. Moreover, he said that an independent Kurdistan should be established.<sup>830</sup> In addition to creating a diplomatic scandal, Gaddafi's speech also served the purpose of discrediting the government.<sup>831</sup> Responding to Gaddafi's provocations, Erbakan emphasized that Türkiye's Arab and Kurdish citizens were collectively part of one nation at the press conference he held in Libya. He emphasized that the Constitution of the RoT does not discriminate against race in any way, and grants equal rights to all citizens. It was also emphasized that Türkiye's only problem is terrorism by ethnic separatists.<sup>832</sup>

Erbakan, who left Libya on October 6, last visited Nigeria. A trade agreement was signed between the two countries, and it was aimed to increase total exports to USD 1 billion.<sup>833</sup>

As a result of this tour, Erbakan tried to establish authentic and tangible relations with Muslim countries, to support mutual economic development and defy the paradigm of colonial dependency on the West and its foreign policy, which had been the prevailing force in Turkish foreign and domestic policy since the foundation of the RoT. However, his move away from Western countries and his cooperation with Eastern and Islamic countries disturbed both Western countries and the Turkish Armed Forces. As a result, Erbakan's rule ended with the "post-modern" coup.

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<sup>830</sup> Altan Öymen, "İşte buyrun", *Milliyet, Gazetesi*, 7 October 1996, 18; Stephen Kinzer, "Tirade by Qaddafi Stuns Turkey's Premier", *The New York Times*, 9 October 1996, 6.

<sup>831</sup> Gencer Özcan, *Onbir Aylık Saltanat: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Dış Politikada Refahiyol Dönemi*, (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları 1998), 192-193.

<sup>832</sup> İhsan Dağı, *Kimlik Söylem ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2015), 104.

<sup>833</sup> Serdar Cam, 35.

#### 5.5.4 Relations with Israel

Erbakan's foreign policy vision was fundamentally about anti-Zionism.<sup>834</sup> According to Erbakan, Zionists aimed to control the world at the political and economic levels, by dominating the global economy and exploiting the people of the world through their usurious capitalist system, maintaining their political domination on the earth through imperialist states.<sup>835</sup> Erbakan alluded to the implicit assumptions of Zionism that Palestinians are inferior, and the Jewish doctrines that all humans are inferior to the Israelites, who are a superior race designed to be served by others. He posited the religious Zionist ambition of gathering all Jews in the Holy Land to establish Greater Israel, with its capital in Jerusalem (illegally occupied since 1967).<sup>836</sup>

However, Erbakan did not consider "Jews" and "Zionists" to be synonymous, and unlike many people of his generation, he was aware that not all Jews are Zionists.<sup>837</sup> It was a matter of curiosity how Israel- Türkiye relations would be after Erbakan became Prime Minister, given that he expressed his antithetical thoughts about Zionism at every opportunity. In addition, the public predicted that Türkiye -Israel relations would progress negatively.<sup>838</sup> Before Erbakan became Prime Minister, Israel and Türkiye signed the "Military Training and Cooperation Agreement" on 23 February 1996.<sup>839</sup> Erbakan and his party harshly criticized Türkiye's military ties with Israel and openly called for the termination of the Israeli-Turkish military cooperation agreement.<sup>840</sup>

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<sup>834</sup> Hakan Yavuz, 320.

<sup>835</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, 2-3.

<sup>836</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş İktidarı: Niçin ve Nasıl*, 34-35.

<sup>837</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, 248; Necmettin Erbakan, *Arkasındakilerle ve Türkiye'nin Kayıplarıyla Darbe*, 108.

<sup>838</sup> Levent Duman, Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement in the 1990s: Why an Alliance?, *Analytical Politics*, Vol.1, No. 2, (2020), 26; Huseyin Yeltin, Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Son Dönem Krizleri: Türk Muhalefetinin ve Kamuoyunun Yaklaşımı, *Artuklu Kaime Uluslararası İktisadi ve İdari Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol.4, No.1, (2021), 7.

<sup>839</sup> Dov Waxman, Turkey, and Israel: A new balance of power in the Middle East, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.1, (1999), 31; Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 157; Özcan, Gencer, *Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Dönüşüm: Güvenliğin Ötesi*, (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005), 68.

<sup>840</sup> Alan Makovsky & Sabri Sayari, *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 69.

Therefore, when he was Prime Minister, he tried to direct Türkiye's perspective toward the East, and in this context, Erbakan's first trip abroad was to Iran, which since 1979 has defined itself as an anti-Western and anti-Zionist country.<sup>841</sup> Additionally, Erbakan signed a 23-year gas contract worth USD 23 billion during his visit to Iran, prior to his trip to three Muslim countries to strengthen relations with Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia (as discussed above).<sup>842</sup> However, the Turkish military establishment opposed Erbakan's rapprochement with Iran, and responded by increasing its involvement in foreign and defence-related affairs.<sup>843</sup>

As a result, the Turkish Armed Forces decided to conclude a "Defence Industry Cooperation Agreement" with Israel, to defy the Prime Minister. This Agreement was signed between the two countries on August 28, 1996, which basically envisaged the transfer of information between the parties in the field of defence and the mutual training of technicians, and the modernization of Türkiye's military equipment was also initiated by Israel. In this context, it was decided to develop 26 F-4 warplanes in Israel and 28 F-4 warplanes in Türkiye. It was also decided that the financing of this project, which cost approximately USD 600 million, would be financed by loans obtained from Israel.<sup>844</sup>

Initially, Erbakan opposed the deal for upgrading Turkish F-4 Phantoms, because it would be too expensive for Türkiye; additionally, as per his anti-interest economic vision, the Agreement amounted to forcing the Turkish people to be enslaved to Israel to pay for their own defence. He instructed members of his party not to ratify the Agreement, but the Turkish military exerted extraordinary pressure on him to eventually ratify the deal.<sup>845</sup>

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<sup>841</sup> Randy J. Smith, *The Pragmatic Entente: Turkey's Growing Relations with Israel*, Princeton University, Unpublished M.A Thesis, 2000, 83.

<sup>842</sup> Philip Robins, *Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan*, *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 2, (1997), 90.

<sup>843</sup> Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 86.

<sup>844</sup> Yavuz Gökalp Yıldız, *Global Stratejide Ortadoğu*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000), 167.

<sup>845</sup> Neill Lochery, *Israel and Turkey: Deepening ties and strategic implications, 1995–98*, *Israel Affairs*, Vol.5, No. 1, (1998), 50; Ali Balcı, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası ve İsrail: 1990'lar ve 2000'lere*, *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, Vol. 2, No.2 (2011), 124; Murat Yıldız, *Türk Dış Politikasına Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan'ın Politik Vizyonunun Etkisi*, *Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, No, 8, (2017), 364.

Thus, the army clearly warned Erbakan that it would not allow him to jeopardize his ties with Israel. General Çevik Bir (b. 1939), then deputy chief of staff, showed that despite the change of government, Türkiye's strategic relations with Israel would remain a permanent state policy.<sup>846</sup> As a result, relations between Israel and Türkiye remained intact, despite Erbakan's rhetoric and opposition to its partnership with Israel.

Thus, the Turkish armed forces made it clear that no change regarding Israel would be tolerated.<sup>847</sup> Thus, with the Israeli incident, problems between the army and Erbakan came to light. The armed forces were already opposed to Erbakan's rapprochement with Iran, and they could never accept Erbakan's attempt to challenge the army on an issue it considered vital, such as relations with Israel.<sup>848</sup> Dissatisfied with Erbakan's foreign policy, the Turkish armed forces pressured Erbakan to resign. Thus, Erbakan left his post with the "post-modern" military coup on 28 February 1997, which was designed with the joint efforts of the army and various groups and institutions in Türkiye.<sup>849</sup>

### **5.5.5 Developing Eight Organization for Economic Cooperation (D-8)**

Erbakan put forward a new foreign policy approach for Türkiye that first floated the concept of looking East to Muslim-majority countries and (in some cases) former Ottoman lands, instead of obediently capitulating to Western Europe at every turn, which had been the tenor of Turkish foreign and domestic policy in one way or another since Abdül Hamid II was overthrown in 1909. Erbakan sought to reorient Türkiye's foreign policy from West to East, and tried to develop closer political relations with Islamic countries as an alternative to the West. Erbakan highlighted the ideas of "Just Order" and "Islamic Union" from the

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<sup>846</sup> Neill Lochery, 56.

<sup>847</sup> Özlem Tür, Turkey and Israel in the 2000s-From Cooperation to Conflict, *Israel Studies*, Vol.17, No.3 (2012), 48.

<sup>848</sup> Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 86.

<sup>849</sup> Jonathan Ghariani, Turkey-Israel Relations: "Golden Years", 1991–2000, *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2024), 14.

first days of his entry into politics, and took an anti-Western and anti-Zionist stance in foreign policy when he was Prime Minister.<sup>850</sup>

Erbakan thought that it was more beneficial for Türkiye to cooperate with Islamic countries rather than cooperate with the West, and he established the D-8 during his term as Prime Minister, seeking to empower the constituent nations (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Türkiye) to develop without imperialist domination and subterfuge from the world economic order dominated by the West. In this context, D-8 is a result of Erbakan's non-Western foreign policy.<sup>851</sup> D-8 was officially established under the leadership of Erbakan at the meeting in İstanbul on 15 June 1997, attended by the prime ministers of the constituent nations. Its main purpose is to organize a potential economy among countries representing rich resources, large populations, and geographical regions. It also aims to develop economic cooperation within the framework of joint projects and strengthen the position of developing countries in the world economy.<sup>852</sup> The D-8's objectives include:

1. The establishment of the Common Market Order and Union instead of the EU.
2. Using a common currency among Muslim countries instead of using the US dollar and Euro.
3. Establishing a United Nations Organization of Muslim Countries instead of the United Nations.
4. Establishing a Defence Cooperation Organization of Muslim Countries instead of NATO.

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<sup>850</sup> Işıl Arpacı, Necmettin Erbakan Örneğinde Türk Dış Politikasının İslamcı Eleştirisi, *Anadolu Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol.4, No.2, (2022), 250; Murat Yıldız, 360-361.

<sup>851</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 209-210.

<sup>852</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *İslam Birliği*, 172; Hasan Acar & Yusuf Karaagac, D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Turkey Within the Scope of International Political Relations, *International Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences*, Vol. 5, No. 3, (2021) 69; <https://developing8.org/image/Booklet/6th-D-8-Summit.pdf>

5. There is a plan to establish the Organization for Cultural Cooperation of Muslim Countries in place of UNESCO.<sup>853</sup>

D-8 countries have six basic principles: peace instead of conflict, dialogue instead of conflict, justice instead of double standards, equality instead of discrimination, cooperation instead of exploitation, and democracy instead of oppression.<sup>854</sup> The establishment of the D-8 as an alternative to the West greatly disturbed Western countries, and Erbakan's being the pioneer of the concept and organization made him a target. The agreements he made with Iran and Libya and his move away from the West in foreign policy and trade and towards Muslim countries greatly disturbed Western countries, some large capital groups in Türkiye, and the Turkish Armed Forces.<sup>855</sup> As a result of all these initiatives of Erbakan, he was ousted and banned from politics with the 28 February "postmodern" coup.<sup>856</sup>

## 5.6 POLITICAL THOUGHTS

### 5.6.1 Views on Secularism

The issue of secularism is a very important one with regard to Erbakan. This is because his party, the MSP, was closed on 20 May 1971, because it was "contrary to the nature of a secular state".<sup>857</sup> After the closure of the MSP, Erbakan founded the RP. However, on 21 May 1997, the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals filed a lawsuit against the RP on the grounds of "actions contrary to the principle of the Secular Republic". As a result, Erbakan's party was closed again due to its violation of secularism.<sup>858</sup> Also,

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<sup>853</sup> Recep Karabulut, Günümüz Dünyasından D-8'e Yeniden Bir Bakış, *International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish*, Vol.12, No.8, (2017), 422.

<sup>854</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *İslam Birliği*, 175.

<sup>855</sup> Şevket Kazan, *28 Şubat Posmodern Bir Darbenin Anatomisi*, 274.

<sup>856</sup> Işıl Arpacı, *Türk Siyasetinde Erbakan*, 317.

<sup>857</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge Press, 1993), 147; Serkan Yorgancılar, *Milli Görüş (1969-1980)*, (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2012), 428; Mashitah Sulaiman & Mohammad Redzuan Othman, 27; Ekrem Kızıldağ; 141.

<sup>858</sup> Tacettin Çetinkaya, *Başbakan Erbakan*, (Ankara: MGV Yayınları, 2023), 172; Hakan Özdemir, 28 Şubat Süreci Arifesinde ve Ertesinde İki Milli Görüş Partisi:Refah Partisi,Fazilet Partisi (Karşılaştırmalı Analiz),

during this process, heavy criticism was made against Erbakan and his political views in both the domestic and foreign press. Especially negative discourse was created in Western public opinion against Erbakan. For example, journalists Nicole Pope and Huge Pope defined Erbakan as follows in their work about Turkish political life:

Erbakan is probably Turkey's most single-minded politician, the man who led his pro-Islamic faithful from the political wilderness in the 1960s to become Turkey's biggest and best-disciplined party of the 1990s. With his round face, his chubby cheeks, and his dashing Italian ties, Erbakan looks more like a prosperous merchant than an Islamic fundamentalist. Add a white beard, and he could make a kindly Father Christmas. Yet in the eyes of many Turks, Erbakan is little short of the Devil incarnate, bent on destroying the very basis of the secular modern republic envisaged by Atatürk.<sup>859</sup>

Similar discourses were also expressed by writers in Türkiye. For example, Turkish journalist Emin Çölaşan (b. 1942) made false claims centring on the concept of the "Fair Order" propagated by Erbakan and the place of the RP in public opinion. He stated that he never believed in the honesty of Erbakan and his party, and that they were a community that did not obey laws and rules.<sup>860</sup> Erbakan smear campaigns because he was a devout Muslim. Also, he specifically emphasized that he had never attempted to change the secular order in Türkiye.<sup>861</sup>

According to Erbakan, secularism means that everyone has freedom of thought, conscience, and worship, and that no one can oppress anyone because of their beliefs. However, in Türkiye, secularism has been applied as a tool of oppression against the Muslim majority population. Erbakan argued that it is necessary for Turks to learn the *true* meaning of secularism, which is not oppressing personal religious identity with the force of the state.<sup>862</sup> Since the meaning of secularism is not known in Türkiye, some people have

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*Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.20, No. 2, (2015), 179-180; Müslim Yarıcı, *Milli Görüş Hareketinin Fikri Temelleri*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Necmettin Erbakan University, 2017, 73.

<sup>859</sup> Nicole Pope & Huge Pope, *Turkey Unveiled: History of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Overlook Press, 1998), 316.

<sup>860</sup> Emin Çölaşan, *Ah Refah Vah Refah*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1998), 50-52.

<sup>861</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Arkasındakilerle ve Türkiye'nin Kayıplarıyla Darbe*, 145.

<sup>862</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 172.

perceived it as hostility to religion and intervened extensively to dictate people's personal lives.<sup>863</sup>

For example, Erbakan was denounced for going on a pilgrimage and fulfilling his religious obligations while he was Prime Minister, as some Kemalists considered that this was against secularism, even though these were issues that would not concern anyone in a genuine secular country.<sup>864</sup> For example, no Catholic Western president would be criticized for visiting the Pope at the Vatican, and elected representatives and heads of state in many secular countries take office by taking an oath on the Bible, while prayers are made during ceremonies in parliaments and universities. Additionally, in the West, wedding ceremonies are held in churches. As can be seen, secularism in the West implements freedom of religion and conscience, not imposing one's own beliefs on others through force and oppression. However, secularism is not perceived this way in Türkiye. Interestingly, those in Türkiye who imitate everything coming from the West have given up imitating the West in this regard.<sup>865</sup>

As a result, according to Erbakan's assessment, secularism means freedom of religion and conscience. The duty of the state is not to interfere with religion; on the contrary, it is to create an environment that will enable people to live according to their personal choices, including their religious beliefs. However, secularism in Türkiye is not understood in this way. Put simply, it is understood as actively disparaging and suppressing any form of religion. A more enlightened definition must be correctly understood and applied for society to live in peace and security.

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<sup>863</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Arkasındakilerle ve Türkiye'nin Kayıplarıyla Darbe*, 145.

<sup>864</sup> Tacettin Çetinkaya, *Başbakan Erbakan*, 161.

<sup>865</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, TBMM Genel Kurul Konuşması, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 49, No.19, (1993), 571-574; Hüseyin Arslan, *Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin Laiklik Anlayışı*, Unpublished M.A Thesis İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2019, 90 .

## 5.6.2 Views on Turkish Education

For Erbakan, the most important issue for ensuring spiritual as well as material development in Türkiye is the issue of education. The current education system in Türkiye is not based on national and spiritual values, therefore, generations that are unfamiliar with their own identity and culture are being raised.<sup>866</sup> According to Erbakan, education should be fundamentally based on morality and spirituality, so that individuals who adhere to national and spiritual values can be raised.<sup>867</sup> This is because citizens with a strong moral foundation and ethical character will be useful to themselves and their communities and states. Conversely, the selfish and solipsistic materialist is destructive to the world, and ultimately himself.<sup>868</sup>

The education system in Türkiye is not grounded in any holistic vision of humanity, nor even national conscience and consciousness. It merely seeks to impart a Western worldview. In this way, individuals have moved away from national consciousness and culture.<sup>869</sup> As a result of this educational mentality, a new generation emerges that is faithless, rootless, alien to its values, and alien to its nation. The moral and social corruption faced by Türkiye and many other countries is the result of a rootless materialistic education system. By establishing a spiritual mentality instead of a materialistic mentality in education policies, a generation that is taught moral principles is at peace with its values and is loyal to its roots and nation can emerge.<sup>870</sup> For this reason, Erbakan gave great importance to Imam-Hatip Schools, which he thought should be encouraged in number and capacity, to impart Islamic religion and national culture. Additionally, students in regular public schools needed to be given more education in religion and morality. Only in this way could national and moral values in society increase.<sup>871</sup>

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<sup>866</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, 90-92.

<sup>867</sup> Serkan Yorgancılar, *Milli Görüş, 1969-1980*, (İstanbul:Pınar Yayınları, 2012), 383.

<sup>868</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, 110.

<sup>869</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 187.

<sup>870</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Millet Meclisi Konuşması: Materyalizm ve Maneviyatçılık*, 9.

<sup>871</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, 90-97.

As a result, Erbakan’s understanding of education is far from materialism and is based on spirituality. Erbakan predicted that with this system based on spirituality, individuals who are faithful and free from imitative mentality would be raised, who could guide the future development of Türkiye in the genuine national interest.

## **5.7 THOUGHTS ON THE WEST AND WESTERNIZATION**

For Erbakan, the most important fundamental problems facing the RoT arise from the Westernization policies followed since the *Tanzimat* era. Therefore, Erbakan aimed to bring a genuine “national” perspective to every event from foreign policy to current developments, from industrialization to education. According to Erbakan, it is not necessary to imitate the West to be an independent, powerful, and developed modern country; on the contrary, he argued that Turks need to protect their own culture and values. For this, they must be “domestic and national” in every field, from industry to education. In this direction, Erbakan put forward the idea of “*Milli Görüş*” (The MGH) as an alternative to Western imitation.

According to Erbakan, the West can be understood as the “mother of all evils” in many respects. While he was talking primarily about colonialism and modern forms of imperialism and expropriation, the current environmental catastrophes produced by Western civilization are now mainstream even in the West itself. Therefore, Türkiye must be different from the West. Erbakan’s desire to be different from the West does not mean that Türkiye should completely reject the West; he argued that its technology and technical development could be followed, while seeking to avoid the pitfalls it faced in its own development. However, he was against the adoption of the culture and values of the West. In other words, he was against Westernization.<sup>872</sup>

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<sup>872</sup> Ihsan Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No.1, (2005), 24-25.

Erbakan thought that Türkiye's main problem was that it had locked itself into imitating the West, thinking that this would bring them success, while Western foreign powers cynically aimed to efface Türkiye's authentic identity by producing imitative mentalities of *de facto* colonial subjects.<sup>873</sup> As discussed previously concerning the obstacles to industrialization he faced from secular Turkish political elites, there was a consensus between Europe and Kemalists from WWII onwards (and the Marshall Plan economic order) that Türkiye should export cheap food to Europe while importing expensive manufactured goods. Against the paradigm of Turkish subjugation, Erbakan took a critical attitude towards the Westernization of Türkiye and set himself apart from other political party leaders.

When Erbakan came to power before the 1995 general elections, he declared that he would end the Westernization process. In his view, Westernization was constructed by early Republican leaders as a rejection of traditional values and attitudes. The effect of Westernization on the character of the state and society had been a more serious problem than the West itself. He saw the attempt to replace the Islamic-Ottoman civilization with the Western civilization as the source of the problems of Turkish society and aimed to liquidate Western civilization.<sup>874</sup> Erbakan was thus against Westernism, which imitates the customs and traditions of Western countries and considers those countries superior to Türkiye. According to him, Türkiye cannot leave its national identity and melt into Western countries.<sup>875</sup>

Erbakan claimed that Westernization had in fact destroyed the Ottoman State, and been the root cause of the moral, social, and economic crises that emerged in the Republican period.<sup>876</sup> Indeed, the material and moral crises facing Türkiye today can be traced to such Westernization policies. If many young people today move away from national values and

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<sup>873</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri ve Çözümleri*, (Ankara: Semih Ofset Matbaacılık, 1991), 6-12.

<sup>874</sup> Ihsan Dagi, "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization", 23-24-25.

<sup>875</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 174.

<sup>876</sup> Abdul Kadir Macit, 119.

are dominated by foreign ideas such as materialism and anarchism, the reason for all this is a blind imitation of the West.<sup>877</sup> Despite this anti-Westernism, Erbakan attached great importance to utilizing all the possibilities of technology that the West monopolized during his lifetime (but which it increasingly does not today).

For example, he envisaged that the technology of the West could be used to develop heavy industry, and attached importance to the progress of the nation in the material field as well as spiritual progress. Erbakan was never a person who wanted to be behind the times. Contrarily, he wanted Türkiye to reach the level of contemporary civilization, but did not want this to happen through imitation of all the West's principles and practices to modernize. He is always in favour of the domestic and national modernization model.<sup>878</sup>

According to Erbakan, "Technology is not the legacy of the West, but the accumulation of humanity in the world". Therefore, non-Western countries can develop their institutions and values and create their domestic and national industries.<sup>879</sup> Türkiye, one of these countries, can get rid of the Western mentality and Westernization with the idea of MGH, systematized by Erbakan, and become a modern state by establishing its domestic national industry.

### **5.7.1 Milli Görüş Hareketi (MGH)**

The main mission of the MGH is to spread Islam and establish an "order of justice". Also, the economic mission of the MGH is to develop the country's economy by developing the heavy industry and defence industry.<sup>880</sup> More importantly, the most important goal of the

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<sup>877</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 175.

<sup>878</sup> Abdul Kadir Macit, 119.

<sup>879</sup> Kamil Şamlıoğlu, *İman -Feraset - Heyecan Necmettin Erbakan*, in İhsan Aktaş, *Kum Saati*, (Ankara: EPA-MAT Basım Yayın, 2021), 66.

<sup>880</sup> Galip Dalay & Dov Friedman, "The AK Party and the Evolution of Turkish Political Islam's Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.15, No.2. (2013), 124-126; Chen YANG & Changgang GUO, "National Outlook

MGH is to get rid of the “imitative mentality”. In this direction, Erbakan aimed to stop material and moral destruction and to ensure the spread of national and moral values to society.<sup>881</sup> According to Erbakan, Türkiye’s biggest problem is “the problem of imitation”. This problem is also the biggest obstacle to Türkiye’s development. To get rid of this problem, it is necessary to eliminate the “imitative mentality” and replace it with the idea of “national vision”. If this mentality is not overcome, the nation will completely lose its own identity. An imitative nation cannot have advanced technology and industry, so it lags behind other societies. It is very natural for a backward nation to be economically exploited and culturally invaded by foreign cultures. As a result, that society is doomed to lose its independence.<sup>882</sup> Therefore, to solve these problems Türkiye must first get rid of Western imitation. Instead of Western imitation, it should adopt the national view.<sup>883</sup>

MGH is an alternative modernization movement against modernization, which regards Western culture as superior, claims that modernization can only be achieved by being included in this culture, and leads to alienation from the national culture.<sup>884</sup> This movement is to overcome the defeat against the West, as it was a century ago. Erbakan, the founder of this movement, never opposed the technology and science of the West while implementing this policy.<sup>885</sup> He opposes culture imported from the West.<sup>886</sup> In this context, the modernization project of the MGH is to modernize by preserving culture and religion. Therefore, the national view is focused on development and industrialization.<sup>887</sup>

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Movement in Turkey: A Study on the Rise and Development of Islamic Political Parties”, *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, Vol.9, No.3, (2018), 7.

<sup>881</sup> Ekrem Zahid Boyraz, 51.

<sup>882</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye’nin Temel Meseleleri ve Çözümleri*, 12-13.

<sup>883</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye’nin Temel Meseleleri*, (Ankara: Rehber Yayınları, 1991), 239.

<sup>884</sup> Menderes Çınar, *Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık*, (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2005), 74; Nazım Maviş, “Muhafazakar Modernleşmenin Aracı Olarak Milli Görüş Partilerinde Eğitim Politikası”, *Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol.9, No.27, (2022), 338,339.

<sup>885</sup> Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt: 6 İslamcılık* in Nuray Mert, *Türkiye İslamcılığına Tarihsel Bir Bakış* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2005), 414.

<sup>886</sup> Hakan Yavuz, *Erbakan’dan Erdoğan’a Laiklik, Demokrasi, Kürt Sorunu ve İslam*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2011), 69.

<sup>887</sup> Abdullah Demir, “Erbakan’ın Türkiye Sanayileşmesine Yönelik Paradigmaları”, *Turkish Studies*, No.12, Vol.8, (2017), 94.

Erbakan, as the founder of the MGH, also touched upon the industrialization movements in Türkiye and criticized the post-Republican industrial policies. This is because Türkiye cooperates with Western experts for its industrial policies. According to Erbakan, foreign experts made efforts to hinder the development of Turkish industry. For example, in 1925 the government planned to establish an iron and steel factory, and Belgian experts were brought in for the iron and steel factory. These experts brought by the state, after examining Türkiye for a few years, said that an iron and steel factory could not be established in Türkiye, which resulted in the construction of this factory being delayed. Then, in 1933, Austrian experts were consulted, but they reached the same conclusion as their Belgian predecessors. However, despite all this, Türkiye established an iron and steel industry factory in Karabük in 1938-1939, albeit a decade later than desired. As a result, Türkiye lost 13 years in seeking to establish an iron and steel factory.<sup>888</sup>

As can be seen, having a Western imitative mentality and admiration for Western countries directly impeded Türkiye's industrial development. Erbakan, who was intractably against the obstructive industrialization policies in Türkiye from the beginning of his career, also criticized the assembly industry, which is another problem in Türkiye. For Erbakan, the important thing in industrialization is *real* industrialization, and having the technological opportunities to make whole products, rather than assembling components assembled elsewhere. For this reason, Erbakan has always supported the development of domestic and national industry.<sup>889</sup>

One of the most important elements of being a modern developed country is undoubtedly to have a strong economy. Being aware of this, Erbakan produced the idea of a "Fair Economic Order", which is a domestic and national idea, being aware of the necessity of having an independent and strong economy. With this idea, instead of imitating

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<sup>888</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Erbakan Külliyyatı Cilt 1*, 110.

<sup>889</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Erbakan Külliyyatı Cilt 5*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MG V Yayınları, 2014), 121.

the economic model of Western societies, Erbakan put forward an alternative model suitable for his society and values.

## **5.7.2 Adil Ekonomik Düzen (Fair Economic Order)**

### **5.7.2.1 Overview**

The Fair Economic Order, which is the economic model of the MGH, is a model that opposes the colonial power's exploitation of weak countries and their use only for their interests.<sup>890</sup> According to Erbakan, there is a "Slave Order" created by imperialism and Zionism in the world, which was already evident in Türkiye's economic field after WWII. It is a result of the conscious, planned, and programmed "modern colonialism" practices of the powers of imperialism and Zionism in the world. This order is maintained in Türkiye through "imitative parties", which acclaim and surrender to the West, especially by borrowing from the IMF to entrench the Slave Order regime in Türkiye.<sup>891</sup> According to Erbakan, Türkiye's economic ties with Western international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank were never in the interests of the country, and are damaging to sovereignty. Türkiye could not have been a tool for the interests of other countries if it had not been yoked to the Slave Order.<sup>892</sup> Societies oppressed by this slave system are doomed to economic backwardness. On the other hand, the countries that exploit them are getting richer. Erbakan planned to abolish this slave order with the Fair Economic Order model built on "rights and justice".<sup>893</sup>

There are fundamental differences between the Western civilization that established the Slave Order and Turkish civilization, particularly concerning the importance of *Hak* (right) and *Batıl* (wrong). The meaning of *Hak* is "unchangeable". The technical term is

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<sup>890</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 216.

<sup>891</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, (Ankara: Semih Ofset Matbaa, 1991), 1-2-3.

<sup>892</sup> Hakan Köni, "Foreign Policy Vision of the Turkish Religious Right: From National View to Justice and Development Party", *International Journal of West Asian Studies*, Vol.3, No.1, (2011), 72.

<sup>893</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Davamız*, 229.

correct in every circumstance. The meaning of *Batıl* is “inexact, wrong”. The technical term is wrong in every circumstance. According to Erbakan, Westerner’s understanding of “right” is power, majority, privilege, and financial interest. In this context, the basis of Western civilization is an understanding of the superiority of force. However, for Islamic civilizations, the concept of “right” represents equality, brotherhood, justice, and reconciliation. According to the Fair Economic Order, which references Islamic civilization, exploitation is not allowed, everyone is given the right, and most importantly, everyone is treated equally. The Fair Economic Order, giving equal opportunity to everyone, aims to eliminate barriers and inequality.<sup>894</sup>

Both capitalism and communism are Western ideologies and economic systems of oppression that exploit the Turkish nation. Erbakan examined the positive and negative aspects of capitalism and communism for a Fair Economic Order system. The capitalist order includes “interest”, which is an unfair means of exploitation and oppression, as well as “profit”, which is an encouraging and regulating element. The communist regime is against interest in principle, but it is also against human nature, as it also opposes the “right to property” and the “profit” transaction. In this context, it is understood that both capitalism and communism are incomplete and unacceptable. Erbakan states that the system most suitable for human nature is the Fair Economic Order, which opposes “interest” but approves the “profit process”.<sup>895</sup>

As can be seen, Erbakan examined the existing systems, separated their positive and negative aspects, and presented an alternative model for Türkiye to become a developed and independent country.

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<sup>894</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, 15-17; Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri*, 90-91.

<sup>895</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, 75-79; Işıl Arpacı, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamına Etkileri Bakımından İslamcılık ve Necmettin Erbakan*, 298-299.

### 5.7.2.2 *General Principles of Fair Economic Order*

There are four fundamental principles of Erbakan's Fair Economic Order:

1. The government should help its citizens to carry out economic activities. The state's role in the economy must make the macro plan of the country and regions and support the investment projects of the foundations or companies that will invest.<sup>896</sup>
2. The government should not allow interest. Since interest does not arise in return for labour and does not correspond to a good or service, there is no interest in the Fair Economic Order. According to Erbakan, while this system creates all kinds of economic and social damage, it leads to the progressive deterioration of income distribution, making the rich richer and the poor poorer.<sup>897</sup>
3. The government should not allow the printing of money unbacked by assets. In the Fair Economic Order, "value for money has to *be*"; in other words, money cannot be issued in exchange for anything other than land, facilities, standard goods, tradeable goods (such as gold), and foreign currency.<sup>898</sup>
4. There should be a partnership system instead of a credit and interest system. Erbakan is against credit and interest systems, which he believes the Zionist and imperialist states have used to enslave worldwide nations, including Türkiye.

Therefore, Erbakan argues that the state should act as a guarantor in the banking, interest, and credit systems, not abuse the system and create an equal and fair order for everyone.<sup>899</sup> According to Erbakan, in the Fair Economic Order, individuals can come together to form partnerships and combine their savings to engage in economic activities.

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<sup>896</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, 20-22.

<sup>897</sup> *Ibid.*, 26-27.

<sup>898</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>899</sup> Nihan İbrişim, *Political Islam and Secularism in Turkish Nationalism: How the concepts of self and others contribute in constructing the "Millet"*, Unpublished M.A Thesis University of Oslo, Norway, 2020, 38.

There are both ways of partnerships, the first of which is to come together and produce a product in a facility and sell it with profit, and to divide the profit among the partners. The other is to establish a facility as a partner, to make a profit by producing and selling the goods produced in this facility, or to make a profit by selling the facility and to divide the profit among the partners. In other words, to be a partner in both the facility and its production and profit. Thus, a person uses the opportunity to consume more than he saves from his production for a temporary period, under certain conditions. In the use of this system, neither interest nor inflation will naturally occur.<sup>900</sup>

As a result, if the “Fair Economic Order” is implemented, **Türkiye** will be saved from social injustice by the rich oligarchs getting richer while the poor become poorer, and it will be liberated from slavery to rich states and Zionist imperialism. In addition, it will cease to be a lagging country because of heavy foreign debts and interest, and conversely become a country that provides financial aid to fraternal Muslim countries, supporting them with all kinds of production and defence industry products. In addition, workers who formerly went abroad to contribute to foreign economies (e.g., Germany) will return to their hometowns and work in better conditions in factories to be established in their own countries. As a result, Türkiye will turn into a developed country that sends tourists, not workers, to the West.<sup>901</sup>

### **5.7.3 Spiritual Development**

The MGH was created by Erbakan as an alternative modernization project, but it does not focus merely on material development. It also focuses on spiritual development as well, which Erbakan viewed as essential for material development itself.<sup>902</sup> His aim in spiritual development is to oppose Westernization and to resurrect national and spiritual values that

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<sup>900</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Yeni Bir Dünya ve Adil Düzen*, edited by Tacettin Çetinkaya, (Ankara: MGV Yayınları, 2021), 85.

<sup>901</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, 97-98.

<sup>902</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Erbakan Külliyatı Cilt 1*, 335.

have been forgotten because of imitating the West.<sup>903</sup> According to Erbakan, Turkish government officials aimed to make Türkiye a part of the West. In this context, Türkiye has been trying to Westernize for two centuries, but it can neither Westernize nor preserve its Muslim identity. Turkish society has sought everything from education to family order, from state organization to judicial system within Western culture, and has rejected its own culture, values, history, and identity in order to try to be Western. Thus, spiritual development could not be achieved in Türkiye.<sup>904</sup>

Türkiye cannot unite with Western countries in the same political structure, as Türkiye's social structure, worldview, history, and culture are different from the West. Therefore, according to Erbakan, the new generation must be raised free from the imitative mentality of the West.<sup>905</sup> The way to achieve this is to base the current education system on national and moral values. In this way, new generations will not be strangers to their own identity and culture. In this way, individuals who are proud of their past, protect their customs and traditions with respect and respect, are away from all kinds of imitations, and have high national and spiritual feelings will be raised.<sup>906</sup> In this context, the measures to be taken to preserve, sustain, develop, and transfer the national culture to new generations and the whole world are as follows:

1. The curriculum and contents of courses such as ethics, sociology, philosophy, and psychology, which are of great importance in providing young people with a worldview, should be rewritten to ensure adherence to national beliefs and spiritual values.
2. Positive sciences textbooks should include sections introducing the Turkish nation's services to these sciences.
3. Care should be taken to ensure that various programs broadcast on television and radio are compatible with national culture, morality, and beliefs. Special

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<sup>903</sup> Haldun Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, (İstanbul:Metis Yayınları, 2003), 35.

<sup>904</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri*, 26-27-28.

<sup>905</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Mecliste Ortak Pazar*, (İzmir: Tek Yol Neşriyatı, 1973), 12-13.

<sup>906</sup> Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975), 26-90-92.

educational programs prepared by authorized experts in the field of spiritual sciences should be broadcast through radio and television.

4. Legislation should be prepared to eliminate the obstacles to be encountered in the implementation of spiritual development mobilization.<sup>907</sup>

As can be seen, Erbakan attached great importance to spiritual as well as material development. The key point to be noted here is that he argued that modernizing requires only industry and technology as the cornerstones of modernization, and not capitulation to the West and its culture, and the active destruction of the indigenous culture of Türkiye. In this context, Türkiye can create a national model by blending indigenous national and spiritual values with the material values of the West, without losing national and spiritual values.

## **5.8 LONG-TERM INFLUENCE ON TURKISH POLITICS**

Although Erbakan was overthrown by the secularist fanatics of the military establishment, his ideas had a profound and long-lasting resonance in Turkish politics that continue to the present day. The most notable figure influenced by his views is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (b. 1954). Erdoğan began his political life at the age of 15 as a member of the National Outlook Organization, founded by Erbakan. Three years after finishing high school, in 1976, he was elected as the youth wing leader of the MSP in the Beyoğlu district of İstanbul. In 1994, Erdoğan was elected mayor of İstanbul, Türkiye's largest and most populous city, from the RP. After the RP was closed, instead of joining Erbakan's new Felicity Party, he founded the AKP in 2001 with Abdullah Gül and some reformers from the RP, which quickly became one of the most powerful political movements in Türkiye.

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<sup>907</sup> İrfan Ersin & Cengizhan Yıldırım, "Necmettin Erbakan'ın Manevi Kalkınma Söyleminin İslam Ekonomisi İçerisindeki Yeri ve Sosyal Sermaye ile Asimetrik Bilgi Konularıyla İlişkisi", *Uluslararası İslam Ekonomisi ve Finansı Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol.2, No.1, (2016), 145; Işıl Arpacı, Türk Siyasal Yaşamına Etkileri Bakımından İslamcılık ve Necmettin Erbakan, 261-262.

As leader of the AKP, Erdoğan served as Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014, and then became the President of the RoT. During his presidency, a referendum was held with the article amendments supported by Erdoğan, and with the amendment made to the Turkish Constitution in April 2017, whereby the existing parliamentary system was transformed into a presidential system. Thus, the office of Prime Minister was abolished, and Erdoğan has been serving as President of the RoT since 2014.

Another important politician was the 11th President, Abdullah Gül, who also entered politics with Erbakan's party. He was elected as a member of parliament from the RP in 1991. In 1993, he served as the Deputy Chairman of the RP responsible for Foreign Relations. In 1999, he was elected as a member of parliament from the FP. After the AKP won the 2002 general elections, Gül was appointed Prime Minister, as AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was banned from participating in politics. When Erdoğan returned to politics, he left the post of prime minister in 2003 and was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. He served as President of the RoT from 2007 to 2014.

As can be seen, many of the founders, current ministers, and members of parliament of the ruling AKP, which has been in power in Türkiye for over 20 years, began their political careers through the party founded by Erbakan. More importantly, under Erbakan's leadership, they gained significant experience in political strategy and party management. For Erdoğan, who was part of the National Outlook Organization founded by Erbakan from his youth, Erbakan was both a mentor and a source of inspiration. Erbakan's political vision and determination played a crucial role in developing Erdoğan's leadership qualities. Erbakan's principles contributed to Erdoğan becoming a strong and decisive leader on the political stage. Erbakan's influence on Erdoğan has been felt at every stage of Erdoğan's political career. Combining the ideological and political education he received from Erbakan with his own leadership approach, Erdoğan has become one of Türkiye's most influential political figures.

Another important politician, as significant as these two prominent political figures who come from the MGH tradition but later founded a separate party, is Fatih Erbakan. Like his father, Fatih is an engineer and a politician, playing an active role in Turkish politics. More importantly, he strives to continue the MGH inherited from his father. After the passing of Erbakan, Fatih Erbakan entered politics to carry on his father's political cause and founded the New Welfare Party in 2018. Fatih, as the Chairman of the New Welfare Party, has adopted a political approach based on Islamist and national values in line with his father's teachings and continues to be actively involved in politics in this direction.

## **5.9 LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

In addition to Erbakan's ideology and policies being influential in Türkiye's politics, he had direct and lasting impacts on industrialization and national technology development. Believing that Türkiye needed to be industrialized to become a developed modern country, Erbakan constantly emphasized the importance of local and national technology both during his academic and political career. In this context, he demonstrated his determination and ambition to develop local and national industry in Türkiye by establishing the Gümüş Motor (Silver Engine Factory), which produced Türkiye's first local engine in 1965. Afterward, he established many of the leading industrial companies in Türkiye, including Military Electronics Industry Inc. (ASELSAN), İskenderun Iron and Steel Inc. (İSDEMİR), Rocket Industry and Trade Inc. (ROKETSAN), Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI), and Turkish Motor Industry and Trade Inc. (TÜMOSAN).

The local and national defence industry initiative that Erbakan had dreamed of throughout his life was brought to life by Özdemir Bayraktar, Erbakan's student at İstanbul Technical University and his close friend who served in Erbakan's party, mechanical engineer and founder of BAYKAR Makina (BAYKAR Machine) and his sons. The company initially produced automotive parts such as engines, pumps, and spare parts for

the automotive sector, but with the participation of the second-generation engineers of the family, Haluk Bayraktar, Selçuk Bayraktar, and Ahmet Bayraktar, as of 2000, BAYKAR began R&D studies in the field of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies for the defence and aviation world. BAYKAR, which broke new ground in Turkish aviation and defence history with its own R&D studies and reached a 93% localization rate in Türkiye, has today ended Türkiye's external dependency on the defence industry by producing UAVs and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).

BAYKAR, which has been working on local and national production for Türkiye's technological independence since 1986, has created a revolution in Türkiye. Before BAYKAR developed local and national UAVs and UCAVs, Türkiye was using HERON drones leased from Israel, and controlled from the same country. Conversely, BAYKAR has galvanized the local and national defence industry that forms the basis of the independent and strong Türkiye that Erbakan had dreamed of for years, and changed the destiny of Türkiye.

Showing great interest in the BAYKAR company, Erbakan visited the company frequently and supported Özdemir Bayraktar and his sons in their local and national defence projects. Selçuk Bayraktar, the architect of Türkiye's first domestic (armed) UAV systems and the first domestic unmanned combat aircraft Bayraktar KIZILELMA expressed his devotion and love for Erbakan, who devoted his life to Türkiye's struggle for development, by writing "TC: ERB: ERBAKAN" on the tail number of "Türkiye's first national and original Tactical UAV System Bayraktar TB2 PT-1", which he developed in 2014. More importantly, he revealed the Bayraktar family's devotion to Erbakan.

As a result, although Erbakan could not realize the national technology and defence industry projects he dreamed of during his own career as an industrial expert and politician, Özdemir Bayraktar and his sons who followed in his footsteps made Erbakan's dreams come true in practice. More importantly, Özdemir Bayraktar and his sons, who, like Necmettin Erbakan, were deeply devoted to Islam and Turkish culture and made significant

contributions to the development of domestic and national technology for Türkiye's full independence, have become the most important example of how a scientist connected to the Islamic tradition can produce high technology and science without breaking away from their own tradition of knowledge and wisdom.

As can be seen, Erbakan's influence was not limited to his own period and even today, thanks to those who followed in his footsteps, Erbakan's influence is felt in every field.

## **5.10 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This chapter has charted Erbakan's thoughts on Turkish modernization, and his evaluation of Türkiye's modernization process as both an industrial expert and academician and a politician. According to him, Türkiye's biggest mistake in this process was simply imitating the West, confusing modernization and Westernization in its modernization process. While it is necessary to focus only on the science and technology of the West to modernize, Türkiye has taken concrete steps towards Westernization by incorporating the culture of the West, with negligible technological and industrial development. Indeed, as Erbakan himself experienced while trying to impart German industrial knowledge and skills to Türkiye, the secularist political elite actively subverted attempts to achieve actual modernization development.

Erbakan claimed that the same inferiority complex had destroyed the Ottoman State. Erbakan's anti-Western attitude does not mean rejecting everything in the West, rather he is against the imitation of irrelevant Western cultural and institutional forms. However, he attached great importance to taking advantage of all the possibilities of technology, which in his lifetime was monopolized by the West. For example, he argued that Western technology should be used to develop heavy industry. Again, the most important issue he always emphasized was the necessity of establishing a local and national industry by taking advantage of Western technology and science.

Erbakan defended the idea that getting rid of underdevelopment and establishing a strong Türkiye again was only possible through industrialization. According to him, the issue of industrialization is the basis of the political and economic independence of nations. This is exactly the reason he entered politics. Erbakan, who completed his doctorate in Germany and worked as an academician in Türkiye, entered politics to develop the local and national industry in Türkiye. For this reason, Erbakan entered politics to try and initiate the industrialization process, which he called the “heavy industry move”. As a result, he achieved great success with the economic and industrial policies he implemented when he came to power in 1996, which resulted in profound improvements in the Turkish economy. However, he was ousted by the military establishment on 28 February 1997, immediately incurring a major economic crisis.

One of the slogans that Erbakan repeated throughout his political life was “morality and spirituality first”. Erbakan thought that the deep-rooted problems in the country resulted from the society breaking away from its roots of civilization and moving away from moral and spiritual values. For this reason, he argued that a development move was needed in the spiritual field as well as in the material field. Erbakan’s goal in spiritual development was to resist Westernization and eliminate the national and spiritual destruction caused by Western imitation. In this context, he supported the idea of “national vision”, which is an alternative modernization project. In his opinion, Türkiye can create a local and national model by combining its religion and culture with the technology and industry of the West. Thus, Türkiye will become a materially and morally strong country by preserving its values.

Correspondingly, Erbakan tried to modernize the country through programs of both material and spiritual progress. He emphasized the local and national modernization model, contrary to the idea that the West should be imitated. He believed that rapid industrialization and spiritual progress would make Türkiye a rich nation, and he worked for this ideal throughout his life. The concepts of modernization and Westernization are

typically confused among Turkish political leaders and everyday people. Understanding the difference between these two concepts helps us better analyse and understand the complex processes of change in societies.



## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

#### 6.1 THE MODERNIZATION AND WESTERNIZATION PARADIGMS

Based on the analysis presented in the preceding chapters, it can be seen that *modernization* is the development of a society's industry, industry, and technology. This process generally brings with it factors such as economic growth, technological progress, increased education levels, and democratization. Modernizing societies transition from traditional production methods such as agriculture and handicrafts to factories and mechanized production processes. This increases economic growth and prosperity. Additionally, in modernizing societies, the level of education generally increases and access to information becomes easier. This enables society to move towards a more conscious and knowledge-based structure.

*Westernization* is the imitation of the culture and values of Western societies in non-Western societies. In other words, it is the process of adopting Western values by shedding traditional values, beliefs, and cultural practices. Although Westernization is associated with the modernization process, and was deliberately and consciously presented and understood as such by the European colonial empires, it is not a natural consequence of modernization. Modernization refers to economic, technological, and social progress, while Westernization refers to the change or loss of cultural identity and values. In other words, the focus of Westernization is culture, and the focus of modernization is technology and industry.

Modernization, while originally a Western concept, is the reflection of the results of major changes experienced in the West, such as the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, in Western countries. As a result of these major changes in the West, western

countries have increased their economic, military, and political power. Non-Western societies, which could not achieve natural modernization on their own, wanted to modernize to have the economic, military, and political power of the West, chiefly in order to avoid the incursion of colonial imperial domination. However, non-Western societies that wanted to modernize thought that they could achieve the economic and political power of the West by imitating Western values, and confused the concepts of modernization and Westernization.

## **6.2 THE CASE OF TÜRKİYE**

Both Attila İlhan and Necmettin Erbakan considered that the foundations of the RoT's preference for Westernization policies instead of modernization date back to the time of the Ottoman State, and the perception of the military superiority of Western powers. Until the seventeenth century, the Ottoman State was in a position to produce solutions to the problems that arose with its own science and technology. However, as a result of the modernization process that started with the Renaissance, Western states were ahead of the Ottoman State in military and technological terms, and the Ottoman State could not follow the military and technological developments in the West in this process. As a result, the Ottoman State experienced a significant decline starting from the late seventeenth century.

This decline came with internal rebellions, external attacks, and economic difficulties. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, imperial rulers, observing the strengthening and progress of modern European states, began to realize that the Ottoman State also needed to strengthen through modernization. After Selim III ascended to the throne in the late eighteenth century, official solutions began to be sought. Many innovations were attempted, especially in the military, with the mass reform program called Nizam-ı Cedid. However, the real radical reforms were made during the reign of Mahmud II. during this period, the idea emerged that the Ottoman State needed to adopt the socio-cultural values of the West to modernize. In other words, this was the first period when

modernization policies were confused with Westernization policies. In this context, Mahmud II, who tried to transform Ottoman society into a Western society with the innovations he made in the socio-cultural field, imitated the West in everything from clothing to food and beverage culture and tried to make society adopt these innovations.

The imitation of the West that began during the reign of Mahmud II continued unabated during the Tanzimat period. Although attempts were made to catch up with the West in the field of the industry during this period, they were not very successful due to the transfer of science and technology developed in Europe in the form of “translation” and “purchase”. Another reason for the failure is that the state started technology transfer and industrialization quite late. After starting these late initiatives, the state remained largely dependent on foreign labour, and science and technology that would reduce dependency on the West could not be produced.

In addition, the factories established with great expense during this period remained dependent on foreign sources in terms of machine spare parts, engineers, qualified personnel, operators, and experts. This was to be a familiar scenario in the coming years, and Erbakan faced active resistance in attempting to introduce home-grown industries in Türkiye, as political elites wished for Türkiye to remain an exporter of low-value agricultural goods and importer of expensive manufacturing goods.

The failure to catch up with the West in the fields of industry and technology, combined with efforts to “modernize” by imitating the West, resulted in a loss of spiritual consciousness and a general change in mentality in society. Educational institutions opened in the European style played an important role in introducing materialism to the Ottoman State. Materialist views of Western origin became widespread among Ottoman intellectuals, causing them to hate traditional social norms and even their own nation and history.

The erroneous modernization policies that started under Mahmud II were replaced with a genuine modernization strategy focused on industrial and scientific development during the reign of Abdül Hamid II. He believed that non-Western states like the Ottoman State needed to modernize within the framework of their own history and civilization, and focused only on the strengths of the West. In this context, he closely followed the innovations in the West and sent delegations to follow scientific developments. He made great efforts to prevent a gap between Western civilization and the Ottoman State. Instead of the culture and civilization of the West, he focused only on scientific developments and made great efforts to protect the religion and culture of the Ottoman State. In this direction, he was an Ottoman equivalent of the Meiji government's modernization ethos in Japan. Contemporaneously, Japan was a civilization that managed to modernize without giving up its ancient beliefs and traditions.

Abdül Hamid II was subjected to vitriolic hatred from European imperialists and their imitative stooges within the Ottoman State, but he long managed to evade being overthrown (the typical fate of Turkish leaders who frustrated the will of Türkiye's external and internal enemies) due to his strong intelligence system and his successful economic policies. As a result, groups that did not like his ideas started a systematic and secret opposition, until they ultimately managed to get rid of him. Abdül Hamid II not only staved off the collapse of the "sick man of Europe" for decades; he actively developed science and technology, particularly communications by telegraph and railway, and boosted economic development, while increasing the Ottoman State's engagement with the broader Muslim world under his Pan-Islamist mission. After his removal in 1909, the course was clear to divide the remains of the Ottoman State among political entrepreneurs in the service of Western imperialism, which occurred after WWI.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman State, the RoT was established by Atatürk, in 1923. He aimed to establish a modern nation state and to raise Türkiye to the level of contemporary civilizations. He believed that a secular and rational culture should be created first and for this purpose, he initiated a series of cultural reforms. According to him, to

modernize meant to become Westernized. Therefore, all modernization reforms included Western elements. This was the basic principle of the reforms he implemented to modernize the country. For these reasons, the modernization movements after the foundation of the Republic were a continuation of the modernization movements of the Tanzimat period. However, in this period, unlike the Ottoman period, all obstacles to change were eliminated.

In this context, Atatürk tried to make the newly established nation state compatible with Western norms by eliminating one by one the traditional Ottoman institutions that he saw as obstacles to development. For example, while Western-style schools were opened alongside traditional educational institutions during the Tanzimat period, madrasahs were closed. Western-style schools were opened during the Republic period, and became the only option in education. Similar changes were made with regard to other institutions.

After Atatürk passed away in 1938, with the election of İsmet İnönü, who served as Prime Minister for many years as President, Westernization policies gained momentum while economic development languished. Cultural policies were completely focused on the West. He ignored the economic, technological, and industrial development necessary for Türkiye's development and instead of making progress in these areas, he tried to impose Western culture on Turkish society. In this context, when we look at the İnönü period in particular, we see the rejection of the past, tradition, and culture.

As a result, when we look at Turkish modernization, we see that the concepts of modernization and Westernization have mostly been conflated and confused. While it is enough to focus only on the technology and science of the modern West to modernize, in the modernization process of Türkiye, the culture and values of the West were imposed on Turkish society. This shows that Turkish modernization is not a modernization that is in line with the traditions, history, and heritage of the society. In this context, Republican intellectuals like İlhan and Erbakan agreed that Turkish modernization was confused with Westernization and suggested that Türkiye should create a modernization program by taking the technological developments of the West and blending them with its own culture.

### 6.3 ATTILA İLHAN AND NECMETTİN ERBAKAN

İlhan claimed that Western culture was not needed for modernization. He stated that the Japanese had managed to modernize by preserving their own culture and values and that a country with an ancient culture and history like Türkiye should modernize by preserving its own culture and values like Japan. Erbakan shared the same basic views and also actively sought to interact with successful anti-imperialist non-Western countries such as Malaysia, which had managed to modernize without abandoning their culture.

Erbakan was more practical and direct in his concerns, as he was an industrialist who had witnessed the effective suppression of Turkish industrialization. In his view, “modernization” should clearly encourage industrial and technological development. As a major literary figure, İlhan was more concerned with the “modernizing” cultural suppression of Türkiye 's traditional civilization and culture, and was aware that traditional Turkish/Ottoman culture was in no way inferior to Western cultures and that suppressing it in the name of “modernization” was a disservice to the Turkish nation.

The fact that these two intellectuals arrived at the same basic conclusions is important, because it shows that people from different political perspectives within Türkiye society who genuinely wish for national wellbeing share the same concerns about Türkiye modernization. İlhan was from a modern and secular family life and defined himself as a “leftist”, whereas Erbakan had an Islamist perspective and defined himself as a “rightist” (the parties he founded and was associated can be characterized as essentially socially conservative centre-right liberal parties in Western political parlance).

Both İlhan and Erbakan argued that Türkiye needed to have a strong economy and advanced technology to become a modern country, and that Türkiye could not achieve this goal because it focused on Westernization policies. Criticizing the Westernization policies of the İsmet İnönü government in particular, İlhan argued that during this period, emphasis was placed on cultural reforms, and economic policies were neglected, thus dragging

Türkiye into social, economic, and political darkness. In addition, in the context of Westernization policies during the İnönü period, the education system focused on Graeco-Roman civilization and actively denigrated Turkish culture and history. İlhan emphasized that Graeco-Roman civilization meant the Romano-Germanic civilization, including the early modern Holy Roman Empire and more recent Habsburg/ Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In other words, the “modernization” paradigm being propagated under İnönü meant deracinating the Turks from their own authentic history. Erbakan also reached similar conclusions to İlhan on this point. He emphasized that the Turkish education system was created according to the Western worldview, in line with the Westernization reforms and that as a result of this educational mentality, generations without faith, and roots, and alienated from national and spiritual values were raised. For both intellectuals, it was unacceptable to prioritize Christian culture and ignore Islam under the name of modernization policies.

According to İlhan and Erbakan, the biggest mistake made by those who advocate modernization in Türkiye is to see Islam as an obstacle to modernization. For İlhan, “Denying the cultural heritage of Islam is as pitiful a result for Türkiye as cutting off half of its body”. At this point, it is quite interesting that İlhan, who described himself as an atheist in some of his interviews, emphasized how important Islam is for the Turkish nation. This dispassionate analysis distinguishes him from the doctrinaire Islamophobia of many “secularist” thinkers in Türkiye. Unlike many intellectuals who know the importance of Islam in Turkish culture and history but ignore it because it contradicts their own ideologies, İlhan did not hesitate to emphasize how important Islam is for the Turkish nation. In this context, the best example that shows that Islam is not an obstacle to modernization is Malaysia, which has built its modernization policies in alignment with its “Islamic Values” and “Look East” policies, and which has been eminently successful. Erbakan also had a vision of modernization very similar to the Malaysian example.<sup>908</sup>

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<sup>908</sup> There may be those who do not see Malay modernization as an alternative to Turkish modernization and who do not understand the modernization relationship between the two countries. However, understanding

Referring to the modernization process of the West, İlhan drew attention to the fact that Westerners have not given up on their own cultures and values. Throughout history, different nations in the West have experienced a feudal period and then moved on to the industrial age. At this stage, they have blended the principles coming from Latin culture with the principles coming from their roots as a nation and have reached the Western synthesis. Therefore, Western civilizations are civilizations that exist separately, and differ from each other in terms of their national characteristics. For example, a French civilization emerged differently from a German or British civilization. As can be seen, there is no single civilization accepted by Western countries. Each country has modernized within its own civilization. However, Türkiye has not been able to present a local and national modernization model by blending its own culture and values with Western technology during the modernization process. At this point, the solution of both thinkers is that Türkiye should combine its culture with Western technology and industry to create a local and

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the relationship between Malay and Turkish modernization requires first examining how we conceptualize modernization processes. If we consider Auguste Comte's positivist perspective and Emile Durkheim's thesis that metaphysical ties must necessarily be severed, we are compelled to accept that modernization involves a society's departure from traditional metaphysical understandings and its turn toward rational and scientific thought. However, the modernization process of Malay society does not fully conform to this assumption. The Malay society has managed to modernize without completely severing its metaphysical ties and has successfully adapted to the modern world while preserving its religious and cultural identity. In this context, the Malay model of modernization presents a noteworthy alternative to Turkish modernization. This is because Turkish modernization, particularly during the Republican period, adopted a French-style secularization model and made significant efforts to eliminate metaphysical elements from social life through state intervention. While this process emphasized a positivist and materialist perspective, Malay modernization developed a model based more on synthesizing tradition and modernity. Regarding the metaphysical foundations of the Turkish and Malay societies, it is true that Malay Islam was greatly influenced by the broader Islamic intellectual tradition, in which the Ottoman State played a significant role, particularly through its influence over Mecca, Medina, and Cairo. In this context, the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence and the Ash'ari theological tradition have held a strong position in both the Malay world and the Ottoman State. Additionally, the Sufi thought and religious orders that flourished in Ottoman lands also spread to the Malay region and had a considerable impact. Therefore, Malay modernization can be considered an alternative model for Turkish modernization. Had Turkish modernization developed while preserving its metaphysical ties, certain societal conflicts and ruptures might have been mitigated. Given that Türkiye is currently searching for a new path to balance tradition and modernity in its modernization process, the Malay experience stands as a case worth examining. However, the applicability of this model depends on factors such as how well it aligns with Türkiye's own sociocultural and historical context, which must be carefully evaluated. See, Azyumardi Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern 'Ulamā' in The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, (Honolulu: Allen & Unwin, 2004), Passim.

national model. In this way, Türkiye will become a strong country both materially and spiritually while preserving its values.

The influence of these intellectuals, who had opposing worldviews and perspectives, was not limited to their own period. İlhan's works are used as an important reference in the sociological and cultural analyses of modern Türkiye, and his works on modernization, Westernization, and national identity in particular continue to have a wide resonance both among Turkish intellectuals and in the academic world. In addition, his life, works, and ideas continue to be the subject of many theses and studies.

Erbakan's ideology and policies have left permanent marks on Türkiye's political and social structure. His influence in politics was not limited to his time but continues today through the politicians and parties he founded who followed in his footsteps. He has been influential in the development of many politicians and statesmen, most notably the 12th and current President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the founder and leader of the AKP, which has been Türkiye's ruling party since 2002. Additionally, he achieved a direct and instrumental role in the resurrection of Türkiye's engagement with the broader Islamic world, and galvanized awareness of the importance of domestic industrial production, particularly for defence, and increased independence from the West and imperialist domination.

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## APPENDIX I: NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND TUN DR. MAHATHIR

### BIN MOHAMAD



Necmettin Erbakan's official visit to Malaysian Prime Minister Tun. Dr.Mahatir Bin Mohamad (National Archives of Malaysia)

## APPENDIX II: NECMETTINE ERBAKAN AND ANWAR IBRAHIM



The dinner organized in honor of Necmettin Erbakan's visit. Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is presented a gift to Erbakan (National Archives of Malaysia).

**APPENDIX III: DATO' DR. ABDULHAMID AHMAD ABU  
SULAYMAN NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND PROF. DR. MOHD.  
KAMAL HASSAN**



Rector of International Islamic University of Malaysia Dato' Dr. Abdul Hamid Ahmad Abu Sulayman, and Deputy Rector, Prof. Dr. Mohd. Kamal Hassan, accompanied Erbakan, Prime Minister, Republic of Türkiye during his official visit to IIUM (IIUM Archives Repository).

## APPENDIX IV: NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND GOH CHOK TONG



Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong hosting dinner for Prime Minister of Türkiye Necmettin Erbakan at Mandarin Hotel (National Archives of Singapore)

## APPENDIX V: NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND LEE CHEE YENG




Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) Lee Chee Yeng welcoming Prime Minister of Türkiye Erbakan on his arrival at PSA Building (National Archives of Singapore).

## APPENDIX VI: NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND SUHARTO



Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan accompanied by Indonesian President Suharto walks to the state guest house in Jakarta (Taken from bridgeman images page).

## APPENDIX VII: ERBAKAN'S VISIT TO BAYKAR MAKINA IN 2009



Erbakan's visit to BAYKAR Makina in 2009 (Taken from Milli Gazete newspaper page)

<https://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/7399255/erbakan-kendi-projesi-olan-iha-ve-sihalari-bayraktara-nasil-verdi>

## APPENDIX VIII: ÖZDEMİR BAYRAKTAR AND ERBAKAN



Erbakan examines unmanned aerial vehicle projects with Özdemir Bayraktar (Taken from haberler.com newspaper page) [https://www.haberler.com/guncel/haberler-hayata-72-yasinda-gozlerini-yumdu-peki-turk-siha-14468807-haberi/#google\\_vignette](https://www.haberler.com/guncel/haberler-hayata-72-yasinda-gozlerini-yumdu-peki-turk-siha-14468807-haberi/#google_vignette)

**APPENDIX IX: TÜRKİYE’S FIRST NATIONAL AND ORIGINAL  
TACTICAL UAV SYSTEM BAYRAKTAR TB2 PT-1**



“Türkiye’s first national and original Tactical UAV System Bayraktar TB2 PT-1”, developed by Selçuk Bayraktar in 2014 and has “TC: ERB: ERBAKAN” written on its tail number (Taken from Karar newspaper page) <https://www.karar.com/milli-ihabayraktarin-ilk-ucan-prototipinde-erbakan-ayrintisi-770088>