



COMMUNITY FORMATION IN THE ASEAN: AN
ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION
AGAINST PIRACY, TERRORISM AND AIR
POLLUTION

BY

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ABSTRACT

Regionalism and regional integration has become a common theme in international politics, states are realising that there is an advantage in regional collectivism. The E.U. is one of the mature examples in successful regional identity formation and integration. This study specifically focuses on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has come to be regarded as one of the best experiments in regionalism in the developing world. This study used variables which focus on cooperation as a tool for joined behaviour at the inter-state level, ultimately leading to interdependence and a community of states where peaceful coexistence and co-dependence is a social norm. This study addressed how cooperation and trust leads to identity formation by studying mainly three areas of cooperation: piracy, terrorism and air pollution. Notwithstanding the limitations of ASEAN, member states have achieved increasing cooperation in the mentioned specific areas of piracy, terrorism, and air pollution through policy coordination and common action. This in turn has translated into a great deal of trust at various levels including leadership, administrative and the public level. The trust intensity might differ from one area of cooperation to another, however, overall, ASEAN members have learned to trust each other further due to the level of cooperation. Therefore this translated into a larger sense of community through regional identity formation among the member states. Trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing processes; the dynamic and positive relationship leads to mutual trust and collective identity. In its analysis of ASEAN cooperation, document analysis was used and data is obtained from primary sources, including ASEAN public records, declarations, speeches, conferences and others. In addition to that, publications in the form of books, journals, and papers written on ASEAN were utilised to examine cooperative action. Finally regional newspapers and key interviews were employed as a way of obtaining insider perspective regarding the issues being studied. This study has found that there is an unambiguous commitment among ASEAN member states to build a moral trust environment, where assured reliability is a common currency. All the three areas examined: piracy, terrorism and air pollution showed increased commitment and synchronized action from individual member states. This in turn has transformed into building of a common regional identity and community formation.

خلاصة البحث

أصبحت الإقليمية والتكامل الأقليمي من أهم خصائص العلاقات الدولية المعاصرة، حيث أدركت الدول الفوائد العديدة من العمل الاقليمي المشترك. ولعل التجربة الماثلة للإتحاد الأوربي خير مثال للفوائد المرجوة من التكامل الأقليمي وبناء هوية مشتركة للدول الأعضاء. تركز هذه الدراسة على رابطة دول جنوب شرقي آسيا المعروفة اختصاراً بالآسيان، والتي تعتبر اليوم واحدة من أبحح تحارب التكامل الاقليمي بين الدول النامية. تستخدم الدراسة مجموعة من المفاهيم المتداخلة والتي تركز على التعاون كآلية لتحقيق المصلحة المشتركة بين الدول الأعضاء لرابطة الآسيان بحيث يحقق ذلك التعاون نوعاً من الاعتماد المتبادل بين الأعضاء مما يؤدي في نهاية الأمر إلى تكوين رابطة من الدول تقوم علاقاتها على مبدأ التعايش السلمي. وعلى الرغم من بعض القصور الذي يكتنف أداء منظمة الآسيان إلا أن أعضائها قد نجحوا في تحقيق قدر كبير من التعاون والتنسيق في ثلاث مجالات حيوية وهامة وهي بالتحديد محاربة القرصنة البحرية، والارهاب وتلوث الهواء. وقد ترجمت هذه النجاحات نفسها في بناء وتقوية معامل الثقة بين الدول الاعضاء على مستوى القيادات والإدارات وعلى مستوى الرأي العام في هذه الدول. هذه الثقة المتبادلة بين الإعضاء قادت بدورها إلى تكوين هوية جماعية للرابطة. ويبدو أن الثقة والهوية الجماعية عاملان متداخلان ويؤثر كلا منهما بقدر على الآخر. قامت الدراسة بفحص الوثائق ذات المصادر الأولية لتحليل التعاون داخل رابطة الآسيان وكان في مقدمة هذه المصادر الأولية اعلانات الرابطة والبيانات المشتركة للمؤتمرات وأحاديث وتصريحات زعمائها. كما اعتمدت الدراسة على كم كبير من المصادر الثانوية كالكتب والمجلات والمقالات والصحف. استفادت الدراسة أيضاً من مجموعة من اللقاءات عقدها الباحثة مع مجموعة من الخبراء حول موضوع الدراسة لإلقاء المزيد من الضوء على محتوياتها. توصلت الدراسة إلى نتيجة مؤداها أنه يوجد بين أعضاء رابطة الآسيان التزام قوي، لا لبس فيه ولا غموض بضرورة بناء وتقوية عوامل الثقة والتعاون بين الدول الأعضاء. ولفحص معامل الثقة والتعاون في الموضوعات الثلاثة لهذه الاطروحة: محاربة القرصنة البحرية، محاربة الإرهاب ووضع السياسات الكفيلة بمحاربة تلويث الهواء، توصلت الدراسة إلى أن الدول الاعضاء التزمت بمجموعة من التدابير والسياسات الصارمة والناجحة على المستوى الفردي والجماعي، ساهمت بدورها في بناء هوية إقليمية جماعية لدول المجموعة.

APPROVAL PAGE

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own investigation, except where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as whole for any other degree at IIUM or other institutions.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACTC	ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime
AEM	ASEAN Economic Ministers
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
AMME	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment
AMMH	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze
AMMTC	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASC	ASEAN Security Community
AWGTP	ASEAN Working Group on Transboundary Pollution
HTTF	Haze Technical Task Force
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMB-PRC	International Maritime Bureau-Piracy Reporting Center
JMM	Joint Ministerial Meeting
MMEA	Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
RHAP	Regional haze Action Plan
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SEACAT	Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Two major forces today pull the world into two opposite directions. The first is nationalism¹ and sub-nationalism² and this can be observed through the many secessionist movements in the world today, especially in Africa, where there are countless ethnic divisions. The second force at work is regionalism and integration, which is also apparent through the many regional organisations, of which the European Union is the most famous. This research is concerned with the second force that is regionalism and integration. This study specifically focuses on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has come to be regarded as one of the most successful experiments in regionalism in the developing world.³ ASEAN was formed on 8 August, 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Its aim was to reduce tensions between Southeast Asia's non-communist states, thereby freeing their weak post-colonial governments to tackle internal

¹ The term “nationalism” is generally used to describe two phenomena: (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have towards their national identity and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. The first definition raises questions about the concept of nation (or national identity), which is often defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and while an individual's membership in a nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as voluntary. The second phenomenon raises questions about whether self-determination must be understood as involving having full statehood with complete authority over domestic and international affairs, or whether something less is required. For a thorough analysis of nationalism, please see Benedict Andersen, *Imagined communities* (London: Verso, 1990), E. J. Habsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Habibul Haque Khondker, *A pendular theory of nationalism. Working Paper Series*, No. 15 (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2003). For a very good discussion on the role of nationalism in the building of a security order in Southeast Asian states, see Bruce Grant, *The security of Southeast Asia, Adelphi Papers 142* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), pp. 20-22.

² Sub-nationalism or ethno-nationalism is defined as sub-national movements for autonomy or independence organised along linguistic, ethnic, religious, or cultural lines.

³ Amitav Acharya, A new regional order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the post-cold war era. *Adelphi Paper 279*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993. p. 3

communist challenges, and to address development priorities.⁴ ASEAN was established as an attempt to institutionalise the rapprochement between Malaysia and Indonesia, and to create a framework to build certainty and trust into relations within Southeast Asia.⁵ ASEAN's founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, claimed for the countries of Southeast Asia "a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development", and stated that "they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference".⁶ However, this intention was not reflected in ASEAN's aims and purposes, which merely called for cooperation in "economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields."

While anti-communism united ASEAN's members, its founders defined the organisation in more conventional regional terms. The Bangkok Declaration stated that ASEAN was open to all Southeast Asian states subscribing to the Association's principles and goals – essentially appeals for good neighbourliness.

Now composed of all ten Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN is moving towards being a more rules-based organisation in order to better meet the challenges posed by regional integration, the expansion of its external linkages and rapid globalisation, with the eventual aim to remain an effective player on the international arena. In pursuing that goal, the leaders of ASEAN signed a historic charter on November 20th, 2007.⁷ This document known as the ASEAN Charter sets the framework and lays the legal foundation for ASEAN to restructure its existing mechanisms and improve its decision-making process to enhance efficiency and

⁴ For the Bangkok Declaration, Thailand, 8 August, 1967 please see Appendix A

⁵ Conway Henderson, *IR: Conflict and Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st Century*. Singapore: McGraw Hill, 1998. p. 15.

⁶ For the Bangkok Declaration, Thailand, 8 August, 1967 please see Appendix A

⁷ ASEAN Charter, <http://www.asean.org/21069.pdf> accessed 2008

ensure prompt implementation of all ASEAN agreements and decisions. The Charter also provides ASEAN with a legal personality.

Over the years ASEAN has grown with a vision for a community of caring societies, with diverse objectives including economic, political, functional, security, and external relations cooperation. Through its consensus-building approach, ASEAN has created a community of nations which are committed to achieve peace, progress, and prosperity in the region in the spirit of equality and partnership.

The desire to achieve regional peace and stability was an innate aspiration of the original members of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand) and this was understandable given the circumstances at the time. These circumstances included the threat of communist insurgencies from within and without, and the end of the policy of confrontation of Indonesia and its desire to re-enter the Southeast Asian system, as well as the polarisation created by the Cold War tension and the Vietnam War.

The ASEAN Vision 2020, calls for an organisation that “shall have, by the year 2020, established a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia where each nation is at peace with itself and where the causes for conflict have been eliminated, through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and through the strengthening of national and regional resilience.” This would be established by what is now commonly known as an ASEAN Security Community.⁸

This concept of a security community is meant to promote political and security cooperation within ASEAN, rather than a defence pact, military alliance or a common foreign policy, all of which are rejected by ASEAN declarations, which meanwhile recognize the sovereign rights of member states to pursue individual

⁸ For the Bangkok Declaration, Thailand, 8 August, 1967 please see Appendix A

foreign policies and defence arrangements. However, ASEAN member states, in addressing the ever changing security challenges must share the responsibility for strengthening peace, stability and security of the region free from foreign military interference in any form or shape, and this would be best accomplished by a security community in the region, which would be formed through a consistent effort of confidence-building measures and mutual consultations and general consensus in all matters affecting the region. This, however, does not mean that security concerns are absent or neglected. In fact, there is extensive security cooperation among ASEAN members on a bilateral and multilateral basis in an effort to avert any common threat to the members. Bilateral military exercises involving ASEAN states have been carried out since 1977. But it needs to be pointed out that bilateral defence links within ASEAN are not uniformly developed. The majority of bilateral military exercises take place between three countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.⁹ A good part of recent expansion of defence links in ASEAN has also involved these three states. For instance, the deployment in 2005 of a joint military force composed of warships, aircraft and surveillance aircraft in the Straits of Malacca. Philippines and Malaysia that have had joint Army exercises from an early date have since 1995 expanded them to include Navy and Air Force, and Indonesia and Singapore jointly built in 1994 the Air Combat Manoeuvring Range (ACMR) and expressed their intention to provide it for the use of other ASEAN members.

In addition to these conventional joint exercises, there are moves toward joint operation in response to transnational dangers, like the joint maritime patrol by Thailand and Vietnam to prevent fishing boat collisions and smuggling and other illegal activities in the Gulf of Thailand.

⁹ For a list of Bilateral Military Exercises in ASEAN during the 1970s and 1980s, see Amitav Acharya, 1993, pp. 70-71.

As a case of comprehensive defence cooperation, the Philippines and Malaysia concluded the Defence Cooperation Treaty on 26 March 1994, as the first such event among the ASEAN members. It is part of ASEAN's culture not to openly speak about security or military cooperation as it has always been a sensitive issue. The security arena/environment has, however, changed tremendously since the end of the Cold War, and has come to be concerned with traditional security issues as well as non-traditional security issues.

1.2 WHAT IS A SECURITY COMMUNITY?

The concept of security community emerged after the Second World War and was aimed at raising the possibility of non-violent changes in international relations. This view challenged the realists' idea of security dilemma. Security dilemma derives from realists' definition of international relations as a vicious circle of security and power build up as states are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the others' power.¹⁰ By contrast, constructivists and their idea of security community perceives international relations as a process of social learning and identity formation, driven by transactions, interactions, and socialization.¹¹

To envisage the origin of this concept, Deutsch in his seminal work defines a security community as:

“[a] group of people that has become “integrated”. By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure...dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief...that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of peaceful

¹⁰ Joshua S Goldstein, *International relations* (4th edn.). Longman, 2001. Pp. 84-85.

¹¹ John Hertz, “Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma”, *World Politics*, Vol. 2, 1950, pp. 157-180.

change [that is, the] assurance that members will not fight each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way.”¹²

This concept of security community initially embodied the idea that communication processes and the density of transaction across borders in the modern world could foster shared identities. Deutsch’s main argument is that states develop the “long-term habit” of managing disputes in a peaceful way. His framework focuses on the development of shared understandings, transnational values, and transactional flows which encourage community building, and offer the possibility of peace.¹³

As Deutsch looked to transaction as the source of new identifications, his emphasis was still on quantitative measures as he was essentially computing the number of transactions. He also overlooked the social relations that are bound up with and generated by those transactions.¹⁴ As a liberal institutionalist,¹⁵ Deutsch focused on how states construct institutions to encourage cooperation and to further their mutual interest in survival. In fact, this definition limits the notion of security to state security, as this concept was defined during the peak of the state-centric perspective.

ASEAN has always hoped to develop a security community by building of trust and regional identity through regional cooperation, be it economic, social or political cooperation. Even in 1967, the founding members declared their intention to unite all the Southeast Asian states within ASEAN. For the purposes of this study we are focusing on their cooperation in three main areas: piracy, terrorism and air pollution.

¹² Karl Deutsch, et.al, *The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. p. 5.

¹³ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.pp. 9-10.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ For work on Liberal Institutionalism see Edward A. Kolodziej work, *Security and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.127-174, also see Joseph M. Grieco’s article, “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organizations*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988, pp. 484-507.

It is worth noting here that although on the individual actor level, some members of ASEAN e.g. Myanmar, have not achieved social harmony or peaceful settlement of internal problems, but harmony and peaceful coexistence has so far been maintained at the intra-state level in ASEAN. It is also worth noting here, that ASEAN is not made up entirely of countries that are based on Western liberal systems. In fact, only three of the organisation's member-states – the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia – are considered liberal democracies.¹⁶ Although considered a multi-party democracy, Cambodia's democratic system remains a struggling one. Malaysia and Singapore have been described as either "illiberal" or "semi-democracies".¹⁷ While Vietnam and Laos have communist systems of government, Brunei is an absolute monarchy. Myanmar has been under the rule of a military junta since 1988 when a popular democratic uprising was brutally suppressed.

Maritime piracy, terrorism and air pollution are of serious concern to the ASEAN states. As such, the Organisation has put into place the necessary framework for cooperation to deal with these challenges. For example, on June 17, 2003, the foreign ministers of ASEAN member states agreed to intensify the fight against maritime piracy; measures would include cooperation and coordination among all institutions concerned, such as naval units, coastal patrols, law enforcement agencies, shipping companies, crews and port authorities.

ASEAN leaders, at their 7th Summit on 5 November 2001, in Brunei Darussalam, adopted the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. The ASEAN leaders viewed terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security and "a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020".

¹⁶ William Case, *Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less*. London: Curzon, 2002.

¹⁷ Ibid.

In 1992, the issue of trans-boundary pollution was addressed by the ASEAN Heads of Government. The Singapore Declaration issued at the conclusion of the Fourth Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of Government held during 27 - 28 January 1992, states that "ASEAN member countries should continue to enhance environmental cooperation, particularly in issues of trans-boundary pollution, natural disasters, forest fires and in addressing the anti-tropical timber campaign."¹⁸

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to assess the development of ASEAN as a security community through trust and regional identity formation by focusing on the organisation's coordination of policy on three key issues: piracy, terrorism and air pollution. The ASEAN, by adopting the Charter at Singapore in November 2007, has fully re-dedicated itself to the notion of a security community. In order to achieve this status, ASEAN has been slowly but surely coordinating its policies on a number of key issues, namely piracy, terrorism and air pollution. Has the coordination of such policies been successful? What are the strengths and weaknesses of those policies? In order to make the above assessment, this study looks into ASEAN's security cooperation and policy coordination in the specific areas of maritime piracy, terrorism and air pollution. This is achieved through the utilization of the variables found in Adler and Barnett model of a security community development which looks at cooperation as a tool for cohesive behaviour at the inter-state level and ultimately to interdependence leading to a community where peaceful coexistence and co-dependence is a social norm, and this process results in trust due to continued positive cooperation and eventually regional identity formation through social learning.

¹⁸ Please see www.asean.com

This study also seeks to clarify/investigate the position of ASEAN through the study of its unique principles known as the “ASEAN Way”, values and norms, as well as an evaluation of its conflict resolution experiment. All the above will help us judge the extent of the assertion that ASEAN has formed a common identity through trust and continued cooperation in various functional areas i.e. piracy, terrorism and air pollution.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION

This research aims to add to the existing literature on ASEAN, as well as to specifically focus on its role as a tool of regional integration based on common values and identity, a theme that has been subject to intense debate among many ASEAN scholars.

A number of scholars who write on ASEAN and Southeast Asia (like Michael Leifer, Donald K. Emmerson, and others) argue that this organization can never be considered a security community as that was not part of its original design and this assumption is supported by looking at the ASEAN initial protocols, which never stated explicitly a security role for the organization but rather always made a vague reference to peace and stability in the region.¹⁹

Furthermore, the study seeks to clarify the evolution of Karl Deutsch’s conception of security community, who had Western democratic and industrialized nations in mind, to the way it has evolved to its present day usages. There is a common presumption that security communities are only possible among liberal democratic states. But the ASEAN states have been able to undertake a community-

¹⁹ Donald K.Emmerson, “Southeast Asia: What's in a Name?”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1984 and Michael.Leifer, “Is ASEAN a Security Organization”? from Michael Leifer “ The Paradox of ASEAN: A Security Organization Without the Structure of an Alliance”, *The Round Table*, No. 271, July 1978.

building project without liberalism and therefore, we question here whether liberalism is a necessary condition for security communities. The growing ASEAN identity presents the potential source of collective identity and, therefore, its foundation for building a security community. The above can be clearly judged through studying ASEAN members' collaboration and synchronization on the policy front especially in the areas of piracy, terrorism and pollution where there is a perceived common threat. The by-product of this would be unconditional trust and collective identity formation.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

ASEAN has made probably the most successful attempt at regional cooperation in the non-Western world. Despite what is considered by some as considerable political and cultural diversity, ASEAN has provided a forum for dialogue between Southeast Asian states, and the opportunity for cooperation. The original purpose of the five founding states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) was to institute to pursue regional stability in response to several bilateral disagreements, most notably *Konfrontasi* and the Malaysian-Philippine feud over the Malaysian state of Sabah. In addition, many claim that the desire to ward off the pressures of the Cold War actors (the US, USSR and China) was another major motivation for the formation of ASEAN. Regionalism was seen as a useful way to 'enhance the bargaining power of small and weak states in their dealings with the Great Powers'.²⁰

It is worth noting here that construction of regional identities is sometimes a direct result of a specific hegemonic discourse. In the case of Southeast Asia, as Donald K. Emmerson argues, it was the Anglo-American hegemony after the Second

²⁰ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. London: Routledge, 2001. pp.1-8.

World War that led to this demarcation and identification of a region.²¹ This regional identification and consolidation was further enhanced after the communist victory in China and the US direct involvement in Vietnam.

Filipino political scientist and ASEAN scholar Estrella Solidum believes that the tendency of states and people towards regionalism in Southeast Asia has been spurred by the motivation of group survival in all its aspects, from the need to manage difficult problems to sheer survival, the increase in the quality of life, the establishment of harmonious relations with neighbouring states through cooperation, and the achievement of regional peace and security.²² However, according to Amitav Acharya, Southeast Asia is an “imagined” region, its physical, political, social and cultural diversity being too immense to qualify it as having a distinctive personality. However, the region’s “nationalist elite” is the one who did this exercise of collective self-imagination in the wake of their liberation from European and American colonialism. As with nationalism, Acharya believes, regions may be imagined, designed, constructed and defended. As a result, the development of a regional Southeast Asian identity may not necessarily conform to the facts of geography, history, culture or politics. Therefore, the notion of Southeast Asia as a homogenous cultural or geographic entity can be said to be overstated. But its social and political identity can be said to be derived from the conscious promotion of a regional unit.²³

The Southeast Asian project of region-building is actually a process of elite socialisation. This socialisation was undertaken as a way of reducing the tyranny of structural diversity and pre-empting post-colonial divisions from erupting into violent

²¹ Donald K. Emmerson, “Southeast Asia: What's in a Name?”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1984. pp. 1-21.

²² Estrella Solidum, *The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asia Regionalism*. Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003. pp. 3-6.

²³ Amitav Acharya, “Southeast Asia: Imagining the Region”. *Himal South Asian*, January 2003. pp. 1-6.

conflict. As a result, the original members of ASEAN have not fought a war against each other since 1967. Nationalism, however, has not waned; it has rather been subsumed under a socially constructed framework of regionalism.

The various regional arrangements in Southeast Asia find legitimacy and validity of their existence in the UN Charter Articles 52-54, which are meant to maintain international peace and security. It is also in accordance with the views of many scholars such as Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who argues for the growth of universal peace from divisible peace in his book *Peace by Parts*.²⁴ This approach calls for peace to be built from the bottom of the ladder of international relations rather than from the top. This is logical because when associated states make their own decisions in a conflict situation, then those decisions would be more legitimate as they stem from prevailing cultures and values that are acceptable to the people more than decisions by outside agents of peace.

Regular meetings and discussions in the form of workshops, seminar diplomacy, and confidence-building measures are widely practiced by a variety of Asian institutions²⁵ and are strategic interactions aimed at creating an environment that can lead to the creation of shared meanings, social reality, and mutual trust.²⁶ Identity helps in a way to constitute practices, which makes people feel more secure within their physical national borders. Shared social identities thus play a constitutive role in that they account “for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist”.²⁷ Shared identities can be learned by agents (like the

²⁴ Joseph Nye (ed.), *International Regionalism: Readings*. Boston: Little Brown, 1968.

²⁵ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia...* pp. 63-71.

²⁶ Fulvio Attina, “Partnership and Security: Some Theoretical and Empirical Reasons for Positive Developments in the Euro-Mediterranean Area” in F. Attina and S. Stavridis, eds; *The Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to Marseille*. Milan: Giuffrè, 2001.p.36.

²⁷ Alexander Wendt, On Constitution and Causation in International Relations, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No.5, 1998, pp.101-118.

political elite), whose intentions can then play a causal role in the construction and reconstruction of security practices.²⁸ This “identity” approach is consistent with a “social communication” theoretical understanding of regional integration. This theoretical understanding suggests that a regional political identity does not emerge from having pre-existing common interests, but rather through conceptual bargaining and argumentative compromises. Then with time, key concepts and norms are accepted as a part of collective identity, the spread of that identity arises from active arguments and socialization rather than from instrumental bargaining and the exchange of fixed interests.²⁹ Instrumental agreements are not unimportant, however, political actors often use normative understandings in a rhetorical manner for instrumental reasons.³⁰ However, instrumental use of norms and instrumental agreements may in time become the structures within which deeper processes of social communication and the internalization of values and norms develop.

ASEAN had avoided applying the word security in its framework of cooperation; however, the primary purpose of this organization was security, as the Bangkok Declaration specifies it in terms of peace and stability. ASEAN during the Cold War was a safeguard against communism. Michael Leifer argued,³¹ “The ostensible purpose of establishing ASEAN was to promote economic, social, and cultural cooperation but regional security was the prime occupation of its founders”. Following the end of the Cold War, the idea of security (in addition to new non-

²⁸ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Taking Identity and Our Critics Seriously”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.35, No.3, 2000, pp. 321-329.

²⁹ Jürgen Habermas. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Vol. I, Trans. By Thomas MacCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984,

³⁰ Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, *International Organizations*, Vol. 55, No.1, 2001.

³¹ Michael Leifer. “Is ASEAN a Security Organization”? from Michael Leifer “The Paradox of ASEAN: A Security Organization Without the Structure of an Alliance”, *The Round Table*, No. 271, July 1978. p.268