



NATIONALISM OR QUEST FOR JUSTICE? A  
CASE STUDY OF THE PATANI-MALAY  
UPRISINGS (1909-2009)

BY

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts at discovering the recent cause of uprisings in Patani, beginning in 2004, i.e. three years after the Thaksin-led government came to power in Thailand. The majority of studies on Southern Thailand tend to point out that Malay nationalism has been the key factor leading to the emergence of the Malay-speaking Muslim uprisings in the region for the last forty years. There is a question on why the Malay-speaking Muslims decided to halt their armed struggle against the central government in the 1980s if nationalism was the main cause of the uprisings. It was reported that the Patani region experienced peace and stability for almost two decades until 2001 when Thaksin Shinawatra won the general election and became Prime Minister. This thesis relies heavily upon primary materials such as texts, unpublished works, dissertations, theses, documents, periodicals, leaflets, propaganda literatures, and newspaper reports found at various universities in Malaysia and Thailand. Apart from that, it also relies upon interviews with several political and community figures in the two countries as well as other external observers. This thesis discovers that all the violent incidents that have been occurring in the region are not merely caused by the Patani liberation movements as many media claim. Instead, there have been invisible hands which play their roles for certain purposes. Some government security forces, especially the military officers and members of the government paramilitary groups, are believed to have been involved in violent incidents as a result of their dissatisfaction of the Thaksin-led government's policy against illicit businesses they have been carried out for decades. Attacks on government officials, buildings as well as civilians are believed to have two motives, first, to challenge the power of the Bangkok-based Royal Thai Police which the central government purposely brought to the Patani region, and second, to alert the military to the growing influence of the newly deployed Royal Thai Police in the region, suggesting that the police might take over all positions the military officers have been enjoying since the 1980s. As for the Patani liberation movements which have not involved in the violence since the conclusion of the peace treaty with Bangkok, they believe that the central government is not sincere in maintaining peace in the region. The liberation movements claim that the government security forces are conducting atrocities on the Malay-speaking Muslims systematically, thereby forcing them to retaliate.

## ملخص البحث

تحاول هذه الأطروحة أن تدرس الأسباب الكامنة وراء الانتفاضات التي حدثت في فطاني منذ عام ٢٠٠٤م، أي بعد ثلاث سنوات من تولي حكومة تاكسين السلطة في تايلاند. وتشير معظم الدراسات عن جنوب تايلاند أن النزعة القومية الملايوية كانت عنصراً رئيساً في اندلاع انتفاضات المسلمين الملايويين في الإقليم خلال الأربعين عام الماضية. لكن هناك سؤال يطرح نفسه، لماذا قرر المسلمون الملايويون تجميد نضالهم المسلم ضد الحكومة المركزية في الثمانينيات إذا كانت النزعة القومية هي الباعث الأساس للانتفاضات الملايوية؟ ويقال إن إقليم فطاني شهد فترة سلام واستقرار حتى عام ٢٠٠١م، عندما فاز تاكسين شنواترا في الانتخابات العامة، ثم أضحى رئيساً للوزراء. تعتمد هذه الدراسة في الأساس على المصادر الأولية مثل الأعمال غير المنشورة، والأطروحات الأكاديمية، والوثائق، والدوريات، والأدبيات الدعائية، والتقرير الصحافية التي توجد في جامعات مختلفة في ماليزيا وتايلاند. وإلى جانب ذلك تستند الدراسة إلى عدد من المعاينات مع بعض قادة المجتمع المدني والسياسي في كلا القطرين، فضلاً عن المراقبين الأجانب. ولاحظت الدراسة أن كل حوادث العنف التي وقعت في الإقليم ليست فقط بفعل حركات التحرير الفطاني، كما تزعم بعض الوسائط الإعلامية، بل هناك بعض الأيدي الخفية التي لها دور في الصراع لتحقيق أغراض معينة. فبعض أجهزة الأمن، وتحديدًا ضباط القوات العسكرية وأعضاء المجموعات البرلمانية هم مشتركون في أحداث العنف نتيجة لعدم اقتناعهم بسياسة حكومة تاكسين ضد بعض الأعمال غير المشروعة التي نفذت لعدد من العقود. ويمكن أن تعزي الهجمات التي وقعت على عدد من المكاتب الحكومية، والمباني، والمدنيين إلى سببين، يرجع السبب الأول إلى تحدي سلطات البوليس الملكي التي بعثتها الحكومة المركزية إلى إقليم تايلاند؛ والسبب الثاني إلى تحسب القوات العسكرية أن النفوذ المتصاعد إلى قوات البوليس الملكي في الإقليم ربما يستحوذ على كل الوظائف التي يشغلها الضباط العسكريون منذ الثمانينيات. أما بالنسبة لحركات التحرر الفطاني التي لم تشترك في العنف منذ أن وقعت معاهد بانكوك فهي تعقد أن السبب الرئيس للعنف يكمن وراء عدم قناعة الحكومة المركزية بتحقيق السلام في الإقليم. وتزعم تلك الحركات التحررية أن قوات الأمن الحكومية تمارس التطهير العرقي ضد المسلمين الملايويين السبب الذي يدفعهم إلى الثأر منها.

## **APPROVAL PAGE**

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## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as a whole for any other degrees at IIUM or other institutions.

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*I would like to dedicate this thesis to my beloved father, Wan Hashim bin Wan Ahmad, who always advises me to be patient and steadfast in my study, and my beloved mother, Shariffah Zaharah binti Syed Mohamed, who passed away on Thursday, 3 Zulqaidah 1422 (17 January 2002).*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
ABREP	Angkatan Bersenjata Revolusi Patani
AID	Agency for International Development
API	Angkatan Pemuda Insaf
ATM	Angkatan Tentera Malaysia
AWAS	Angkatan Wanita Sedar
BATAS	Barisan Tani Malaya
BBMP	Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani
B.E.	Buddhist Era
BIPP	Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani
BNPP	Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani
BPP	Border Patrol Police
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional
CCASBP	Command Centre for Administration of Southern Border Provinces
C.E.	Christian Era
C.O.	Colonial Office
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
DLA	Department of Local Administration
DPP	Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
GEMPAR	Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya
GERBAN	Gerilla Bandar
H.	Hijrah

IMT-GT	Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle
ISOC	Internal Security Operations Command
JCPMB43	Joint Civilian, Police and Military Body 43
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JMBRAS	Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
KMM	Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Malaysian Militant Group)
KMM	Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young Malays Union)
KRIS	Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung
MAGERAD	Majlis Gerakan Revolusi Dalam Negeri
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MOIA	Ministry of Interior Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
MPAJA	Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army
NAP	New Aspiration Party
NCIA	National Council for Islamic Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPKC	National Peace Keeping Council
NRC	National Reconciliation Commission
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
PAS	Parti Islam Se-Malaya/Malaysia
PCIA	Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs
PETA	Pembela Tanah Air
PKMM	Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya
PKRRP	Pergerakan Komando Revolusi Rakyat Patani

PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia
PULO	Patani United Liberation Organisation
PRM	Parti Rakyat Malaya
r.	reigned
RRAFA	Rural Reconstruction and Alumni Friends Association
SAAN	Southern Alternative Agriculture Network
TRT	Thai Rak Thai
TMSA	Thai Muslim Students' Association
UMNO	United Malay National Organisation

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 – STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Thailand is located in the tropical region of Southeast Asia. The country shares its border with Myanmar (Burma) to the west, Laos to the north and east, Cambodia to the southeast, and Malaysia to the south.<sup>1</sup> It was known as Siam until 1938 when a law was enacted that changed its name to Thailand (Thai: *Prathet Thai*, which means “Land of the Free”) so as to denote her independence from any colonial powers. Unlike other nations of Southeast Asia, Thailand was never colonised. Geographically, the country is divided into five regions, i.e., southern region, northern region, northeastern region, eastern region, and the central region which is also known as Thai Proper. The capital city of Bangkok is considered a specially governed district which is often counted as the sixth region. The southern region commonly known as southern Thailand is divided into two parts, i.e., Upper South and Lower South. The Upper South comprises nine provinces while the Lower South comprises five provinces, i.e., Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, and Satun,<sup>2</sup> all of which are known in Thai as *Changwat Chaidaien Pak Thai* (Southern Thailand Border Provinces).

Thailand has a population of about 65,905,410 (2009 estimation) with 75 percent being ethnic Thai while the Chinese constitute 14 percent. Other non-Thais form about 11 percent.<sup>3</sup> Thai is the official language of the country while English is

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 2.

<sup>3</sup> The World Factbook, *Thailand*, <[www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov)> (Accessed on 20 June 2009).

considered the second language and is usually spoken by the elite. Other languages are Chinese, Malay, Khmer, Karen, Hmong and Mon. They are spoken only by the minorities. Buddhism is the official religion of the country as 94.6 percent of the population is Buddhist. Muslims form about 4.6 percent while the rest are Christians, Hindus, Confucians, and others.<sup>4</sup>

In this predominantly Buddhist country, Islam is regarded as the second largest religion. According to the National Statistical Office, there are about 2.97 million people who adhere to Islam throughout the country.<sup>5</sup> There are three categories by which the Muslims of Thailand are identified—Malay-speaking Muslims, Thai-speaking Muslims (who were ethnically Malays of Satun and Songkhla provinces), and non-Malay Muslims of different ethnicities who prefer being identified as Thai-Muslims. Of the total number of Muslims in Thailand, ethnic Malays constitute the largest group which stands approximately 1,930,000.<sup>6</sup> The majority of them are concentrated in the lower part of southern region, specifically the three southernmost provinces, i.e., Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, collectively known to the locals as Patani.<sup>7</sup>

Indeed very little is known to the outside world about the situation in Patani. Media reports have generally identified these three southernmost provinces of Thailand as restless areas where Malay liberationists and separatists are fighting against the Thai government for decades<sup>8</sup> while most outsiders believe that Muslims are in conflict with the Buddhist central government in Bangkok. The provinces of

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> The National Statistical Office in Bangkok provided this figure in late 2000, but the Islamic Office of Thailand in Nongchok, Bangkok in December 2000 claimed that the number of Muslims across Thailand was larger than that of the government census. See Appendixes 3 and 4.

<sup>6</sup> Hasanudin Daud, "Patani Dulu Dan Sekarang", in Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, *Tamadun dan Sosio-Politik Melayu Patani*, (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 2007), 180

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix 5.

<sup>8</sup> Pathan, Don, "Fire On South," <[www.nationmultimedia.com](http://www.nationmultimedia.com)> (Accessed on 20 June 2005).

Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, as reported in the media, have long acted as a zone of discontent and violence. This situation has been fostered by local resentment of central government assimilation policies. There are also reports on high level of poverty and underdevelopment in the region as compared to other provinces of the country.<sup>9</sup> Administrative corruption and arbitrary security measures enacted in the name of national security are also claimed to have exacerbated the problem.<sup>1</sup> According to the international and local media, violence in these provinces has so far been steadily escalating since early 2004. There has been widespread concern in the region that if it were left unchecked, the unrest could turn into a mass-based insurgency, or even a regional uprising, although to date there is no evidence of external involvement in the bombings and killings that have become almost a daily occurrence.

In fact, violence in Thailand's three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat reportedly started as early as the 1960s when separatist movements waged a liberation campaign against Bangkok's rule. By mid 1980s, the campaign appeared to have become weak after the central government managed to arrest a number of so-called separatist leaders. While the Thai armed forces reportedly killed more than a thousand separatist, supporters, and sympathizers, the Thai government tried to deal with the rest of them in a good manner by offering clemency to those who would be willing to surrender. Political observers believed that the Patani liberation campaign had come to an end; the three Malay-speaking southernmost provinces were therefore regarded as being in a state of pacification ever since. However, in 2001 these three provinces once again experienced conflict. Some experts have suggested

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<sup>9</sup> "Thailand's Restive South," <[www.BBCnews.com](http://www.BBCnews.com).> (Accessed on 15 July 2005).

<sup>1</sup> Adams, Brad, "Two Years After Killings, No Security Personnel Have Been Persecuted," <[www.hrw.com](http://www.hrw.com).> (Accessed on 24 October 2006).

this occurred under the influence of foreign Muslim groups such as the al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). They claimed that after the tragedy of September 11, 2001 in New York, a number of so-called radical Muslim groups expanded their wings of influence over regions that have a majority Muslim population in order to gain more support from their brethren. These groups have been accused of trying to sow hatred for Western powers particularly the United States of America and Britain for bringing about a state of deterioration to most Muslim countries.

Ever since Thailand became one of the staunch supporters of the United States' foreign policy on the so-called war against terrorism, Thai authorities and most terrorism experts suspect that the violence in Patani has had something to do with what they called Islamic insurgence under the instigation of foreign Muslim groups.<sup>1</sup> Ethnic and religious differences in the region are believed to have become a suitable ground on which insurgencies can easily spark. Others suggest that such connections have never been fully substantiated and have remained highly contentious.<sup>1</sup> Still other reports suggest that a number of Patani Muslims have received military training at al-Qaeda centres in Pakistan and in some Middle Eastern countries.<sup>1</sup> The Thai authorities claim to have known for quite some time that many Patani Malay-Muslim activists went overseas to further their studies at Islamic learning institutions, where they came under the influence of, as the authorities called, hard-line teachers who have been members of anti-Western organisations.<sup>1</sup> Some reportedly joined the jihad war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Soon after the Afghan war

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<sup>1</sup> B. Raman, "Thailand and International Islamic Front," <[www.saag.org](http://www.saag.org)> (Accessed on 9 January 2004).

<sup>1</sup> Dillon, Dana, "Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism," *Heritage Foundation Lecture*, December 2004, 20.

<sup>1</sup> Bradley, John, "Waking Up to the Terror Threat in Southern Thailand," *The Straits Times*, 27 May 2004, 10.

<sup>1</sup> Abuza, Zachary, "A Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Separatist Groups," <[www.Jamestown Foundation.com](http://www.JamestownFoundation.com)> (Accessed on 8 September 2006).

was over, these Patani Malay-Muslim activists returned to Thailand as extremists.<sup>1</sup> Yet many experts believe, to the contrary, that the Patani uprisings have little or nothing to do with the so-called global terrorist organisations. Many have claimed that the Patani uprisings have forged links with groups such as the religious-nationalist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines and the Free Aceh Movement or *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) in Indonesia<sup>1</sup> with an aim to establish an independent state.

While some claim the violence may have had external influences, several informed political and security analysts in Thailand believe the current spate of attacks have more to do with entrenched criminal interests than localised or imported radicalism. Indeed some outside observers believe that local clan, commercial or criminal rivalries do play some part in the violence throughout the region. Their reason for such a claim is that the three southernmost provinces of Thailand have an active tradition of black market activity, with syndicates participating in a range of illicit endeavours from non-licensed gambling and "under-the-table" oil sales to firearms, human trafficking, prostitution and drug smuggling.<sup>1</sup> These groups have often clashed in the past as they sought to expand their various enterprises and establish control over additional lucrative markets and sales turf.

By the end of 2001, there had been many attacks on government buildings which are symbols of Thai authority. A number of schools and police stations in Patani were reported to have been burned down by unknown persons. At first, the Thai government blamed the attacks on bandits and gangsters that were believed to

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<sup>1</sup> "Thailand Islamic Insurgency," <[www.GlobalSecurity.org](http://www.GlobalSecurity.org)> (Accessed on 27 April 2005).

<sup>1</sup> Abuza, Zachary, "Indonesians infiltrate Southern Thailand Insurgency," *Bangkok Post*, 29 November 2005, 8.

<sup>1</sup> Holt, Andrew, "Thailand's Troubled Border: Islamic Insurgency or Criminal Playground?" *Terrorism Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 2 (May 20, 2004).

have clashed for their own spheres of influence. In 2002, the attacks resulted in deaths among police and army personnel. The number of incidents involving casualties increased rapidly in 2003. The authorities said it was too early to tell who was responsible, but suspicion fell on the banned liberation groups<sup>1</sup> that had been fighting against the central government for decades.

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On 28 April 2004, hundreds of Malay-Muslim men, mostly between 15 and 27 years of age, across Yala, Pattani, and Songkhla provinces, according to Thai military officials, launched a series of attacks on eleven well-defended police stations and army checkpoints with light weapons. The attacks ended in a bloody showdown at the famous Kerisek Mosque in Pattani province, a symbol of Malay-Muslim resistance to Thai (Siamese) domination, when the Thai army gunned down thirty-two men inside the mosque, in what police described as "suicidal" attacks.<sup>1</sup> The authorities claimed that they had merely quelled the insurgency when the government troops took over the mosque held up by a small group of assailants. By the end of the day, the media reported that over 100 attackers, a civilian, and several members of the security forces lost their lives.<sup>2</sup>

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The incident prompted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to depict the uprising as the local front in the global war on terrorism. As a result, a new emergency security law, described as "martial law plus", was enforced in the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. However, critics said the new law paved the way to create a dictatorship in Thailand's southernmost

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<sup>1</sup> "Thai Government Rejects Amnesty Proposal For Southern Separatists," *Bangkok Post*, 29 November 2005, 12.

<sup>1</sup> "Southern Unrest", <[www.nationmultimedia.com](http://www.nationmultimedia.com)> (Accessed on 14 March 2006).

<sup>2</sup> "Thailand's Restive South", <[www.BBCnews.com](http://www.BBCnews.com)> (Accessed on 15 July 2005).

provinces.<sup>2</sup> The new law, was subjected to special Prime Ministerial powers, i.e., gave Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra power to impose curfews, censor publications and other media, ban public meetings, tap phones, make widespread arrests and hold suspects without charge. It would, according to the critics, make all security forces and state officials working in a designated emergency area immune from criminal or civil prosecution. This had later drawn widespread objections from both Muslims and Buddhists not only in the Lower South but also across Thailand, who claimed that it would inflame tensions, rather than calm them.

On 25 October 2004, the district of Tak Bai in Narathiwat province saw the most publicized incident of the uprising. The Thai police arrested six local Muslim men, who worked for the government as village defense volunteers. All of them were accused of having supplied weapons and firearms to Patani separatists. They were detained without trial under the new emergency security law. Reports said that a Muslim demonstration was organised in the district to demand their release, for rumours had quickly spread among the locals that all the detainees were tortured during the period of incarceration.<sup>2</sup> The demonstration ended with seven Muslim demonstrators killed by gunshot while the other seventy-eight detainees, as the Thai army claimed, died of suffocation in trucks while on their way to the Pattani military camp.<sup>2</sup> The incident sparked<sup>3</sup> widespread protests across the Lower South. The situation became worse by 2005 when a series of bomb attacks shook the three southernmost provinces, resulting in great damage and casualty.

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<sup>2</sup> Scarpello, Fabio, “*Thai Tactics Win Fear, Not Favour*,” <[www.atimes.com](http://www.atimes.com)> (Accessed on 26 February 2005).

<sup>2</sup> “*Southern Unrest*”, <[www.nationmultimedia.com](http://www.nationmultimedia.com)> (Accessed on 14 March 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Ungpakorn, Giles, “*The<sup>3</sup> Thai State cannot win the war in Southern Thailand*,” <http://www.pcpthai.org>> (Accessed on 15 March 2008).

To date, it is unclear who is behind the almost daily rounds of bombings and shootings of Muslim and Buddhist civilians that plague Lower Southern Thailand. Unlike similar conflicts in other parts of the world, no one claims responsibility for the attacks. While the government claims it has arrested many people suspected to have been involved in the attacks, yet no concrete evidence has been brought forward to prove their involvement. Even if there were links between the suspects and the violence that occurs almost every day, there is still a glaring shortage of information particularly of factors that forced the region to be in a state of discontent. Indeed up to this moment, no information on the Patani uprisings has clearly been revealed. While most reports are eager to point fingers at the Muslim separatist groups and bandits as the reason for all the violence in the Lower South, its primary factors are still far from clear.

## **1.2 – RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This study tries to figure out why this conflict has reached to such a dimension where innocent people have become victims, and to understand the background of the conflict. In order to achieve this, the following questions need to be addressed:

- i. Is there a conflict of culture between the people from Thai Proper (Central Thailand) and the people in the Lower South? If there is, what is the nature of that conflict? Can they co-exist peacefully?
- ii. How do the Malay-Muslims view the central government in Bangkok?
- iii. Where do the Muslims of other parts of Thailand stand in this conflict?
- iv. Are there any outside forces involved in the conflict? Is there any international connection to it?

### **1.3 - SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

A study of the Malay-speaking Muslim uprisings in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand is crucially important at this particular moment because the unrest has claimed thousands of lives of civilians and no one has claimed responsibility. This study seeks to find reasons behind the discontent that occurs in the region. A series of shooting and bombing suddenly started in the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat after the region underwent peaceful situation for almost twenty years. The Thai authorities were quick to accuse the Muslim separatist groups of trying to resume their liberation campaign. The authorities accused Malaysians in the states bordering Thailand, primarily Kelantan, of collaborating with the so-called separatist movements. This is because the Thais believe that the people of Kelantan share the same culture and faith with those of Patani. Therefore, the Thai authorities claimed that Patani Muslim separatists embraced Malay nationalism as a means of getting support from the Muslims in Kelantan to fight against the Thai-speaking dominated central government for independence of the region.

If Malay nationalism were the main reason for the Patani uprisings against the Thai-dominated central government, why the Patani liberation movements agreed to stop their fighting for independence in the 1980s and joined the central government in the decision-making process thereby enabled the Patani region to experience peace and development for almost twenty years. The violence resurged in 2002 after Thaksin Shinawatra won the general election and formed government in Thailand. This study attempts to answer this question.

There are also claims by the Thai authorities that the liberation movements were no longer capable of waging liberation campaigns because they lost strength

during the government military operations throughout the 1970s.<sup>2</sup> Since the Patani liberation movements claim to no longer capable of waging armed campaigns against Bangkok, then who is responsible for the current violence? If the liberation movements still exist, then why are the Thai military forces still unable to eliminate all of them? If the liberation movements in these three southernmost provinces have not any strong and influential leaders, then who controls them and makes them difficult to be wiped out? Is there a third party, which exerts strong influence on the movements?

Some sources claim that the Patani uprisings since 2002 are an indication of potential al-Qaeda network involvement,<sup>2</sup> a name the Western media have been projecting as a terrorist organisation. The organisation reportedly expanded its orbit of influence over leftist groups and liberation movements around the world to create fear and tension. The attacks, according to one of the sources, were the handiwork of a small number of highly organised, experienced separatists who received special military assistance from the so-called terrorist organisations outside Thailand.<sup>2</sup> These separatists were reported to have embarked on a concerted and well-planned campaign of ambushes, murders, weapon thefts and criminal extortion since the Thaksin-led government transferred security responsibilities from the Army to the police. Others claimed that the so-called *Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM)* or Malaysian Militant Group was supporting the uprisings. This Malaysian group was accused of having links to the *Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)* an Islamic organisation in

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<sup>2</sup> Nidhi Aeusrivongse, "Understanding the Situation in the South as a Millenarian Revolt," *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*, Vol. 6, (March 2005), 4-6.

<sup>2</sup> Holt, Andrew, "Thailand's Troubled Border: Islamic Insurgency or Criminal Playground?" *Terrorism Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 2 (May 20, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> Bradley, John., "Waking Up to the Terror Threat in Southern Thailand," *The Straits Times*, 27 May 2004, 10.