

THE VATICAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FASCIST REGIME IN ITALY (1922-1943)

BY

NOOR SYUHADA BINTI SHAHIDAN


A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for
the degree of Master of Human Sciences in History and
Civilization

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MAY 2025

ABSTRACT

In February 1929, Benito Mussolini's Fascist government and the Vatican signed a pact, officiating the reconciliation of Italy and the papacy. Known as the Lateran Accords, previous works have emphasised the pact's role in enhancing Mussolini's political image and restoring the sovereignty of the papacy; however, discussions on the overall relationship have been mostly overlooked. This research applies a dual framework of the church-state relations and instrumentalism to delve deeper into the partnership between the Italian Fascist government and the Vatican. Through the analysis of several archival resources such as autobiographies and encyclicals, it becomes apparent that both parties aimed to strengthen their authority over their respective domains, a goal they believed could only be achieved with each other's support. This is further displayed through a survey of policies and reforms created and reinstated by either the Vatican or the Fascist government. Its biggest implication being on the Protestants and the Jews, which both sides aimed to marginalise; yet found themselves in a bigger conflict due to concurrent social tensions, such as the unresolved Fascist violence against Catholic institutions and the dispute over youth associations, as well as a dissimilar moral perspective on the treatment of these religious groups. Secondary sources were also utilised in this research. Hence, this research contributes new insights into the relationship's centrality in the Italian political atmosphere and the treatment of religious minorities in Italy.



خلاصة البحث

في فبراير 1929م، وقعت حكومة بينيتو موسوليني الفاشية والفاتيكان اتفاقية، مما أدى إلى المصالحة بين إيطاليا والبابوية، والمعروفة باسم اتفاقيات لاتران. وقد أكدت الأعمال السابقة على دور الاتفاقية في تعزيز الصورة السياسية لموسوليني واستعادة سيادة البابوية؛ ومع ذلك، فقد تم تجاهل المناقشات حول العلاقة الشاملة في الغالب. يطبق هذا البحث إطارًا مزدوجًا للعلاقات بين الكنيسة والدولة والآلية للخوض بشكل أعمق في الشراكة بين الحكومة الفاشية الإيطالية والفاتيكان. من خلال تحليل العديد من الموارد الأرشيفية مثل السير الذاتية والرسائل البابوية، يتضح أن كلا الطرفين يهدفان إلى تعزيز سلطتهما على مجالتهما الخاصة، وهو هدف اعتقدا أنه لا يمكن تحقيقه إلا بدعم بعضهما البعض. ويتجلى ذلك بشكل أكبر من خلال مسح للسياسات والإصلاحات التي أنشأها وأعادها الفاتيكان أو الحكومة الفاشية. وكان أكبر تأثير لها على البروتستانت واليهود، الذين سعى كلا الجانبين إلى تهميشهم؛ ومع ذلك، وجدوا أنفسهم في صراع أكبر بسبب التوترات الاجتماعية المتزامنة، مثل العنف الفاشي ضد المؤسسات الكاثوليكية الذي لم يُحل، والنزاع حول جمعيات الشباب، بالإضافة إلى اختلاف المنظور الأخلاقي في معاملة هذه الجماعات الدينية. كما استُخدمت مصادر ثانوية في هذا البحث. وبالتالي، يُسهم هذا البحث في رؤية جديدة حول مركزية هذه العلاقة في المناخ السياسي الإيطالي ومعاملة الأقليات الدينية في إيطاليا.

APPROVAL PAGE

I certify that I have supervised and read this study and that in my opinion, it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Master of Human Sciences in History and Civilization.



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
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as a whole for any other degrees at IIUM or other institutions.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I am grateful to Allah SWT. Completing this program and thesis would be impossible without His blessings, grace, and will. I am most grateful for His plan in meeting with such wonderful and kind people throughout my life.

I want to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Mohd Helmi bin Mohd Sobri. I owe the completion of my thesis to his invaluable guidance which assisted me in honing my analysis to its proper course. A special thank you to Dr. Olsi Jazexhiu and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Spahic Omer for their insights and feedback during my proposal defence. The same goes for other lecturers and staffs of the History and Civilization Department whose presence and unwavering support were just as instrumental.

A special mention goes to my fellow course mates who I have got to know during the duration of my master's program. I am appreciative of the kindness and support that comes with the friendship I have formed with them. Thank you, especially to Shahirah, Izzati, Syed, Aiman, and Amirah for their encouraging words and open ears.

I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to my lifelong best friends, Aisyah and Suh Shuen. Our long conversations have lifted my spirit and confidence during the ups and downs of writing my thesis.

Most gratitude, however, belongs to my family. I will always be indebted to their support and sacrifices – my mother, Normi binti Abdul Latif, for her patience in listening to my concerns and whining; my father, Shahidan bin Abdullah, for his emotional and financial support; my younger sister, Syazwina, for her jokes in distracting me during times of stress; and my older sister, Syazwani for her prayers from afar. A gratitude to my maternal aunts and uncles for their encouragement in pursuing my studies, as well as my late maternal grandparents for being my inspiration.

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
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The 19th century signified a turning point in the political history of modern Italy. As the *Risorgimento* or unification of Italy was brought to motion by Italian nationalists such as Giuseppe Garibaldi, a military campaign had also been orchestrated to form the frontiers of Italy which included several papal states. Yet, the capture of Rome in 1870 was what had caused a rift between the Roman Catholic Church or the Vatican, and the Italian government. As the Italian troops were marching to Rome, Pope Pius IX was asked to surrender in exchange for autonomy. Yet, the Pope had refused due to his adamant belief that no forces would dare to attack the ancient holy city as it was protected by God.¹ Yet, the Pope's enthusiasm did not halt the Italians' efforts to capture Rome, ergo, annexed the ancient capital city into Italy. This marked the end of the papal temporal rule over Rome which caused dissatisfaction, especially from Pope Pius IX - the then head of the Vatican. As a result, the Pope had become a prisoner of the Vatican. It was described as follows:

Pius now cast himself as a prisoner. Although he had control of the hundred acres of the Vatican, with its magnificent palaces and gardens, and no one would stop him from leaving were he so inclined, images of his imagined imprisonment spread quickly.²

The 'imprisonment' of Pope Pius IX within the Vatican walls had led to the enmity of the Vatican towards the Italian government. The situation remained hostile for several papacies until the pontificate of Pope Pius XI in the 1920s. The Fascist Italian government had been established with Benito Mussolini being elected as the Prime Minister of Italy.³ Both under new leadership, the Vatican and government had sought to end years of

¹ Henry Chadwick and Owen Chadwick (eds), *A History of the Popes: 1830-1914*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 216.

² David I. Kertzer, *The Pope Who Would Be King: The Exile of Pius IX and the Emergence of Modern Europe*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 344-345.

³ Martin Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy: Second Edition*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 22.

hostilities by developing a relationship that would benefit both parties and the Italian society. Under the gist of ‘Man of Providence’, the Vatican had shown support to the Fascist government and Mussolini.⁴ At the same time, Mussolini implemented new policies in compliance with the Catholic teachings. Yet, it was not until February 1929 that the relationship was eventually officiated through the signing of the Lateran Accords.⁵ However, as two antithetical entities, both could not escape from their differences in views and need for authority. While the government may seem tolerable to some of the Vatican’s requests, it did not mean that they would be submissive to their sacerdotal allies. As a result, there were some instances where both parties had clashed due to certain issues such as the participation of women in sports, religious holidays, and street names. Yet, those issues can be considered as minor issues as it would be resolved through negotiations – which often times resulted in the Pope’s submission.

While the main players in this relationship may be the Vatican and the Fascist Italian regime, its implications had spillover to other fractions of the Italian society and the religious minorities were not exempted. Before the 1920s, religious minorities in Italy, primarily the Jews and Protestants, had enjoyed religious freedom to a certain degree. Not only were they allowed to practice and preach their religion freely, religious centres were also allowed to be established. It had been mentioned that, “Along with the Waldensian church, two other Italian evangelical churches were founded in the wake of the granting of religious freedom and civic emancipation”.⁶ However, after the election of Pope Pius XI and the establishment of the Fascist regime, the religious minorities had become the main target of both parties. With the Vatican’s hostilities towards the Protestants coupled with the Fascists’ discontent of the Jews, these two religious groups were affected by the ‘budding’ alliance. This included their diminishing freedom from the Lateran Accords and the Law on Permitted Cults. Nearing to World War II, the religious minorities were forced to resist against the government’s mistreatment – and in the case of the Jews, seek refuge

⁴ David I. Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, (New York: Random House, 2014), p. 111.

⁵ Ibid, p. 109.

⁶ Kevin Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2021), p. 22.

from persecution. This begs the question, to what degree did the relationship impacted the conditions of the religious minorities' between the 1920s to 1940s?

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The anomalies behind the Fascist Italian government's relationship with the Roman Catholic Church or the Vatican still lingered in the minds of many historians, especially those in the specialisation of modern Italian history. Mussolini's known hatred against priests, and the Church's indignation towards the government, within this so-called 'relationship' had raised many eyebrows even in today's historical context. One might question: what was the nature of this relationship? Was it a recipe for Italy's peace and order or towards its crumbling to shambles? Also, to what extent was this actually for the collective benefit of the Italians? Hence, this had intrigued this study of the motives and factors behind the relationship – analysing how both parties would benefit or how it pushed them into pursuing the relationship with one another. It also aims to highlight the fact that the relationship was in pursuit of both parties instead of being one-sided.

It is clear that the motives of not only the Vatican and the Fascist government, but also the personal ambitions of their main players, Benito Mussolini and Pope Pius XI which led to the eventual development of the relationship between the two ill-matched 'allies'. Yet, when did the 'development' start? Commonly, many had misinterpreted the relationship's development to take off after it was officiated during the signing of the Lateran Accords in 1929. While the Lateran Accords can be reckoned as the highlight of the Church's relationship with the Fascist government, they did not fully signify the full process of the relationship's development as it seemed to have simply formalised the relationship. There should also be further analysis of the events leading up to the accords. Thence, this research would study the development of the relationship before the Lateran Accords, which included its early measures, reactions, and responses, as well as the challenges faced during that time. Answering the question of how it started and why the event was significant in the relationship's development.

As the relationship between Mussolini's regime and the Vatican developed, it was quite obvious that it strengthened the situation of the Catholics as the major religious group in Italy. However, what about the religious minorities, particularly the Jews and Protestants? Predominantly, most discussions had repeatedly stressed on how the relationship had been advantageous towards the Catholics. Yet, implications towards the religious minorities can be deemed as quite limited. Therefore, to what extent did these developments had affected them? As the Lateran Accords had been considered as the highlight in the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist Italian regime, did it shape the situation of the religious minorities during the 1930s and World War II? How did they react? These are the questions that would be raised in the research analysis.

With that being said, it can be seen that certain gaps would be addressed by raising several key questions. This research can be said as worthy to be studied as it would thoroughly examine the Fascist Italians' alliances during its rise between the 1920s to 1930s. It also analyses its gradual decline as the nation prepared itself for its military campaigns and World War II.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the statement of the problem, some research questions had come to light. These questions are very pertinent in this research.

1. Why did both the Fascist Italian government and the Vatican had decided to pursue a relationship with each other?
2. How was the development of the relationship before the Lateran Accords?
3. How did the relationship affect the religious minorities in Italy, especially during the 1930s?

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1. To study the contributory factors behind the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Fascist Italian government.
2. To analyse the development of the relationship before its officiation in the signing of the Lateran Accords.
3. To evaluate the implications of the relationship towards the religious minorities in Italy especially during the 1930s.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

Why would this research be significant? In response, this research holds various significances that would benefit many individuals and various societies. The significance of this research can be closely linked to the research statement of the problem.

Primarily, this research will redound to society's advantage considering the role of historical knowledge in today's society. This research would assess the relationship between governments and religious institutions in a historical context as well as its implications towards other groups of the society – in this case, the religious minorities of Italy. Thus, this research will provide a better understanding of one of the most crucial diplomatic relations of the Fascist Italian government before their entrance into World War II. It will display the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the rise of fascism, not only in Italy but also in Europe, as well as the effects it had towards the religious minorities in Italy, especially the Jews and Protestants.

Apart from that, this research would address certain gaps and loopholes found in relevant literatures towards the research. Thus, this research also attempts to contribute to the literature by filling in the gaps and loopholes found. As it addressed and filled out certain gaps, this research would provide the framework for future research on the historical studies of modern Italy.

It can be seen that this research holds much significance. It addresses certain issues and gaps in regards to the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Fascist Italian government.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

Historical studies and research, which focused on diplomatic relations of Fascist Italy, especially with the Nazi Germans, can be considered quite popular in modern Italian history. However, their relationship with the Vatican was quite limited and scarce even after the Vatican had opened its records for research. While there were experts such as David I. Kertzer and John Pollard who produced some major works in regards to the Holy See-Italy relations during the rise of Mussolini's Fascist regime in Italy, to consider this as 'enough' or 'sufficient' can be seen as an overstatement. Many other pieces of literature had mere acknowledgment of the relationship, providing just minimal information on the contact between the Church and the Fascist government. So much so that many created the assumption that Mussolini's rejection of religion had resulted in negligence against the Catholic Roman Church – which was never the case. On the other hand, earlier studies on the relationship's effects towards other religious groups in Italy, such as the Protestants and Jews can also be considered infrequent.

The most appropriate literature that played a big significance in this research was a book entitled *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, written by David I. Kertzer. A known expert in the religious history of Italy, Kertzer had produced numerous works analysing the presence of the Vatican in modern Italian history. His book detailed the role of Pope Pius XI in the relationship between the Vatican and the Fascist regime in Italy. Through a comparative analysis, Kertzer had analysed the personalities and actions of not only Pope Pius but also Benito Mussolini, where he had asserted that regardless of the differences between the two, both of their motives had played a huge role in the relationship. In one of the most compelling paragraphs, Kertzer had voiced the similitude between the two which was as follows:

Despite all obvious differences, the pope and Mussolini were alike in many ways. Both could have no real friends, for friendship implied equality. Both insisted on being obeyed, and those around them quaked at the thought of saying anything that would displease them. They made an odd couple, but the pope had quickly come to recognize the benefits of casting his lot with the former priest eater. As a result, within a year of the March on Rome, the Fascist revolution had become a cleric-Fascist revolution. A new partnership had begun...⁷

The book also analysed the development of the relationship during the course of Pope Pius's pontificate – from early contact between the Church and the Fascist government to issues before the Pope's death. Still, the book itself cannot be described as perfect literature. One of the gaps that can be found was the lack of concentration on the discussion of the Lateran Accords, which held some significance in this research. On a side note, another gap that can be found in this book was the lack of information on the state of the relationship after the death of Pope Pius XI. While the book did insert certain information about the religious minorities during the course of the relationship, the analysis was brief and quite indistinct. Thus, the mentioned gaps should be addressed.

Similarly, Emma Fattorini's book entitled, *Hitler, Mussolini and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech That was Never Made*, which was translated by Carl Ipsen, was another piece of literature that held some significance to the intended research. While Kertzer's work had laid out the motivations of both Pope Pius XI and Benito Mussolini as well as the development of the relationship before the death of Pope Pius, Fattorini had focused solely on the Pope's role – highlighting his motivations and actions during his pontificate. One of Fattorini's most riveting discussions and elaborations was Pope Pius XI's idea of the rebirth of Christian Society and its so-called morphosis into Mussolini. With the Pope's insistence that Mussolini was a godsend for Italy, it had also been mentioned that "...the Church hoped to use the authoritarianism of the regime to erect a Catholic state..." which implied the edge that the Pope had expected in spreading the Vatican's influence in the Italian masses.⁸ The question of whether his expectations were ever met was a different story. Nonetheless, Fattorini's analysis displayed ample

⁷ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 68.

⁸ Emma Fattorini, *Hitler, Mussolini and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech That Was Never Made*, trans. Carl Ipsen, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 38.

information on the reason behind the Vatican's support and relationship with the Fascist government through the Pope's visions and goals. Even so, the literature lacked in mentioning of the reactions and responses from other members of the Church. Also, there was obscurity in the development of the relationship in the 1930s, as well as a lack of discussion on the religious minorities. Thus, the gaps relating to the Pope's views towards the Fascist ideology, as well as the development of the Holy See-Italy relations after the formation of Fascist Italy, needed to be discussed further.

Apart from that, the journal article by Benjamin Passey entitled, 'How the Pope Played Politics: The Papal Politics of Pope Pius XI in 1920s and 1930s Italy' also had much useful information within the scope of this research. Published in an issue of *The Thetean: A Student Journal for Scholarly Historical Writing*, the article concentrated on Pope Pius's engagement with Mussolini in the politics of Italy. The article's commentary on the Pope's policy towards the Italian state under Benito Mussolini's leadership. It had been mentioned that "...the Pope saw in Mussolini an opportunity that had not been presented to his predecessors....", which voiced the Pope's desperation to defeat liberal democracy to separate himself from his predecessors.⁹ Although the article had quite a detailed discussion on the Pope's self-centredness, like Fattorini's book, the article lacked in discussing the reactions gained from his actions. Also, it did not detail the consequences of his motives and actions in the development of the Holy See-Italy relationship of that time. On that note, these loopholes mentioned needed to be addressed.

While the previous pieces of literature discussed the motivations and role played by Pope Pius XI and the Vatican, factors that stemmed from Benito Mussolini and the Fascist regime were needed to counterbalance the research. On that note, Martin Clark's *Mussolini* can be considered as most appropriate to be one of the fundamental pieces of literature in this research. As a supposed biography of Mussolini, Clark's work had some analysis of Mussolini and the Fascist's relationship with the Vatican. The book studies the life of Mussolini before his rise as a Fascist dictator or *Il Duce* (The Leader), showed certain connections towards his motivations, as well as actions towards the Vatican and their relationship as it progressed.

⁹ Ibid.

The book had managed to insert several details on how Mussolini had utilised the Fascist government's relationship to control the Church and their activities, ergo gaining more support for him and the government from not only the Italian masses but also from Catholics of other parts of the world. Yet, similar to Kertzer's *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, Clark also did not analyse the Lateran Accords as well as its impact. Besides that, there was not much discussion on the relationship after the 1930s. Therefore, the gaps found required to be addressed in this research.

Similarly, John Pollard's book entitled, *Catholicism in Modern Italy: Religion, Society and Politics Since 1861* displayed how the Fascists and Mussolini could benefit from their relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. Other than the creation of an emphatic regime towards the Catholics and common enemies, Pollard's work had analysed the role of Pope Pius's international image as a means for the Fascists to forge a relationship with the Church.¹⁰ This corresponded with the Fascists' goal of dominating other parts of Europe that valued the Pope's views and decisions. It signified how much this relationship would benefit the Fascists on the international stage. Yet, the most distinctive factor that Pollard acknowledged was the Fascist esteemed idea of "...the regeneration of Italian society and the State from the 'decadence' into which they claimed it had fallen after the brief glories of the Risorgimento", which was aligned with the Vatican's aim of forming a Catholic Italian society free of liberalism.¹¹ Despite there being no specification on the topic of the Holy See-Italy relations under Fascist Italy, subtle information had been elaborated. Still, Pollard's work lacked an explanation of how the relationship developed before the Lateran Accords. Most of Pollard's discussions were keen on the contributory factors of the relationship's establishment. Therefore, the gap mentioned needed to be addressed.

While the previous pieces of literature focused more on the factors of the relationship's formation, Lucia Ceci's *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy* – translated by Peter Spring, had detailed the development of the Church's relationship with the

¹⁰ John Pollard, *Catholicism in Modern Italy: Religion, Society and Politics Since 1861* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p.185.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 94.

government. Ceci had delved into the government's reforms and policies to 'satisfy' their sacerdotal partners. Such examples can be seen in the government's new policies on religious holidays including the holiday on 4th October 1926 to commemorate the death of one of Italy's infamous Catholic friars, Francis of Assisi.¹² On another note, the book also discussed crucial events leading up to the signing of the Lateran Accords as well as highlighting certain conflicts between the government and the Church. More significantly, the book had discussed the accords' implications towards other religions due to "the promulgation of the law on religious cults", which labelled other religions – especially Judaism and Protestantism as 'cults'.¹³ Yet, the book was in want of discussions on the reactions from the masses in regards to the government's reforms in building diplomacy with the Vatican. The loophole would only raise the question of whether the members of the Vatican and the Fascist government were appreciative or receptive to the dictator's enthusiasm. Thus, the loophole needed to be addressed.

Another one of John F. Pollard's books entitled, *The Vatican & Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, had played much significance in this research. Like Lucia Ceci's *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, this book had focused on the development of the relationship but it also included discussions on the reactions and conflicts of the relationship. The most distinctive feature of Pollard's book was the use and discussion of the key concept, '*Conciliazione*' or conciliation. While some other pieces of literature may have either analysis or mere references on that particular event, the use of that concept was absent. It had been mentioned that "...it needs to be said that the *Conciliazione* was an agreement reached at the highest levels of Church and State, the result of negotiations amongst a very few individuals at the highest level and conducted in the greatest of secrecy".¹⁴ On that note, Pollard had pointed how the Vatican's utilisation of the *Conciliazione* as a means to gain support from the regime to restrict religious freedom in Italy, primarily in suppressing the proselytism of the Protestants.¹⁵ It seemed that Pollard had heavily signified the Vatican's desperation to secure Catholicism as the sole religion of

¹² Lucia Ceci, *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, trans. Peter Spring, (Leiden & Boston: Koninklijke Brill, 2017), p. 107.

¹³ Ibid, p. 104.

¹⁴ John F. Pollard, *The Vatican & Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 48.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 108.

Italy. Another interesting feature of this book was the attachment of the Lateran Accords as well as other laws and agreements related to the Holy See-Italy relations under Fascist Italian regime. Still, Pollard's analysis was flawed due to its disregard for the responses of other groups of the society. The reactions discussed by Pollard were mostly of the inner circles of the Vatican and the Fascist government. Therefore, these gaps needed to be addressed.

In comparison, the book entitled, *Faith and Fascism: Catholic Intellectuals in Italy, 1925-43*, written by Jorge Dagnino discussed the reactions and responses to the relationship. In his book, Dagnino had discussed the responses of the Catholics in Italy including intellectuals from an organisation known as the Italian Catholic Federation of University Students or *Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana* (FUCI). Focusing on their development and activities under the Fascist regime, a discussion in regards to their reaction towards the Vatican's 'reconciliation' with the government had been included. Specifically, Dagnino had identified prominent leaders of FUCI of that time; Igino Righetti and Giovanni Battista Montini. In the book, the reactions of FUCI members had been further elaborated on. For instance, Montini's dissatisfaction with the Vatican's growing relationship with the Fascist government had been mentioned with the justification of the possibility that the religious freedom of the Catholics would be taken over by liberalism.¹⁶ This signified the opposition of some Catholics against the relationship. Still, the book fell flat in exploring the effects of their reactions and responses towards the Vatican, the Fascist Italian government, and their 'growing' relationship. Besides that, it lacked an explanation on the counter-response from both the Vatican and the Fascist government. Thus, these gaps mentioned needed to be addressed.

On the other hand, the journal article entitled, 'The Italian Fascist Regime, the Catholic Church and Protestant Religious Minorities in Terre Redente (1918-40)', written by Gašper Mithans had analysed the reactions of the Protestants concerning the Church's relationship with the government, especially towards the Lateran Accords. The article highlighted the Protestants' concerns of the accords of its impact against religious pluralism in Italy, but soon was ironed out in a separate legislation in the 1930s as pointed out as

¹⁶ Jorge Dagnino, *Faith and Fascism: Catholic Intellectuals in Italy, 1925-43* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 54.

“...the legislative context in which the confrontation between the Catholic Church and Protestant religious communities that took place changed from tolerated to allowed”.¹⁷ Yet, the likeness between Mussolini’s regime and their relationship with the Vatican was short-lived. Mithan’s article had burrowed deep into Protestants’ reactions coupled with the consequences they had to face as a result of the Vatican’s diplomacy with Mussolini’s regime. However, the discussion vaguely discussed the Protestants’ reaction before the Lateran Accords. On that note, this one gap needs to be addressed.

From another angle, the book entitled, *God and the Fascists: The Vatican Alliance with Mussolini, Franco, Hitler and Pavelić* by German author, Karlheinz Deschner provided a great study on the Nazi’s reaction towards the Fascists’ relationship with the Vatican. In one of its chapters, Deschner’s work provided an analysis of the relationship’s development, starting from its early steps followed by events that preceded the Lateran Accords in 1929. Most importantly, the book contributed to the analysing of the Nazis’ reaction towards the accords and the ‘reconciliation’ era between the Fascists and the Church. It was also mentioned that Hitler welcomed the Church reliance on the Fascists for protection against democracy and National Socialism.¹⁸ This indicated the German Nazi dictator’s support over his Fascist Italian partner’s decision in forging a relationship with the Church – though the two shared a similar discontent over the Church and Catholics. Under the subtopic 'The Nazis’ Reaction to the 'Reconciliation' with the Fascists,' discussions have elaborated on the Nazis’ views of this relationship, highlighting their approval, which ultimately led to a German concordat that mirrored the Lateran Accords. However, there is a lack of detailed explanation regarding the concordat itself and how it connects the two accords within the context of their relationship. Thus, this loophole must be addressed.

Moreover, the book entitled, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 1914-1958* by John Pollard had been very instrumental, especially in the discussion of the relationship after the Lateran Accords. In one of its chapters, which focused on the pontificate of Pope

¹⁷ Gašper Mithans, “The Italian Fascist Regime, the Catholic Church and Protestant Religious Minorities in Terre Redente (1918-40),” *Approaching Religion* 9, no. 1-2 (2019): p. 62.

¹⁸ Karlheinz Deschner, *God and the Fascists: The Vatican Alliance with Mussolini, Franco, Hitler and Pavelić* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2013), p. 38.

Pius XI, Pollard mentioned the Pope's pontificate as an era of 'compromise' towards Mussolini's policies, especially his antisemitism policies.¹⁹ Moreover, Pollard's work also provided some discussions on the Vatican's relationship with the government after the death of Pope Pius XI. In one of its chapters, Pollard discussed the relationship between the Vatican and the Fascist government during the pontificate of Pope Pius XII. That particular chapter showed how the rise of a new Pope, as well as the war, had affected the relationship. However, some gaps can be found in Pollard's analysis. There was a lack of discussion on the relationship before the Lateran Accords as Pollard had only focused mainly on the conflicts and situations of religious minorities during the 1930s. Besides that, Pollard vaguely justified how or to what extent had the relationship affected the religious minorities. Hence, this gap needs to be addressed.

In addressing the effects of the relationship towards the religious minorities in Italy, one piece of literature that came to light was Michele Sarfatti's *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*. While the book may only focus on the Jews in Italy between the 1920s till 1940s, it can be considered as quite pertinent to this research as it navigated the Jews' situation as one of Italy's religious minorities under the Fascist regime. From the demographics to their persecution by the government, the book had provided an in-depth and rare discussion on the Italian Jews around the Interwar Period. Notably, Sarfatti had linked the focal point of his book with the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist government. As Catholicism had been defined as "the sole religion" in Italy according to the Lateran Accords, Sarfatti had stated that the law had granted the government the power and control over other religious groups, which included "...the power to approve the selections of ministers of the minority faiths, to dissolve the administration of a sect, and the power to name a commissioner of its own choosing...".²⁰ This point out that while the Lateran Accords officiated the relationship between the Vatican and the Fascist government, it also had tightened the government's grip over the Jews. However, unlike Pollard's *The Vatican & Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, which heavily signified the Vatican's desperate need to maintain religious

¹⁹ John Pollard, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 1914-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 247.

²⁰ Michele Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, trans. John Tedeschi and Anne C. Tedeschi (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), p. 45.

sovereignty in Italy, Sarfatti had discussed how on certain occasions, both Pope Pius XI and Pius XII had detested Mussolini's persecution of the Jews. Yet, Sarfatti's book was lacking in analysing the responses and reactions of the Jews towards the relationship and its policies. Thus, this loophole needed to be addressed in this research.

In contrast, the book entitled *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy* by Kevin Madigan had discussed the conditions of the religious minorities from the Protestants' standpoint. The book addressed the antagonism of the Church towards the Protestants as they had labelled them as "the Protestant Danger", which mentioned that, "...evangelicals were bringing to Italy a "civilizing" form of Christianity in the service of a diabolically inspired scheme...".²¹ On the other hand, Madigan had thoroughly discussed the implications of the Lateran Accords towards the Protestants. The so-called laws which aims to secure the rights of the religious minorities had only burdened the Protestants as it only "established or recognised a preexisting hierarchy of religious faiths".²² Despite their discussions on the different religious minorities of Italy during the Fascist regime, Madigan's book had missed the mark in discussing the reactions and responses of the Protestants. Similar to Sarfatti, Madigan's main discussion highlighted the effects of the relationship towards the Protestants but fell flat on analysing their reactions. Hence, this gap needed to be addressed.

Another piece of literature worth mentioning was *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* written by John Cornwell. This particular book was used to analyse the relationship after the death of Pope Pius XI, as well as during World War II, which both had fallen around the same time as the pontificate of a new Pope, Pope Pius XII. While the book may not focus solely on the Roman Catholic Church's relationship with the Fascist Italian government, it deeply burrowed into the Church's and the Pope's contact with Mussolini. Such contact can be referred to during the years preceding the war, the new Pope had sent the Vatican's representative to praise Mussolini for his policies as a means of persuasion for him to push Hitler into averting the war.²³ Also, Cornwell had discussed the

²¹ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 42.

²² Ibid. p. 44.

²³ John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 230-231.

situations of the Jews and how the Pope had tried to aid them from persecution. Yet, certain gaps needed to be addressed. While the book may have mentioned numerous contacts between the Vatican and Mussolini's government, it vaguely explained how those moments affected the relationship. On another note, the book had focused more on the Church's relationship with other European countries, especially Nazi Germany and Britain – making the Vatican's relationship with Fascist Italy seem secondary. With that, it is important to address the mentioned gaps.

From the available literature, it is evident that there are many angles of the Roman Catholic Church's relationship with the Fascist Italian government that has yet to be addressed, ergo, many loopholes were found and remained vague. Overall, the gaps and loopholes found in the mentioned literatures included the lack of explanation on the factors behind the relationship's initiation. Also, there were a lack of discussion on the events leading up to the Lateran Accords, as well as obscure information on its content and responses from members of both parties, including outside parties –intellectuals, the Jews, and the Fascists' foreign allies. Also, most of the literatures missed the mark in analysing the relationship after the death of Pope Pius XI, which was quite crucial in this study. Thus, it can be said that the loopholes or gaps needed to be rectified in the present research.

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Historical research is essentially qualitative, concentrating on the interpretation of historical events and contexts. It employs various methodologies, such as critical analysis, contextualisation, and comparative studies to thoroughly understand the subjects of analysis and the overall research process. This research utilises a combination of primary and secondary sources relevant to its scope, elaborated primarily through critical document analysis.

One of the main primary sources used in this research would be autobiographies and memoirs. Autobiographies and memoirs are very crucial as it provides the personal narratives of individuals involved in this study. Such autobiographies included the English version of Mussolini's 1928 book; *My Autobiography* that was ghostwritten by Richard

Washburn Child and Luigi Barzini Jr. Another example would be the 1927 autobiography; *The Life of Benito Mussolini* by Margherita G. Sarfatti. The mentioned autobiographies would be utilised in providing a wide understanding of Mussolini's thoughts on religion before Fascist Italy, as well as the basic idea of the relationship between the Church and his regime. From Pope Pius's point of view, autobiographies such as William Teeling's 1937 book, *The Pope in Politics: The Life and Work of Pope Pius XI*, which documented certain aspects related to this research.

On the other hand, publications such as books and journal articles of that time would also be of great use in conducting this research. Publications nearing the timeframe of the research topic would provide substantial relevant information based on the account of the authors themselves. Books written by Italian authors such as Avro Manhattan's 1949, *The Vatican in World Politics*, can be considered quite essential as one of its chapters focused on the relationship between the Vatican and the Fascist government. Apart from that, books written by foreign authors within the timeframe would also be utilised in this research. For instance, the 1941 book, *Church and State in Fascist Italy* by Irish scholar, Daniel A. Binchy and the 1945 book, *The Vatican and the War*, by American author, Camille M. Cianfarra. In addition, published books such as Barone B. Quaranta's 1923, *Mussolini: As Revealed in his Political Speeches (November 1914-August 1923)* can also serve its purpose to provide speech texts related to this research. Moreover, articles in journals such as *Foreign Affairs* and *The Catholic Historical Review* from the 1920s to 1940s would provide some relevant information for the research discussions. Other than publications, some related printed documents would also be of use. Printed documents such as the translated Lateran Treaty 1929 as well as the encyclicals released by Pope Pius XI and Pope Pius XII would also be analysed.

Besides that, visual primary sources would be of great use in this research due to their representation of that moment in time. In this research, some photographs from the database of the Digital Vatican Library and online image archives were obtained. These sources were fundamental in justifying certain key points highlighted within the course of this research.

Needless to say, the proposed primary sources would provide substantial information for the research analysis. Together with a wide range of secondary sources, it would aid with the progress of this research.

1.8 CHAPTERISATION

In this research, there would be five chapters.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

- The first chapter's purpose is the introduction where the research background, objectives, statement of the problem, literature review, and methodology would be elaborated.

Chapter 2

- This chapter would delve into the historical situation on the eve of the establishment of the Fascist Italian regime. Answering the first research question (Why did both the Fascist Italian government and the Vatican had decided to pursue a relationship with each other?), this chapter would discuss how the idea of a relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Fascist Italian government was constructed and the factors that influenced its establishment. The earliest form of contact between both parties would be discussed.

Chapter 3

- In this chapter, the development of the relationship would be further discussed. Linking to Chapter 2, the progress of the relationship before its officiation would be detailed in this chapter, ergo, answering the second research question: How was the development of the relationship before the Lateran Accords? Also, responses and reactions from members of the Church, government, and

other groups of the society would be discussed. This chapter would end with discussions on the Lateran Accords.

Chapter 4

- To answer the question of how did the relationship affected the religious minorities in Italy, especially during the 1930s, this chapter would reassess the implications of the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist Italian government towards religious minorities – primarily the Jews and the Protestants. Linking to the previous chapter, this chapter would stress on the effects of policies and reforms done in the 1920s – such as the Lateran Accords, towards the religious minorities. Also, their conditions during pivotal moments of the relationship from the 1930s till the fall of the Fascist Italian government in early 1940s would also be examined. This included Mussolini's Racial Laws and the election of Pope Pius XII.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations

- The final chapter would conclude the overall content of the research, followed by recommendations by the researcher for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FORMATION OF THE VATICAN'S TIES WITH MUSSOLINI'S FASCIST REGIME

2.1 INTRODUCTION

To fulfil one of the paper's objectives, this chapter seeks to study the factors influencing the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Fascist regime in Italy. This chapter's main purpose is to provide an in-depth analysis of related issues and events that shaped this relationship. The discussion encompasses precedent issues in the church-state relationship, coincidental leadership changes in 1922, the initial interaction between the Vatican and the Fascist regime, and the motivations behind the relationship – each interconnected. To present the paper's overarching argument in studying and analysing the relationship, this chapter is significant in acknowledging the purpose, influence, and main actors of the relationship before delving deeper into its development. Additionally, this chapter is important in identifying the antecedents of certain events and problems of other discussions in the paper.

Before the rise of the Fascist regime, the relationship between the Vatican and the Italian government was overall inconsistent, with it sometimes being cordial but often stumbling upon conflicts that halted any possibilities for reconciliation. The political situation after the war also proved to be another major obstacle. Italy's political landscape between 1918 and 1921 was experiencing a decline as its dominant parties, the Liberals, Socialists, and Radicals – and much later the Catholic democratic group, struggled to maintain power amidst a series of unexpected resignations and brief governments.²⁴ It was during this time that the Fascist movement found its way into the Italian political structure

²⁴ On the eve of the war, the political scene of Italy had been dominated by the three mentioned groups. Catholic political groups emerged in 1904 after the ban on Catholics' involvement in politics was loosened by Pope Pius X. Yet, the representation was strengthened in 1919 after the PPI which initially had strong ties with the Vatican, gained popularity, thus became one of Italy's prominent Italian political parties of that era whilst the Radical Party had dispersed. On the political history of Italy before the 1920s, refer to Denis M. Smith, *Modern Italy: Political History* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 191-288.

after joining Giovanni Giolitti's coalition, the National Bloc for the 1921 general election. After Benito Mussolini and his Fascists won 35 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, they later withdrew from the coalition and became a part of the opposition.²⁵

In his very first speech in the Chamber in June 1921, Mussolini unexpectedly acknowledged the sanctity of the Vatican, the Catholic beliefs, and Rome. This had elicited mixed reactions of confusion and excitement from his peers, the Church, Italian society, and foreign partners. Those who were confused found themselves caught off guard by why such an aggressive anti-clerical figure would make such contradictory statements so drastically and quickly. After the March on Rome which resulted in the formation of the Fascist regime and the rise of Mussolini as Italy's Prime Minister in 1922, he continued to display some actions to reflect his 'acceptance' towards the Catholic traditions. This attracted the attention of the Vatican and their new leader, Pope Pius XI who coincidentally was elected the same year. As a result, the Fascist regime oversaw the creation of a diplomatic alliance between the Vatican and Italy – a great achievement that had eluded its predecessors. Yet, this unexpected partnership raised more questions, particularly about why and how it developed.

²⁵ Martin Clark, *Mussolini: Profiles in Power* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 51. The political system of Italy was that of a constitutional monarchy, with a parliament consisting of two distinct chambers: the upper house, known as the Senate, and the lower house, known as the Chamber of Deputies. Between 1939 and 1943, the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved and replaced by the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations.

2.2 ISSUES IN THE CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS BEFORE THE FASCIST ERA

2.2.1 Conflicts over the War

Before the emergence of the Fascist regime, one of the obvious issues in Italy's relationship with the Vatican was related to World War I. The impact of the war had threatened the relationship which seemed to be improving in comparison to its situation in the 19th century.²⁶

Primarily, Italy's stance in the war had been one of the major obstacles in the relationship in the 1910s. Initially on the neutral line, Italy had retracted its neutrality and entered the war on the Allies side in May 1915.²⁷ The decision was strongly opposed by the Vatican who would prefer for Italy to remain neutral and avoid any involvement in the war. Apart from its efforts to promote peace, the Vatican was deeply concerned over the repercussions of Italy's involvement in the country's social fabric.²⁸ Surely, the concerns of the Vatican were true. By entering the First World War on the Allies' side, Italy had indirectly 'invited' the Central Powers to launch attacks on its grounds, thus compromising Italy's security and threatening its socio-economic conditions. Just over a month after Italy revoked its neutrality, Austria bombarded Venice on 23rd May 1915, causing mass destruction to the coastal cities and towns.²⁹ The Italian society appeared to have greater risks at stake compared to the decision-makers. As such, the food crisis and shortage of domestic supplies such as coal, wheat, and wool hit Italy between 1917 to 1918, which resulted in the rampage of its people.³⁰ With that being said, the fracture of the society further justified the Pope's distress. Italy's decision to enter the war had become a point of

²⁶ For more information on the conflicts and tensions in the 19th century, see Frank Coppa, "Italy: Church and the Risorgimento," in *The Cambridge History of Christianity: World Christianities, c. 1815-c.1914*, ed. Sheridan Gilley and Brian Stanley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 233-249.

²⁷ "Italy in the War by May 12, Paris Report Declares," *Evening Star* (Washington DC, United States), April 26, 1915, p. 1. The decision came after the signing of a secret treaty between the Allies and Italy to convince the latter to enter the war on the former's side. Negotiations had been ongoing for months which indicated that the Italian government had planned for Italy's entry for a considerable long time.

²⁸ Pollard, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism, 1914-1958*, p. 46.

²⁹ "Austria Shells Venice!" *The Tacoma Times* (United States), May 24, 1915, p. 1.

³⁰ "News of Serious Bread Riots in Italy Leake Out," *The Birmingham Age-Herald* (United States), October 18, 1917, p. 2.

contention in its relationship with the Vatican. While maintaining the Vatican's neutrality, Pope Benedict XV actively advocated for the cessation of the war by engaging in talks and discussions with the parties involved, resulting in some allegations of bias from Italian officials.³¹

Another source of conflict between the Vatican and Italy concerning the war was the former's interference to end the war. While he could not prevent or block Italy from entering the war, the Pope had been persistent in his call to end the war. Talks and negotiations with both the Allies and Central Powers had been conducted. Yet, as Italy was particularly at war against Austria-Hungary, the Vatican had been in frequent contact with Vienna to avoid the war's escalation. Between the negotiations, the Vatican had accomplished to secure the release of prisoners of war who were considered unfit for military duties as well as the protection of churches and monuments in Italian coastal cities.³² Despite the progress of easing the tensions with Vienna, the Church's involvement and cordialness did not sit well with the Italian government. This was largely due to the speculations of the Pope's support towards the Central Powers.³³ The speculation would also mean that the Vatican had jumped ship, thus sparking the Italian government's paranoia of a possible cooperation between the Vatican and the Central Powers.

To thwart the alleged cooperation, the government had implemented various tactics to monitor and regulate the Vatican's actions since May 1915. The Italian authorities had been instructed to keep a close eye on the Vatican's activities and communications, including mail and telegrams.³⁴ In addition, cryptanalysts were assigned to decipher the Vatican's code system and search for any potentially alarming messages.³⁵ The government had tried its best to oversee any suspicious activities or communication of the Vatican that would indicate their collaboration, but there was no viable information to support such

³¹ "Pope Regrets Italy's Decision for War," *New York Tribune* (United States), May 23, 1915, p. 2.

³² "Francis Joseph Takes Kindly to Pope's Proposal," *Bismarck Daily Tribune* (Dakota, United States), January 6, 1915, p. 1; "Austria to Spare Churches," *The Sun* (New York, United States), July 27, 1915, p. 2.

³³ Vanda Wilcox (ed.), *Italy in the Era of the Great War* (Leiden and Boston: Koninklijke Brill, 2018), p. 195. Such suspicions peaked when the Italian government received news of the Vatican's discussion with Berlin on the topic of the Pope's peace proposal in 1918.

³⁴ David Alvarez, "Vatican Communications Security, 1914-18," *Intelligence and National Security* 7, no. 4 (1992): p. 443.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 446-449. In the early 20th century, all communications of the Church would have to pass through Italy but the latter assured that it had no control or authority over the former's communications. Yet, the Vatican had invented their code in 1907 as an alternative means of communication.

claims. Consequently, Italy's mistrust as well as its inclination to control the Vatican had provoked tensions between the two. It brought the assumption of the former's intention to control the latter, which had been the main source of contention during the 19th century.

2.2.2 Treatment Against Religious Orders in Annexed Territories

Another integral issue that needed to be addressed was the government's hostilities against religious orders in annexed territories. After gaining some concessions in the Adriatic Sea between 1918 to 1920, the Italianisation policy was enforced towards the population of the annexed territories. As they were predominantly Slavs, Croats, and Germans, the population in territories including Trieste, Fiume, parts of Dalmatia, and some islands in the region were subjected to the policy, as the government aimed to integrate them into the nation's culture and values.³⁶ Such aims were to incorporate the territories under one national identity: Italy.

However, the extreme measures had led to the rejection and protests from the locals. This included the local clergy, bishops, and priests who were forced to use the Italian language in their religious services and ceremonies after their native languages were banned. Thus, some religious orders had campaigned against the Italian authorities through protests and engagement with international leaders. One of them was Juraj Carić, the bishop of Split who had gone as far as to meet President Woodrow Wilson in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to appeal for the withdrawal of the Italian authorities from the Slavs land, such

³⁶ Joseph V. Fuller (ed.), *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1919*, vol. V, *The Paris Peace Conference* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 80-95; "Islands to Go to Italy," *The Evening Star* (Washington, DC, United States), November 12, 1920, p. 26. The Italianisation process had been implemented so drastically and the locals were expected to adapt so rapidly. The policy included enforcing the use of the Italian language in all mediums whilst restricting the use of the locals' native languages. Non-Italian cultural societies were prohibited and any publication can only be published in Italian. Geographical names and some of the locals' surnames were Italianised to enhance the Italian characters of the region. The policy was continued by Mussolini during his leadership between the 1920s to 1940s in which stricter regulations were added to not only integrate the population as Italians but also as Fascists. For more information on the Italianisation policy of the Adriatic region between 1918 to 1943, refer to Maura E. Hametz, *Making Trieste Italian, 1918-1954* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2005); Dennison I. Rusinow, *Italy's Austrian, 1919-1946* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

as Dalmatia and Fiume to be part of Yugoslavia.³⁷ In response, the Italian authorities became hostile towards the locals as punishment for their obstinate attitude. Believed to possess extreme influence over the locals, religious orders were amongst the prime targets of hostilities, subjected to public humiliation and deportation as their positions were taken over by Italians.³⁸ This caused some conflicts between Italy and the Vatican as the latter was against the former's ill-treatment of the people, especially the Roman Catholic religious orders. Yet, the issue was never fully resolved by Benedict XV and his predecessors. It seemed to be a regular pattern in the dynamic throughout the first half of the 20th century as many key issues were left unresolved, even under the Fascist regime.

2.2.3 Halt in the Resolution of the Roman Question

Another crucial issue in the pre-Fascist relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and Italy was the Roman Question. As the byproduct of the Risorgimento, the Roman Question had been the main subject of contention of the relationship since the late 19th century. The context behind the concept was defined as "...the security of a spiritual good, the security of ecclesiastical liberty, through the territorial independence of the head of the Church....," which signified the complexity of the issue as it not only covered the sanctity and sovereignty of the Roman Catholic Church but also its security and freedom.³⁹ Even so, the general view had identified the Roman Question as a dispute between the Vatican and Italy over the temporal power of the papacy in Rome and other papal territories.

³⁷ Ljubinka Trgovčević (ed.), *125 Years of Diplomatic Relations between the USA and Serbia* (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, 2008), pp. 93-94.

³⁸ Dragan R. Živojinović, *American, Italy, and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917-1919)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 259, 262 & 264. As a coverup, Italian authorities insinuated that the mass deportation was due to a contagious outbreak that could threaten the population if not disposed of.

³⁹ Joseph Schroeder, *American Catholics and the Roman Question* (New York, Cincinnati & Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1893), p. 74. Materials centred on the discussion of the Roman Question are quite rare even today. One notable material that had been fundamental for its extensive discussion on the Roman Question was: Edmond About, *The Roman Question*, trans. Henry C. Coape, (New York: Appleton and Company, 1859). Editor of *America*, a Catholic journal, had explained about the Roman Question in a section of his book. See Wilfrid Parsons, *The Pope and Italy* (New York: The America Press, 1929), see Appendix B, pp. 117-119.

The definition tied in the significance of the Question towards the relationship whilst also hinting at the reasons behind the stalling in its resolution. As much as the Roman Question played a big part in the betterment of the relationship, the involvement of some major territorial claims prevented it from being resolved, thus turning the Question into a major obstacle. Only two Prime Ministers had been keen on resolving the Question. The first was Vittorio Orlando in 1919. Following a discussion between a representative of the Vatican and Orlando in Paris on 18th May 1919, they reconvened on June 1st, this time accompanied by Bonaventura Cerretti – the Secretary of the Congregation of Extraordinary Affairs.⁴⁰ A memorandum with some proposed conditions of the settlement had been represented by Cerretti and upon reading it, Orlando had agreed to present it to the King and the Italian Senate.⁴¹ However, it fell through due to his resignation shortly after his return. His replacement, Francesco Nitti would be the second Prime Minister who attempted for a settlement of the Roman Question. In July 1919, Nitti suggested that the Holy See would abandon its territorial claims in exchange for an official agreement that recognised the Apostolic Palace as a sovereign state.⁴² He had also been engaging in a few meetings with Gasparri to discuss the Roman Question. Yet, in the same case as Orlando, he resigned after various socio-economic turbulence, thus once again stalling the resolution of the Roman Question.

Nitti's successor, Giovanni Giolitti who was a staunch Liberal showed no interest in a settlement with the Vatican. It was not surprising considering Giolitti's strong view of 'the Church and State as two parallels that should never meet', in addition to the Italian political scene being conquered by anti-clerics.⁴³ The political and socio-economic troubles had stalled any attempt to resolve the Roman Question.

⁴⁰ The representative mentioned was Francis Kelley who at the time was an American bishop. At the time, both Kelley and Orlando were attending the Peace Conference in Paris. On the suggestion of the Counsellor of the Italian Delegation to the Peace Conference, he had met with Orlando to discuss the solution to the Question from the views of the American Catholics. The conversation led to Kelley being sent to Rome to report on the conversation and Orlando's interest in a settlement. For more detailed elaboration, refer to David Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 235 – 236.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 236.

⁴² "Nitti Seeks Modus Vivendi Regarding Roman Question," *The Catholic Standard and Times* (Philadelphia, United States), August 13, 1919, p. 1.

⁴³ Gaetano Salvemini, *The Origins of Fascism in Italy*, ed. Roberto Vivarelli (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 153. The statement had been made during a session in the Chamber of Deputies on 30th May 1904. While that specific line had been coopted as Giolitti's principal view and policy

2.2.4 Burdensome Economic Policies

Giolitti's return to the Prime Minister position in 1920 was only greeted with socio-economic problems left behind by his predecessors. To contain the disorders and any potential spill-over, a plethora of reforms were implemented with the primary goal of stabilising the nation's situation, especially its economy. Yet, Giolitti's administration strategy of repairing the economy would require various mandates and taxes, which consequently affected the Italian society, including the Church.

The first hint of tension occurred in 1920 when the government mandated the registration of all bearer securities and properties under individual names rather than organisations, as part of an initiative to prevent any evasion of death duties and personal tax payments.⁴⁴ As most of the Church securities' holders and their replacements were elderly, the new legislation would cause a considerable surge in death duties, ultimately depleting a large portion of the Vatican's finances.⁴⁵ Yet, the problem was sorted through discussions between both sides. Upon the request of the Cardinal Secretary of State, Pietro Gasparri, the government had agreed to exempt all Church possessions and securities from the legislation.⁴⁶ While the issue was resolved, it did not seem to be the end of Giolitti's attempt to financially despair the Church, nor could it be handled similarly.

The government's choice of granting various concessions to the Socialist trade unions between 1919 and 1920 only posed significant challenges, especially in Italy's relationship with the Vatican. Due to a series of strikes and riots by the Socialist unionists, the government tried to resolve the socio-economic conflicts through policy.⁴⁷ Yet, to seek the popular discontent of the socialists, it only attracted more disapproval of other unions,

against the Church, it is worth noting that in the same speech, he had warned the Vatican of the repercussions if they intended to interfere with any governmental affairs.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 352.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Initially, the Vatican had hoped for assistance from the PPI in resolving this issue. However, during a discussion between the party's leaders and members of the Vatican, the latter suggested the former cooperate with the Conservatives and Fascist groups to reverse the legislation. The party, however, had rejected the notion as they refused to ally themselves with the Fascists, emphasising their own political goal and agenda. The PPI's lack of concern had further deepened the wedge in their relationship with the Vatican. John N. Molony, *The Emergence of Political Catholicism in Italy* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), p. 104; Salvemini, *The Origins of Fascism in Italy*, p. 352.

⁴⁷ Martin Clarke, *Modern Italy: 1871 to the Present* (Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 249.

including those affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church as well as the middle classes. Hence, tensions flared between Giolitti's government and the Vatican. The situation worsened as new taxes were imposed against all church possessions. Though not bound by the financial regulations of Italy, the government had decreed that all assets of the church be liable for taxation.⁴⁸ Unlike before, however, the decree had been specifically made for the churches' assets, thus no possible loopholes can be claimed for the Vatican to appeal for exemptions. Following this incident, the Vatican had taken retaliatory measures against the government, a first for Benedict XV's papacy. Both the Vatican and the Italian's Popular Party (PPI) had withdrawn their support for Giolitti and his administration.⁴⁹ Subsequently, affecting their popularity in the Italian political structure.

2.3 NEW LEADERS IN 1922

In the years of indecisiveness in the relationship between the papacy and the Italian government, major events involving the rise of new leaders on both counterparts in 1922 led the relationship to change its course.

Nearing the end of January 1922, word had spread of the death of Pope Benedict XV. The burial service was held the next day on 23rd January with a mourning period extending for ten days whilst the College of Cardinals prepared for the papal conclave which was announced to be held on 2nd February.⁵⁰ The selection process of a new pope was already been known to be a complex process; however, the 1922 papal conclave was met with various difficulties mainly due to the divide among the cardinals. The division between the intransigents and moderates arose from their conflicting stance on the Vatican's policy with Italy. The intransigents, led by Cardinal Merry del Val, opposed any attempt at reconciliation, while their opponents, led by Cardinal Gasparri, were eager to resolve the

⁴⁸ Heinrich A. Winkler, *The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West, 1914-1945*, trans. Stewart Spencer, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 196.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ "Begin 10 Days of Mourning," *The Evening Journal* (Delaware, United States), January 23, 1922, p. 1. For more information on the process of a papal conclave, refer to "Involved Procedure and Great Secrecy Mark Election of Pope," *New York Tribune* (United States), January 22, 1922, p. 3; "Election of Pope Follows Obsequies Lasting 9 Days," *The Washington Herald* (Washington D.C., United States), January 22, 1922, pp. 1-2.

Roman Question through conciliatory policies with the Italian government.⁵¹ This made it difficult for the conclave to conclude electing Benedict XV's replacement. Despite vast speculation of potential successors, the two-third majority was finally received on 6th February by the Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Achille Ratti with a total of thirty-eight out of fifty-three votes.⁵² Hence, he became the new Pope under the name, Pius XI.

Coincidentally, Italy was also facing a change in administration as the College of Cardinals was preoccupied with the election of a new pope. Ivanoe Bonomi, who was the Prime Minister at the time, had stepped down from his position amidst the recurrent political troubles and increasing socio-economic tensions. Yet, it had been suggested that his administration's sympathetic response towards the passing of Benedict XV may have some part in his resignation. Bonomi's government had permitted the Italian flag to be placed at half-staff and some officials to express their sympathy in the Chamber of Deputies, thus drawing criticism from the opposition.⁵³ He was replaced by the Liberal Party's Luigi Facta but political tensions and rising socio-economic issues still loomed in the Italian government. By then, the main challenge was the rising political violence between the Communists, Socialists, and Fascists that had been widespread throughout Italy. Growing in supporters since 1920, the violence carried out by the Fascists reached its peak during the 1921 election which witnessed a minor victory for Benito Mussolini's Fascist movement.⁵⁴

⁵¹ William Teeling, *The Pope in Politics: The Life and Work of Pope Pius XI* (London: Lovat Dickson Limited, 1938), p. 10. In the weeks before the 1922 conclave, rumours had spread regarding a rivalry between the Italian and foreign cardinals but were later rebuked. "Conclave to Vote for Italian Pope: Indications on Second Ballot," *The New York Herald* (United States), January 25, 1922, p. 4.

⁵² "Cardinal Ratti Elected to Succeed Pope Benedict and Takes Title of Pius XI," *The Evening World* (New York, United States), February 6, 1922, p. 1. Among the speculated candidates were the heads of the two factions: Cardinal Merry del Val and Cardinal Gasparri. Some other candidates from both sides were also put forward. Yet, it was implied that both factions were on the realisation that neither of their candidates would stand a chance to be elected. Hence, both factions had decided that a middle-ground candidate was needed. As he was not affiliated with either faction, Achille Ratti had been deemed a suitable choice. "Conclave to Elect Successor to Pope Opens Feb. 1 or 2: Speculate on Successor," *The Evening Star* (Washington D.C., United States), January 23, 1922, p. 4; Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, pp. 7-9 & 14-16.

⁵³ "Rome Cabinet Out Following Clash over the Vatican," *The Evening Star* (Washington D.C., United States), February 2, 1922, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Mussolini's and his Fascists' presence in the Italian political structure had been a result of their gains in the 1921 election. The Fascist movement known as the Italian Combat Leagues (*Fasci Italiani di Combattimento*) had contested after joining Giolitti's National Bloc. Subsequently, the movement and Mussolini gained 35 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The movement was later been reformed as an official political party and renamed the National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*, PNF) which encompassed

The rise of the Italian Fascists led to the formulation of a political takeover under the leadership of Mussolini. Not only had he been backed by many regional Fascists, but the Fascist leader had the support of the futurists, industrialists, war veterans, the youths, and some political figures. Namely ex-Prime Minister Antonio Salandra had also backed Mussolini and engaged in several meetings through intermediaries.⁵⁵ The growing support for Mussolini exhibited the mounting confidence in his leadership over other former Prime Ministers. Also, with the support of leaders such as Salandra, competition for Mussolini began to diminish. At this rate, it seemed the Duce had chosen to be friendly but vigilant rather than pester his enemies or opponents – seemingly creating the illusion of an alliance through a ‘shared’ political agenda.

Between February to October 1922, there were sporadic conflicts throughout the country between Socialists, Communists, and Fascists vying for control of the local political scene. In a letter from Pius XI to the bishops in Italy, he described, “...we see factions multiply, their adherents becoming more bitter every day, running often now in one direction, now in another, to perpetrate bloody crimes with an endless train of reprisals which overturn the whole structure of social life,” as he instructed the bishops to continue their duties during this critical period.⁵⁶ In some cities, major disturbances occurred due to the heavy use of firearms in the clashes. As a result, firearm permits were removed by the government in May 1922. In August, martial law was issued in some parts of Italy whilst the security of the Chamber of Deputies had been tightened to avoid any disturbance during its sessions.⁵⁷ However, as the political violence in Italy between the three blocs escalated, several cities such as Bologna, Cremona, Florence, and Pisa had fallen into the hands of the Fascists.⁵⁸ As their power grew, the Fascists’ plan evolved into a much greater goal. On

Mussolini’s government from 1922 to 1943. The shift from a movement to a party was simply due to a crisis of authority amongst the Fascists in Italy. For more information, refer to Christopher Duggan, *Fascist Voices: An Intimate History of Mussolini’s Italy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 45-47.

⁵⁵ Bosworth, *Mussolini*, p. 167.

⁵⁶ Harry C. Koenig (ed.), *Principles for Peace: Selections from Papal Documents, Leo XIII to Pius XII* (Washington D.C: National Catholic Welfare, 1943), p. 327.

⁵⁷ “Fascisti Crowds Attack and Loot: Italy Stops Arms Privileges in Larger Cities as Outbreak Occur,” *The Washington Herald* (Washington D.C, United States), p. 1; “5 Provinces Under Martial Law in Italy,” *New York Tribune* (New York, United States), August 7, 1922, p. 1.

⁵⁸ “Fascisti Army of 65,000 in Bologna,” *The New York Herald* (New York, United States), June 1, 1922, p. 2; “Fascisti Seize 3 Radical Centers,” *The New York Herald* (New York, United States), July 16, 1922, p. 9; “3 Cities in Italy Seized by Fascisti: Florence, Cremona and Pisa are Captured after Nationalist Army Overawes State Authorities,” *New York Tribune* (New York, United States), October 28, 1922, p. 1.

24th October, a secret meeting was held in Florence to discuss strategies to take over Rome and to remove the Facta government, though the Fascists initially denied any intentions or plans of marching on Rome.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, with the expansion of the Fascist occupation encompassing more cities, their primary aim became increasingly apparent.

Between 27th and 28th of October, the Fascists and its leaders, including Mussolini, were mobilised at different locations for a march on Rome.⁶⁰ As a last resort, Prime Minister Facta presented a decree before the king to enforce martial law in Italy and bring in the Italian army to stop the Fascists. Out of concern for a potential civil war that could worsen the wounds of a deteriorating Italy, the king refused to sign the decree, and, being humiliated, Facta handed in his resignation.⁶¹ To restore the peace, the king made several conditions to appease the Fascists. Giolitti was persuaded to form the new cabinet but he rejected the king's proposal of offering five key portfolios to the Fascists and Mussolini.⁶² After Salandra also rejected his offer, the king summoned Mussolini to come to Rome to form a government.⁶³ Hence, this marked the start of Mussolini's Fascist regime in Italy.

It was apparent that the year 1922 was significant in the Italy-Vatican relationship. As expected, the changes in both leaderships had a great impact on the direction of the relationship. On another note, it was significant to point out the Vatican's adjustment to Italy's new climate of control. Being it was the first time that the Fascists were in power, the Vatican had yet to familiarise itself with the Fascists' political style. Nonetheless, both leaders had intentions of building an alliance. Pope Pius XI had announced his decision to the Vatican to engage with Mussolini's government whilst Mussolini too had his intentions.

⁵⁹ George Seldes, *Sawdust Caesar: The Untold History of Mussolini and Fascism* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), p. 116; "Fascisti Promise Peace if Reds Aid," *The Washington Herald* (Washington D.C., United States), p. 2. Interestingly, during the meeting, Mussolini was not the first nor second choice to lead the government after the Fascists had taken over. After both choices had refused the offer, Mussolini's name had been brought up.

⁶⁰ For more information on the March on Rome and its preceding events, see Guilia Albanese, *The March on Rome: Violence and the Rise of Italian Fascism*, trans. Sergio Knipe (Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2019).

⁶¹ "Italy Proclaims Martial Law, then Rescinds Order; Cities Seized," *The Evening World* (New York, United States), October 28, 1922, pp. 1-2.

⁶² "Says He Represents Majority," *New York Tribune* (New York, United States), October 28, 1922, p. 1.

⁶³ Benito Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, trans. Richard W. Child, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), pp. 184-185.

2.4 MUTUAL OR DISTINCT INTERESTS?

2.4.1 Pius XI's and the Vatican's Perspective

2.4.1.1 Mussolini's Shift in Attitude Towards the Church

Mussolini's alteration of stance towards the Church was one of the factors that drove the Vatican to pursue a relationship with the Fascist regime.

Yet, before the 1920s, Mussolini had been known as an overzealous anticleric. During his childhood, his views on the Church were as follows:

I kept up my religious practices side by side with my mother who was a devout believer, and my grandmother, but I never could remain long in church especially when the great ceremonies were on. The lights from the candles, the penetrating odour from the incense, the colours of the sacred vestments, together with all the long-drawn-out singing of the congregation and the sound of the organ, disturbed me profoundly.⁶⁴

In 1904, he launched a vitriolic attack against the Roman Catholic Church and its believers in his first publication, 'God Does Not Exist' (*Dieu N'existe Pas*).⁶⁵ He once mocked the Vatican, likening it to a "den of intolerance and of a gang of robbers".⁶⁶ Other noteworthy instances included his campaign to terminate state subsidies to the Church and his satirical invitation for the Pope to leave Rome in an *Il Popolo d'Italia* article in November 1919.⁶⁷ Mussolini had been maliciously and openly antagonistic against the Roman Catholic Church, though he tends to deny being anticlerical. In his autobiography, he claimed that, "Mussolini, the grown man, is no great lover of the clericals, and he is not, and never has been, a bigot in the matter of the observances of the Church," which was an attempt to defend his actions as simply acts of disdain against the Church but not bigotry.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, p. 31.

⁶⁵ For the full translated text, refer to Appendix 2 in Seldes, *Sawdust Caesar: The Untold History of Mussolini and Fascism*, pp. 387-390.

⁶⁶ Gaudens Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1938), p. 164.

⁶⁷ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 25.

⁶⁸ Margherita G. Sarfatti, *The Life of Benito Mussolini*, trans. Frederic Whyte, (London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1927), p. 68. Coincidentally, Pius XI was the Archbishop of Milan before his election

Yet, when he took the stage to deliver his first speech before the Chamber of Deputies on 21st June 1921, he took his colleagues by surprise when he addressed the Church. The part of his speech about the Church was as follows:

I maintain that the Imperial and Latin tradition of Rome is represented to-day by Catholicism. If, as Mommsen said thirty years ago, one could not stay in Rome without being impressed by the idea of universality, I both think and maintain that the only universal idea at Rome to-day is that which radiates from the Vatican...For this reason I advance this hypothesis, that if the Vatican should definitely renounce its temporal ambitions – and I think it is already on that road – Italy ought to furnish it with the necessary material help for the schools, churches, hospitals etc., that a temporal power has at its disposal.⁶⁹

His change of tone was further evolved during the start of his days as Prime Minister. At the altar of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Rome, he led his cabinet to a mass and instructed them to kneel in prayer.⁷⁰ On 16th November 1922, his first speech as Prime Minister before the Chamber of Deputies was closed with, “And may God help me to carry my arduous task to a victorious end”.⁷¹ This small remark was significant as it was the first mention of the word ‘God’ in the parliament of modern Italy. It appeared that the Duce’s efforts to incorporate Catholic customs into the political climate aimed to alleviate the past governments’ constraints on any sort of religious affiliation in politics.

Though it seemed so sudden, Richard W. Child in the foreword of Mussolini’s autobiography explained that:

In spite of quick, firm decisions, in spite of grim determination, in spite of a well-ordered diagrammed pattern and plan of action fitted to any moment of time, Mussolini, first of all, above all and after all, is a personality always in a state of flux, adjusting its leadership to a world eternally in a state of flux.⁷²

while Mussolini’s Fascist organisation was based in Milan. Although there was no indication of any direct contact between both men, it was evident that Pius XI had witnessed the behaviour and activities of the Fascists under Mussolini’s leadership, especially their anticlericalism. Teeling, *The Pope in Politics: The Life and Work of Pope Pius XI*, p. 75.

⁶⁹ Bernardo Quaranta (eds.), *Mussolini: As Revealed in His Political Speeches (November 1914 – August 1923)* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1923), p. 202. In the same speech, he denied that the Fascists did not invade or attack any churches which was quite confusing as there was evidence of Fascist attacks on local churches and religious orders.

⁷⁰ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 34.

⁷¹ Quaranta (eds.), *Mussolini: As Revealed in His Political Speeches (November 1914 – August 1923)*, p. 218.

⁷² Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, p. xii.

Yet, it was quite confusing as to why these recent changes overweighed Mussolini's past animosity against the Church. Even more peculiar was why the new pope and several Vatican officials were quick to assume that he would make a reliable ally just from Mussolini's year of change.

2.4.1.2 The Roman Question

As stated, the key element of the Italy-Vatican relationship in the early 19th century centred on the Roman Question. In retrospect, there were a couple of occasions where the Question was nearly on its path to a resolution, but to no avail.

As 1921 and 1922 had witnessed the change in the attitude of the Duce towards the Church, the newly appointed Pius XI was optimistic about an ultimate resolution of the Roman Question, which could lead to a reconciliation between the Vatican and Italy. Also, the resolution could guarantee a plethora of benefits and privileges to the Vatican and the Catholics of Italy. Primarily, it solidified and further protected the sovereignty and position of the pope and the Vatican but more significantly, the status of Catholicism in Italy.

2.4.1.3 Re-Catholicisation of the Italian Society

Reformation of the Italian society with Catholic tenets was a consequential effect of a partnership with the Fascist government and the resolution of the Roman Question. Mainly the Vatican's aim to enhance the expression of the Catholic identity and integration of the practices and symbols of Catholicism into the public life of Italian society.

In Pius XI's first encyclical, he mentioned his goal in following the ambition of Benedict XV's "re-establishment of the Kingdom of Christ by peace in Christ", in which he continued to mention the dangers of rejecting the principles of Christianity from public

life, including in education, family life, and governance.⁷³ While a friendly rapport enabled the Vatican to communicate and negotiate with the government in certain policy-making situations, restoring the sovereignty of the Pope through the Question resolution would grant the Pope the authority to shape policies within his domain.

2.4.1.4 Protection and Security

On the other hand, protection and security against violence, dangerous ideologies, and corrupt religion was another key goal. Even after the Fascist regime had been formed, raids and attacks of the Fascists all over Italy were still recurrent, especially against religious centres and the clerics. In that sense, the Vatican was hopeful in depending on the regime to contain the continuous violence of the Fascist belligerents. Yet, it became evident that although Mussolini was the figurehead of the regime, he did not hold complete control over all the Fascists in Italy. Also, his ‘changes’ did not reflect on the Fascists as many of them were staunch anticlerics.

The Vatican had looked upon the relationship to shield Italy from the prevalent influence of socialism and communism. Pius XI strongly detested both ideologies, considering them equally perilous. During his time as Benedict XV’s emissary in Poland, he studied both ideologies and concluded that socialism was the forefront of communism, and both were equally threatening and could not be associated with the Church’s beliefs.⁷⁴ Major events in Europe, such as the Bolshevik Revolution, had put the Pope on edge. His concerns heightened when many members of the PPI – which was supposed to be a subsidiary of the Vatican, had associated themselves with socialists.⁷⁵ Thus, the Pope placed his trust in Mussolini as Italy’s protector against the socialists and communists.

⁷³ Pope Pius XI, *Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio* [On the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ], The Holy See, December 23, 1922, <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius11/p11arcan.htm>.

⁷⁴ Teeling, *The Pope in Politics: The Life and Work of Pope Pius XI*, pp. 70 & 114.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 108.

Although it was not widely specified, it can be related to the Duce's animosity against the socialists.⁷⁶

On another note, the Vatican was in a pressing need to eradicate the Protestant teachings in Italy. Deemed as a corruption towards Christianity, various Protestant sects had emerged in various parts of Italy after the war due to annexations, immigration, and the return of Italian missionaries from overseas. As their population grew sporadically, the Vatican was concerned with its impact on Catholics and the sanctity of the Church. Hence, a relationship with Italy could not only control but also aid in the Vatican's major mission of diminishing Protestant sects in Italy. Additionally, reestablishing the authority of the Vatican and the Pope, as well as defining the status of the Catholic faith in Italy, would advance the prospects of accomplishing the mission.

Hence, it can be implied that the Vatican and Pius XI had esteemed Mussolini and his government as their protectors against the three mentioned threats. From there, the Duce was referred to by Pius XI as the 'Man of the Providence' in 1926, bestowing him as the man chosen by God to protect the Church and to aid them in reconstructing a Catholic state in Italy.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Mussolini's intense rivalries against the Socialist Party began after he resigned from the party's publication, *Avanti!* which eventually led to his removal from the party. A former proactive member, his constant use of *Avanti!* to publish critical articles against Italy's initial neutrality, a theme which the party had restricted. Due to this, Mussolini announced his withdrawal from the publication. This sudden announcement caused an outbreak of various rumours against him and became more vigorous after his removal from the party in November 1914. Later that year, he founded *Il Popolo d'Italia* and began his political career as a Fascist. Although his retention of some socialist tenets, he was highly critical of Marxism such as Marxist's concept of materialism and anti-capitalist economics. Yet, he became one of the Italian Socialist Party's major enemies since then, engaging in various feuds against the party and its members. For more information, refer to Sarfatti, *The Life of Benito Mussolini*, pp. 165-167 & 201-206; Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, p. 37.

⁷⁷ Fattorini, *Hitler, Mussolini and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech That Was Never Made*, p. 38; Gaetano Salvemini and George LaPiana, *What to Do with Italy* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), p. 74.

2.4.2 The Fascists' Interest in the Vatican

2.4.2.1 Vital Support

From Mussolini's and the Fascists' viewpoint, their interest in the Vatican had been fundamental to their assurance to remain in power. As such, previous governments had fallen due to shortcomings in gaining the support of the majority and their significance. In the minds of Mussolini and his fellow Fascists, the Vatican would be of great significance as their support would aid in garnering the support of the Catholics in Italy.

In doing so, the regime needed to establish itself as the Vatican's favoured option over the other parties. For the PPI, the Fascists' task was made easier due to the existing tensions between the party and the Vatican, as well as Pius XI's disapproval of the party. Added to the party's socialist wing, Pius XI subsequently retracted the Vatican's support of the PPI in 1924 as there was no perceived need for a separate Catholic political party following the former's endorsement of the Fascist regime.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Mussolini assumed the heroic role of easing the Vatican's trepidation in curbing the advancement of socialism and communism in Italy. Though not thoroughly discussed, it can be assumed that Mussolini's transformation in 'embracing' some Catholic traditions into the political contours of Italy had outshined his Liberal opponents. Mussolini had taken the anomalies of the current society as a gesture of tolerating what his foes tried to oppress.

With the Vatican's dying support towards the PPI, their animosity against the socialists and communists, as well as Mussolini's recent acts that defied his fellow Liberals' practices, it seemed to be great timing for the regime to engage with the Vatican, thus building significant support for their governance.

⁷⁸ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 57.

2.4.2.2 Political Prestige and Image

The regime's rapport with the Vatican aided in the build-up of Mussolini's and his regime's reputation, not only to Italian localities but also to international communities. This approach was pertinent in promoting and propagating the tenets of fascism to the world.

It differentiated Mussolini's Fascist regime from Italian statesmen and international governments. One key target was the publication press. As some sort of irregularity of that time, the regime's ties with the Vatican would tend to attract the attention of a myriad of local and foreign press. With such publicity, it inadvertently elevated the reputation of the Fascists and their principles, thus appealing to the public.

On the other hand, much credit was needed to be given to Pius XI in promoting the Duce's government. As the Pope was the figurehead of the Roman Catholic Church, Catholics all over the world would accept his judgment and decrees. Hence, when Pius XI supported and endorsed Mussolini's government, many Catholics all over the world followed his lead and hailed them. One clear example can be seen when he bestowed Mussolini as the 'Man of Providence' in December 1926, the Catholics began to recognise the Duce and his regime as god's gift to the world.⁷⁹ Even if some of them had their doubts, they would rather keep silent than turn their backs against their supreme pontiff.

As a result of the establishment of local international prestige, it affected the international perception towards the Fascists whilst enabling its penetration within other international communities. In consequence, fascism had been widespread in other parts of the world, predominantly in Europe. Some leaders had been modelled from Mussolini's regime whilst some had incorporated the ideology's principle with other doctrines. One of them was clerical fascism, which was prominent in Europe.

⁷⁹ Salvemini and LaPiana, *What to Do with Italy*, p. 81.

2.4.2.3 Reconstruction of Rome

Besides that, the Fascists' and Mussolini's interest was also due to their intent to reconstruct and transform Rome. Yet, this factor would only materialise after 1929 – following the signing of the Lateran Accords.

Mussolini aimed to reconstruct Rome to 'restore the grandeur of the Roman Empire' through various development projects. He detailed the beauty of Rome and its significance in his first speech in Parliament in 1921. However, to reconstruct the holy city, cooperation and agreements with the Vatican were crucial. Otherwise, Mussolini and his regime would face condemnation, potentially contributing to their downfall. As a result, he propagated the idea "to correct the stark Modernism of the views which he had expressed on the origin of Christianity by finding a place for Providence in the mission of the Roman Empire".⁸⁰

Through a cordial relationship, the regime could cooperate with the Vatican in restructuring – or revamping – Rome. Subsequently, matters favoured Mussolini, with development projects conducted in Rome in the 1930s. Yet, was that the end of the story? The motivations for reconstructing Rome seemed to be much 'deeper' than Pope Pius and the Vatican had anticipated. Subjected to the idea of 'restoring the Roman Empire,' Mussolini ventured to restore the ancient ruins of Rome, involving archaeological excavations.⁸¹ In other words, monuments in Rome would be tampered with if such projects were to take place. Eventually, this would threaten the relationship later. Nonetheless, the Fascists' and Mussolini's interest in pursuing a relationship with the Vatican stemmed from their intent to reconstruct Rome.

⁸⁰ Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 213.

⁸¹ Baxa, "A Pagan Landscape: Pope Pius XI, Fascism, and the Struggle over the Roman Cityscape," p. 113.

2.5 FIRST CONTACT

Under the suggestion of some Vatican officials, a secret meeting between Mussolini and Gasparri was held in January 1923 at an apartment in the Palazzo Guglielmi.

The secrecy of the meeting aimed to avoid public attention or speculation; thus, it was proposed to take place in a location hidden from view, facilitated by intermediaries.⁸² During the meeting, both men engaged in friendly conversation, but due to the government's infancy, no major issues were discussed. However, the meeting laid the foundation of the collaboration's future. A key agreement reached by Gasparri and Mussolini was the necessity of a confidential middleman for communications between the Pope and the Duce regarding sensitive matters. Consequently, Pietro Tacchi Venturi was appointed to this role to maintain open lines of communication between the Pope and the Duce.⁸³

Nonetheless, this initial interaction set the stage for the rapprochement between the Vatican and Italy since 1871, shaping the trajectory of church-state relations in the country.

2.6 CONCLUSION

Mussolini's drastic embrace of Catholic values convinced the Vatican of his potential as a protector of both the Church and Italian society. In turn, the regime viewed the Vatican and the Pope as crucial to solidifying its political position, both locally and globally.

The decline in Catholic support – resulting from the confiscation of economic privileges, mistreatment of clergy, and the unresolved Roman Question – had tarnished the political image of previous governments. These historical issues shaped the objectives behind the establishment of their relationship. Although their goals diverged, they were all intricately linked to the Roman Question. Resolving this issue would not only enhance the

⁸² Ceci, *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, p. 85. The location was chosen due to its two entrances which were convenient as the two could enter the building through different entrances to avoid any attention of journalists or others.

⁸³ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 53.

image of fascism and elevate the regime's political status, but also secure the support of the majority. Meanwhile, the Vatican aimed to restore its influence, reclaim its privileges, and safeguard society against harmful ideologies.

Ultimately, the interplay between Mussolini's ambitions and the Vatican's aspirations illustrates the complex dynamics of power, faith, and politics in Italy during this tumultuous period, demonstrating that the pursuit of political legitimacy can often lead to unexpected alliances that challenges the very principles that politicians claim to uphold.



CHAPTER THREE

PROGRESS IN THE 1920S: THE LATERAN ACCORDS, STRUGGLES, AND RESPONSES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

To fulfil the objective of analysing the development of the relationship before the Lateran Accords, this chapter's main principle was to highlight the early development of the relationship following the secret meeting in 1923. This included a survey on the early policies of Mussolini's government and the Vatican that were closely related to the relationship leading up to the Lateran Accords in 1929. Furthermore, this chapter will delve into the conflicts in the relationship during the 1920s and examine internal and external responses towards the Vatican's ties with the regime. This chapter is significant in illustrating the early contributions from both sides in maintaining good rapport and each contribution came with its outcomes in the form of conflicts and reactions.

The 1923 confidential meeting between Mussolini and Gasparri marked the first contact in the history of the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist regime in Italy. In the 1920s, the relationship had developed on a positive note. Mussolini's regime kept its word by implementing many religious policies to appease their sacerdotal ally. In return, the Vatican continued to hail the government with its support even during times of crisis, notably amidst the Matteotti Crisis in 1924. The alliance was at its peak when the Lateran Accords (*Patti Lateranensi*) were signed in 1929, settling the long-awaited Roman Question. However, the relationship had faced some challenges which halted the accords' drafting. Although the conflicts had been worked out, they affected the resonance of the relationship. Moreover, the evolution of the relationship garnered a range of reactions, which in turn influenced the Vatican's and regime's relations with other groups and parties.

3.2 EARLY COMPROMISE

3.2.1 Religious-Related Policies

Right after Gasparri's confidential meeting with Mussolini, policies had been implemented as a cushion for the Church's interest. Amongst them were regulations protecting the sanctity of the Church and the Pope. Newspaper editors who published blasphemous content against the Vatican and the Pope in their editorials could now be terminated due to new legislations.⁸⁴ Therefore, any anti-church or anti-clerical written pieces would be suppressed.

From the economic aspect, several economic initiatives had been implemented by the regime since before Mussolini's secret meeting with Gasparri. In late 1922, the regime had succeeded in rescuing the Bank of Rome (*Banca di Roma*), Italy's largest Catholic bank from a financial collapse. As a vital centre of the Catholic banking system, the bank played a major role in the finances of the Vatican as it held a large portion of the Vatican's deposits.⁸⁵ Hence, this signified the significance of the bank to the Vatican. As part of their rescue mission, the regime revalued the lira and created the *Istituto Centrale di Credito* as a controlling body to supervise all surviving Catholic banks, including the Bank of Rome.⁸⁶ After the confidential meeting, more economic policies in favour of the Roman Catholic Church were enforced. Subsidies and allowances had been granted by the Italian government. Between 1924 and 1925, Mussolini's government differed from the practice of his predecessors by approving subsidies to churches in annexed territories and funds to reconstruct those that were ruined by the war, as well as allowances to Italian clergies.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 63.

⁸⁵ Martin Blinkhorn (ed), *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Oxon: Routledge, 2001), p. 39. Following the collapse of the Banca Italiana di Sconto, Italy was hit with a bank crisis that affected many local banks including the Bank of Rome. For more information on the collapse of the *Banca Italiana di Sconto*, see Piero Sraffa, "The Bank Crisis in Italy," *The Economic Journal* 32, no. 126 (June 1922): pp. 178-197.

⁸⁶ Blinkhorn (ed), *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe*, pp. 39 & 45.

⁸⁷ Albert Zarka, *Mussolini: An Intimate Biography by His Widow, Rachele Mussolini* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1974), p. 126; Ceci, *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, p. 82.

Some social policies had also been altered to conform to the Vatican's ideals and teachings. Amongst others, the Italian education system had been the primary goal. In elementary schools, instructions on the displays and hanging of crucifixes in classrooms were reinstated whilst mandatory religious instruction through catechism and examinations of Catholic schools had been accredited as to those in the public school system.⁸⁸ These policies were ratified in 1923 through the Gentile Reform (*Riforma Gentile*) architected by the Minister of Education, Giovanni Gentile. Changes were also made at the tertiary level. In October 1924, the University of the Sacred Heart in Milan was officially recognised by the government as a national university – accrediting the degrees of its students.⁸⁹ As Catholic representation was enhanced in the Italian education system, these policies additionally recognised the system of Catholic schools and universities, thus increasing their students' opportunities and competition with students of other Italian schools.

Furthermore, familial values had been another social subject of the integration of Roman Catholic tenets into the government's policies. Since 1923, the regime had aligned itself with the Roman Catholic's contempt against the issue of divorce. Besides being widely critical of the issue, the regime forced non-Catholics to conform to their opposition by abolishing the divorce rights of non-Catholics in the annexed territories.⁹⁰ Most controversial was the regime's ban against birth control, though condoms were permitted. From the regime's viewpoint, the ban was aimed at generating the nation's birth rate but coincided with the Church's views against birth control.⁹¹ Such efforts were also part of the regime's initiative to promote family life and increase the birth rate in Italy.

The regime's endorsement had added to the grandiose of Catholic festivities and rituals. On Christmas Eve of 1924, Pius XI launched the Holy Year which was celebrated throughout the next year. The year was initiated with the ceremony of opening the holy door of St. Peter's Cathedral, which was followed by a procession or public parade through

⁸⁸ Richard J. Wolff, "Catholicism, Fascism and Italian Education from the Riforma Gentile to the Carta Della Scuola 1922-1939," *History of Education Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1980): p. 6.

⁸⁹ Robert Sencourt, "The New Position of the Vatican," *The Atlantic Monthly* 143, no.6 (June 1929): p. 821.

⁹⁰ Clark, *Mussolini: Profiles in Power*, p. 52; Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, p. 43.

⁹¹ Clark, *Mussolini: Profiles in Power*, p. 134. As an initiative to promote married life, a tax was imposed on bachelors aged 25 and over, except religious orders and women.

the streets of Rome to other basilicas.⁹² On the regime's part, day trip tickets were supplied inclusive of free railway trips to some of Italy's notable holy venues whilst the authorities were assigned to oversee the smoothness and security of the celebrations.⁹³ Since then, Catholic celebrations and ceremonies were no longer restricted and were held on a large scale with massive crowds and displays of religious banners and symbols. This indicated the expansion of the Roman Catholic Church's freedom of worship as opposed to the restrictions by past governments.

Religious holidays were recognised and added to Italy's civil calendar as national holidays. Since 1923, several decrees were enacted to recognise religious feasts and saints' commemoration as public holidays.⁹⁴ Still, some holidays needed to meet certain requirements as determined by Mussolini. Commemoration of saints had to fulfil a certain required level of sainthood and 'Italianness'.⁹⁵

It seemed that the regime's early policies designated for the benefit of the Vatican had encompassed various angles. These policies manifested the Vatican's motivation towards the relationship. As such, the legal policies had provided the security that the Vatican had sought whilst the economic privileges were secured through the regime's economic reforms. More significantly, the educational blueprint from the Gentile Reform and the regime's advocacy of familial values had largely fulfilled the goal of societal reconstruction and restoration of Catholic elements within the Italian masses. Yet, some of these policies were questionable as to whether it was designed to benefit the Church or if it was coincidental.

⁹² "Thousands Attend Ceremony Marking Holy Year Opening," *The Evening Star* (Washington DC, United States), December 24, 1924, pp. 1 & 3. The processions outside of the basilicas were an ancient tradition that had not been done since 1900. As part of the Vatican's isolation from Italy, the processions were only conducted within the compounds of the basilicas. The processions were divided into three groups that would march to three different locations; from the Church of San Vito to the holy door of Santa Maria Maggiore; from the Scala Santa to the holy door of Archbasilica of St. John Lateran; and around the compound of the Papal Basilica of Saint Paul Outside the Walls, from the vestry to portico of the basilica. At the end of each location, the holy doors of the basilicas would be opened as part of the Holy Year's launch ceremony. "Vatican to Revive Ancient Ceremony: Opening of Holy Doors to Be Proceeded by Processions in Roman Streets," *The Sunday Star* (Washington DC, United States), December 21, 1924, p. 20.

⁹³ Sencourt, "The New Position of the Vatican," p. 821.

⁹⁴ Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 141.

⁹⁵ Ceci, *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, pp. 107-108.

3.2.2 Political Support and Reputation Building

In turn, the policies and reforms favourable to the Vatican had enhanced its political backing of the Fascist regime. Despite his success in forming a government, Mussolini's administration was still vulnerable, especially due to the large presence of the socialists and PPI in the political sphere of Italy. Hence, the Vatican's support was crucial for the regime to remain in power.

One notable example of the vitality of the Vatican's support was during the Matteotti Crisis in 1924. When socialist politician, Giacomo Matteotti was kidnapped and killed by a group of Fascists in June 1924, Mussolini had come under fire from the locals and international platform.⁹⁶ The Socialists were outraged due to speculation of Mussolini's involvement and attempt to free the murderers from any criminal charges; the Italian public protested due to Mussolini's inability to claim responsibility; whilst the Fascists were angered over the lack of protection for their fellow Fascists.⁹⁷ The only place Mussolini could depend on for support was the Vatican, which had vigorously attempted to regain the public confidence over the Fascist regime. The Vatican's newspaper, *Civiltà Cattolica* brushed off the speculation of Mussolini's ties with murder whilst showering the regime with words of gratitude for their contribution towards the Church in which the paper implored Italians to support the regime to sustain peace.⁹⁸ Although Mussolini was able to escape the crisis on his own doing, the Vatican's support was crucial in ensuring his grip on power. The Vatican's active role in denying the accusations as well as its constant call

⁹⁶ Socialists internationally had rallied against the murder of Matteotti and blamed Fascism for the assassination. Many socialist leaders had heavily criticised Mussolini as a result. The Labor Party in Britain had passed a resolution that criticised the murder and Mussolini's administration. Foreign socialist press such as Chicago's *The Daily Worker* had extensively published various articles to expose the Fascist regime's corruption with Matteotti's murder. "Swiss Socialists Rally," *The Sunday Star* (Washington DC, United States), June 22, 1924, p.11; The National Archives of the UK (TNA), CAB 23/48/13, p. 18.

⁹⁷ Some politicians, particularly the socialists had speculated about the Duce's involvement in the kidnapping and murder. Before his death, Matteotti had been outspoken in his criticism against Mussolini's administration. In his pamphlet, "One Year of Fascism," Matteotti accused the regime of using a large sum of unauthorised funds from the Italian treasury. Just weeks before his abduction and murder, Matteotti also denounced the Fascists before the parliament for their voter intimidation. Also, the connection between the leader of murderers and Mussolini's press secretary and close henchmen fuelled speculation of Mussolini's involvement. "Mussolini Proved Murderer of Matteotti by Documents Published by 'Il Lavoratore'," *The Daily Worker* (Chicago, United States), July 15, 1924, pp. 1 & 3.

⁹⁸ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 75; Jan Nelis, "The Clerical Response to a Totalitarian Political Religion: "La Civiltà Cattolica" and Italian Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no.2 (April 2011): p. 256.

for the people's loyalty towards the regime had contained the discontent to some extent. This was largely due to the Catholics' loyalty to the Vatican.

The relationship's evolution had also positively impacted the reputation of the regime. Especially after the Holy Year, a new form of respect had been given to Mussolini and his government for their tolerance towards the Catholic practices in modern Europe where many leaders had attempted to isolate and push away religion from the societal pattern. The Pope's address in December 1925 added more to the regime's advantage. In an allocution before the College of Cardinals, Pius XI praised and expressed his gratitude towards the Fascist regime and authorities for their assistance in the organisation of the Holy Year.⁹⁹ The Pope's recognition once more brought attention to the government, enhancing its image on an international scale.

Even so, Fascist violence had been widespread all around Italy in the background of 1925, with local Catholic institutions and centres as the principal subjects of these scrutinies. However, the media was more interested and invested in the Holy Year than the issue itself. Between 1926 and 1928, a series of unofficial meetings and discussions were underway to resolve the Roman Question and officiate the reconciliation between Italy and the Vatican. The Vatican was represented by experienced Consistorial lawyer, Francesco Pacelli, while Professor Domenico Barone, Councillor of State and Member of the Disciplinary Council of the Fascist Party represented the government.¹⁰⁰ Still, the violence against the Catholics had caught up with the regime and caused major conflicts in its relationship with the Vatican, thus disrupting the negotiation process of the settlement. Another conflict that surrounded the dispute was over the Italian youth groups.

⁹⁹ "No Settlement of Roman Question," *The Catholic Telegraph* (Cincinnati, United States), December 17, 1925, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Miriam M. Binder, "Italy and the Vatican: From the Close of the World War to the Lateran Treaties of 1929," (Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1930), p. 39, <http://210.48.222.80/pqdtglobal1/proxy.pac/dissertations-theses/italy-vatican-close-world-war-lateran-treaties/docview/1644868504/sem-2?accountid=44024>. Francesco Pacelli was the older brother of Eugenio Pacelli, the future Pope Pius XII who would replace Pius XI in 1939.

3.3 CONFLICTS ALONG THE WAY

3.3.1 Fascist Violence

Since 1920, Fascist violence had been sporadic throughout Italy with Catholic institutions and centres becoming one of its main targets. Yet, the installation of Mussolini's government did not resonate with the blockage of the violence.

Oddly enough, the violence had been continuous during the Holy Year 1925 when many Catholic institutions were subjected to Fascist raids and attacks. Bullet holes punctured through the walls of multiple Catholic centres, with its furniture, pictures of holy figures, and crucifixes destroyed by fire or vandalism.¹⁰¹ At that time, the Vatican's official newspaper, *Osservatore Romano* had published a series of articles documenting the violence as part of their retaliation. Though it did not deplore the government specifically, it mentioned that "...in civilized societies, law and not mob violence should rule," dropping subtle jabs at the Fascist regime.¹⁰²

By 1926, Mussolini's administration began to feel the heat over the issue as pressure from the Vatican piled up. Pius XI himself felt the need to push Mussolini to live up to his image as their only capable protector. On 4th November, he sent Francesco Pacelli to warn Mussolini of the possible endangerment of the negotiations if the violence on Catholic institutions was prolonged whilst a letter from the Vatican's emissary, Tacchi-Venturi had proposed for Mussolini to deplore the violence during the meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism the next day.¹⁰³ The Duce yet again found himself caught between two disparate sides: the Vatican and the Fascist belligerents. His obstinate stance to oblige to the Vatican's suggestions did more damage to the issue and the relationship. During the meeting, Mussolini urged for an end to the widespread Fascist violence in Italy but chose

¹⁰¹ As quoted in "Catholic Clubs Raided: Fascist Mobs Wreck Furniture, Newspapers are Threatened," *The Evening Star* (Washington DC, United States), p. 1.

¹⁰² "Foes of Fascists Driven to Exile: Vatican Organ Protests," *The Evening Star* (Washington DC, United States), August 12, 1925, p. 28. The Vatican press reported on the violence but was never condemnatory. Even if the editors had any intentions to condemn the regime or Mussolini, such an editorial would need to be approved by the Pope beforehand.

¹⁰³ Albert C. O'Brien, "Benito Mussolini, Catholic Youth, and the Origins of the Lateran Treaties," *Journal of Church and State* 23, no.1 (1981): p. 119.

to not mention Catholic centres as one of the main targets of the violence.¹⁰⁴ This was a pivotal point in realising Mussolini's lack of power to control the entirety of the Fascists in Italy. Although he genuinely desired to end the aggression against the Catholics, he did not possess a strong grip over the Fascists to quell their hatred against the Church.

However, the Duce did attempt to salvage the situation through other means. On his part, he contacted the President of the Catholic Action – one of the violence-targeted Catholic institutions via telegram to denounce the attacks on the Catholics, while *Il Popolo d'Italia* demanded the discipline of the Fascists in an editorial on 7th November 1926.¹⁰⁵ A few days later, the government issued for all prefects to suppress the attacks conducted by the Fascist belligerents.¹⁰⁶ However, the order proved to be fruitless due to Mussolini's lack of authority over the Fascists outside of his domain. Yet, the Vatican failed to grasp such a fact. With the negotiations in great progress, the Pope had used the negotiations to unsettle Mussolini through threats of the Vatican's withdrawal. As a result, representatives of the negotiations had unintentionally involved themselves in the conflict. Pacelli would pass along the Pope's threats to Barone, who would then relay the information to Mussolini, who would deliver a message to Pacelli through Barone.¹⁰⁷

A few weeks after the first complaint and resistance from the Church, the regime eventually obliged their requests. As they could not afford to lose their support, the regime was intent on remaining in the Vatican's favour. Fulfilling the Vatican's initial advice, Mussolini had openly criticised the attacks before the Council of Ministers on 6th December to which he mentioned, "No less condemnable are certain sporadic acts of violence committed against buildings intended for Catholic worship or against priests of the Roman Catholic Church, to which fascism has shown and must always show the greatest respect".¹⁰⁸ Action had also been taken on the prefecture level, though it had been indirectly due to the attacks were against the Catholics. Investigations on the attacks had been conducted whilst consultations between Mussolini and the prefects were held to ensure that

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 120.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ For more information, refer to pp. 120 – 121.

¹⁰⁸ Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel (eds.), *Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini*, vol. XXII (Firenze: La Fenice, 1957), p. 273. This was just a rough translation from the original Italian text.

law and order were restored.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, these measures are considered temporary since the Fascist violence and anticlericalism persisted up to the 1930s.

However, tensions in the friendship between the Vatican and Mussolini's government seemed to have been temporarily eased. The conflict highlighted Mussolini's lack of authority over the Fascists and the Vatican's insistence on his protector role. In the eyes of the Vatican, Mussolini had the authority to control the Fascists, which could shield them and the Catholics, but it was just a false display to gain their trust and support.

3.3.2 Disputes over Youth Groups and Organisations

Alongside navigating a solution to the violence against the Catholics and negotiating a settlement, the Vatican and Mussolini's regime were also embroiled in another conflict concerning youth groups and organisations. Upon coming into power, Mussolini was deeply invested in shaping the youth of Italy to create a new wave of Fascists, ensuring the longevity of the presence and impact of fascism in Italy, as well as preserving his legacy.¹¹⁰ Italian youths from all backgrounds and demographics were included in the regime's agenda.

Between 1923 and 1926, multiple Fascist youth societies and organisations were created all over Italy. On 3rd April 1926, a law was enacted to create a juvenile branch of the Fascist military organisation known as the National Fascist Youth Organisation or *Opera Nazionale Balilla* (ONB), consolidating all Fascist youth groups and societies.¹¹¹ However, as Mussolini's government had aimed for dominance over all Italian youths, their cause was challenged by Catholic youth societies and organisations, with some operating directly under the Vatican. The Catholic groups and associations, already victims of Fascist

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 271. There was neither any mention of the Catholics nor the Church in the article of *Il Popolo d'Italia* which updated on the current situation. Instead, the article focused on the initiatives as efforts to restore peace and block any violence after Mussolini's assassination attempt on 31st October 1927.

¹¹⁰ Since the beginning of his political career, Mussolini had been a staunch advocate for the youth's role in the nation-building of Italy. He acknowledged them as 'the flower of Italy'. "Mussolini Tells Why He Forced Out Cabinet in Italy: Movement of Youth, He Says, for Salvation of Nation Through Discipline," *The Evening World* (New York, United States), October 27, 1922, p. 2.

¹¹¹ Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 410.

aggression, were now at risk of the regime's efforts to dominate and indoctrinate the Italian youths.

In the following months, the regime intended to shadow the Catholic organisations' activities, to rival them and attract Catholic youths. The April 1926 law enforced the employment of chaplains and the existence of religious instructions as one of the organs of the ONB.¹¹² For that reason, the Fascist press had undermined the Catholic youth groups as unnecessary.¹¹³ In the next year, the regime manipulated the dissolution of the Catholic youth groups through their policies. New clauses enacted on 12th January 1927 regulated any youth societies and organisations in towns with a population under 20,000 to be abolished, resulting in Pius XI decreeing for the dissolution of Catholic Boy Scout organisations under such circumstances.¹¹⁴

Taking advantage of the Pope's yielding, the regime proceeded to monopolise sporting and athletic institutions, thus furthering more restrictions on the surviving youth associations. Enforced under the ONB decree, sports and athletic activities of youth societies and organisations were only permitted for the organs of the ONB and subsequently, it resulted in the suspension of the Federation of Italian Catholic sports associations.¹¹⁵ This was a display of the regime's monopoly and claim of exclusivity to secure their dominance. Yet, this particular action had led to the retaliation of Pius XI at the expense of the negotiations. After many threats from their side, the Vatican eventually suspended the negotiations from June 1927 to January 1928. In his Christmas Allocution 1927, Pius XI mentioned his concerns about the closure of numerous Catholic youth societies and associations which had no guarantee to be reopened.¹¹⁶ This indicated the loss of confidence of the Pope towards Mussolini and his regime to salvage the Catholic youth associations.

¹¹² Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 145.

¹¹³ Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 414.

¹¹⁴ "Catholic Scouts Limited by Pope: Boys' Groups in Cities Under 20,000 Disbanded by Papal Decree," *The Evening Star* (Washington D.C., United States), January 25, 1927, p. 24. The clause was a new addition to the April 1926 law. The Pope's decree was due to his insistence to abolish the Catholic Boy Scouts under his order rather than the government's law.

¹¹⁵ Ceci, *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, p. 123.

¹¹⁶ "Pope Surveys the Year 1927: Italy," *The Catholic Telegraph* (Cincinnati, United States), December 29, 1927, p. 5.

Surviving groups, such as the Catholic Action (*Azione Cattolica*) were able to operate but on the condition of a religious organisation. It can be suggested that the regime was hopeful to absorb the memberships from the dissolved societies as it would be the only choice available for youths in such towns. It can be asserted that it was not a question of unnecessary rivalry but rather of monopolising the youth groups and organisations in Italy. However, the ONB decree had worked against the regime. After the dissolution of the Catholic Boy Scouts, many of its members joined the Vatican's main youth organisation, the Catholic Action, thus elevating its strength and influence as a youth organisation.¹¹⁷ The Catholic Action's inclusion of sports activities had increased its popularity in 1928, much to the regime's chagrin. After the Fascist press had criticised the organisation for functioning beyond the regulations, the government had issued for the disbandment of any organisations or groups promoting education for professional, artistic, and vocational preparation, as well as the education of physical, moral, and spiritual development of the youths.¹¹⁸ In other words, no youth associations, other than the ONB, were permitted to operate.

Just a few months after the negotiations' resumption, Pius XI suspended the negotiations for a second time between April to May 1928. However, this time, the Pope was resolute in his decision to suspend the negotiations definitively. Through the Pope's emissary, Mussolini had agreed to exempt the surviving Catholic youth organisations from the decree, and in return, the Pope would resume the negotiations.¹¹⁹ In addition, a special clause in the Lateran Accords had been designed for the Catholic Action and its close associating groups. Article 43 of the concordat of the Lateran Accords stated Italy's recognition of the Catholic Action and its organs on the condition that they adhered to the Vatican's directives and functioned as an apolitical organisation.¹²⁰ The Pope kept his word and resumed the negotiations.

¹¹⁷ Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 416.

¹¹⁸ Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel (eds.), *Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini*, vol. XXIII (Firenze: La Fenice, 1957), p. 131. This is a rough translation from the original text. Prefects were instructed to close all non-ONB associations within thirty days from the day the order was decreed on 30th March 1928.

¹¹⁹ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 46.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 214.

Evidently, the dispute between the Vatican and Mussolini's Fascist government over the youth groups had caused major problems in their relationship. More significantly, it threatened the negotiations for the settlement of the Roman Question. The negotiations were on the brink of suspension due to the aggression towards the Catholics and its institutions, but the closure of Catholic youth associations prompted Pius XI to ultimately halt the negotiations. Although an agreement had been made to resolve both conflicts, the solutions were just temporary. During the 1930s, Fascist attacks on the Catholics and their centres were ongoing, whilst conflicts regarding the Catholic Action persisted.¹²¹

3.4 LATERAN ACCORDS

3.4.1 Final Procedures Leading to 11th February 1929

As the two conflicts had been ironed out, both sides had full concentration on the negotiations which had been stalled multiple times. From August 1926, preparations had been in progress with a series of unofficial meetings and discussions with representatives from the Vatican, and from the regime, Professor Domenico Barone.¹²² The negotiations were done in full secrecy, though rumours of a potential agreement between the Vatican and Mussolini's government had spread even overseas.

In the final months of 1928, the negotiations were at their final stages and the necessary documents for the Roman Question were signed on 22nd November. Hence, arrangements for an official signing of the papers were formulated, beginning with the appointment of delegates and sub-delegates from both parties. Pope Pius XI had delegated

¹²¹ In the 1930s, Mussolini and his regime continued their campaign against the remaining Catholic societies, specifically the Catholic Action, due to the accusation of the organisation's political involvement, which violated the terms of the Lateran Accords.

¹²² Both men were quite reputable in their respective careers. Representing the Vatican, Pacelli was known for his legal expertise in ecclesial affairs and knowledge of the Roman Question. With his experience in handling matters related to the Bank of Rome, he was well-suited to tackle the financial dimension of the negotiations. Also with a law background, Barone had climbed the ranks from his position in the Ministry of Justice to State Councillor in 1926 – the highest position in the Italian civil service. His experience in the religious affairs department during his time in the Ministry of Justice had proved to be requisite in the negotiation process. Binder, "Italy and the Vatican: From the Close of the World War to the Lateran Treaties of 1929," p. 39; Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 42.

Cardinal Gasparri, with the power to sub-delegate Pacelli and Monsignor Francesco Borgongini-Duca, while King Emmanuel III delegated Mussolini, with the power to sub-delegate Barone.¹²³ However, due to Barone's untimely death on 4th January 1929, Mussolini had assumed his role to complete the negotiations.

Before the day of the signing, Vatican officials were informed of the negotiations. However, some had been sent elsewhere under the pretence of international affairs to avoid any unwanted opposition as the eventful day was approaching.¹²⁴ Ambassadors of Italy and the Vatican were only informed on 7th February 1929, just a few days before the official signing.¹²⁵ Other Fascist officials, on the other hand, were not informed of the negotiations, which meant they were only aware after the document was signed and through the media. Only a handful were aware of the news. Like Pius XI, this was Mussolini's attempt to avoid any unwanted opposition as he was greatly aware of the potential strong opposition from his fellow Fascists, especially due to the strong anti-clerical in the majority. As such, it can be inferred that both sides had anticipated opposition from their parties that could present a major obstacle to the settlement.

On the morning of 11th February 1929, Mussolini, accompanied by Dino Grandi, his undersecretary of foreign affairs, headed to the Lateran Palace where they were greeted by Gasparri and Borgongini-Duca. They later proceeded to the Hall of the Popes, where the signing was scheduled to take place. The signed document would later be known as the Lateran Accords, named after the palace in which it was signed. From that moment onward, the 11th of February 1929 was designated as the official date of the reconciliation of Italy and the Vatican, as well as for the resolution of the Roman Question. Moreover, the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist regime reached its climax on that significant day.

¹²³ Binder, "Italy and the Vatican: From the Close of the World War to the Lateran Treaties of 1929," pp. 40-41. Borgongini-Duca had joined the negotiations during the drafting of the concordats. As for the role of the Italian monarchy, the government had consulted with the king regarding territorial issues from the negotiations. It is safe to say that the involvement of Emmanuel III caused some problems due to his hesitance and anxiety to let go of some parts of his kingdom to fulfil the territorial demands of the papacy. John Whittam, *Fascist Italy* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 77.

¹²⁴ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 103.

¹²⁵ Seldes, *Sawdust Caesar: The Untold History of Mussolini and Fascism*, p. 250; Ibid, p. 106.

Photo 1: The signing of the Lateran Accords on 11th February 1929



From left to right: Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzardo, Monsignor Francesco Borgongini-Duca, Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, Francesco Pacelli, Benito Mussolini, and Dino Grandi

Source: Vatican Digital Library

Photo 2: Photography session at the halls of the Palace of the Holy Office of the Inquisition



Source: University of Michigan Library Digital Collection¹²⁶

¹²⁶ “Mussolini and Gasparri,” In the digital collection Art, Architecture and Engineering Library, Lantern Slide Collection, <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/u/ummu2ic/x-ls013005/ls013005>, University of Michigan Library Digital Collections, accessed April 29, 2024.

3.4.2 Significance of the Accords

The accords consisted of three parts; the treaty which comprised of 27 articles; the concordats comprised of 45 articles; and the financial convention.¹²⁷

The accords, in its core, was a resolution of the Roman Question, which restored the sovereignty of the papacy. In its fine print, the Italian monarch and State declared their recognition of the Vatican's autonomy position, and in turn, the Vatican recognised the Kingdom of Italy as a legitimate state, repairing decades of animosity which the Law of Guarantees 1871 had failed to achieve. Reiterating Article 1 of the 1871 agreement, the accords acknowledged the Pope as "sacred and inviolable", and it sought to protect the sanctity of the Supreme Pontiff through the Italian State's law. Equivalent to crimes of incitement against the King, blasphemy against the Pope is punishable with similar penalties. Similarly, ecclesiastic characters and symbols are protected by the Italian law. Impersonation of religious orders and misuse of ecclesiastic uniform equally punishable as abuse of military uniform.

Accordingly, sovereign prerogative of Royal patronage over ecclesiastical members was abolished and non-interference clauses are repeatedly stressed, in fulfilment of the Italian State's recognition. Article 11 of the treaty stated that Italy must not interfere in the administrative affairs of the Church's central bodies. This principle is further elaborated in later clauses, such as Article 39 of the concordat, which prohibits interference by Italian scholastic authorities in matters concerning Catholic universities, seminaries, colleges, and other Catholic training institutions. Additionally, Article 19 of the concordat specifies that the selection of archbishops, bishops, and coadjutor fell under the sole jurisdiction of the Vatican; however, the Vatican must communicate the name of the appointed individual to the Italian Government to avoid any political objections.

As the Italian State was constituted to a non-interference law in the Vatican's internal affairs, there were hints of urging the Vatican to detach itself from politics. Article 43 of the concordat prohibited any religious orders from attaining memberships of any political party, even the PNF. This conveyed the regime's cautionary step of confining the

¹²⁷ For the full translation of Lateran Accords, see Appendix I.

political dissent of the Church and containing the influence of the PPI that lingered within the Italian masses, despite its dissolution in 1926. Article 19 of the concordat also suggested the same issue, ensuring the ecclesiastical appointments did not carry any potential influence or alignment with political affairs. Moreover, Vatican organs, specifically the Catholic Action was of apolitical function. Even so, the said article would take part in another conflict between the Vatican and Mussolini's regime in the early 1930s when an order of dissolution of the Catholic Action was issued after the organisation conducted various socio-economic campaigns. Article 29 (d) of the concordat declared that religious institutions were only for religious purposes.

To further its reconciliation, financial relations between Italy and the Church were also repaired, consequently rebuilding the financial stability of the Vatican. After the financial rescue mission of Banca di Roma in 1922 and allocation of subsidies, compensation for losses in 1870 was also stated in the Financial Convention (Annex IV of the treaty), in forms of cash and bonds. Outside of the Financial Convention, allocation of funds from the State's budget were also provided for administration and development. Infrastructure construction projects were to be undertaken by the Italian State within the Vatican's domain, as outlined in Article 6 of the treaty.

Geographical domains of the Vatican were defined thoroughly in the accords, thus creating an autonomous holy state, the Vatican City (Città del Vaticano). Other than compensation, territories restored and returned to the authority of the Vatican were outlined in Annex I-III of the treaty.

Privileges and immunities were provided to the Vatican, signifying its exclusivity and sacerdotal status. Taxation burden imposed by previous laws targeting the Vatican and its entities was abolished while some common taxes are exempted, namely income tax and customs duties (Article 17 and 20 of the treaty). Those in service of the Church, either major or minor, are exempted from civic duties, primarily military service, and jury duties. The Vatican is excluded from certain Italian laws, notably the ban on non-Fascist youth associations. The Catholic Action and its affiliates are legalised and recognised after getting caught in between a conflict in the relationship over the youth associations. The regulation prior to the accords required the Catholic Action to only operate as a religious organization,

which resulted in a dissolution order a few months later after the regime's thorough assessment deemed its activities as unlawful. In contrast, the accords did not impose a specific function on the organisation but mentioned for it to disengage from any political party.

Moreover, the accords established the position of the Catholic religion as the sole religion of Italy. Article 1 of the treaty aided in the revival of the Catholic identity within the societal landscape of Italy, and in that capacity, it established exclusivity over other religions. Following the Gentile Reform, which mandated Catholic instruction in state elementary schools, state secondary schools in Italy also adopted this requirement as outlined in Article 36 of the concordat. Simultaneously, the Roman Catholic Church was granted the freedom to disseminate its teachings through media and publications. By this time, the Vatican had leveraged its partnership with the Italian Fascist regime in its campaign against what it deemed "corrupt religions." In the 1930s, the Church invoked the clauses of the Lateran Accords to restrict the activities and propagation of those religions. This indicated that the accords revived the Catholic identity of the Italian society at the expense of religious pluralism.

On the regime's part, the Italian identity was tied with the Catholic religion to some degree. Similar to the foundation of the exclusivity of the Catholic religion, the accords subtly drew a line between the Italians and non-Italians in the Italian State. In this context, Italian nationality and residency were primary requirements for religious orders in Italy whilst only Italian religious orders are recognised by the State. Non-Italian nationals are not to be appointed to any ecclesiastical offices and the Italian language was the only medium of congregation or practice as stated in Article 22 of the concordat. In light of this, annexed territories predominantly populated by non-Italophone were forced into congregations in the Italian language, rather than their mother tongue. This was aligned to the Italianisation policy of annexed territories which was ongoing even before the Fascist government came to power.

On 25th May 1929, the Lateran Accords was approved by the Italian Senate and later ratified on June 7th. Even so, the Italians were divided in their response to the accords. Foreign countries had mixed reactions as well.

3.5 REACTIONS AND RECEPTIONS

3.5.1 The Vatican

Some members of the Church also expressed their support for the relationship. One obvious example would be Cardinal Gasparri, who had been pushing for conciliatory policies to resolve the Roman Question. As for his rival, Cardinal Rafael Merry del Val, he had occasionally displayed gratitude towards Mussolini's regime. During the peak of the celebration of St. Francis of Assisi Day on 4th October 1926, Merry del Val expressed his appreciation to those involved. His address can be described as follows:

In his address, the cardinal legate, Merry del Val, thanked the local administration for the cordial reception it had given him, said some kind words about the political officials who had cooperated in the celebration, and then spoke of Mussolini as "him who holds the reins of the Italian government, and who with a clear grasp of the real state of things continues in the resolve that religion be respected, honored, and practiced. Visibly protected by God, he has raised again the fortunes of the nation by his wisdom, increasing its prestige before the whole world."¹²⁸

Even so, his critique of the Lateran Accords demonstrated his continuous disapproval of the Vatican's conciliatory approach.

Another strong opposition to the Lateran Accords was from Cardinal Bonaventura Cerretti, one of the Vatican's representatives who had met Vittorio Orlando in Paris to discuss a potential settlement of the Roman Question back in 1919. However, his opposition to the accords was rooted in his hostilities against the Fascist regime, which extended to his opposition to their ties with the Vatican. On the week of the signing, Cerretti was sent to Australia as the Pope's legate to the International Eucharistic Congress, making him one of the cardinals sent abroad on 'international matters' to prevent potential resistance.¹²⁹ Critics of the accords had viewed the accords as Pius XI's misstep in signing an imbalance agreement in which the Vatican gained little benefits at a greater expense. Cardinal vicar of Rome, Basilio Pompili stated that, "They gave away Rome, its prestige,

¹²⁸ Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 225.

¹²⁹ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 103 & 128.

its historical importance, its monuments, its churches,” ergo claiming that the accords had only discredited the grandeur of the holy city.¹³⁰ Vatican officials involved in the accords or had early knowledge of it were also subjects of some criticism. Francesco Pacelli, in his role as the Vatican representative in the negotiations, and his brother Eugenio Pacelli – the future successor of Pius XI, were described as ‘servants and slaves of fascism’ that only brought humiliation to the papacy and the Vatican.¹³¹ To contain the opposition, critics within the Vatican sphere were instructed to restrain from any further reproval. Some faced much deeper repercussions than just a warning. Pompili was asked to resign by the Pope due to the former’s refusal to tone down his critique whilst Cerretti was overlooked for the position of the new secretary of state.¹³² Despite this, these criticisms did not affect the accords but the Pope had attempted to suppress much of it to avoid further disrespect to the papacy.

Nevertheless, it was safe to imply that the Lateran Accords had caused a divide within the Vatican sphere. In comparison to the divide during the 1922 conclave, disagreements in the Lateran Accords also stemmed from the officials’ perception of the Fascists.

3.5.2 Fascists Officials

As for the Fascist officials, it had been expected that the major resistance was largely due to the anti-clerical sentiments. On 25th and 26th February 1929, a Fascist Grand Council meeting was held to approve the accords but instead, it was filled with angry speeches and violence.

The most vocal was Roberto Farinacci. During the dispute over youth organisations, the secretary of the PNF urged the regime to stop pleasing the Church by stating, “...in recent times we have pursued an ecclesiastical policy of unnecessary and exaggerated

¹³⁰ As quoted in Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid, p. 149. The future Pope had encouraged his brother to participate in the negotiations which had the critics from the Vatican suspect his role to accords.

¹³² Ibid, p. 128 & 149.

condescension”.¹³³ Several other officials echoed similar complaints on the accords as they viewed Mussolini had yielded to the Vatican. In a telephone conversation, Giuseppe Bottai complained that Mussolini had made excessive concessions to the Vatican, and in his correspondence, Emilio De Bono expressed his concerns about the government’s need to cut back to compensate the fortune given to the Vatican.¹³⁴ The architect of the Gentile Reform, Giovanni Gentile, was also on the opposition side of the Lateran Accords. From his viewpoint, compulsory religious instruction in Italian secondary schools threatened his plan to reform the educational system in which he intended to substitute religion with philosophy.¹³⁵ Furthermore, Dino Grande – who was present during the day of the signing, mentioned that as the Catholic Action was granted permission to operate under the clause of the concordat, it would add more opposition against the regime.¹³⁶ Principally, the Duce’s submission and the possibility of the Vatican making more demands in the future were the main concern of the resistance.

Even so, some Fascist officials were enthusiastic and receptive to the accords between the Vatican and the Italian Fascist regime. Mussolini’s brother and one of the prominent editors of his daily newspaper, *Il Popolo d’Italia*, Arnaldo Mussolini persuaded Mussolini to assume propitiatory approaches towards the Vatican.¹³⁷ A devoted Catholic, Mussolini’s brother had advocated for the state’s reconciliation with the Vatican, thus backing any policies in favour of the Church. In an editorial in *Il Popolo d’Italia* entitled, *Ora del Luce*, published the day after the signing, Arnaldo expressed his enthusiasm towards the Lateran Accords which stated “...we Fascists, as Italian Catholics who were born and educated according to Christian principles, baptised in our churches, which are full of national memories, are transported with joy by resolution of the “Roman Question”.¹³⁸

Opposition within the Fascist officials did little effect. Some, such as Gentile, had conformed to the accords and disassociated themselves from the critics due to their loyalty

¹³³ As quoted in Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 162.

¹³⁴ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 63.

¹³⁵ Alastair Hamilton, *The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism, 1919-1945* (London: Anthony Blond Ltd, 1971), p. 63.

¹³⁶ TNA, FO/800/263/03 (Ronald Graham to Austen Chamberlain), p. 390.

¹³⁷ Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 126.

¹³⁸ As quoted in Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 62.

to the Duce whilst others tended not to display their discord publicly. Thus, none of the party's opponents voiced their rejection when the accords were presented in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the following months. Some did express their reluctance on several clauses of the accords concerning matrimonial law (Art. 34 of the concordat) and the restoration of ecclesiastical property.¹³⁹ However, it did not affect their vote in favour of the accords.

3.5.3 Italy

3.5.3.1 Religious Orders

Some religious orders in Italy had also shown support towards the Duce and the relationship. Beyond doubt, the regime had introduced – or reintroduced, various policies which worked in favour of the Church and the Italian religious orders.

In the 1920s, a survey had been conducted to evaluate the level of support for Mussolini's regime amongst the Italian bishops and archbishops and only 21 out of over 200 of them were indecisive in their allegiance towards Mussolini's regime.¹⁴⁰ This displayed proof that a large fraction of the Italian archbishops and bishops were submitting their trust and confidence in the Fascist regime, ergo indicating signs of support towards the regime's relationship with the Vatican. The Bishop of Spoleto was one example that had gradually shown his support to the regime after claiming its local officials had treated him with respect.¹⁴¹ Some had also attributed gratitude and high praise for the changes made by the regime since its early years as government. The Bishops of Pavia and Vigevano had also shown their gratitude for the introduction of religious instruction into schools in Italy as well as the government's ability to stop the socialists in their respective bishoprics.¹⁴² When the settlement between Italy and the Vatican had been announced,

¹³⁹ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 69.

¹⁴⁰ Slav and German archbishops and bishops in annexed Italian regions were excluded from this survey. Ibid, p. 51.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

most of the religious orders had responded favourably as well. On the day of the accords' signing, many churches throughout the country celebrated the historical event. From the account of a member of the Vatican's secretary of state office, it had been stated that "...from Turin to Sicily, bishops and priests ordered their church bells rung in celebration, honouring the man who had finally brought harmony between church and state".¹⁴³ In some cities, for instance, Chieti and Bologna, the archbishops held a special mass of thanksgiving to commemorate the special event.¹⁴⁴ The diocesan press also had high praise for the accords.¹⁴⁵

However, despite the support, some remained hesitant and unsympathetic about the regime. The mentioned survey also suggested that most archbishops and bishops in Italy either rejected or had yet to declare their allegiance to the Fascist regime, suggesting that the regime struggled to fully secure its influence over the religious orders in the country. This scenario was linked to the obstinacy and unpleasant experiences with their local Fascist officials. The Archbishop of Fermo who had been known as an unreformable conservative, had been reputed for his protests against the Fascists in his region whilst the Bishop of Vicenza had feuded against the local Fascists between 1924 to 1932 because of their maltreatment towards the clergy and laymen.¹⁴⁶ This indicated that the divide in reactions of the religious orders was also due to contradictory personal experiences with the Fascists in their region.

While some were lucky enough to have friendly engagements, some had to face the brutalities and hostilities of the Fascists in their region, thus explaining the differences in perception towards the Fascists. However, after the Lateran Accords were signed, some of these resisters did appreciate its clauses, specifically those that protected the interests and rights of the religious orders.¹⁴⁷ Some had gradually changed their attitude towards the regime. For instance, in Trento, it had been reported that the local clergy had become more

¹⁴³ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, pp. 112 & 432.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 111.

¹⁴⁵ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 50.

¹⁴⁶ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 111.

¹⁴⁷ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 52.

congenial with the local Fascist officials since the Lateran Accords.¹⁴⁸ Except for certain conflicts between Pius XI and Mussolini over the interpretation of the accords, it can be indicated that the accords were embraced by a large portion of the Italian religious orders.¹⁴⁹

3.5.3.2 Politicians

As most Italian religious orders had been drawn by the Lateran Accords, several politicians outside of the Fascist Party felt differently. Even before the accords, most local politicians had been displeased with the relationship and the efforts that the regime had put into it.

Liberal and communist politicians viewed the Gentile Reform as another political strategy. In his 1929 work, *Stato Operato*, communist leader Palmiro Togliatti affirmed Mussolini's tactic of utilising his relationship with the Vatican for diplomatic leverage with predictions of the relationship's failure as he reasoned, "...because the Church will go to any lengths to preserve its universal character".¹⁵⁰ After the accords were signed, Togliatti was amongst those who condemned the Lateran Accords as just being another public relations exercises of the regime's that carried no effect on Italian society.¹⁵¹

Some politicians had the impression that the regime had overindulged in the Vatican's requests and their request had grown to be excessive. In the Chamber of Deputies, Ezio Garibaldi had put forward his complaint that the accords would be the antecedents of the Catholics going overboard with their demands and put pressures over the regime to fulfil them.¹⁵² Like the Fascists, leaders such as Garibaldi shared the same anxiety of

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 53.

¹⁴⁹ On 13th May 1929, Mussolini presented the Lateran Accords before the Italian Senate. It was during this moment that Duce made a controversial statement regarding the Vatican in his speech. In his speech, he stated that the accords did not signify the Vatican as free or sovereign and claimed that, "...the Fascist state abandoned little, if anything, in temporal matters while relegating the Church to a secondary position in secular affairs," and added that the educational system was solely the state's responsibility. This had resulted in another dispute between Mussolini and Pius XI and some Fascist officials were concerned that the dispute would cause their local clergies to return to their hostile attitude towards the regime. For information on the conflict, refer to Frank J. Coppa (ed.), *Controversial Concordats: The Vatican's Relations with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), pp. 108-110.

¹⁵⁰ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 101.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 57.

¹⁵² Ezio Garibaldi was the grandson of Risorgimento hero, Giuseppe Garibaldi. Despite this fact, his speech was almost neglected in the Chamber of Deputies during that day. Ibid, p. 66.

viewing Mussolini's 'generosity' as too disproportionate and a sign of the regime's enslavement towards the Vatican. Bear in mind Togliatti's statement that the Vatican was willing to go to extremes just to preserve its universal character. On the contrary, some leaders viewed the matter from the opposite side. Ex-member of the PPI and peasant leader, Guido Miglioli had commented that the last couple of years of the negotiations had shown how Pius XI was gradually played by the regime's rules.¹⁵³ Another ex-PPI member, Francesco Luigi Ferrari criticised the concordats as a "clericalization of public and private institutions".¹⁵⁴

On the other hand, other critics, namely Benedetto Croce, pointed out the anti-clericalism violence of the Fascists which had yet to be contained. In his argument before the Senate in May 1929, Croce had been the only Senator to bluntly criticise the accords. From his viewpoint, the accords will exacerbate the violent anti-clericalism in Italy, which mostly stemmed from Fascist officials of Mussolini's government.¹⁵⁵ It became apparent that Croce's statement was true as violence against the local churches and the Catholics escalated even after 1929. Many Fascist officials were still aggressively anti-clerics as they seized any opportunity to condemn the Vatican, especially when the relationship had some complications in the 1930s. Nearing the end of Croce's debate, he laid out two reasons that resulted in the accords not receiving his vote. His criticism was as follows¹⁵⁶:

1. Supporters enthusiastically accept the consequences of this legislation, believing it will lead to positive outcomes and unexpected benefits in the future, reflecting the notion that good can come from bad and truth can emerge from falsehood.
2. The second criticism is that the agreement achieved through the concordat is an example of clever political manoeuvring, to be evaluated not based on simplistic ethical principles, but as a political strategy, as the common saying goes that the end justifies the means.

¹⁵³ Guido had left Italy in 1926 and had heard of the Lateran Accords overseas. Ibid, p. 55.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Italy, Senato, Discussioni, *Atti Parlamentari* Vol. I, 1929: p. 192, col. 2. The original Italian text was translated using Google Translate.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 193, col. 1-2.

Hence, Croce viewed the accords was not for the holistic good of neither the Vatican, the Italian Catholics nor the Italian masses, but just another political scheme to uphold the image of Mussolini's government. Those who predicted favourability from the accords failed to reflect on the potential dangers that it could also inflict. His speech did not have much effect on the discussion. It did, however, catch the attention of Mussolini who had prepared his response during the voting day. He affirmed that he did not need Croce's vote as he said, "I want to say right away that I am grateful for your vote against. The tale of sour grapes does not play out here (*laughs*), because we do not need that vote...".¹⁵⁷ The sarcasm was used to point out Croce's envy and attempt to undermine Mussolini's success, which he failed to achieve.

Even so, the flood of accolades and support had drowned out the limited amount of outspoken criticism, particularly in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. As such, former Prime Minister, Paolo Boselli mentioned in the Senate that although the accords did not countermand the Law of Guarantees, it did rectify its errors and weaknesses.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, cleric-Fascist politician, Carlo Santucci in his debate on 23rd March argued that the bonds between the regime and the Roman Catholic Church were advantageous for Italian Catholics and their institutions, while the accords fostered moral unity in the country.¹⁵⁹

The votes for the accords' ratification had turned out to be a landslide, with 316 voting in favour of the accords whilst only 6 voted against.¹⁶⁰ Such results had been the outcome of some of the Fascists' loyalty towards Mussolini whilst some chose to not display any signs of animosity within the party before their opponents.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 206, col. 2.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 203, col. 2.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 176, col. 1. Formed in Italy between 1919 and 1922, 'clerical-fascism' was a movement consisting of Catholics who had inserted a set of attitudes of fascism with their Catholic teachings and mostly consisted of ex-PPI members. In the 1920s, the movement had gained some dominance amongst the Italian Catholics but was later largely marginalised. The movement had also emerged in many parts of Europe and gained stronger prominence than in Italy. Refer to Roger Griffin, "The 'Holy Storm': 'Clerical Fascism' through the Lens of Modernism," in *Clerical Fascism in Interwar Europe*, edited by Matthew Feldman, Marius Turda and Tudor Georgescu, (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-15.

¹⁶⁰ Those against were Croce, Luigi Albertini, Alberto Bergamini, Emmanuele Paternó, Francesco Ruffini, and Benedetto Sinibaldi. Ibid, p. 211.

3.5.3.3 Intellectuals

Likewise, many local intellectuals disapproved the Lateran Accords. Different leanings were the cause behind the disparity of their disapproval. Only a fraction expressed their gratitude towards the Vatican and Mussolini's regime for their efforts to reconnect Italy with the Vatican.

Much like opposition within the regime, Fascist intellectuals' rejection was fuelled by their anti-clericalism. Gabriele D'Annunzio, who had some time be regarded as the founder of Italian fascism had written a letter to Mussolini in 1931 to express his disappointment in regards to the Lateran Accords.¹⁶¹ In the letter, he lamented, "I always disapproved of the Conciliation because I know how irreducible the mercantile, intrusive spirit of the Vatican is".¹⁶² Italian jurist and also a member of the Fascist Party, Alfredo Rocco shared D'Annunzio's disappointment citing that, "...the Conciliation was a disappointment because it provided yet another object of allegiance".¹⁶³ Yet, some despite the opposition came to view the accords from a rather positive angle. Italian dramatist, Luigi Pirandello who had explicitly displayed his anti-clericalism through some of his works, saw the Lateran Accords as "...an opportunity for fascist "religion" to incorporate aspects of Catholic ritual, saving it from death...".¹⁶⁴ In other words, he viewed the accords' purpose of rescuing Fascism from diminishing by adopting some elements of Catholic teachings.

Response from Catholic intellectuals had some resemblance to their Fascist counterparts. Giovanni Battista Montini – the future Pope Paul VI, was the central ecclesiastical assistant of the Italian Catholic Federation of University Students or *Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana* (FUCI) and had been critical of the relationship between the Church and the Fascist regime. This was due to his antipathy against the regime and his opposition had reached a climax when the Lateran Accords was

¹⁶¹ Hamilton, *The Appeal of Fascism: The Study of Intellectuals and Fascism 1919-1945*, p. 63. D'Annunzio's corresponding letters and their publications were censored from the public. This passage had been quoted by Hamilton from Renzo De Felice's *D'Annunzio e la vita politica italiana dal 1918 al 1936*.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Mary Ann Frese Witt, *The Search for Modern Tragedy: Aesthetic Fascism in Italy and France* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 117.

signed in 1929. The future Pope Paul VI had called the accords as being ‘merely a pseudo-reconciliation’ to Mussolini’s publicity stunt to appear as the Church’s protector.¹⁶⁵ Also, he had predicted that the accords would result in a potential loss of spiritual freedom for the Vatican and Catholics in Italy.¹⁶⁶

However, not all viewed the accords negatively. It was met with enthusiasm by Igino Righetti, who was serving as the national president of FUCI, as evidenced in his letter to the president of the association’s female branch on 14th February 1929.¹⁶⁷ Another member, Ariano Bernareggi stressed the need to reinvigorate the Catholic faith within the local population, drawing a parallel between the reestablishment of Italy as a Catholic nation and the necessity to rejuvenate the spiritual essence of its people.¹⁶⁸ In contrast to Montini, Bernareggi’s statement supported the objective of the accords in extending the spiritual freedom and identity of the local Roman Catholics.

3.5.3.4 Journalistic Response

Articles from local newspapers displayed their reception of the Lateran Accords. The dichotomy in reception were influenced by the differences in leanings.

Catholic press and journals also published some pages in conjunction with the historical day. Newspapers such as *La Civiltà Cattolica*, the Catholic Action’s journal *Bollettino Ufficiale*, and the Catholic University’s press *Vita e Pensiero* rejoiced over the settlement and devoted a tribute to Mussolini due to his part in resolving the Roman Question.¹⁶⁹ The cleric-Fascist papers also hailed the accords through their editorials. Similar to the Catholic papers, *Il Corriere d’Italia* and *Il Momento* shown adulation towards Mussolini for his success whilst asserting that the reconciliation between the Vatican and

¹⁶⁵ Peter Hebblethwaite, *John XXIII: Pope of the Century* (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 65.

¹⁶⁶ Dagnino, *Faith and Fascism: Catholic Intellectuals in Italy, 1925-43*, p. 54.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 48.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 50.

Italy was something that the cleric-Fascists have been working on since 1923, although their role was rather minor.¹⁷⁰

On the contrary, some Fascist publications had openly expressed their disapproval. Youth publications such as *il Saggiatore*, *Il Cantiere*, and *L'Universale* were some of the Fascist press that made public criticism about the relationship.¹⁷¹ Yet, some complaints came with certain repercussions. One publication, *A e Z* was seized by the police after a satirical poem entitled, *Mussolini Inter Grato Re* (Integrate King).¹⁷² The author, Emilio Settimelli also faced the consequences of his poem. His membership in the Fascist Party was suspended, he later would have a run-in with Mussolini and sent into exile.¹⁷³ Hence, it was evident that opposition from the Fascist press was not immune to the regime's suppression and punishment. The termination of opposition from the local press, especially from the Fascists, was vital in controlling the public's perception of the accords, as Grandi pointed out the press's ability to sway readers with its persuasive and one-sided nature.¹⁷⁴

3.5.3.5 Ethnic Minorities

Though their reactions were not widely mentioned or analysed, there were some indications of disapproval from the Slav and German minorities in Italy. Much can be related to the forced 'Italianisation' policy that the regime had enforced against the Slavs and Germans in Italian annexed territories since 1922 – since the formation of the Italian Fascist regime.¹⁷⁵

As a result, locals had been hostile and unsympathetic towards the regime. Yet, to say that the Vatican did not attempt to stop this matter was untrue. In fact, before 1929, through Tacchi-Venturi, the Church had spoken out against the Ministry of Education's policy to abolish the use of the native language for religious instruction among Slav and

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 64.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid; Ray Moseley, *Mussolini: The Last 600 Days of Il Duce* (Maryland: Lyons Press, 2021), p. 236.

¹⁷⁴ TNA, FO/800/263/03 (Ronald Graham to Austen Chamberlain), pp. 389-390.

¹⁷⁵ Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 92.

German students.¹⁷⁶ The Vatican's newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano* had also defended their rights to minister in their native languages. However, the Vatican's efforts seemed to have little impact as discrimination against the Slav and German minorities in Italy continued. Unfortunately, some impact of the Lateran Accords seemed to have worsen their situation. According to Article 22 of the concordats, only Italian citizens are eligible to occupy an ecclesiastical benefice in any church in Italy and are required to use the Italian language in their services. Not only did it limit the services of Slavic and German clergies and religious orders, but the clause also presented difficulties for those in the community who were not fluent in Italian.

Apart from that, the religious minorities also opposed the relationship, and similar to the Slavs and Germans, the Lateran Accords had some impact on them. On the contrary, the Vatican did little to advocate for their rights as their goal was to establish the dominance of Roman Catholicism as the sole religion of Italy.

3.5.4 International Reactions

3.5.4.1 Germany

Nazi Germany had been receptive to Mussolini's attempt in reconciling Italy with the Vatican. From the political aspect, Adolf Hitler saw the relationship as a chance to gain some political leverage in Germany.

Before his rise to power, Hitler had strived to impress the local priests to gain Catholic voters and annihilate his conservative opponents, such as the Catholic Centre Party and the Bavarian People's Party.¹⁷⁷ Both he and Mussolini had used the same tactic to strengthen their influence. Using the accords, Hitler asserted that the existence of Catholic political parties contradicted the essence of the Lateran Accords, which prohibited the

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 93.

¹⁷⁷ Geoffrey Pridham, *Hitler's Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923 -1933* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), p. 170-171. The Catholic parties did lose their popularity near the end of the Weimar Republic. For more information, refer to Ruth Henig, *The Weimar Republic, 1919-1933* (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 39-44.

churches and its members' involvement in politics.¹⁷⁸ He held on to this stance to press for the end of Catholic parties and suppress the influence of Catholic politicians.

Other than the German Führer, the accords also received positive responses from Hitler's targets, namely Catholic politicians. Prominent Centre Party leader, Konrad Adenauer congratulated Mussolini via telegram in 1929.¹⁷⁹ Journalistic reactions had also been fairly positive, particularly in Catholic papers. *Bayerischer Kurier* on 16th February 1929 labelled the signing date as "the hour of God" while using the ancient Greek legend of the cutting of the Gordian Knot as an analogy of Mussolini's part in the settlement.¹⁸⁰ Another Catholic paper from Munich, *Allgemeine Rundschau* mentioned that "who lived in the closest relationship...with Roman Catholicism was upon to solve this question which no liberal had dared to tackle so energetically".¹⁸¹

Consequently, the Lateran Accords set a precedent for future negotiations between the Vatican and the Nazi government in Germany. Since the accords' conclusion, many Germans have pushed for a similar concordat to be created which would strengthen the rights and position of the Catholic Church in Germany. Hence, the concordat known as *Reichskonkordat* was signed in July 1933 in Rome. In the same year, Catholic political parties in Germany were dissolved and some of its members were arrested.

¹⁷⁸ Deschner, *God and the Fascists: The Vatican Alliance with Mussolini, Franco, Hitler and Pavelić*, p. 39.

¹⁷⁹ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876 – 1952*, vol. 1, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, trans. Louise Willmot (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995), p. 222.

¹⁸⁰ Deschner, *God and the Fascists: The Vatican Alliance with Mussolini, Franco, Hitler and Pavelić*, p. 38.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

3.5.4.1.1 Reichskonkordat Vs. the Lateran Accords

Signed a few years after the Lateran Accords, the *Reichskonkordat* resembled the accords but at the same time contrasted one another.¹⁸²

In the same vein as Italy, Germany strengthened its diplomacy with the Roman Catholic Church. A German ambassador was assigned to the Vatican while an official Apostolic Nuncio was assigned to the State.¹⁸³ Prior to 1933, there were no official Apostolic Nuncio, though Germany and the Vatican established diplomatic relationship in 1920. Between 1917-1925, Eugenio Pacelli (the future Pius XII) was appointed as the Nuncio of Bavaria in personal union with the Nuncio in Germany, where he carried out nunciature duties throughout the German territories. Later in 1925, Pacelli became the Nuncio of Prussia, in personal union with the Nuncio in Germany. Although it was not directly stated, this clause indicated Germany's acknowledgement of the Vatican City.

In this regard, laws of protection were also established. The misuse of religious orders' uniforms was deemed equivalent to the offense of misusing military uniforms, as specified in the Lateran Accords. However, the German concordat provided more comprehensive protections for religious orders. Article 5 stated that any harm or offense, in any form, as well as any interference with the duties of ecclesiastical offices, would be taken seriously under German law.

The religious orders of the German Roman Catholic Church were guaranteed freedom to propagate the Catholic teachings. As both pacts outlined the religious orders' freedom of exercise and publications, the German concordat outlined the freedom of communication between the Vatican and the local Roman Catholic Church. Publications from the Vatican are permitted to the German land without any sort of rejection. Still, any information of pastoral duties or of the internal affairs of the Church must be classified to preserve secrecy, as stated in Article 9.

¹⁸² For the full translation of *Reichskonkordat*, see Appendix II.

¹⁸³ Apostolic Nuncio was a diplomatic representative of the papacy, their responsibility was alike to an ambassador.

The clauses of the *Reichskonkordat* also granted privileges to the Church in Germany that closely resembled those of the Lateran Accords. Similarly, the authority of the local Roman Catholic Church was outlined. Under the administration of the Church, Catholic parishes, parish and diocesan associations, Episcopal Sees, bishoprics and chapters, religious orders and congregations, as well as institutions, foundations, and property had the ability to engage in legal actions, ownership of properties, and fulfilling other legal functions as recognised by the civil law. Church entities that were not recognised under public law, will be granted similar rights.

Even so, the German government retained some authority in the decision-making processes of the local Roman Catholic Church. Similar to the Vatican, the Church was free to reorganise its administration; however, when it came to the establishment of new entities or structures that required state funding, the German State had the authority to intervene. Additionally, the creation of new parishes needed to be discussed between diocesan bishops and government representatives for standardisation purposes. On Germany's part, demolition of religious institutions, religious centres and buildings can be done, only with the agreement of the ecclesiastical authorities.

Employment in public offices represents another contrast between the *Reichskonkordat* and the Lateran Accords. While the latter explicitly prohibited the employment of religious orders in public offices, the former included a similar clause but with some flexibility. German clergy wishing to accept employment in public offices or corporations under the German State must obtain an official document, known as *nihil obstat*¹⁸⁴, from the judicial magistrate of their diocese and from the governing body of the public law corporation. The German concordat laid out the freedom which the German State had granted to the Roman Catholic Church, which was also done in the Lateran Accords. It displayed a distinction between the two concordats in relations to the involvement of religious orders in the public life.

Moreover, one of the major distinctions between the *Reichskonkordat* and the Lateran Accords was their approach to integrating Catholic identity into national identity. While both accords established Catholic identity within the societal framework of their

¹⁸⁴ A document from the Church which cannot be object on any moral grounds.

respective countries, they differed in how they upheld national identity in relation to the Catholic religion. The Lateran Accords explicitly tied Italian identity to the Catholic faith, whereas the *Reichskonkordat* was less direct. Article 14, which outlined the requirements for local religious orders, did not mention German nationality as a primary criterion, focusing instead on German citizenship and academic credentials. However, in a more subtle manner, Article 21 stated, "...the inculcation of a patriotic, civic, and social sense of duty in the spirit of Christian religious and moral law," suggesting a connection between national identity and religion.

Overall, while the *Reichskonkordat* and the Lateran Accords shared similarities in their diplomatic recognition and protections for the Roman Catholic Church, they also exhibited significant differences in their approach of integrating Catholic identity within national frameworks. The *Reichskonkordat* affirmed the Church's role in German society but maintained a level of state oversight that allowed for intervention in ecclesiastical matters. In contrast, the Lateran Accords established Italy's non-interference in the Vatican and its ecclesiastical affairs while more explicitly intertwining Italian identity with Catholicism, creating a clearer connection between national and religious identity. These distinctions highlight the varying dynamics of church and state in Italy and Germany during this period.

3.5.4.2 United States

In the case of the United States, the accords impacted its own relationship with the Vatican from various angles. The impact caused a political and social division within the American society.

From an economic point of view, the United States' primary concern was the cessation of the Vatican's dependency on them, given the history that they shared. In the wake of the Law of Guarantees 1871, the United States developed an economic relationship with the Vatican. The American Catholic community had been contributing funds to the Vatican to help mitigate its long-standing financial struggles, which were worsened by the

Vatican's rejection of the agreement.¹⁸⁵ Even during the 1920s – as the Vatican was engaging with Mussolini's regime, Pope Pius XI had received a loan from American banks to cover some of the Vatican's expenses.¹⁸⁶ The concern was that the Vatican would no longer be dependent on the United States aid, thus dismissing or neglecting such diplomacy with the United States. Hence, the United States raised concerns over the relationship, particularly after the Lateran Accords.

From a political perspective, anti-Catholics had rejected the Italy-Vatican relationship and the accords due to the persecution complex of 'Catholic ambition of dominance' over the world's politics. Americans with such sentiments did not refrain from publicly expressing their disapproval. In a discussion of the Foreign Policy Association on 16th March 1929, lawyer, Charles C. Marshall characterised the accords as 'internationalism and supernationalism' as he projected that the Pope's newfound prestige would prompt him to position himself superior to other nations and cautioned of the future implications if a Roman Catholic electoral candidate were to secure victory in a state election in the United States.¹⁸⁷ Anti-Catholic politicians had also conveyed their disapproval of the Lateran Accords in US Congress. On 23rd April 1929, the junior senator of Alabama mentioned that, "...Mussolini commenced the work of destruction of free government over there," suggesting Catholics threatened the country's freedom.¹⁸⁸ Apart from that, claims of dual allegiance had been another subject of the argument among the critics. In their argument, American critics had questioned the loyalty of the local Catholics, whether it was towards the United States government or the Vatican. Hence, the opposition accused the Catholics of un-Americanism as they seemingly should only be loyal to one

¹⁸⁵ William K. Thompson, "American Reaction to the Lateran Treaty Of 1929: A Study of the Influence of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy," (Master's thesis, American University, Washington D.C., 1966), p. 22, https://aura.american.edu/articles/thesis/AMERICAN_REACTION_TO_THE_LATERAN_TREATY_OF_1929_A_STUDY_OF_THE_INFLUENCE_OF_PUBLIC_OPINION_ON_FOREIGN_POLICY/23882025?file=41878929.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 23.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 28.

¹⁸⁸ Mussolini was brought up as the Congress was in the discussion of the junior senator's attack during his speech in Brockton, Massachusetts which he claimed to be an assassination attempt by a group of Catholics. It was important to note that the senator was invited as a member of the Ku Klux Klan and his speech's main idea was the threats of Roman Catholics towards the United States. He described the similitude between the incident and Mussolini's settlement with the Vatican. Refer to U.S. Senate *Congressional Record*, 71st Cong., 1st sess., 23 April 1929, pp. 352-359.

nation.¹⁸⁹ Subsequently, tensions between the anti-Catholics and Catholics had peaked with the former aggressively campaigning against the latter.

On another note, other Christian branches feared the relationship would cause tensions between the Catholics and other branches, particularly Protestants.¹⁹⁰ Such tensions had been the result of the establishment of a Catholic hierarchy or superiority against other Christian branches. The statement had been related to the anti-Catholics' political concerns about the Church. A Protestant author had mentioned how the new profound political sovereignty of the Pope came with privileges and status that would benefit the Roman Catholics rather than Christianity, which would have damaging implications for the relationship between Catholics and other Christian branches.¹⁹¹ In that instance, the propagation of Protestant teachings was notably hampered by the accords.

In the accords' defence, editor of the country's Catholic weekly, *America*, Wilfrid Parsons, had scrutinised critics for their misconceptions and hypocrisy. In his book, *The Pope and Italy*, he debunked every criticism made against the accords. For the dual allegiance claims, he called out the absurdity of such claims as 'material of popular controversy, but not for reasonable men' as he made it clear that the Pope's bond with Catholics outside of the Vatican City was merely spiritual.¹⁹² Besides that, Parsons also lambasted critics for their denial of the papacy's rights and freedom for sovereignty as follows:

If it means anything at all, it means that Mussolini and Cardinal Gasparri, in signing the treaty, committed a wrong. A wrong against what? Against other peoples who do not practise [sic] union of Church and State? Hardly. It is none of their business. Against an abstract opinion, held by some people, though not by all? But in political

¹⁸⁹ Thompson, "American Reaction to the Lateran Treaty of 1929: A Study of the Influence of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy," p. 47.

¹⁹⁰ In the 1920s, tensions between the Protestants and Catholics in the United States were on the rise after Pius XI's December 1925 encyclical, *Quas Primas* which the Pope had announced the new Church holiday, Christ the King. The Lutheran Council had criticised the encyclical as some of its contents "...are sectarian in the worst sense and uncharitable". As the holiday would be celebrated on the last Sunday of October, the council commented that the selection of the holiday's date (31 October 1926) was unsuitable as it coincidentally fell on the same date as the Protestant's celebration of the anniversary of the reformation movement's establishment. As a result, the council summoned the Protestants in the country to boycott the new holiday. "Pope Encyclical Hit by Lutheran Council," *The Evening Star* (Washington DC, United States), March 19, 1926, p. 17.

¹⁹¹ Thompson, "American Reaction to the Lateran Treaty of 1929: A Study of the Influence of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy," p. 34.

¹⁹² Parsons, *The Pope and Italy*, p. 68.

theory nobody is at liberty to prescribe to a sovereign nation what form of government it shall adopt for itself, or agree to in another. The very people who utter that objection are those who are most outspoken against our interferences in the nations of Latin America. Even to object to monarchy in another country in the name of liberty is a denial of liberty.¹⁹³

Generally, it was safe to say that the United States reaction to the relationship had been mostly influenced by the current situation of that time. As anti-Catholicism was at its peak in the 1920s, it became the main opposition against the relationship. Also, it worsened the bitter battle between the anti-Catholics and the Catholics in the US.

3.5.4.3 France

On the other hand, the Vatican's reconciliation with Italy would complicate the Vatican's improving relations with France. Due to the tensions between Italy and France in the mid-1920s, the Vatican was caught in the middle, conflicted in salvaging its rapport with both countries.¹⁹⁴ Thus, the accords would impede the France-Vatican relationship.

As such, various French press, leaders, and religious orders did not take the news of Italy's reconciliation with the Vatican too well. France had been the biggest foreign critic of the Lateran Accords. On 12th February 1929, Left-wing French paper, *L'Ère Nouvelle* claimed that the accords as 'the alliance of two Romes against the France of 1789', thus implying its concern over the threats of the Italy-Vatican relations against France.¹⁹⁵ Apart from that, some concerns over the fate of French churches and religious orders had also

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 69.

¹⁹⁴ In the 1920s, the Franco-Italy relations were quite fragmented due to a series of conflicts over anti-French sentiments in Italy and territorial rivalries. For more information, refer to Henry de Jouvenel, "France and Italy," *Foreign Affairs* 5, no. 4 (July, 1927): 538-552; William I. Shorrock, "France, Italy, and the Eastern Mediterranean in the 1920s," *The International History Review* 8, no. 1 (Feb. 1986): pp. 70-82.

¹⁹⁵ As quoted in Peter C. Kent, *The Pope and the Duce: The International Impact of the Lateran Agreements* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 60. The statement was written at the end of the article and was extensive. The *L'Ère Nouvelle* article stated that, "L'alliance des deux Rome est conclue contre la France de 89, contre la France des libertés, contre la France organisatrice de l'équilibre européen au profit des condottières modernes et des propagandistes confessionnels de la Mittel-Europa," which roughly translated as, "The alliance of the two Romes is concluded against the France of 89, against the France of freedoms, against the France organiser of the European balance for the benefit of the modern condottières and the confessional propagandists of Mittel-Europa". Refer to "Editorial," *L'Ère Nouvelle* (Paris, France), Février 12, 1929, p. 1.

been voiced. Such arguments were made by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the impact of the accords towards French religious missions in the East had been their source of apprehension.¹⁹⁶ The French Church was also uneasy with the agreement between the Vatican and Italy. Like their Italian counterparts, they feared that the Vatican became subordinated to the Italian government, which could affect French religious orders in France and Italy.¹⁹⁷ The outpour of criticism from France then gained reactions from the regime and the Vatican.

On Mussolini's part, he could not conceal nor avoid his irritation with France and their condemnation of the Lateran Accords. Sir Ronald Graham, the British ambassador to Italy, had sensed the Duce's annoyance towards the French articles and viewed an inclination from Mussolini's blatant display of discontent with France during a conversation with Prince Paul of Serbia.¹⁹⁸ The statement was dismissed by Grandi who claimed the French had accepted the accords gracefully but mentioned there were no expectations for their approval in the first place.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, Pius XI had taken the approach to respond to critics generally, but the media had assumed it was largely targeted to French critics due to its retaliation, specifically on claims of the Vatican's subordination. In an editorial in *L'Osservatore Romano*, part of the Pope's response affirmed that he was fully aware and competent in safeguarding the Church's freedom and position, much like he did while being a prisoner of the Vatican.²⁰⁰

In the case of France, it had been one of the strongest attackers of the Lateran Accords, mainly stemming from the assumption of political alliance against the country, fear of the Vatican's subordination under Italy, and concern over the French Churches and its religious orders. Despite the responses and hostility by Pius XI and Mussolini, it did not retract the criticisms from the French. As a result, the Vatican's attempt to improve rapprochement halted and the regime's animosity grew even more.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 60.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ TNA, FO/800/263/03 (Ronald Graham to Austen Chamberlain), p. 388.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 388-389.

²⁰⁰ "Vatican Answers Critics of Accord: Pope Has Not Subordinated His Authority, Editorial Declares," *The Evening Star* (Washington D.C., United States), February 19, 1929, p. 2.

3.5.4.4 Britain

In contrast, the British government responded well to the Lateran Accords. On several occasions, government officials had extended its support and gratitude to the Vatican and the regime.

The Prime Minister received orders to extend congratulations on behalf of the British government and urged the Secretary of State to appoint a representative to the Congress of the International Postal Union in acknowledgment of the papacy's sovereignty.²⁰¹ Furthermore, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Austen Chamberlain had publicly conveyed his support for the accords and the relationship between the Vatican and Mussolini's government on several instances. On the night of the signing day, he expressed his recognition and praise towards the Lateran Accords in his speech in Birmingham.²⁰² Another was during a trip to Florence on 2nd April 1929 where he congratulated Mussolini for his success in a settlement with the Vatican over the Roman Question.²⁰³

However, discussions of the accords were rare as it was brought up minimally before the British Cabinet. On 13th February, raised issues in the House of Commons were the potential membership of the Vatican State in the League of Nations and the impact of agreements on Anglo-Vatican relations to which Chamberlain stated that no definite answer could be given until the contents of the Lateran Accords were disclosed.²⁰⁴ Although this discussion did not feature any positive or negative remarks about the accords, it did signal the concerns of some members of the British Parliament based on the issue raised. In a Cabinet meeting, Chamberlain's subsequent update on March 13th revealed that Roman Catholics, excluding those in Italy, were not happy with the accords.²⁰⁵ No updates on the release of the Lateran Accords' contents were discussed. Based on the issues raised and

²⁰¹ Thomas E. Hachey (ed.), *Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1914-1939: Confidential Annual Reports of the British Ministers to the Holy See* (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1972), p. 152. The representative's task was to sign international agreements, negotiated in the Congress of the International Postal Union.

²⁰² TNA, FO/800/263/03 (Ronald Graham to Austen Chamberlain), p. 390; "Chamberlain Lauds Peace with Vatican: Sir Austen Prays That World's Other Quarrels May End as Happily," *The New York Times* (United States), February 12, 1929, p. 2.

²⁰³ Peter Edwards, "The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings," *The Historical Journal* 14, no. 1 (March 1971): p. 162.

²⁰⁴ United Kingdom, *Hansard Parliamentary Debate*, House of Commons, vol. 225 (13 February 1929).

²⁰⁵ TNA, CAB 23/60/11, p. 5.

reports on the dissatisfaction of foreign Roman Catholics, it suggested scepticism from some Cabinet members. Still, none were directly expressing their disapproval.

3.6 CONCLUSION

Both the Vatican and the Italian Fascist regime adopted conciliatory strategies in their policies and reforms to enhance their relationship starting from 1922. The Mussolini government implemented various policies designed to benefit the Roman Catholic Church, and in return, the Vatican's support was vital for solidifying the Fascists' political position, especially during crises.

These developments led to negotiations aimed at resolving the Roman Question, representing the apex of their partnership as it aligned with the broader objectives of both parties. However, sporadic Fascist violence against local Catholics and their institutions persisted, driven by ongoing disputes over youth societies and organizations between the Vatican and the regime. This tension resulted in a standstill in negotiations, with Pius XI suspending talks on two occasions following several conflicts. Although these disputes were eventually resolved, they caused significant delays in the negotiation process. In early February 1929, the Lateran Accords was signed by Mussolini as Italy's representative and Gasparri as the Vatican's delegate. Conducted in secrecy, the announcement of the resolution of the Roman Question took both local and international communities by surprise. Reactions were largely influenced by ideological perspectives, political inclinations, global political structures, and concerns over religious supremacy.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPACT OF THE ITALY-VATICAN PARTNERSHIP ON RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN ITALY

4.1 INTRODUCTION


Linking to the prior chapter, this chapter specifically reflects on the implications of the relationship towards religious minorities, thus fulfilling the study's third objective. While much of the relationship's development in the 1920s have been previously discussed, this chapter evaluates its effects on a specific group in Italian society that can be deemed as the most affected by the relationship: the religious minorities. However, it is important to note that much of the discussion will focus on Jews and different sects of Protestants in Italy – as they made up almost the entirety of the Italian religious minorities' population. Their interaction with both the Vatican and the Italian government, as well as their reactions to the relationship, will be touched upon in this chapter's discussion. Furthermore, the discussion will also include the fate of religious minorities in the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, there is a clear observation of how it affected the dynamics of the relationship, especially during one of Italy's most crucial eras.

In the 1930s, less than one-third of the Italian population were religious minorities. The larger portion of minorities were Protestants and Jews, which communities had been widely distributed throughout Italy. In a nation populated by around 42 million people, around 44,000 Italian and foreign Jews had settled in Italy but were less than 1.1 per thousand of Italy's population whilst around 135,000 Protestants had resided all over Italy.²⁰⁶ Protestant sects populating in Italy during that period were: Adventists, Methodists, Waldensians, Pentecostals, Baptists, Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), Lutherans, and Wesleyans. However, some sects varied congregations and churches due to

²⁰⁶ Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, p. 25; Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 222.

the integration of ethnic practices and lingo. Annexed regions, namely Fiume and Pula, possessed sects separated by ethnic influence.

Other religions comprised of even minute non-Catholic communities including Muslims²⁰⁷ – migrated from Italy’s colonies in Africa, and Greek Orthodox Christianity. Despite the small population, the Vatican had intended to limit the religious liberation and rights of the religious minorities. This was aligned with their goal of upholding the Roman Catholic’s status as a predominant religion in Italy as well as eliminating the influence of the Protestant church in Italy. Hence, the Vatican had utilised its developing relationship with the Fascist regime to accomplish such goals. The regime in turn would also expect the Vatican’s support in the former’s own crusade against the Jews – given the latter’s anti-Judaic sentiments throughout the years.



²⁰⁷ Muslims had already settled in Italy after their invasion of Sicily (*Siqiliyyah*), Sardinia, and south of Italy between the 8th and 9th century. Since then, the southern region had been a stronghold of the Muslims of that time. However, conquests of the Christian kingdoms of the 12th century and subsequently the Inquisition had led to the decline of Muslims in that region. The last known Muslim community was last traced in Venice in 1587 and there was no indication of whether any surviving descendants resided in Italy after the 17th century. The Muslim community briefly mentioned in this research would refer to the migrated Muslims from Italy’s colonies in Africa during the 1930s. For more information on the history of Islam in Italy from the 8th century, refer to Ataullah Bogdan Kopanski, “Islam in Italy and its Libyan Colony,” *Islamic Studies* 32, no. 2 (1993): pp. 191-197.

4.2 JEWISH AND PROTESTANT POPULATION

Table 4.1: Jewish Communities in Italian provinces and regions in 1st January 1932 and 1st January 1940

Jewish Communities (corresponding provinces and region)	1 January 1932 (Jewish data)	1 January 1940 (Jewish data)
Turin (Turin, Aosta, Cuneo)	3,836	2,918
Alessandria (Alessandria, Asti)	455	276
Casale Monferrato	157	82
Vercelli (Vercelli, Novara)	245	187
Genoa (Liguria, Massa and Carrara)	3,000	1,350
Milan (Milan, Como, Pavia, Sondrio, Varese)	5,548	5,000
Mantua (Mantua, Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona)	625	417
Verona (Verona, Vicenza)	429	231
Venice (Venice, Belluno, Treviso)	1,711	1,324
Padua (Padua, Rovigo)	610	503
Merano (Tridentine Venice)	332	79
Gorizia (Gorizia, Udine)	214	242
Trieste (Trieste, Pola)	5,025	2,850
Fiume (Fiume, Zara)	1,150	822
Abbazia	225	106
Parma (Parma, Piacenza)	98	60
Modena (Modena, Reggio Emilia)	469	278
Bologna (Bologna)	1,300	550
Ferrara (Ferrara, Forlì, Ravenna)	822	525
Ancona (Marche)	835	675
Florence (Florence, Arezzo, Pistoia, Siena)	2,730	2,800

Pisa (Pisa, Lucca)	481	351
Livorno (Livorno, Grosseto)	1,941	1,300
Rome (Lazio, Umbria)	12,316	11,700
(Abruzzi and Molise, Sardinia)	/	/
Naples (Campania)	858	530
(Puglia, Lucania, Calabria, Sicily)	/	/

Source: As cited in Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, pp. 20-21.




Figure 4.2: Italian Provinces with Substantial Protestant Presence in the 1920s and 1930s²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹

Data collected from several secondary sources: Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*; John A. Davis, *The Jews of San Nicandro* (New

4.3 IMPLICATION TOWARDS RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

4.3.1 Status in Italy

The primary concerns revolved around legal status and religious freedom. These concerns had stemmed from the Vatican's past frustrations with pre-Fascist laws and constitution related to the religious freedom of non-Catholics, a fact that was well-recognised.

Historically, the Vatican viewed the freedom of worship for non-Catholics, initially established in Italy by the Piedmontese constitution of 1848 and later guaranteed by the Risorgimento, as a challenge to the Church's authority and position.²¹⁰ For this reason, Protestants and Jews, particularly, felt uneasy when the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist regime began to evolve. Based on historical context, they foresaw the Vatican's desire to secure its national status in Italy, potentially at the expense of limiting the religious freedom and status of other faiths.

Regarding Protestant churches, the Vatican's aim to reduce their status and restrict religious freedom had the added consequence of curbing their expansion within Italian society. Pius XI had publicly made statements which identified the Protestants as a direct threat against the Roman Catholic Church, as evident in his encyclical, *Mortalium Animos* (On Religious Unity), issued on January 6, 1928, where the Pope elaborated on these perceived threats. Some of its contexts are as follows:

There are some, indeed, who recognize and affirm that Protestantism, as they call it, has rejected, with a great lack of consideration, certain articles of faith and some external ceremonies, which are, in fact, pleasing and useful, and which the Roman Church still retains. They soon, however, go on to say that that Church also has erred, and corrupted the original religion by adding and proposing for belief certain doctrines which are not only alien to the Gospel, but even repugnant to it...²¹¹

Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2010); Mithans, "The Italian Fascist Regime, the Catholic Church and Protestant Religious Minorities in Terre Redente (1918-40).

²¹⁰ Davis, *The Jews of San Nicandro*, p. 65. In 1848, the Sardinian Kingdom had issued a decree which secure the civil rights of the Christians and Jews under the Kingdom. The law was intended to protect the Waldensians and Jews of the kingdom from being persecuted or mistreated. After the Risorgimento, all religions were all equally recognised as 'cults admitted by the State' in accordance of the Italian Penal Code of 1889 (Zanardelli Code).

²¹¹ Pope Pius XI, *Mortalium Animos* [The Minds of Mortals], The Holy See, January 6, 1928, <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius11/p11morta.htm>.

By branding the Protestant churches as ‘false Christianity’, Pius XI unequivocally expressed the need to diminish these perceived threats before they could encroach upon the Roman Catholic Church and its followers. Hence, the most direct measure taken was to restrict their freedom, which encompassed their activities and preaching. This objective was in alignment with the Vatican’s goal of reshaping Italian society into a predominantly Catholic one, as discussed in the previous chapter. Consequently, achieving a superior status over other religions became fundamental as it provided the Church with leverage in obtaining various privileges. As a result, it was entirely justifiable for religious minorities to become increasingly concerned about the emerging partnership between the Vatican and Mussolini’s Fascist regime.

As their ties grew stronger, more reforms favouring the Roman Catholic Church were implemented, making it increasingly evident that the Church’s status was on the rise. The most concerning reform was the 1927 Penal Code, which explicitly stated that it would “diminish the principle of the equality before the law of all citizens”.²¹² This signalled that the new status quo was imminent and would soon be established and enforced. In the following years, non-Catholic communities took various initiatives to safeguard their positions and rights, coinciding with the drafting of the Lateran Accords. Even before the public announcement of the accords, several reforms and new laws had given hints to religious minorities about what the Vatican and the regime were planning.

In response, Jewish leaders joined forces to develop appropriate legislation to help their communities adapt to the growing influence of the Fascists and the potential process of Catholicisation of Italy. Their strategy aimed to reform the Jews without infringing on their identity and equal rights in Italy, a cause they had advocated for even before World War I.²¹³ In January 1927, a memorandum was submitted to Mussolini proposing such a law. However, the royal decree n. 1731, would only be completed, and implemented on 30th

²¹² Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini’s Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, p. 300.

²¹³ Joshua D. Zimmerman (ed), *Jews in Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule, 1922-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 48. Nearing the war, the Jewish communities had been calling for the establishment of their equal rights and national identity in Italy. The advocacy had started when Jewish youth movement had rejected the assimilation policies as due to the fear of losing their Jewish identity and heritage. Such attitudes further deepened due to the Jews involvement in the war. For more information, refer to Edward Madigan and Gideon Reuveni (eds), *The Jewish Experience of the First World War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 185-195.

October 1930.²¹⁴ The new legislation not only recognised the Jews' rights and identity in Italy but also founded a centralised system for the Jewish communities in Italy.²¹⁵

Around this time, another law was being developed, specifically targeting religions other than Catholicism in Italy. This new law, known as the law of 24th June 1929 n. 1159 (*La legge 24 giugno 1929 n. 1159*), declared religions other than Roman Catholicism as 'permitted cults' or *Culti Amessi*.²¹⁶ Religious minority leaders had been predominantly involved in the drafting of this law. The most prominent leader was Waldensian jurist, Mario Piacentini. In his writings, Piacentini had stressed on the vitality of a protection for religious minorities against the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist regime.²¹⁷ Hence, after the decree, Piacentini saw it as a triumph for religious freedom, hailing it as '*la Magna charta della libertà religiosa in Italia*' or the 'Magna Charta of religious freedom in Italy'.²¹⁸ The law was implemented the following year on 28th February 1930 with more details and elaboration by the royal decree n. 289.

The Church, however, was less pleased with this triumph. While Roman Catholicism still maintained a superior status distinct from other religions, their main objective was to restrict religious freedom to cause the cessation of Protestantism, only to be halted by the new law. It seemed that the Vatican had mistook the accords' clause that declared Catholicism as the sole state religion as to also encompass the restrictions of other faiths' freedom and rights. This resulted in an increase of aggressiveness of the Church against Protestants to eliminate the latter's renewed status and privilege. Vatican officials

²¹⁴ In many sources, the law had been referred to as the Falco Law, though there no indication of whether it was made as an official name for the law.

²¹⁵ Before the mid-1910s, all Jewish communities were divided by their own legal systems which were predominantly influenced by their geographical settings. Jewish leaders had started to gradually centralised the communities throughout Italy as part of their cause of strengthening the Jew identity and position in the nation. Established in 1914, the Consortium of Italian Jewish Communities had functioned to represent the communities to enable the unity of Italian Jews and engagements with communities on the international front. Michele Sarfatti, "The Falco Law and the Italian Jewish Communities," *The Lateran Pacts, The Rights of the Jews, and Other Religious Minorities: A Chapter in the History of Church and State Relations*, New York University, filmed October 25, 2013, 00:39:57 – 0:41:39, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJVqqP_7eWE.

²¹⁶ In some sources, the law had been referred to as '*La Legge sui Culti Ammessi*' or Law on Allowed Religions.

²¹⁷ Adolf Keller, "How the War Affects the Relationship between Church and State on the European Continent," *The Shane Quarterly* 1, no.3 (1940): p. 207.

²¹⁸ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, pp. 71 & 296.

had attempted to have their own interpretation of the law by twisting and manipulating its context in favour of them and against the religious minorities, particularly against Protestants. In their own interpretation, the Vatican had strictly defined activities that comprised ‘acts of worship’. From Borgongini-Duca’s view, preaching, proselytising, or religious discussions was not part of ‘acts of worship’ but an illegal form of propaganda, ergo it should be punished as it would potentially harm the mindset of Italians.²¹⁹ Yet, these claims would be refuted by the government. In a report of the Lateran Accords on 18th June 1929, the Central Commission of the Senate had confirmed that religious discussion was in fact considered a form of religious practice.²²⁰ Even so, it did not stop the Vatican from finding other ways to harass Protestants.

However, the laws and regulations failed to provide adequate support for religious minorities in maintaining their status and position in Italy. Despite the implementation of the Falco Law, it proved ineffective in safeguarding the Jews from the growing wave of anti-Semitism that emerged in the late 1930s. In the case of the law that passed on June 24, 1929, the Vatican, in its persistent crusade against Protestants, made extensive efforts to exploit any legal loopholes or find ways to circumvent it. They also used the Lateran Accords to target and persecute Protestants. Consequently, the Lateran Accords, Falco Law, and the law of 24th June 1929 established policies that led to different treatments and relationships between the state and each religion.

4.3.2 Tight Surveillance and Frequent Investigation

On the other hand, religious minorities were subjects of tight surveillance and frequent investigations as a result of the Vatican’s relationship with the Fascist regime. Protestants and Jews were constant targets, each for different reasons from their respective perspectives.

From the Vatican’s standpoint, the Protestants were viewed as religious corruption and an obstacle in the Catholicisation process of the Italian society whilst the regime was

²¹⁹ Ibid, p. 163.

²²⁰ Ibid.

more concerned with antisemitism and antifascist sentiments. Still, there were cases of the regime's oppression against the Protestants. Italian Methodists faced oppression from the regime due to their active involvement in resistance movements against the Fascists.²²¹ The YMCA, on the other hand, was treated with suspicion because the regime feared its influence over Italian youths, particularly due to the word 'Young' in its full name.²²² Therefore, the Vatican accused Protestants of claims that would provoke the regime and trigger their intervention.

The Vatican would pressure the government through constant reports and complaints, which the former intended to push the latter's boundaries and limits. Constant complaints and reports were continuously sent to the government, with Borgongini-Duca playing a significant role. In 1934, he submitted a memorandum entitled 'The Problem of Protestant Proselytism in Italy' to the Foreign Minister, Buffarini-Guidi, and Mussolini (through Buffarini-Guidi).²²³ The memorandum stressed the harms of the Pentecostals towards Italian society. Another member of the Vatican, Monsignor Federico Sargolini had also played a big role in collecting reports from provincial religious orders. It was mentioned that, "Sargolini swiftly complied with the Pope's request, sending out questionnaires to every Italian diocese in the summer or fall of 1930. Having received many responses, he compiled his report, which he sent, in March 1931, to Pacelli".²²⁴

In addition to constant pressures, some exaggerated and surreal reports, including medical reports were also submitted as evidence on the dangers posed by the Protestants. This modus operandi was utilised since the late 1920s when the Vatican accused Protestants of being a threat to the regime, accompanied by the submission of exaggerated reports. Such reports included medical reports to display their dangers towards the physical and mental environment of the Italian society. On one occasion, the Vatican called upon a doctor to provide medical-psychiatric reports detailing the harms of the Pentecostals' practices and

²²¹ Paul N. Garber, *The Methodists of Continental Europe* (New York: Editorial Department, Board of Missions and Church Extensions, The Methodist Church, 1949), p. 92.

²²² Jeffrey C. Copeland and Yan Xuan (eds.), *The YMCA at War: Collaboration and Conflict during the World Wars* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018), p. 69.

²²³ Davis, *The Jews of San Nicandro*, p. 67.

²²⁴ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 100.

beliefs on their congregation.²²⁵ Somehow these methods had been effective as it had resulted in the intervention of the regime and the Italian authorities. On 9th April 1935, the Interior Ministry had issued a circular ordering the prefects and police forces of every province throughout Italy to provide detailed records of Protestant sects and their communities.²²⁶ Since then, the regime and the Vatican had regularly exchanged reports on the activities of non-Catholic communities.

Over time, the investigations became increasingly vigorous and aggressive, especially towards the end of the 1930s. More details were provided including occupational background, household income, personal traits, and habits, as well as opinions towards the regime.²²⁷ For instance, the Vatican had investigated on a Protestant couple who had purchased an apartment near the walls of the Vatican and the particulars included detailed information of the couple's children.²²⁸ This raised questions of whether some of the information, such as on the children, were ever necessary or useful to prosecute Protestants. However, instances of misinformation did occur. One notable case involved the leader of the Jewish community of San Nicandro, Donato Manduzio, who was fined based on allegations of unauthorised Protestant meetings.²²⁹ These thorough investigations appeared to be prone to inaccuracies, possibly due to errors or rumours. This raised questions about the accuracy and trustworthiness of these investigations.

²²⁵ Davis, *The Jews of San Nicandro*, p. 66. The doctor, Dr. Osvaldo Zacchi would attend their meetings or gatherings under a disguise and allegedly had observe signs of epilepsy, hysteria, and convulsions of the people in the meetings including women and children. George Talbot, *Censorship in Fascist Italy, 1922-43* (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 117.

²²⁶ Ibid, pp. 68-69.

²²⁷ Mithans, "The Italian Fascist Regime, the Catholic Church and Protestant Religious Minorities in Terre Redente (1918-40)," p. 63.

²²⁸ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 95.

²²⁹ Davis, *The Jews of San Nicandro*, p. 69.

4.3.3 Various Bans

Besides frequent interrogations and tight monitoring, various bans were imposed against religious minorities in the 1930s. Despite the implementation of the Law of Admitted Cult, the regime and the Vatican increasingly demonstrated discrimination against religious minorities towards the end of the 1930s.

Initially reluctant, the regime gradually persecuted some Protestant churches, mainly due to their alleged foreign links and antifascist sentiments. Italian Methodists, including pastors and leaders, were staunch participants in the antifascist resistance, while the Jehovah's Witnesses were heavily accused of espionage activities—providing information to the United States.²³⁰ With such information, the Vatican seized the opportunity to further emphasise the dangers of Protestants to the Italian society and the regime. Hence, some sects were added to the regime's list of enemies. But it seemed that the goal was not to appease their sacerdotal partner, rather to appease themselves.

Since the 1930s, various bans had been introduced to limit the activities of the Jews and some Protestant sects. Despite the Law of Admitted Cult permitting some religious freedom, the government had ignored the clauses which they ironically had introduced to protect the non-Catholics. Religious activities of Protestants had gradually been shut down and banned by the regime. The ban was solidified when the regime issued the Buffarini-Guidi decree (*Cirolare Buffarini-Guidi*) in April 1935, which ban activities of some Protestant sects and Jews as they were deemed as harming the Italian society and its continuity.²³¹ As a result, some sects had to operate underground to avoid persecution. Protestant pamphlets were banned by the government as the content was considered as anti-Catholic, which equated to antifascism. In 1938, the government confiscated the Salvation Army's pamphlet titled, *Gesú Cristo Ritornerà* (Jesus Christ will Return) for the mentioned factors.²³² Foreign activities were also banned. During the years of Italy's occupation of

²³⁰ Garber, *The Methodists of Continental Europe*, p. 92; Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 37.

²³¹ Paolo Zanini, "Twenty Years of Persecution of Pentecostalism in Italy: 1935-1955," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 20, no. 5 (2015): p. 686.

²³² Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 165.

East Africa, Italian Protestant missionaries had travelled and preached their teachings in some areas, which did not sit well for Pius XI. To quash the Protestant missions in Africa, the Pope had accused the Protestants as British agents in Africa.²³³ Evidently, it seemed that the Vatican's campaign against the Protestants was not only bound within Italy but also other parts of the world. The Vatican had extensively made sure that there was no room for Protestants' religious freedom.

Other bans included import ban as well as circulation of Protestant religious testaments and books in Italy. The Bible of the Protestants had been widely banned as another alleged means of anti-Catholic and antifascist propaganda tool. In the 1930s, a plethora of non-Catholic publications imported to Italy were confiscated. In an aggravated situation, the subscribers of the Jehovah's Witness publication, *The Watchtower*, were hunt down by the government after the authorities confiscated the publication's import in Italy.²³⁴ Overseas letters and mails were also heavily monitored to note the religious minorities' foreign correspondents.

The persecution of religious minorities intensified as the Fascist regime entered The Second World War in late 1930s. It was already known that the Racial Law of 1938 had subsequently sent Italian Jews to the Fascists' concentration camps but some Protestant sects were also sent there. From the late 1930s to early 1940s, several members of Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses had also been sent to concentration camps to be punished as both the regime and the Vatican had criminalised their denomination in Italy.²³⁵ It was apparent that the Vatican had some role in the persecution of the Protestants in these camps.

²³³ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 298.

²³⁴ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 38.

²³⁵ Ibid, p. 36; Gerhard Beiser and Katarzyna Stokłosa (eds.), *Jehovah Witnesses in Europe: Past and Present Volume 1* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), pp. 23-25.

4.3.4 Closure of Religious Centres and Buildings

Apart from that, the status of religious centres, buildings, and houses were also challenged by the relationship. Existing religious centres were deemed as threats towards the Church and society, ergo various centres were ordered to be shut down since the 1920s.

Allegedly due to holding an unauthorised meeting, a Pentecostal meeting centre in a town in the province of Basilicata was shut down by the Italian authorities in 1925.²³⁶ Construction of new centres, buildings or religious houses were also caught in the same conflict. In addition to requiring government authorisation, certain conditions must be met for the constructions to be approved and completed. As usual, these conditions were always linked to the Roman Catholic Church. In this context, the Vatican again had control over constructions requested by other faiths and was disguised behind the required 'government's authorisation.' This can be seen in the conditions set for the construction of Protestant churches. Requiring government authorisation, the construction of new Protestant churches can only be done within a considerable Protestant community and at their request. If the main purpose of the construction was to spread their teachings to Catholics, local Roman Catholic priests had some power to file a complaint about any suspicious activities, leading to the automatic rejection of the application.²³⁷ There were also instances where such constructions were not rejected but prohibited by Mussolini himself. In the 1930s, Mussolini had prohibited the construction of a mosque in Rome, and his decision had pleased Pius XI, as the Vatican had been against the idea for centuries.²³⁸

²³⁶ Davis, *The Jews of San Nicandro*, p. 66.

²³⁷ Richard A. Webster, *The Cross and the Fasces: Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy* (California: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 154.

²³⁸ Denis M. Smith, *Mussolini* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. 159; Kopanski, "Islam in Italy and its Libyan Colony," p. 191. The incident came after some had proposed for the construction of a mosque for migrated Muslims from Italy's colonies. Mussolini stated that a mosque would only be built in Rome when a Roman Catholic church would be built in Mecca.

4.3.5 Situation in Italian Academia and Educational System

From the relationship, the Catholics had also gained many privileges in the academia and educational system in Italy, which subsequently affected the position of religious minorities. The implications had come from certain angles. Mainly, the reforms conducted in favour of the Vatican and Catholics had its effects towards non-Catholic students.

As the Gentile reforms had imposed Catholic instructions in all Italian elementary schools, initially it did not exempt non-Catholic students. After some changes, another law was added which exempted students whose “parents declare that they want to provide it themselves”.²³⁹ In other words, religious education of other faiths was only bound informally in their households, while Catholic students had a bigger opportunity to be educated in schools by educators and religious textbooks approved by the Vatican.

Later in the Lateran Accords, such privileges had been extended to secondary schools as stated in Article 36 of the Concordat. This reflected the regime’s educational reforms centred around the Roman Catholic Church and its majority in Italian society. Thus, this suggested that the policies discriminated against non-Catholic students as the regime’s ‘greatest’ solution was to encourage informal religious education outside of school. To some non-Catholic leaders, this was the regime and the Vatican’s personal attack against the identity and beliefs of religious minorities. For instance, between 1930 and 1931, Jewish students in elementary schools had to face the challenge of using standardised textbooks that contained the Church’s anti-Judaic sentiments.²⁴⁰ Some leaders had grown concerned over the possibilities of any attempts of conversion. Jewish leaders, Angelo Sereni and Angelo Sacerdoti had reported that, “...Gentile had told them he could not guarantee that in the new school system there would not be attempts on the part of Catholic teachers to proselytise Jewish children.”²⁴¹ Thus, some Jewish leaders rejected and criticised Gentile educational reforms as they believed they were “...giving the clergy undue

²³⁹ Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini’s Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, pp. 44 & 299.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 65. After several appeals, the Union of Italian Jewish Communities was permitted by the regime to remove – but not replace, any sensitive context.

²⁴¹ Ibid, pp. 47-48.

influence over both religious belief and teaching itself".²⁴² In obtaining privileges in the educational system, the Vatican had also gained some control over the society's education, which subsequently affected the non-Catholic students' rights and freedom for education. The regime also seemed to permit the Vatican with such control whilst ignoring the well-being of religious minority students.

For this reason alone, the privileges gained through the Vatican's relationship with the Fascist regime hindered minority groups' efforts to establish their own educational system. The Vatican had an open opportunity to obstruct such attempts as they pleased. For the Jews, education had been part of their advocacy of national identity in Italy. Since the 1910s, the communities had planned for the expansion of Jewish education throughout Italy. In a Jewish Youth Congress in Turin on December 1912, it had been on discussion that while there were significant number of Jewish elementary schools in Italy, the number of students were relatively small with most from low-income families and schools that offered complete cycle of six grades were limited in cities like Florence and Livorno.²⁴³ Therefore, it was crucial for the Italian Jewish communities to establish more Jewish schools and their own educational system to strengthen the Jewish identity of their youth. Yet, with the new educational reforms, it had threatened such efforts.

The Protestants were affected as well. Aside from the educational reforms, the Roman Catholic Church had attempted to overshadow or outcompete Protestant schools. From the relationship, various projects of Catholic schools had been green-lit by the regime. Hence, construction of Catholic schools, kindergarten and orphanages were intentionally done in rural areas of dominant Protestant communities. Namely, Spezia, that was labelled as 'the Seat of Protestantism in Italy' as one of the primary locations, along with other Protestant strongholds such as Portici, San Sebastiano, and Teramo.²⁴⁴ To some extent, the Vatican was able to convince the regime to intervene. For example, in 1925, Mussolini ordered the closure of the Methodist College of Rome after the Vatican filed a complaint.²⁴⁵

²⁴² Renzo De Felice, *The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History*, trans. Robert L. Miller, (New York: Enigma Books, 2001), p. 78.

²⁴³ Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, p. 47.

²⁴⁴ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, pp. 65 & 172.

²⁴⁵ John Hearley, *Pope or Mussolini* (New York: The Macaulay Company, 1929), p. 84.

In some localities, the religious orders had taken it upon themselves to close any Protestant schools, instrumentalising the context of the accords to expand their authority in taking such actions.²⁴⁶ This later established a pattern of behaviour among some Italian religious orders, who viewed the Lateran Accords as a validation of their authority in their respective areas.

Moreover, the relationship had also led to the exclusion of Protestants and Jews in the Italian academia and educational system. Like the students, non-Catholic teaching professionals also had to face challenges of discrimination and mistreatment due to their faiths. Educational policies and reforms in favour of the Vatican had diminished the role of non-Catholic teachers and educators. When the Gentile reform was introduced, many of the religious minority leaders had expressed their concern of the fate of these teachers. This included the prediction of the Chief Rabbi of Rome, Angelo Sacerdoti, who foresaw the potential exclusion of Jews from teaching roles in Italian public schools.²⁴⁷ As mentioned previously, the new reform had somehow gifted the Vatican some control over the Italian educational system. One such policy granted the Church authority in appointing instructors in religious classes, posing a threat to the positions of these teachers.²⁴⁸ Sacerdoti's prediction also suggested that he feared such leeway could lead to even more authority for the Vatican in regards to teaching professionals in public schools and other academic institutions. However, persecution of Jews in 1938 did, in fact, affected Jewish teaching professionals, not only in public schools but also in Italian universities and colleges. In that year alone, there had been an extensive dismissal of Jewish teaching and managing staffs in schools and institutions throughout Italy.²⁴⁹ Yet, this incident was primarily an outcome of the Fascist regime's persecution of Jews in the late 1930s.

Protestant educators, on the other hand, were targets of the Vatican. As the previous point, the Vatican had used the contents of the accords to their advantage, especially against

²⁴⁶ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 275.

²⁴⁷ Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution*, p. 47.

²⁴⁸ In January 1925, a decree had introduced a system which a cleric would be selected by the *Provveditore* at the beginning of every school year as an instructor for religious classes. The *Provveditore* would be given a list of candidates provided by the local religious authorities to make his selection. Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy*, p. 445.

²⁴⁹ Annalisa Capristo, "Italian Intellectuals and the Exclusion of Their Jewish Colleagues from Universities and Academies," *Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary*, no. 164 (2013): p. 66.

Protestants. Also, this was related to the former's fear of 'religious pollution' that could be spread by Protestant teachers. Hence, exaggerated claims once again found their way into the Vatican's strategy to eliminate Protestant teachers. Article 5 of the treaty was often used to accuse Protestant teachers of apostasy, leading to their dismissal from their positions.²⁵⁰ The same clause had also been used as an excuse to go after Protestant schools. Protestant and Jewish teaching professionals in Italy were clearly affected by the relationship between the Church and the regime, and both groups had to face the same extensive effects.

4.4 DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

4.4.1 The Vatican's Condemnation of the Regime's Antisemitic Policies

The prejudice against the Jews would cause a severe blow to the Vatican's collaboration with Mussolini's regime. Both aimed to annihilate Jews and Protestants but their similar goals had transformed into a conflict due to the differences in approaches. While Protestants remained a major nemesis, antisemitism was strongly rejected by the Vatican.

A campaign against the regime's policies in 1938 was public and active, citing their antisemitic nature as contradictory to Roman Catholic principles. The release of the Manifesto of Racist Scientists (*Manifesto della razza*) in July 1938 provoked a storm of protests by the Pope. The Manifesto, at the outset, contradicted Mussolini's initial claim in which he stated, "...there are no pure races left; not even the Jews have kept their blood unmingled...Nothing will ever make me believe that biologically pure races can be shown to exist to-day," but the Manifesto asserted the existence of a pure Italian race.²⁵¹ The manifesto more injuriously attempted to inflict racism within the Italian societal. In its seventh point, the manifesto exhorted for the 'pure race' to detach themselves from non-European races, to elevate superiority and embrace greater responsibility.

²⁵⁰ Madigan, *The Popes Against The Protestants: The Vatican and Evangelical Christianity in Fascist Italy*, p. 113. Article 5 of the treaty in the Lateran Accords mentioned that no apostate or censored clergy can be appointed or kept in any teaching position office, or employment in which they would be in direct contact with the Italian public. Pollard, *The Vatican & Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, p. 205.

²⁵¹ Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933), p. 39. For the Italian and unofficial translation of the Manifesto, refer to Appendix III.

Pius XI characterised the document as “a true form of apostasy” and called on the members of the Catholic Action and its organs to reject the regime’s racial laws.²⁵² Consequently, the frequency of assaults on Catholic Action centres by regional Fascists increased significantly, thus proving the continuity of the issues before the Lateran Accords. The Pope proceeded to critique racism and stressed its parallel with exaggerated nationalism during his address before students of the College of Propaganda Fide between July and August 1938. On one occasion, Pius XI underscored the divisive nature of racism, which obstructed the essential connections between individuals, communities, and nations, thus undermining the fundamental principles of coexistence.²⁵³ The Pope’s critique suggested the consequences would very much be implicated to the Italian masses.

4.4.2 The Regime’s Retaliation

In response, the regime had pried into the Vatican's antisemitic history to battle against their censure of the racial legislation. Current incidents were also brought up to expose the Vatican’s double standards.

The Vatican’s past with the Jews was brought to light by the Fascist press. At the forefront of the critique against the Vatican's historical conduct, Roberto Farinacci, an outspoken anti-cleric, utilised his publication, *Il Regime Fascista* to launch his attack. In October 1938, an article entitled, “Adaption That Surprises,” illustrated the paper’s bewilderment over the Vatican’s drastic change in policy towards the Jews.²⁵⁴ One of the Vatican’s journals, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, known for its myriads of articles on Jews since the 19th century was analysed to create further doubt on the Vatican. Namely, *Il Regime Fascista* emphasised the Catholic journal's repertoire of incitement by labelling Jews as ‘a plague of mankind’.²⁵⁵ *La Civiltà Cattolica* was again attacked for its present Catholic antisemitism model. The year 1938 saw the release of articles on the perceived Jewish

²⁵² Camille Cianfarra, *The Vatican and the War* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1945), pp. 133-134.

²⁵³ Cianfarra, *The Vatican and the War*, p. 135.

²⁵⁴ Robert A. Maryks, *Pouring Jewish Water into Fascist Wine: Untold Stories of Catholic Jews from the Archive of Mussolini’s Jesuit Pietro Tacchi Venturi* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publication, 2011) p. 19.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 20.

threat, followed by the regime's rationale for its antisemitism, which unmistakably illustrated the journal's stance.²⁵⁶ Thus, Farinacci wasted no time to exploit the situation to his advantage. He claimed *La Civiltà Cattolica* as a strong ally in the regime's racial campaign but the journal rebuked the claims as it never defended the confiscation of Jewish properties as enforced by the law.²⁵⁷ Still, it would be difficult for the journal to defend itself due to its active discriminatory publications against Jews.

As racism was in question, the regime utilised *La Civiltà Cattolica* backing of racial provisions in Italian colonies in East Africa. A year before the racial provisions in Italy, the regime imposed discriminatory laws against local Africans, which was supported by the Vatican and its organs.²⁵⁸ The regime, having once been appreciative, eventually interpreted the Vatican's action savoured on hypocrisy: opposing racism domestically while endorsing racial bans internationally.

The Vatican attempted vigorously to defend themselves against the claims made by the regime. The main strategies were to create clear distinction between the Church's anti-Judaism and the regime's antisemitism, and contain any anti-Judaic activities of its organs. *L'Osservatore romano* defended the Vatican's past by affirming that the Popes' intention of safeguarding the Christians.²⁵⁹ Explanatory articles on anti-Judaism of the Vatican were also released. Many justified anti-Judaism stemming from the Vatican's suspicions as a religion which called for some separation between Jews and Catholics, whilst antisemitism denied a race's sense of existence which contradicted universality of the Church.²⁶⁰

The Fascists strike a final blow on the Vatican by not containing the local Fascist attack on the Catholic Action. The association was also accused of violating its apolitical

²⁵⁶ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 302.

²⁵⁷ Webster, *The Cross and the Fasces: Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy*, p. 126.

²⁵⁸ Ceci, *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, p. 223. Racism against the African communities were also rationalised in the Manifesto of Racist Scientists as to preserve the purity of the Aryan race. As such, the transportation of Catholic missionaries was exploited to fulfil the regime's objective of civilization expansion of the pure race. The Vatican, however, aimed to eliminate missions of Protestants in East Africa. Augias, *The Secrets of Rome: Love & Death in the Internal City*, p. 363; Dagnino, *Faith and Fascism: Catholic Intellectuals in Italy, 1925-43*, p. 79.

²⁵⁹ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 109.

²⁶⁰ Frank J. Coppa, "Between Anti-Judaism and Anti-Semitism, Pius XI's Response to the Nazi Persecution of the Jews: Precursor to Pius XII's 'Silence'?", *Journal of Church and State* 47, no. 1 (2005): p. 65; Zimmerman (ed), *Jews in Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule, 1922-1945*, p. 274.

function by participating in the Pope's protest against the racial laws. To protect the Catholic Action, the Vatican designed an agreement which in turn had the regime contained their opposition.

4.4.3 Pius XI's Final Battle

The Vatican found themselves in a predicament as attacks on Catholic Action centres escalated all over Italy due to the Vatican's antiracist campaign. The regime, however, were unbothered to contain the attacks caused by the local Fascists.

As reports mounted over the attacks, the Vatican proceeded to reach an agreement to rescue the Catholic Action. A three-page typed document consisted of three demands from the Pope to Mussolini. The demands were: the cessation of mistreatment of Jews; the allowance for Catholic Action to continue its activities without government interference and the reinstatement of Catholic Action members expelled from PNF; and the dismissal of the party leader in Bergamo due to the intense brutalities directed at Catholic Action centres in the city.²⁶¹ Upon reviewing the stipulations, Mussolini altered the terms regarding the Jewish population, albeit with a hint of irony undertone. He asserted that the new racial regulations were less severe than those historically imposed by the papacy against Jews over the centuries.²⁶² In return, the Vatican would agree to refrain from criticising any future racial laws.²⁶³ On 20 August 1938, the agreement was signed; however, it did not end the friction between the Vatican and the regime, as reported by various press. While it was agreed upon that the Vatican and its organs refrain their criticism, Pius XI resumed his campaign against antisemitism.

Even so, the agreement was a triumph for Mussolini and his regime in containing the protests of the Vatican. As such, it can be suggested that the Vatican's concerns over the growing violence towards the Catholic Action was anticipated by Mussolini. On August 2,

²⁶¹ Cianfarra, *The Vatican and the War*, pp. 135-136.

²⁶² Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 108.

²⁶³ Ibid.

1938, his son-in-law recounted an incident involving the Duce's emotional outburst directed toward the Pope and said, "I do not underestimate his strength.... but he must not underestimate mine either, 1931 should have taught him. A sign from me would be enough to unleash anti-clericalism of the Italian people,".²⁶⁴ 1931 was referring to the Crisis of 1931 where a public dispute between the regime and the Vatican resulted in the dissolution of the Catholic Action in the government and various Fascist attacks against Catholics in various cities.²⁶⁵ Mussolini's statement had given away crucial points in his relationship with the papacy towards the 1930s. His exploitation of anticlericalism and Fascist violence displayed his lack of sympathy towards the Church and allowance of violence. A similar warning was sent when Pius XI continued his public antiracist opposition. In another conversation with Ciano on 22nd August 1938, he mentioned, "If the Pope continues to talk, I will tickle up the Italians and in less than no time I will turn them into anti-clericals again".²⁶⁶ In reference to the conflicts of the 1920s, this raised questions regarding Mussolini's capability to suppress anticlerical violence: was he merely unable to contain it, or did he never intend to do so from the start?

Aside from the threats posed by the Duce, the regime continued to obstruct Pius XI's efforts to combat the racial legislation. The speeches delivered by the Pope were either boycotted or taken out of context by Fascist press, though the Pope maintained the same momentum in his opposition.²⁶⁷ The Vatican faced a renewed dilemma in November of that year concerning the racial laws imposed by the regime. The ban on marriages between Aryans and non-Aryans were stressed by the Vatican as a violation of the Lateran Accords. As per the latest law, such unions were deemed illegal, therefore mandated to be annulled.²⁶⁸ Article 34 of the concordats, however, stated that church marriages including between Catholics and non-Catholics were legalised by the Italian civil law whilst any cases of annulment were adjudicated by the ecclesiastical courts or canon law.²⁶⁹ Several attempts

²⁶⁴ Galeazzo Ciano, *Ciano's Hidden Diary, 1937-1938*, trans. Andreas Mayor, (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1953), p. 141.

²⁶⁵ For more information, refer to Chapter 6 of Pollard, *The Vatican & Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict*, pp. 133-161.

²⁶⁶ Ciano, *Ciano's Hidden Diary, 1937-1938*, p. 146.

²⁶⁷ Cianfarra, *The Vatican and the War*, p. 136.

²⁶⁸ "Fascists to Press Racial Program Despite Protest: Marked Irritation Shown to Vatican's Protest of Marriage Law," *The Evening Star* (Washington D.C., United States), November 15, 1938, p. 4.

²⁶⁹ Refer to Parsons, *The Pope and Italy*, pp. 109 – 110.

were made by the Vatican aimed to persuade Mussolini to retract the new marriage law. In a handwritten correspondence, Pius XI appealed to Mussolini and King Emanuele III to withdraw the law, but his plea was in vain.²⁷⁰ Devastation on the Vatican increased when Fascist violence directed at the Catholic Action and its facilities remained ceaseless.²⁷¹ The signed agreement demonstrated a one-sided nature, benefiting the regime by suppressing the Vatican's dissent, while leaving the Vatican's concerns unaddressed.

In the final months before his death, Pius XI was still determined to put a fight against the racial laws imposed by the regime. With the assistance of foreign Jesuits, John La Farge, Gustave Desbuquois and Gustav Gundlach, an encyclical was composed to condemn racism that was beginning to permeate various regions across the globe.²⁷² However, several problems prevented the encyclical to be publicly released. The first being the draft's dispatcher passing it over to Enrico Rosa – the editor of *La Civiltà Cattolica*, when he was instructed to only deliver the draft to the Pope.²⁷³ As a result, the second problem arose when Vatican officials were against the draft after discovering its existence.²⁷⁴ The encyclical titled, the Unity of the Human Race (*Humani Generis Unitas*) was never released due to the death of Pius XI on 10th February 1939.

The Duce was more than delighted to hear the news, which was documented a year later. In a conversation with *The Times's* correspondent, Camille Cianfarra, Bruno Mussolini revealed, "I remember when the Pope died, Ciano [Count Galeazzo Ciano] telephoned Father early in the morning to give him the news. I was in Father's (Mussolini's) library when the call came. He broke into a big smile and said, '*Finalmente se n'e' andato!* [Finally, he is gone.] He then turned to me and explained, '*Quel Vecchio ostinato e' morto.*' [That obstinate old man is dead.]"²⁷⁵ This showed Mussolini's personal resentment towards Pius XI due to the disputes in the 1930s. As for Pius XI, he still showered his gratitude to both the King and Mussolini for the settlement of the Roman Question on its tenth anniversary,

²⁷⁰ "Fascists to Press Racial Program Despite Protest: Marked Irritation Shown to Vatican's Protest of Marriage Law," p. 4. The King had responded but stated the issue was between the Vatican and the regime.

²⁷¹ Cianfarra, *The Vatican and the War*, p. 144.

²⁷² Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*, p. 189.

²⁷³ Fattorini, *Hitler, Mussolini and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech That was Never Made*, p. 155.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Cianfarra, *The Vatican and the War*, p. 20.

even as they were embroiled in the dispute over the racial laws.²⁷⁶ In comparison, it can be inferred that the Pope highly respected Mussolini and can be assumed of his eternal intentions to repair the Vatican's ties with the regime.

4.4.4 The Regime and the New Pope

Even after Pius XI's passing, the relationship did not seem to improve very much and it seemed that Mussolini did not make any effort to repair it. Mussolini, however, did try to have some involvement in the selection of the new Pope for his own benefit. As Italy entered World War II the papacy collaborated with the regime's rivals to prioritise the safety of the Vatican and Italy.

During the election of Pius XI's successor, Mussolini exercised some influence to shape the next pontificate in his favour. Together with Hitler, he pressured for the election of a candidate sympathetic to the Fascist approach, only to be met with disappointment.²⁷⁷ The new Pope, Eugenio Pacelli who took the name, Pius XII, stressed the preservation of peace as his main policy. By coincidence, his pontificate commenced concurrently with the onset of the war. As Mussolini's regime was consumed with the war, the Vatican engaged with the Allies to ensure the security of the Vatican and Italy. For instance, a telegram to a British diplomat in December 1943, Sir D'Arcy Osbourne, illustrated the Vatican's request for the protection of its domain and Italy from the British government.²⁷⁸ The Vatican's collaboration with Britain had long been speculated by the regime. Farinacci, in *Il Regime Fascista*, had labelled some Vatican officials, including Giovanni Battista Montini, as anti-Italian for their links with the regime's enemies and were conspiring against the Italian government.²⁷⁹ Farinacci's statement had some truth to it. Despite their close links with Britain, some Vatican officials engaged with other collaborators. For example, Montini collaborated with King Emmanuele III's daughter-in-law, Princess Maria José of Belgium

²⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 144.

²⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 23.

²⁷⁸ TNA, FO 371/37330/25.

²⁷⁹ Anthony Rhodes, *The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators 1922-1945* (New York, Chicago, & San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974) p. 300.

to oust Mussolini and reach a peace agreement, but the plot was suspended due to King's disapproval²⁸⁰ Consequently, as Mussolini approached his impending defeat in 1945, his former ally, the Vatican, began to distance itself and conspire to terminate his regime. In reflection of his near downfall during the Matteotti Crisis in 1924, Mussolini could have leveraged his connections with the papacy to restore his political standing; however, the friction that developed during the 1930s obliterated any prospects for support from the Church and the Catholic community.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The Vatican and the Fascist regime aligned to pursue shared goals, including persecuting religious minorities, especially Protestants and Jews, whose challenges stemmed not only from limited representation but also from the dominance of the Catholic majority in state governance.

Through this relationship, Roman Catholics gained privileges that effectively curtailed the rights of non-Catholic groups. Although the Law of Admitted Cults was enacted to define the rights of religious minorities, the Vatican's overarching influence on the regime undermined the law's efficacy, rendering it largely ineffective. Despite the apparent alignment of purpose between the Vatican and the regime, their relationship ultimately became a significant source of conflict. The implementation of racial laws in the late 1930s created major frictions in the partnership, and despite the appointment of a new Pope, the relationship continued to deteriorate until the regime's collapse following Italy's defeat in World War II.

²⁸⁰. Sullivan (ed.), *My Fault: Mussolini as I Knew Him*, p. 193.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In 1922, Benito Mussolini seemed to display signs of overshadowing his predecessors, as well as his political rivals, by reconciling Italy with the Vatican. His first speech in the Parliament a year prior had shown some signs of his acceptance and amity towards the Catholic Church and the papacy, despite his anticlerical past. Mussolini's clandestine engagement with Cardinal Gasparri in 1923 further cemented his goal of forming a connection between the Fascist regime and the Vatican.

Since its isolation in the 1870s, the Vatican had longed to resolve the Roman Question, which included the papacy's sovereignty. This issue had been delayed since the end of World War I due to the constant change of leadership. On another note, the Vatican aimed to reform Italy by integrating the Catholic identity, practices, and beliefs into the tenets of its society. However, the Fascist regime aimed to reform Italian society into a Fascist one. In the regime's mind, the reconciliation would bolster their standing and reputation on the global stage, enabling the spread of the ideology and Mussolini's influence internationally. Additionally, both the Vatican and the regime sought to eliminate common enemies, creating a sense of commonality. In this case, the partnership was mutually beneficial and complementary, with the Vatican seeking protection from its enemies, especially the Socialists and Communists, and the regime relying on them for support against these political factions.

With their respective goals and objectives intact, developments in the relationship took place rapidly after their first meeting. A plethora of reforms and policies in favour of the Roman Catholic Church had been implemented by the regime to impress their sacerdotal partners. From aiding with the Church's finance crisis to reforming the educational system, the regime seemed to further cement its superiority over the previous governments as their progress humiliated the latter's hesitance. After its biggest achievement in commencing the Holy Year in 1925, an official agreement had been orchestrated between 1926 to 1928. However, the agreement had been delayed on a few occasions due to the conflicts in the relationship. As cordial and smooth as it seemed,

complications emerged as a result of the antithetical nature of the relationship. Complications such lengthy discussions to curb the fascist violence against local Catholics and their institutions, as well as disputes over Italian youth groups had been a hindrance towards the relationship. Temporal solutions were aimed to avoid further disruptions towards the negotiation process. Although the Lateran Accords were completed and signed in February 1929, there was no denying that the ties between the Vatican and Mussolini's regime began to loosen as they reached their peak. It was worth to note that the accords did not contribute much to reduce the tensions at hand. Still, the regime and the Vatican band together in defending their accords against the oppositions.

Concurrently, the relationship significantly impacted various segments of Italian society, particularly Protestants and Jews. As the key religious minorities, both groups became targets of the Vatican and the regime. While the Vatican sought to solidify the Catholic Church's influence in Italy, the regime's crackdown was driven by resistance from certain Protestant sects and a push for a pure Italian national identity. Persecution of Jews and Protestants intensified in the late 1930s, with both groups subjected to strict surveillance and harassment by the authorities. Disparate views on antisemitic policies in subsequent years led to conflicts within an already fragile alliance. Viewing the regime's antisemitism as a violation of humanity, Pius XI dedicated his final years to protesting Mussolini's racial campaign, resulting in a prolonged struggle between ecclesiastical officials and the regime, and marking a significant deterioration in their relationship compared to the 1920s. After Pius XI's death, his successor, Eugenio Pacelli – who became Pope Pius XII – was unable to restore peace, focusing instead on protecting Italy and the Vatican during the realities of World War II. The new Pope's communications with the Allies regarding security further strained the alliance. This decline continued until the fall of the Fascist regime in 1943.

The relationship between the Fascist regime in Italy and the Vatican resembled typical diplomatic engagements found in various political landscapes. Two entities came together to achieve similar goals, often tested by their respective strengths and weaknesses. In this case, the relationship's strength lay in its unique ability to repair the church-state gap that had long been a source of tension throughout the European continent. However, this strength gradually exposed the alliance to vulnerabilities. Although it generated

benefits for both sides, the partnership ultimately revealed itself as a form of convenience. Mussolini held onto the Vatican as a moral posture to bolster his reputation, especially in times of crisis, while Pius XI relied on the regime to uphold his sacred duties to the Church and the Catholic faith.

Nevertheless, the true failure of this alliance laid in its diminishing focus on its initial goal. As time passed, both the Vatican and the regime lost sight of their primary objective of reconciling Italy with the Church. Efforts to maintain the relationship were overshadowed by self-serving motivations. What began as a display of compromise transformed into a battleground of political machinations and conflicting perceptions. Thus, this alliance not only reshaped the political and religious landscape of Italy but also served as a stark reminder of the entanglement of religious and political authority, often at the expense of genuine ethical principles and the well-being of the people that they claim to serve.

Ultimately, the complex interplay of religious and political tensions during this period laid the groundworks in enduring conflicts between the Vatican and Italy. This research illustrates the complexities of church-state relations, supporting the theory of instrumentalism, which emphasises the utilisation of religious institutions by political entities. Moreover, it underscores the importance of understanding the dynamics between political authorities and religious groups, highlighting the need for compromise and ethical considerations in their interactions.

A comprehensive and holistic understanding of Italo-Vatican relations and its history is urgently needed to adequately address current and future questions, as well as to find appropriate solutions to historic wrongs. On the other hand, the analysis and discussions in this dissertation had opened many doors for other sorts of inquiries in addressing other gaps. Hence, further studies should be put forward from other angles such as the division amongst the Vatican members and the Fascists in their response against the reconciliation, effects of the relationship towards other foreign alliances and diplomacies, and the treatment of other religious minorities.

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APPENDIX I: LATERAN ACCORDS, 11TH FEBRUARY 1929²⁸¹

THE TREATY

In the name of the Most Holy Trinity:

Whereas the Holy See and Italy have recognised the desirability of eliminating every reason for discord which may exist between them and of arriving at a final settlement of their reciprocal relations which shall be consistent with justice and the dignity of the two high contracting parties, and which, by permanent assuring to the Holy See a position *de facto* and *de jure* which will guarantee to it absolute independence for the fulfilment of its exalted mission to the world, and enable the Holy See to consider as finally and irrevocably settled the Roman question, which arose in 1870 by the annexation of Rome to the Kingdom of Italy under the dynasty of the House of Savoy;

And whereas it is a duty, for the purpose of assuring the absolute and visible independence to the Holy See, to guarantee to it an indisputable sovereignty in the international domain, it has been recognised as necessary to constitute, under special conditions, the Vatican City and to recognise the full ownership, and the exclusive and absolute dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the same;

His Holiness, the Supreme Pontiff Pius XI and his Majesty Victor Emmanuel III., King of Italy, have decided to conclude a treaty and have appointed for that purpose two plenipotentiaries, viz.:

His Holiness the Pope: His Most Reverend Eminence Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, his Secretary of State;

His Majesty the King of Italy: His Excellency Cav. Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister, and Head of the Government;

Who, having exchanged their respective credentials, found the same good and in due form, have agreed to the following articles:

Art. 1

Italy recognises and reaffirms the principle embodied in article 1 of the statute of the Kingdom of Italy dated 4th March, 1848, according to which the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion is the sole religion of the State.

²⁸¹ Great Britain, *British and Foreign State Papers, 1929 Part I*, vol. 130 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934), pp. 791-814. The original Italian text can be found in *Gazzetta Ufficiale Del Regno D'Italia* 70, no. 130 (5 Giugno 1929): pp. 2501-2533.

Art. 2

Italy recognises the sovereignty of the Holy See in the international domain as an attribute inherent in its nature and in conformity with its tradition and the requirements of its mission in the world.

Art. 3

Italy recognises full ownership and the exclusive and absolute dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican, as at present constituted, together with all its appurtenances and endowments; by this means is created the Vatican City for the special purposes and under the conditions prescribed by the present treaty. The boundaries of the said City are indicated in the plan forming annex I to the present treaty, of which it forms an integral part.

It is further understood that, although a part of the Vatican City, St. Peter's Square, will continue normally to be open to the public and subject to the police control of the Italian authorities, which shall cease at the foot of the steps leading into the Basilica, although the latter shall continue to be used for public worship. The polices shall accordingly refrain from ascending the steps and entering the said Basilica unless they are invited to intervene by the competent authorities.

Whenever the Holy See considers it necessary, for the purpose of special ceremonies, to close St. Peter's Square temporarily to the public, the Italian authorities shall withdraw beyond the outer lines of Bernini's Colonnade and extension thereof, unless they are invited by the competent authorities to remain.

Art. 4

The sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the Vatican City, which Italy recognises as appertaining to the Holy See, precludes any intervention therein on the part of the Italian Government and any authority other than that of the Holy See.

Art. 5

For the purpose of the execution of the provisions of the preceding article before the present treaty enters into operation, the territory forming the Vatican City shall be freed from any obligations and the presence of any occupants by the Italian Government. The Holy See shall arrange for the accesses thereto to be closed, and shall enclose the open parts, except St. Peter's Square.

It is further agreed that as regards the immovable property situated therein and belonging to religious institutions or bodies, the Holy See shall take steps directly for the settlement of its relations with the latter, the Italian State maintaining a disinterested attitude.

Art. 6

Italy shall ensure, by the conclusion of the necessary agreements with the interested bodies, an adequate supply of water to Vatican City in ownership.

Italy shall further provide for communication with the State railways by means of the construction of a railway station within Vatican City at the point shown on the annexed plan and by the running on the Italian railways of carriages belonging to the Vatican.

It shall also provide for the direct connection with other States of the telegraph, telephone, radiotelegraph, radiotelephone and postal services in the Vatican City.

Finally, Italy shall also provide for co-ordination of other public services.

Provision shall be made for the whole of the foregoing at the expense of the Italian State within the period of 1 year from the entry into force of the present treaty.

The Holy See shall make arrangements at its own expense for the organisation of the means of access to the Vatican already in existence and those which it may see fit to open subsequently.

Agreements shall be concluded between the Holy See and the Italian State concerning the circulation in the territory of the latter of the land vehicles and aircraft of the Vatican City.

Art. 7

The Italian Government engages not to permit within the territory surrounding the Vatican City new buildings overlooking the latter, and for the same purpose to undertake the partial demolition of those already existing from the Porta Cavalleggeri and along the Via Aurelia and the Viale Vaticano.

In conformity with the rules of international law, the flight of aircraft of any kind whatever over the Vatican territory is prohibited.

In the Piazza Rusticucci and in the zones adjoining to the Colonnade to which the extraterritoriality referred to in article 15 does not extend, any building or street alteration which may be of interest to the Vatican City shall be undertaken by mutual agreement.

Art. 8

Considering the person of the Supreme Pontiff as sacred and inviolable, Italy declares any attempt against the same, and any incitement to commit such an attempt, to be punishable with the same penalties as are prescribed in the case of an attempt, and incitement to commit such, against the person of the King.

Offenses or public insults committed within Italian territory against the person of the Supreme Pontiff by means of speeches, acts and writings, shall be punished in the same manner as offenses or insults against the person of the King.

Art. 9

In accordance with the rules of international law all persons having permanent residence within Vatican City shall be subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See. Such residence is not lost by the mere fact of temporary residence elsewhere unaccompanied by the loss of a habitation in the City itself or by other circumstances proving that such residence has been abandoned.

On ceasing to be subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See, persons referred to in the preceding paragraph shall *ipso facto* be considered Italian nationals, when according to the provisions of Italian law, independently of the circumstances of fact above contemplated, they are not to be considered as possessing any other national status.

To such persons, while they are subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See, the provisions of Italian law shall be applicable within the territory of the Kingdom of Italy, even as regards matters in which the personal law should be observed (when these are not governed by regulations issued by the Holy See). In the case of persons who are held to possess other nationality, the laws of the State to which they belong shall apply.

Art. 10

The Church dignitaries and persons belonging to the Papal Court, whose shall be specified in a list to be agreed upon by the high contracting parties, even when not citizens of the Vatican, shall be always and in every case, so far as Italy is concerned, exempt from military service, jury obligations and every service of a personal character.

This provision shall also apply to officials on the establishment declared indispensable by the Holy See, who are permanently employed and earning a fixed salary in the offices of the Holy See, and also in the departments and offices specified below in articles 13, 14, 15 and 16, which exist outside Vatican City. Such officials shall be enumerated in another list, to be agreed upon as above-mentioned, which shall be revised annually by the Holy See.

Clergy who, by reason of their office, perform outside the Vatican City any act as officials of the Holy See shall not that account to be subject to any hindrance, enquiry or interference on the part of the Italian authorities.

Any foreigner holding ecclesiastical office in Rome shall enjoy the personal guarantees appertaining to Italian nationals in virtue of the laws of the Kingdom.

Art. 11

The central bodies of the Catholic Church shall be exempt from any interference on the part of the Italian State (subject to the provisions of the Italian laws respecting the acquisitions of juridical persons) and from conversion as regards immovable property.

Art. 12

Italy recognises the right of the Holy See to active and passive legation in accordance with the general rules of international law.

Envoys of foreign Governments to the Holy See shall continue to enjoy in the Kingdom all of the privileges and immunities appertaining to diplomatic agents in virtue of international law, and their headquarters may remain in Italian territory and shall enjoy the immunities due to them in accordance with international law, even if the States to which they belong maintain no diplomatic relations with Italy.

It is understood that Italy undertakes always and in every case to leave free the correspondence from all States, including belligerents, to the Holy See and *vice versa*, and to allow the free access of bishops from all parts of the whole world to the Apostolic See.

The high contracting parties undertake to establish normal diplomatic relations between themselves by accrediting an Italian Ambassador to the Holy See and a Papal Nuncio to Italy. The latter shall be the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in accordance with the customary right recognised by the Congress of Vienna in the Act of the 9th June, 1815.

In virtue of the sovereignty recognised, and without prejudice to the provisions of article 19 below, diplomatists of the Holy See and couriers sent in the name of the Supreme Pontiff shall enjoy in Italian territory, even in time of war, the treatment due to diplomatists and carriers of despatches of other foreign Governments in accordance with the rules of international law.

Art. 13

Italy recognises the patriarchal Basilicas of St. John Lateran, St. Mary Major and St. Paul, with the annexed buildings (annex II, 1, 2 and 3), as being the absolute property of the Holy See.

The State shall transfer to the Holy See the free management and administration of the said Basilica of St. Paul and the attached monastery, and shall further pay to the Holy See the capital sum corresponding to the amounts annually allotted for the Basilica in the estimates of the Ministry of Public Instruction.

It is likewise understood that the Holy See is the absolute owner of the dependent building of St. Callistus, near St. Mary in Trastevere (annex II, 9).

Art. 14

Italy recognises the full ownership by the Holy See of the pontifical palace of Castel Gandolfo, together with all endowments, appurtenances and appendages thereof (annex II, 4) which are now already in the possession of the Holy See. Italy further undertakes to cede to the Holy See, likewise in full ownership, and to hand it over within 6 months from the entry into force of the present treaty, the Villa Barberini at Castel Gandolfo, together with all endowments, appurtenances and appendages thereof (annex II, 5).

In order to make into one single whole the real property situated on the northern side of the Janiculum Hill belonging to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide and other ecclesiastical institutions and facing the Vatican Palaces, the States undertakes to transfer to the Holy See or to the bodies specified by it the immovable property belonging to the State or to third parties that area. The properties belonging to the said Congregation and other institutions and those to be transferred are indicated on the annexed plan (annex II, 12).

Finally, Italy shall transfer to the Holy See in freehold the former monastic buildings in Rome attached to the Basilica of the Twelve Holy Apostles and to the churches of Sant' Andrea della Valle and San Charles ai Catinari, with all the annexes and appendages thereof (annex III, 3, 4 and 5), to be transferred free of occupants within 1 year of the entry into force of the present treaty.

Art. 15

The property enumerated in article 13 and in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 14, together with the Palaces of the Dataria, the Chancery, the Propaganda Fide in the Piazza di Spagna, the palace of the Holy Office and annexes, that of the Convertendi (now the Congregation for the Eastern Church) in the Piazza Scossacavalli, the palace of the Vicariat (annex II, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11) and the other buildings in which the Holy See may in future see fit to establish other offices, although forming part of the territory of the Italian State, shall enjoy the immunities recognised by international law as appertaining to the headquarters of the diplomatic representatives of foreign States.

The same immunity shall also apply as regards the other churches, those outside Rome, during the time of celebrations held therein at which the Supreme Pontiff is present, without their being open to the public.

Art. 16

The properties mentioned in the three preceding articles and those used as headquarters of the following Papal institutions: The Gregorian University, the Biblical, Oriental and Archaeological Institutes, the Russian Seminary, the Lombard College, the two palaces of St. Apollinaris, and the house of retreat for the Clergy of St. John and St. Paul (annex III, 1, 1bis, 2, 6, 7 and 8) shall not at any time be subject to charges or expropriation for reasons of public utility, unless with the previous agreement of the Holy See, and shall be exempt from the payment of contribution, whether ordinary or extraordinary, to the State or any other body.

The Holy See shall be at liberty to administer as it thinks fit all the properties specified in this or in the three preceding articles, without the necessity of obtaining the authorisation or consent of any Italian Government, provincial or communal authority, who may in this respect place entire reliance on the lofty artistic traditions of the Catholic Church.

Art. 17

The emoluments of whatsoever nature due by the Holy See and by other central organisations of the Catholic Church and bodies administered direct by the Holy See, including those outside Rome, to dignitaries, employees and salaried staff, including those temporarily employed, shall in Italian territory be exempt, as from the 1st January, 1929, from any tax payable to the State or to any other body.

Art. 18

The artistic and scientific treasures existing within the Vatican City and the Lateran Palace shall remain open to scholars and visitors. Full liberty shall be reserved to the Holy See to regulate the admission of the public thereto.

Art. 19

Diplomatic officers and envoys of the Holy See, diplomatic officers and envoys of foreign Governments accredited to the Holy See, and dignitaries of the Church arriving from abroad and proceeding to the Vatican City, and possessing passports issued by their State of origin and visés by Papal representatives abroad, shall be admitted without further formality to the City across Italian territory. The same shall apply to the above-mentioned persons who, being duly furnished with regular Papal passports, are proceeding abroad Vatican City.

Art. 20

Goods arriving from foreign countries and destined for the Vatican City, or for institutions or offices of the Holy See outside the City, shall always be admitted in transit over Italian territory at any point of the Italian frontier and at any Italian port, with entire exemption from customs duties or octroi duty.

Art. 21

All cardinals shall enjoy in Italy the honours due to Princes of the blood. Those resident in Rome, even outside the Vatican City, shall for all purposes be regarded as citizens of the latter.

When the Pontifical See is a vacant Italy shall take special steps to ensure that there be no impediment to the free transit and access of Cardinals across Italian territory to the Vatican, and that their personal liberty is not impeded or restricted.

Italy shall further ensure that within Italian territory surrounding the Vatican City no acts are committed which may in any manner disturb the meetings of the Conclave.

The same principle shall also apply in the case of Conclaves which may be held outside the Vatican City, and Councils presided over by the Supreme Pontiff or his Legates, and with regard to bishops summoned to take part in the same.

Art. 22

At the request of the Holy See or by delegation of the same, either in individual cases or permanently, Italy shall take measures within her territory for the punishment of crimes committed within the Vatican City, except when the perpetrator of the offence has taken refuge in Italian territory, in which event proceedings shall immediately be taken against him in accordance with the provisions of the Italian laws.

The Holy See shall deliver up to the Italian State persons who take refuge in the Vatican City and are accused of acts committed in Italian territory which are considered criminal by the laws of both States.

Similar action shall be taken in regard to persons accused of crimes who take refuge in the properties declared by article 15 to be immune, unless the dignitaries in charge of the same prefer to request the Italian police to enter and arrest them.

Art. 23

The rules of international law shall apply as regards the execution in Italy of judgements of the courts of the Vatican City.

On the other hand, judgements and orders of ecclesiastical authorities in spiritual or disciplinary matters regarding ecclesiastical or religious persons which are officially communicated to the civil authorities shall without further formality have full juridical effect in Italy for all civil purposes.

Art. 24

As regards the sovereignty appertaining to it in the international sphere, the Holy See declares that it desires to remain and will remain aloof from rivalries of a temporal nature between other States and from international congresses convened to deal with them, unless the contending parties make a joint appeal to its mission of peace. In any event the Holy See reserves the right to exercise its moral spiritual influence.

Consequently, the Vatican City shall always and in all circumstances be regarded as neutral and inviolable territory.

Art. 25

By a special convention, signed at the same time as the present treaty and constituting the annex IV and an integral part of the treaty, provision is made for the liquidation of sums due to the Holy See by Italy.

Art. 26

The Holy See considers that by the agreements signed this day there is adequately assured to it everything that is necessary for making provision, with the requisite liberty and independence, for the pastoral administration of the diocese of Rome and the Catholic Church in Italy and throughout the world; it declares the Roman question to be finally and

irrevocably settled and therefore eliminated, and it recognises the Kingdom of Italy under the dynasty of the House of Savoy, with Rome as the capital of the Italian State.

Italy on her part recognises the State of the Vatican City under the sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff.

The law dated the 13th May, 1871, (No. 214), and any other provisions contrary to the present treaty are abrogated.²⁸²


Art. 27

Within 4 months of its signature the present treaty shall be submitted to the Supreme Pontiff and the King of Italy for ratification, and shall enter into operation on the exchange of ratifications.

Rome, February 11, 1929.


(L.S.) PIETRO CARDINAL GASPARRI.

(L.S.) BENITO MUSSOLINI.



²⁸² Law of Guarantees, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1873-1874*, vol. 65, pp. 638-642.

Annex I – Territory of the State of Vatican City




*Annex II*²⁸³ (I) – Lateran Basilica (St. John Lateran), Lateran Palace and annexed Holy Stairs

ALLEGATO II. — Immobili con privilegio di extraterritorialità
e con esenzione da espropriazioni e da tributi.

A II. II
Tav. 1

*Basilica e Palazzo Apostolico Lateranense ed
annessi con la Scala Santa ~*




Dietro Carl. Gayoni:
Benito Mussolini

²⁸³ Territories under Annex II were properties with extraterritoriality privilege and with exemption from expropriation and taxes.

Annex II (2) – Basilica of S.M. Maggiore with annexed building

AII. II
Tav. 2

Basilica di S.M. Maggiore con gli edifici annessi.




Pietro Cos. Geronzi

Benito Mussolini

All. II
Tav. 3

*Basilica di S. Paolo con gli
Edifici annessi*




■ Zona ora adibita a strade e piazze ~

Pietro Cos. Gayoni
Benito Mussolini

All. II
Tav. 4


Palazzo Pontificio di Castel Gandolfo



N.B. - La strada di S. Antonio è adibita a passaggio pubblico.


Detto Carl. Geronzi
Benito Mussolini

Annex II (5) – Villa Barberini of Castel Gandolfo



All. II
Tav. 6

Palazzo della Dataria ~




Dietro Cart. Sagami

Benito Mussolini

All. II
Tav. 7


Palazzo della Cancelleria ~



Annex II (8) – Palace of Propaganda Fide

A. II. II
Tav. 3

Palazzo di Propaganda Fide ~




Scala 1:5000

Pietro Ant. Sagoni
Benito Mussolini

Ann. II
Tab. 9

Palazzo di S. Callisto in Trastevere



Sca'a 1:5000

■ *Zona del Demanio, o di terzi da cedere alla S. Sede*


Pietro Carlo Sgarbi
Benito Mammucari

Annex II (10) –


- (i) Palace of the Convertendi (now the Congregation for the Eastern Church) in Piazza Scossacavalli
- (ii) Palace of the Holy Office and adjacencies

Atl. II
Tav. 10

Palazzo dei Convertendi (ora Congregazione per la Chiesa Orientale) in piazza Scossacavalli ~



Palazzo del S. Offizio ed adiacenze ~




Pietro Ant. Sgarbi

Benito Mussolini

Alt. II
Tav. 11


*Palazzo del Vicariato
in via della Pigna*



Scala 1:5000

Pietro Ant. Sagoni
Beniamino

Annex II (12) – Properties on the Janiculum




Note - For corrections dependent on road needs, arrangements will be made with the Governorate of Rome

ALLEGATO III. — Immobili esenti da espropriazioni
e da tributi.

Ann. III
Tav. 1

Università Gregoriana




Pietro Ant. Sagoni

Enrico Mammì

Ann. III
Tab. 1 bis

Università Gregoriana alla Pilotta ~




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Benito Mussolini

AII.III
Tav. 2


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Luigi Card. Sgambati
Benito Mussolini

Ann. III
Tab. 3

Palazzo dei SS. XII Apostoli




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
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Benito Mumbici

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


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Arch. Carlo Sgarbi
Benito Mussolini

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*Istituto archeologicò - Istituto Orientale -
Collegio Lombardo - Collegio Russo ~*



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Dietro Card. Sagoni
Benito Mussolini

AII. III
Tav. 7

Palazzi di S. Apollinare -



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
Dietro Card. Sagoni

Benih Mumukshu

Annex III (8) – House of retreat for the Clergy of St. John (Giovanni) and St. Paul (Paolo)

AII.III
Tav. 8

*• Casa di esercizi per il Clero in
SS. Giovanni e Paolo ~*



■ *Zona archeologica per la quale e per il Ninfeo
di Nerone saranno stabilite intese col Ministero
della Pubblica Istruzione ~*

Pietro Lud. Sagoni
Genil Mummici

(Annex IV) **FINANCIAL CONVENTION**

Whereas in pursuance of the provisions of the treaty by which the Roman question has been finally settled the Holy See and Italy have considered it necessary to regulate their financial relations by a separate convention which shall, however, form an integral part of the treaty;

And whereas the Supreme Pontiff, considering on the one hand the enormous prejudice incurred by the Apostolic See through the loss of the patrimony of St. Peter established by the former Papal States and the property of the ecclesiastical bodies, and having regard on the other hand to the ever-increasing needs of the Church, even in the city of Rome alone, and nevertheless bearing in mind the financial position of the State and the economic condition of the Italian people especially after the war, has considered it desirable to limit the demand for indemnity to what is strictly necessary, and to ask for a sum, partly in cash and partly in stock, the value of which is much less than that which the State should have paid up to the present to the Holy See in fulfilment of the obligation incurred by the law of the 13th May, 1871, alone;

And whereas the Italian State, appreciating the paternal sentiments of the Supreme Pontiff, regards it as its duty to comply with the request for the payment of the said sum;

The high contracting parties, represented by the same plenipotentiaries, have agreed as follows:

Art. 1

Italy undertakes to pay to the Holy See, upon the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, the sum of 750,000,000 Italian lire, and at the same time to hand over to the Holy See Italian 5 per cent. Consolidated Bearer Stock, with coupon payable on the 30th June next, to the nominal value of 1,000,000,000 Italian lire.

Art. 2

The Holy See declares that it accepts the foregoing in final settlement of its financial relations with Italy arising out of the events of 1870.

Art. 3

All documents to be executed for the purpose of carrying into effect the treaty, the present convention and the concordat shall be exempt from all taxation.

Rome, February 11, 1929.

(L.S.) PIETRO CARDINAL GASPARRI.
(L.S.) BENITO MUSSOLINI.

CONCORDAT

In the name of the Most Holy Trinity:

Whereas from the commencement of the negotiations between the Holy See and Italy for the settlement of the Roman question the Holy See itself proposed that the treaty relating to that question should be accompanied, as a necessary complement, by a concordat for the regulation of the conditions governing religion and the Church in Italy;

And whereas the treaty for the settlement of the Roman question has this day been concluded and signed;

His Holiness Pius XI, the Supreme Pontiff, and His Majesty Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, have resolved to conclude a concordat, and for that purpose have appointed the same plenipotentiaries who were delegated for the treaty, viz.:

His Holiness the Pope: His Most Reverend Eminence Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, his Secretary of State;

His Majesty the King of Italy: His Excellency Cav. Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister, and Head of the Government;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have agreed on the following articles:

Art. 1

In accordance with article 1 of the treaty, Italy shall assure to the Catholic Church the free exercise of spiritual power and the free and public exercise of worship, as well as of its jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, in accordance with the provisions of the present concordat. Where it is necessary Italy shall afford to ecclesiastics the protection of her authorities for the acts of their spiritual ministry.

Having regard to the sacred character of the Eternal City, the Episcopal See of the Supreme Pontiff, the centre of the Catholic world and the goal of pilgrimages, the Italian Government shall adopt measures to prevent in Rome all that may conflict with that character.

Art. 2

The Holy See shall communicate and correspond freely with the bishops, the clergy and the whole Catholic world without any interference on the part of the Italian Government.

Similarly, so far as concerns their pastoral ministry, the bishops shall communicate and correspond freely with their clergy and with all the faithful.

Both the Holy See and the bishops may freely publish and also affix in the interior and at the outside doors of the buildings set aside for worship or at the offices of their ministry the instructions, ordinances, pastoral letters, diocesan notices and other documents

concerning the spiritual government of the faithful which they may see fit to issue within the scope of their competence. Such publications and notices and, in general, all papers and documents relative to the spiritual government of the faithful shall not be subject to any fiscal charges.

The said publications, as far as concerns the Holy See, may be in any language. Those issued by the bishops shall be in Italian or Latin, but the ecclesiastical authorities may add translations in other languages side by side with the Italian text.

The ecclesiastical authorities may make collections both inside and at the entrance to churches and buildings belonging to them without any interference on the part of the civil authorities.

Art. 3

Theological students, those of the last two years of their theological preparation for ordination and novices of religious institutions may, at their own request, postpone the fulfilment of their military service obligations from year to year until their 26th year.

Clergy ordained *in sacris* and members of religious orders who have taken vows are exempt from military service, except in the event of general mobilisation. In that case, priests will be drafted to the armed forces of the State, but will continue to wear clerical dress in order that they may exercise their sacred office among the troops under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the military ordinary, in accordance with the provisions of article 14. Other clergy or members of religious orders shall preferably be employed in medical work.

Nevertheless, priests with a cure of souls shall be exempt from answering the call in the event of general mobilisation. Ordinaries, parish priests, their *locum tenens* or coadjutors, curates and priests who are substantive incumbents of rectorships of churches open to public worship, are considered as coming under this category.

Art. 4

Ecclesiastics and members of religious orders shall be exempt from service on juries.

Art. 5

No ecclesiastic may be engaged or remain in an employment or office of the Italian State or of public bodies subordinate thereto without the consent of the diocesan ordinary.

The withdrawal of such consent shall deprive the ecclesiastic of the right to continue in such employment or office.

In any case priests who are apostates or under censure may not be employed or continue in a post as teacher, or in an office or employment in which they come into direct contact with the public.

Art. 6

The stipends and other allowances enjoyed by ecclesiastics by reason of their office shall be exempt from attachment to the same extent as the salaries and emoluments of civil servants.

Art. 7

Ecclesiastics may not be required by magistrates or other authorities to give information regarding persons or matters known to them by reason of their sacred office.

Art. 8

In the event of an ecclesiastic or a member of a religious order being brought before a criminal magistrate for a crime, the King's Procurator must immediately inform the ordinary or the diocese in whose territory he exercises jurisdiction, and must at once transmit to him officially the result of the enquiry and any judicial sentence passed, whether of first instance or of appeal.

In the event of arrest the ecclesiastic or member of a religious order shall be treated with the consideration due to his status and rank in the hierarchy.

In the event of an ecclesiastic or member of a religious order being sentenced, the punishment shall, if possible, be served in establishments separate from those destined for laymen, unless the competent ordinary has reduced the convicted person to lay status.

Art. 9

In principle buildings open for worship are exempt from requisitions and occupation.

If it is necessary, on grounds of serious public necessity, to occupy a building open to worship, the authority undertaking the occupation must make previous arrangements with the ordinary, unless reasons of absolute urgency prevent this course being adopted. In that event, the occupying authority must immediately inform the ordinary of the fact.

Except in cases of urgent necessity, the public force may not enter buildings open to worship, for the purpose of carrying out their duties, without first advising the ecclesiastical authority thereof.

Art. 10

On no account whatever shall steps be taken for the demolition of buildings open to worship, without previous agreement with the competent ecclesiastical authorities.

Art. 11

The State recognises the following festivals established by the Church:

Every Sunday; New Year's Day; Epiphany (the 6th January); the feast of St. Joseph (the 19th March); Ascension Day; Corpus Christi; the feast of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul (the 29th June); the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary (the 15th August); All

Saints' Day (the 1st November); the feast of the Immaculate Conception (the 8th December); and Christmas Day (the 25th December).

Art. 12

On Sundays and feasts of obligation, in churches in which a chapter officiates, the priest celebrating conventual mass shall say aloud, according to the King of Italy and the Italian State.

Art. 13

The Italian Government shall communicate to the Holy See the organic list of ecclesiastical established staff employed in administering spiritual help to the armed forces of the State, as soon as this list has been approved by way of law.

The names of the ecclesiastics to whom the supreme direction of the service of spiritual ministry is entrusted (military ordinary, his vicar and inspectors) shall be communicated confidentially by the Holy See to the Italian Government. Whenever the latter have any reason to object to any name, they shall inform the Holy See, which shall submit another name.

The military ordinary shall be invested with the dignity of an archbishop.

The appointment of military chaplains shall be made by the competent authorities of the Italian State on their names being put forward by the military ordinary.

Art. 14

The Italian air, land and sea forces shall enjoy, in respect of their religious duties, the privileges and exemptions granted by canon law.

With regard to such forces, military chaplains shall have parochial competence. They shall exercise their sacred office under the jurisdiction of the military ordinary, assisted by his ecclesiastical court.

The military ordinary shall likewise have jurisdiction over the religious personnel, male and female, attached to military hospitals.

Art. 15

The military ordinary archbishop shall preside over the chapter of the Pantheon church in Rome and shall constitute with the same the clergy to whom is entrusted the religious service of the said Basilica.

This clergy is authorised to undertake all religious ceremonies, including those outside Rome, which, in accordance with canonic regulations, may be requested by the State or by the Royal House.

The Holy See consents to confer on all canons composing the chapter of the Pantheon the dignity of protonotary *ad instar, durante munere*. The appointment of each of them shall

be made by the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, on their names being submitted by His Majesty the King of Italy following a confidential notification of such nomination.

The Holy See reserves to itself the right to transfer the diaconate to another church.

Art. 16

The high contracting parties shall proceed by agreement, by means of mixed commissions, to the revision of the boundaries of the dioceses, with the object of making them correspond, if possible, to those of the provinces.

It is agreed that the Holy See will establish the diocese of Zara; that no part of the territory subject to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy will be under a bishop whose see is in territory subject to the sovereignty of another State; and that no diocese in the Kingdom will include portions of territory under the sovereignty of another State.

The same principle shall be observed in respect of parishes existing, or to be established, in territories near the frontiers of the State.

The modifications of the delimitation of dioceses which may have to be effected in future, after the readjustment above-mentioned has taken place, shall be carried out by the Holy See after previous agreement with the Italian Government, in conformity with the principles above indicated, with the exception of such small modifications of territory as may be called for by the welfare of souls.

Art. 17

The reduction in the number of dioceses resulting from the application of the provisions of the preceding article, shall be effected progressively as the said dioceses become vacant.

It is understood that the reduction shall not involve the suppression of the titles of the dioceses or of the chapters, which shall be preserved, the dioceses being regrouped in such a manner that the capitals thereof correspond to those of the provinces.

The reductions aforesaid shall leave intact the present economic resources of the dioceses and of the other ecclesiastical bodies existing therein, including the allowances now paid by the Italian State.

Art. 18

In the event of two or more parishes being either temporarily or permanently amalgamated by order of the ecclesiastical authorities, either by placing them in the care of a single parish priest, with one or more assistant priests, or by constituting two or more priests into a single clerical establishment, the State shall maintain unchanged the allowance payable to such parishes.

Art. 19

The selection of archbishops and bishops shall appertain to the Holy See.

Before proceeding to the appointment of an archbishop or diocesan bishop or coadjutor *cum jure successionis*, the Holy See shall communicate to the Italian Government the name of the person selected in order to ensure that the latter have no objections of a political nature to such appointment.

The relative steps shall be taken with the utmost despatch possible and with all secrecy in order that the name of the person chosen may not be divulged until his appointment has taken place.

Art. 20

Before taking over their dioceses bishops shall take on oath of allegiance to the Head of the State in the following terms:

“Before God and His Holy Apostles I swear and promise allegiance to the Italian State, as becomes a bishop. I swear and promise to respect, and to cause to be respected by my clergy, the King and the Government established in accordance with the constitutional laws of the State. I further swear and promise that I will enter into no agreement nor attend any council which may be prejudicial to the interests of the Italian State and to public order, and that I will not permit my clergy to participate in such. As it is my concern to promote the welfare and interests of the Italian State I will endeavour to prevent any evil which may threaten it.”

Art. 21

The bestowal of ecclesiastical benefices shall devolve upon the ecclesiastical authorities.

Appointments of persons to benefices shall be confidentially notified by the competent ecclesiastical authorities to the Italian Government, and such appointments shall not take effect until 30 days after such notification.

Within this period the Italian Government shall, in the event of serious objections to the appointment, confidentially inform the ecclesiastical authority thereof. Should the divergence of views be maintained the ecclesiastical authorities shall submit the case to the Holy See.

If serious reasons arise which render it undesirable that an ecclesiastic should continue in a particular benefice, the Italian Government shall communicate the same to the ordinary, who shall take proper steps, within a period of 3 months, in agreement with the Government. In the event of a difference of opinion between the ordinary and the Government, the Holy See shall entrust the settlement of the question to two ecclesiastics selected by it, who shall come to a final decision in the matter in agreement with two delegates of the Italian Government.

Art. 22

Ecclesiastics who are not Italian nationals may not be appointed to benefices in Italy. Incumbents of dioceses and parishes must, in addition, speak the Italian language. In cases of necessity, coadjutors must be assigned to them who, in addition to Italian, understand and speak the language used in the district, so that they may afford religious ministrations in the language of the faithful according to the rules of the Church.

Art. 23

The provisions of articles 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 22 shall not refer to Rome and the suburban dioceses.

It is also understood that whenever the Holy See may proceed to reorganise the said dioceses, the allowances now paid by the Italian State either to the episcopal revenues or to other ecclesiastical institutions shall remain unchanged.

Art. 24

The *exequatur* and the Royal *placet*, as also any Imperial or Royal nomination in connexion with appointments to benefices throughout Italy, are abolished, saving the exceptions stipulated in article 29 (g).

Art. 25

The Italian State renounces the sovereign prerogative of Royal patronage over major and minor benefices.

The Royal gift of presentation to benefices, whether major or minor, is abolished. The pensionable *terzo* in the provinces of the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is likewise abolished.

The corresponding payments shall cease to be charge on the State and on the subordinate administrations.

Art. 26

The appointment of incumbents to major and minor benefices and of those persons who temporarily represent the vacant see or benefice shall take effect from the date of the ecclesiastical nomination, which shall be officially notified to the Government. The administration and the enjoyment of the revenues during the vacancy shall be governed by the rules of canon law.

In the event of bad administration the Italian State may, in agreement with the ecclesiastical authority, proceed to the sequestration of the temporalities of the benefice, handing over the net revenue in favour of the incumbent or, in his absence, for the benefit of the benefice.

Art. 27

The Basilicas of the Holy House at Loreto, St. Francis at Assisi, and St. Anthony at Padua, together the annexed buildings and works, except those of a purely lay character, shall be ceded to the Holy See, and their administration shall devolve freely upon the same. The other bodies of every description administered by the Holy See in Italy and the missionary colleges shall likewise be exempt from all interference on the part of the State and from conversion. The Italian laws regarding the acquisitions of juridical persons shall nevertheless remain applicable.

As regards property now belonging to the aforesaid sanctuaries, steps shall be taken for its allocation by means of mixed commissions, attention being paid to the rights of third parties and to the endowments necessary for the said works of purely lay character.

As regards the other sanctuaries in which civil administrations exist, the latter shall be replaced by the free administration of the ecclesiastical authorities saving, where necessary, the allocation of property in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

Art. 28

In order to set consciences at rest, the Holy See shall grant full pardon to all persons who, in consequence of the Italian laws alienating the ecclesiastical patrimony, are in possession of ecclesiastical property.

To this end the Holy See will issue to the ordinaries appropriate instructions.

Art. 29

The Italian State will review its legislation as concerns ecclesiastical matters with a view to reforming the same and setting it in order, so as to bring it into harmony with the principles underlying the treaty concluded with the Holy See and with the present concordat.

The following is henceforward agreed between the two high contracting parties:

(a) The juridical personality of the ecclesiastical bodies hitherto recognised by Italian law (the Holy See, the dioceses, chapters, seminaries, parishes, &c.) being maintained, all churches open for worship which did not formerly possess juridical personality shall be recognised as having the same, including those belonging to suppressed ecclesiastical bodies, and there shall be assigned to the latter the revenue at present allotted to each of them by the Worship Fund.

Subject to the provisions of article 27, administrative councils, wherever existing or whatever their denomination, even if they are composed entirely or in the majority of laymen, shall not interfere in the services of worship, and the appointment of members shall be made in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities.

(b) The juridical personality of religious associations, whether their members take vows, or otherwise, which are approved by the Holy See and have their headquarters in the Kingdom, and are legally and in fact represented there by persons possessing Italian

nationality and domiciled in Italy, shall be recognised. The juridical personality of the Italian religious provinces, within the limits of the territory of the State and its colonies, and of associations with headquarters abroad, shall also be recognised when the same conditions are present. The juridical personality of houses shall further be recognised when, by the special rules of the various orders, power to acquire and possess property is attributed to these houses. Finally, the juridical personality of Generals' houses and of the agencies of religious associations, including foreign ones, shall be recognised. Associations and religious houses which already possessed juridical personality shall retain the same.

The documents relating to the transfer of immovable property from the present nominal holders to the associations already in possession thereof shall be exempt from all taxes.

(c) Confraternities whose object is exclusively or predominantly worship shall not be subject to further changes as regards their aims and shall be subordinate to the ecclesiastical authorities as regards their working and administration.

(d) All religious foundations of whatever kind shall be permitted, provided it is clear that they correspond to the religious needs of the people, and that no financial charge on the State arises therefrom. The same provision also applies to the foundations already existing *de facto*.

(e) In the civil administration of the ecclesiastical patrimony arising out of the alienating laws one-half of each administrative council shall consist of members appointed by the ecclesiastical authorities. The same shall apply as regards the religious funds of the new provinces.

(f) Acts hitherto accomplished by ecclesiastical or religious bodies in contravention of the civil laws may be recognised and regularised by the Italian State at the request of the ordinary, to be submitted within 3 years from the entry into force of the present concordat.

(g) The Italian State renounces the privileges of exemption from ecclesiastical jurisdiction enjoyed by the Palatine clergy throughout Italy (with the exception of those attached to the churches of the Holy Winding Sheet at Turin, the Superga, the Sudario in Rome, and the chapels attached to the palaces serving as residences of the Sovereigns and Royal Princes), and all appointments and presentations to benefices and offices shall be governed by the rules in the preceding articles. A commission *ad hoc* shall arrange for the allotment to each Basilica or Palatine church of an appropriate endowment in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 27 regarding property of sanctuaries.

(h) The privileges in respect of taxation already laid down in favour of ecclesiastical establishments by Italian laws hitherto in force shall remain in operation, and devotional and religious aims shall for all purposes of taxation be assimilated to those of beneficence and education.

The following are abolished: the extraordinary tax of 30 per cent imposed by article 18 of the law of the 15th August, 1867 (No. 3848); the duty on candidature referred to in article 31 of the law of the 7th July, 1866 (No. 3036); article 20 of the law of the 15th August, 1867 (No. 3848); and the tax on transfer of usufruct arising from property

constituting the endowment of benefices and other ecclesiastical bodies, which was laid down by article 1 of the Royal decree of the 30th December, 1923 (No. 3270). In future no special tax whatever shall be imposed upon the property of the Church. The tax on professions and the licence tax instituted by Royal decree of the 18th November, 1923 (No. 2538), in place of the abolished tax on professional practice and retail trade shall not be applied to ministers of religion in respect of the exercise of their sacerdotal ministry nor shall any other tax of that nature.

(i) The use of the ecclesiastical or religious habit by secular persons or by ecclesiastics and members of religious orders to whom such use has been forbidden by definite order of the competent ecclesiastical authority, which must for that purpose be officially communicated to the Italian Government, shall be prohibited and punished by the same penalties and punishments as those provided in the case of abuse of military uniform.

Art. 30

The ordinary and extraordinary administration of property belonging to any ecclesiastical institution or religious association shall be carried out under the supervision and control of the proper authorities of the Church, any intervention on the part of the Italian State being excluded, and without any obligation to subject such property to conversion.

The Italian State recognises the right of ecclesiastical institutions and religious associations to acquire property, subject to the provisions of the civil laws governing acquisitions by juridical persons.

Pending further agreement to the contrary the Italian Government shall continue to make good any deficiencies in the revenue of ecclesiastical benefices by the grant of subventions on a scale not inferior to their real value, as established by the laws at present in force. In consideration thereof the financial administration of such benefices, so far as concerns acts and contracts exceeding the scope of ordinary administration, shall be effected with the intervention of the Italian Government and, in the event of a vacancy, the handing over of the property shall be effected in the presence of a representative of the Government, and a *procès-verbal* to that end shall be drawn up.

The episcopal revenues (*mense*) of the suburban dioceses and the patrimonies of the chapters and parishes of Rome and of the aforesaid dioceses shall not be subject to the intervention referred to above. For the purpose of the supplementary subvention the amount of income to be paid to beneficed clergy out of the said episcopal revenues and patrimonies shall be settled by means of a report made yearly by the suburban bishop for the diocese and by the Cardinal Vicar for the city of Rome on their own responsibility.

Art. 31

The creation of new ecclesiastical bodies or religious associations shall be carried out by the ecclesiastical authorities in accordance with the rules of canon law; the recognition thereof for civil purposes shall be effected by the civil authorities.

Art. 32

The recognition and authorisation prescribed in the provisions of the present concordat and the treaty shall take place in accordance with the rules laid down by the civil laws, which must be brought into harmony with the provisions of the aforesaid concordat and treaty.

Art. 33

Power of disposal over the catacombs existing underground at Rome and other parts of Italy is reserved to the Holy See with the consequent responsibility for their custody, maintenance and preservation.

Subject to the laws of the State and saving any rights of third parties, the Holy See shall therefore be at liberty to proceed with any necessary excavations and the removal of sacred relics.

Art. 34

Desiring to restore to the institution of marriage, which is the basis of the family, a dignity in conformity with the Catholic traditions of its people, the Italian State recognises the civil effects of the sacrament of marriage as governed by canon law.

Notices of marriage as above shall be published at the communal offices as well as at the parish church.

Immediately after the ceremony the parish priest shall explain to the parties the civil effects of the marriage and read the articles of the Civil Code concerning the rights and duties of married persons. He shall draw up the marriage certificate, an exact copy of which he shall forward within 5 days to the commune in order that it may be entered in the registers of civil status.

Actions for the nullity of marriage and the annulment of marriages solemnised but not consummated shall be reserved to the competence of ecclesiastical courts and departments.

The relative orders and judgements, when they have become final, shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of Segnatura, which shall verify whether the rules of canon law have been observed as regards the competency of the judge, the citation and legal representation or non-appearance of the parties.

The said final orders and judgements, together with the relative decrees of the Supreme Court of Segnatura, shall be transmitted to the Court of Appeal of the State having competence for the district, which, by ordinances issued in council, shall render them executive for purposes of civil law, and shall order them to be noted in the civil registers in the margin of the certificate of marriage.

As regards suits for personal separation, the Holy See agrees that these shall be justiciable by the civil judicial authority.

Art. 35

As regards secondary schools kept by ecclesiastical or religious bodies, the institution of State examinations with effective parity of conditions for candidates from Government institutions and from the aforesaid schools, shall be maintained.

Art. 36

Instruction in Christian doctrine according to the form accepted by Catholic tradition is regarded by Italy as the foundation and crown of public instruction. She therefore agrees that the religious teaching now given in the public elementary schools shall be further developed in the secondary schools according to a programme to be settled between the Holy See and the State.

This instruction shall be given by means of teachers and professors, priests or members of religious orders, approved by the ecclesiastical authorities, with assistance from lay teachers and professors, who shall, for that purpose, be furnished with a certificate of qualification issued by the ordinary of the diocese.

The revocation of this certificate by the ordinary shall forthwith deprive the teacher of the capacity to teach.

Only text-books approved by the ecclesiastical authorities shall be used for such religious teaching in the public schools.

Art. 37

In order to facilitate the religious instruction and attendance at religious services of youths entrusted to their care, the heads of the State associations for the physical training and instruction of the Avanguardisti and Balilla prior to their military service shall arrange their time-tables in such a manner as to form no impediment to the performance of religious duties on Sundays and feasts of obligation.

Art. 38

The appointment of professors to the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart and the subordinate training institution of the Immaculate Mary is subject to the approval of the Holy See, with a view of ensuring that no exception can be taken to them from the moral and religious points of view.

Art. 39

The universities, major and minor seminaries, whether diocesan, interdiocesan or regional, academies, colleges and other Catholic institutions for the training and education of ecclesiastics shall continue to be subordinate to the Holy See alone, without any interference on the part of the scholastic authorities of the Kingdom.

Art. 40

The theological degrees granted by the faculties approved by the Holy See shall be recognised by the Italian State.

The diplomas obtained at the schools of ancient ethnology, the custody of historical documents and the science of palaeography attached to the Library and Historical Documents Museum of the Vatican City shall likewise be recognised.

Art. 41

Italy shall authorities the wearing in the Kingdom and its colonies of Papal orders of chivalry, upon registration of the letter of appointment, to be effected on presentation of the letter and a written request by the interested party.

Art. 42

Italy shall allow the recognition, by means of a Royal decree, of titles of nobility conferred by the Supreme Pontiffs, even after 1870, and of those which may be conferred in future.

The cases in which such recognition is not subject in Italy to the payment of tax shall be laid down.

Art. 43

The Italian State recognises the organisations subordinate to the “Azione Cattolica Italiana” in so far as these, as laid down by the Holy See, pursue their activities outside any political party and in the direct subordination to the hierarchy of the Church for the dissemination and practice of Catholic principles.

The Holy See takes the opportunity afforded by the present concordat to renew the prohibition against Italian ecclesiastics and members of religious orders becoming members contending in favour of any political party whatever.

Art. 44

If, in future, any difficulty should arise regarding the interpretation of the present concordat, the Holy See and Italy shall endeavour, by mutual accord, to arrive at an amicable settlement.

Art. 45

The present concordat shall enter into operation on the exchange of ratifications, at the same time as the treaty concluded between the same high parties for the elimination of the Roman question.

On the entry into force of the present concordat, the provisions of the superseded concordats of the former Italian States shall cease to apply in Italy. The Austrian laws and the laws, regulations, ordinances and decrees of the Italian State now in force, in so far as

they are contrary to the provisions of the present concordat, shall be regarded as abrogated on the coming into force of this concordat.

A commission composed of persons appointed by both high parties shall be appointed immediately after the signature of the present concordat, to make provision for carrying it into effect.

Rome, February 11, 1929.

(L.S.) PIETRO CARDINAL GASPARRI.

(L.S.) BENITO MUSSOLINI.



APPENDIX II: *REICHSKONKORDAT* (CONCORDAT BETWEEN THE VATICAN AND THE GERMAN REICH), 20TH JULY 1933²⁸⁵

His Holiness Pope Pius XI and the President of the German Reich, moved by the common desire to consolidate and promote the friendly relations existing between the Holy See and the German Reich, and wishing to regulate lastingly, in manner satisfying to both parties, the relations between the Catholic Church and the State for the entire territory of the German Reich, have decided to conclude with individual German States and also accruing for the remaining states a fundamentally uniform treatment of the questions to which it pertains.

For this purpose:

His Holiness Pope Pius XI has appointed as his Plenipotentiary His Eminence the Most Reverend Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, his Secretary of State.

The President of the German Reich has appointed as Plenipotentiary the Vice Chancellor of the German Reich, Herr Franz von Papen.

Who, having exchanged their respective credentials and found them to be in good and proper form, have agreed on the following articles:

Article 1 – The German Reich guarantees the freedom of the profession and public practice of the Catholic religion.

It recognizes the right of the Catholic Church, within the limits of the law that applies to all, to regulate and administer her own affairs independently, and, within the framework of her competence, to publish laws and ordinances binding on her members.

Article 2 – The concordats concluded with Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932) remain in force, and the rights and liberties of the Catholic Church recognized in them remain unchanged within the territories of the respective states. For the other states the agreements reached in the present Concordat apply in their entirety. The latter are also binding for the three States named above in so far as they deal with matters not regulated by the State Concordats or supplement the regulations previously adopted.

In the future, the conclusion of concordats with individual States shall be effected only in accord with the Government of the Reich.

²⁸⁵ Concordat between the Holy See and the German Reichl (July 20, 1933). In United States Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Series C (1933-1937), The Third Reich: First Phase, Volume 1: January 30 – October 14, 1933. Document Number 371* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1957-1964), pp. 669-78.

Article 3 – In order to foster good relations between the Holy See and the German Reich, an Apostolic Nuncio will as heretofore reside in the capital of the German Reich and an Ambassador of the German Reich at the Holy See.

Article 4 – In its relations and correspondence with the bishops, the clergy and other members of the Catholic Church in Germany, the Holy See enjoys full freedom. The same applies to the bishops and other diocesan officials in their relations with the faithful in all matters pertaining to their pastoral office.

Instructions, ordinances, pastoral letters, official diocesan gazettes, and other enactments regarding the spiritual guidance of the faithful issued by the ecclesiastical authorities within the framework of their competence (article 1, paragraph 2) may be published without hindrance and brought to the notice of the faithful in the forms hitherto usual.

Article 5 – In the exercise of their spiritual activity the clergy, in the same manner as the officials of the State, enjoy the protection of the State. The latter will proceed in accordance with the general laws of the State against offences to their persons or their character as clergy, as well as against interference with the carrying out of their official duties; and in case of need will provide official protection.

Article 6 – The clergy and members of Orders are exempt from the obligation of taking public offices and such duties as are incompatible, under the prescriptions of Canon Law, with the clerical status or membership in an Order. This applies particularly to the office of juror [*Schöffen und Geschworenen*], member of tax boards or of the finance courts.

Article 7 – In order to accept employment or an office of the State, or with a corporation under public law dependent on the State, clergy must have the nihil obstat of their diocesan Ordinarius, as well as that of the Ordinarius of the seat of the corporation under public law. The nihil obstat may be revoked at any time for important reasons of ecclesiastical interest.

Article 8 – The official income of the clergy is exempt from attachment, as are the official salaries of officials of the Reich and State.

Article 9 – The clergy may not be required by judicial and other authorities to give information concerning facts that have been confided to them while exercising their pastoral duties and therefore come under the pastoral obligation to preserve secrecy.

Article 10 – The wearing of the dress of the clergy or of the Orders by laymen, or by clergy or members of the Orders who have been legally forbidden by the competent ecclesiastical authorities to wear them, by order officially communicated to the authorities of the State, is subject to the same penalties by the State as the misuse of the military uniform.

Article 11 – The present organization and demarcation of dioceses of the Catholic Church in the German Reich is to remain in force. Establishment of a new bishopric or province of the Church or other changes in the demarcation of the dioceses which may seem advisable in the future, in so far as new arrangements within the boundaries of a German Land are involved, remain subject to agreement the competent Land Government. New arrangements or changes extending beyond the boundaries of a German Land require agreement with the Reich Government, to whom it is to be left to obtain the consent of the Länder Government in question. The same applies to the establishment of new provinces of the Church or changes in existing provinces, in the event that several German Länder are concerned. The foregoing conditions do not apply to changes in ecclesiastical boundaries which are made solely in the interest of local pastoral work.

In the event of reorganization within the German Reich, the Reich Government will communicate with the Holy See for the purpose of changing the organization and demarcation of dioceses.

Article 12 – Without prejudice to the provisions of article 11, ecclesiastical offices may be freely established and changed, provided expenditures of state funds are not required. Governmental cooperation in the establishment and alteration of parishes is to take place in accordance with principles agreed upon with which the diocesan bishops, and the Reich Government will try to influence the Länder Governments to make them as uniform as possible.

Article 13 – Catholic parishes, parish and diocesan associations, Episcopal Sees, bishoprics and chapters, religious orders and congregations, as well as institutions, foundations, and property which are under the administration of ecclesiastical authority, shall retain or acquire legal competence in the civil domain according to the general prescriptions of the law of the State. They shall remain corporations under public law in so far as they have been such hitherto; the others may be granted the same rights under the law that applies to all.

Article 14 – In principle the Church has the right to make appointments freely to all Church offices and benefices without the participation of the State or the civil communities, in so far as other arrangements have not been made through the Concordats mentioned in article 2. With respect to the filling of Episcopal Sees, the regulation applying to the Metropolitan See of Freiburg (ecclesiastical province of Upper Rhine) shall be similarly applicable to the two suffragan bishoprics of Rottenburg and Mainz, as well as to the bishopric of Meissen. The same applies, in the two suffragan bishoprics named, to appointments to the Cathedral Chapter and the regulation of the right of patronage.

Furthermore, there is agreement on the following points:

1. Catholic clergy who hold an ecclesiastical office in Germany or who exercise pastoral or educational functions must:

- (a) be German citizens,
- (b) have obtained a diploma entitling them to study at a German higher institution of learning,
- (c) have finished at least 3 years of philosophical and theological study at a German state university, a German ecclesiastical academic institution or a pontifical institution of higher learning in Rome.

2. The bull for the nomination of archbishops, bishops, of a coadjutor *cum jure successionis*, or of a *praelatus nullius*, will only then be drawn up after the name of the person selected has been communicated to the Reichsstatthalter in the appropriate Land, and after it has been confirmed that there are no objections of a general political nature against the person.

In case of the consent of Church and State, the requirements listed in paragraph 2, figure 7, (a), (b), and (c) may be waived.

Article 15 – Orders and religious associations are subject to no special restrictions on the part of the State, with regard to their foundation, establishment, the number and – subject to article 15, paragraph 2 – the characteristics of their members, their activity in pastoral work, in education, in nursing and charitable work, in the ordering of their affairs and the administration of their property.

Superiors of Orders who have their official residence in German Reich must have German citizenship. Superiors of provinces and of Orders, whose residence is outside the territory of the German Reich, have the right of visitation with respect to their establishments in Germany.

The Holy See will endeavor to ensure that the provincial organization is so arranged for the establishments of the Orders within the German Reich that the subordination of German establishments to foreign provincial Superiors is eliminated as much as is feasible. Exceptions to this may be permitted in agreement with the Reich Government particularly in cases where the small number of establishments makes the creation of a German province impracticable, or where there are special reasons why a provincial organization that has become historic and proved efficient should be retained.

Article 16 – Before the bishops take possession of their dioceses they shall take an oath of allegiance either before the Reichsstatthalter of the appropriate province, or the Reich President as follows:

“I swear and promise before God and on the Holy Gospel, as befits a bishop, loyalty to the German Reich and to the province of I swear and promise to respect, and to have my clergy to respect, the constitutionally constituted government. In dutiful solicitude for the welfare and interest of the German State, I shall try, in the exercise of the spiritual office entrusted to me, to prevent any injury that might threaten it.”

Article 17 – The rights of ownership and other rights of the corporations under public law, institutions, foundations, and associations of the Catholic Church in their property are guaranteed according to the general laws of the State.

Buildings used for religious services may not be destroyed for any reason whatsoever without the previous agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities concerned.

Article 18 – In case those payments to the Catholic Church by the State which are based on law, treaty, or special legal titles should be commuted, a friendly agreement will be reached in good time between the Holy See and the Reich before the working out of the principles to be laid down for the commutation.

Usage based on law is numbered among the special legal titles.

The commutation must accord to the party entitled to commutation appropriate compensation for the loss of previous government payments.

Article 19 – Catholic theological faculties in State institutions of learning are to be retained. Their relation to the ecclesiastical authorities is to be based on the stipulations set forth in the pertinent Concordats and the Supplementary Protocols appended to them, with due regard to the relevant ecclesiastical regulations. The Reich Government will interest itself in assuring a uniform practice, in accordance with all the pertinent regulations, for all Catholic faculties of Germany in question.

Article 20 – The Church has the right, in so far as other agreements do not exist, to establish for the training of the clergy, philosophical, and theological institutions entirely dependent on the ecclesiastical authorities, provided no State subsidies are requested.

The establishment, direction, and administration of the seminaries for priests and as well as of the church-maintained hostels shall, within the limits of the law that applies to all, be left exclusively to the ecclesiastical authorities.

Article 21 – Catholic religious instruction in the primary schools, vocational schools, secondary schools, and high educational institutions is a regular subject of instruction and is to be taught in accordance with the principles of the Catholic Church. In religious instruction, special emphasis is to be placed on the inculcation of a patriotic, civic, and social sense of duty in the spirit of Christian religious and moral law, just as is done in all other instruction. The subject matter of instruction and the selection of textbooks for religious instruction are to be determined in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities. The ecclesiastical authorities are to have an opportunity, together with the school authorities, to examine whether the students are receiving religious instruction in accordance with the tenets and requirements of the Church.

Article 22 – In the appointment of Catholic teachers of religion, agreement is to be reached between the bishop and the Land Government. Teachers who have been declared

by the bishop unsuited for further teaching of religion, because of their teachings or moral conduct, may not be employed as teachers of religion as long as this obstacle exists.

Article 23 – The retention of Catholic denominational schools and the establishment of new ones, is guaranteed as heretofore. In all parishes in which parents or guardians request it, Catholic elementary schools shall be established, if, with due regard for local conditions of school organization, the number of pupils allows a regular school operation, in accordance with the standards prescribed by the State, to appear feasible.

Article 24 – In all Catholic primary schools only such teachers are to be employed as being to the Catholic Church, and guarantee to fulfil the special requirements of the Catholic denominational school.

Within the framework of the general professional training of teachers, arrangements will be made which will secure the training of teachers, arrangements will be made which will secure the training of Catholic teachers in accordance with the special requirements of the Catholic denominational school.

Article 25 – Orders and religious congregations are entitled to establish and conduct private schools, within the framework of the general laws and conditions fixed by law. These private schools confer the same rights as the State schools in so far as they meet the requirements in effect for the latter with respect to the curriculum.

With respect to the admission of members of Orders or religious associations to the teaching profession, and their appointment to elementary, secondary, or senior schools, the general requirements are applicable.

Article 26 – Subject to more comprehensive regulation later on of questions of marriage law, it is agreed that in addition to the case of a critical illness of a betrothed person admitting of no delay, also in case of serious moral emergency, the existence of which must be confirmed by the appropriate episcopal authority, the consecration of the marriage by the Church may precede the civil wedding. The pastor is obliged in such cases to notify the Registry Office without delay.

Article 27 – The German Reichswehr is granted an exempted pastoral care for the Catholic officers, officials, and enlisted men belonging to it, as well as for their families.

The Army Bishop is responsible for the direction of the military pastoral care. His ecclesiastical appointment is made by the Holy See after the latter has put itself in touch with the Reich Government in order to designate in agreement with it a suitable candidate.

The ecclesiastical appointment of the chaplains and other military clergy is made by the Army Bishop after prior agreement with the competent authorities of the Reich. The Army Bishop may appoint only such clergy as have received from their competent diocesan bishop permission to enter upon military pastoral work, and an appropriate certificate of

qualification. The military clergy are to have pastoral rights with respect to the troops and members of the Army assigned to them.

More detailed regulations concerning the organization of the Catholic pastoral work in the Army are to be set forth in an Apostolic Brief. The regulation of the relationship as it applies to the Civil Service is to be done by the Government of the Reich.

Article 28 – In hospitals, penal institutions, and other public establishments the Church is permitted to make pastoral visits and hold divine services, subject to the general rules of these institutions. If regular pastoral care is established in such institutions, and if clergy must be engaged as State or other public officials for this purpose, this is to be done in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities.

Article 29 – In matters concerning the use of their mother tongue in divine services, religious instruction, and church organizations, the Catholic members of a non-German national minority residing within the German Reich will be placed in no less favorable a position than that which corresponds to the legal and actual position of individuals of German descent and language within the territory of the foreign state in question.

Article 30 – On Sundays and religious holidays, a prayer is to be offered up for the welfare of the German Reich and nation in the Episcopal churches, chapels, and abbey churches of the German Reich following the main service, in accordance with the precepts of the Church liturgy.

Article 31 – Those Catholic organizations and societies which serve exclusively religious, purely cultural and charitable purposes, and, as such, are subordinate to the ecclesiastical authorities, will be protected in their establishments and their activity.

Those Catholic organizations which, in addition to their religious, cultural and charitable purposes, also serve other purposes, such as social or professional interests, will without prejudice to a possible future inclusion in State associations, enjoy the protection of article 31, paragraph 1, provided they guarantee to carry on their activity outside any political party.

It is reserved to the Government of the Reich and the German Episcopate, to determine by joint agreement which organizations and associations come within the scope of this article.

In so far as the Reich and Länder have in their charge sports and other youth organizations, care will be taken that the members of the same are enabled regularly to perform their church duties on Sundays and holidays, and that they will not be required to do anything irreconcilable with their religious and moral convictions and obligations.

Article 32 – In the basis of the special conditions existing in Germany, and in view of the guarantees created by the stipulations of this Concordat of legislation protecting the

rights and freedoms of the Catholic Church in the Reich and its Länder, the Holy See will publish stipulations which exclude the clergy and members of Orders from membership in political parties, and activity for such parties.

Article 33 – The matters pertaining to ecclesiastical persons or ecclesiastical affairs, which have not been dealt with in the foregoing articles, will be regulated for the ecclesiastical sphere in accordance with applicable Canon Law.

Should any difference of opinion occur in future regarding the interpretation of application of a stipulation of this Concordat, the Holy See and the German Reich will effect a friendly solution by mutual agreement.

Article 34 – This Concordat, whose German and Italian texts have equal force, is to be ratified, and the instruments of ratification are to be exchanged, as soon as possible. It enters into force on the day of their exchange.

In witness hereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Concordat.

Signed in two original texts, in the Vatican City, July 20, 1933.

EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI
FRANZE VON PAPEN

FINAL PROTOCOL

At the signing of the Concordat concluded today between the Holy See and the German Reich, the duly empowered Signatories made the following identical statements, which form an integral part of the Concordat itself.

To Article 3 – The Apostolic Nuncio to the German Reich, in accordance with the exchange of notes between the Apostolic Nunciature in Berlin and the Foreign Ministry on March 11 and March 27, 1930, is Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps accredited there.

To Article 13 – It is agreed that the right of the Church to levy taxes remains guaranteed.

To Article 14, paragraph 2, section 2 – It is agreed that if objections of a general political nature exist, they will be put forward in the shortest possible time. If after 20 days no such statement has been made, the Holy See will be justified in assuming that there are no objections to the candidates. The name of the person in question will be kept in strict confidence until the announcement of the nomination.

This is not to establish the basis for the right of veto by the State.

To Article 17 – Buildings or properties of the State devoted to purposes of the Church are to remain in use as before, subject to existing contracts.

To Article 19, paragraph 2 – At the time of signature of this Concordat, the basis is provided especially by the Apostolic Constitution, *Deus Scientiarum Dominus* of May 24, 1931, and the Instruction of July 7, 1932.

To Article 20 – The hostels under the direction of the Church in institutions of higher learning and gymnasia are to be regarded, with respect to the tax laws, as essential ecclesiastical institutions in the true sense of the word and as integral parts of the diocesan organization.

To Article 24 – Existing institutions of the Orders and Congregations will also be given due consideration in the accordance of recognition [*bei ihrer Zulassung*], in so far as private institutions are in the position to meet the State requirements generally in effect after the reorganization of the system for the training of teachers.

To Article 26 – A serious moral emergency exists when there are insuperable or disproportionately difficult obstacles impeding the procuring of documents necessary for the marriage at the time.

To Article 27, paragraph 1 – Catholic officers, officials and enlisted men, as well as their families, do not belong to local parishes, and are not to contribute to their maintenance.

Paragraph 4 – Issuance of the Apostolic Brief takes place after agreement has been reached with the Government of the Reich.

To Article 28 – In urgent cases entry of the clergy is guaranteed at any time.

To Article 29 – Since the Government of the Reich has indicated its readiness to be accommodating in the matter of non-German minorities, the Holy See declares that, in confirmation of the principles it has always upheld regarding the right to the use of the mother tongue in pastoral work, in religious instruction, and the conduct of Catholic societies, it will take into consideration when making arrangements for concordats with other countries in the future the inclusion of an equivalent provision protecting the rights of the German minorities.

To Article 31, paragraph 4 – The principles established in article 31, paragraph 4, apply also to the Labor Service.

To Article 32 – It is understood that similar regulations regarding activity in party politics will be introduced by the Reich with regard to the non-Catholic denominations.

The conduct which has been made obligatory for the clergy and members of Orders in Germany in virtue of article 32 does not involve any sort of limitation of the preaching and

interpretation of the dogmatic and moral teachings and principles of the Church in accordance with their duty.

At the Vatican City, July 20, 1933.

EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI
FRANZE VON PAPEN

Annex

(The High Contracting Parties Agree to Maintain Secrecy Concerning the Annex)

In the event of a reorganization of the present German military system by the introduction of general military service, the induction of priests and other members of the secular and regular clergy for the performance of military service will be regulated in agreement with the Holy See, in accordance with the following basic principles:

(a) The students of philosophy and theology who are in Church institutions preparing for the priesthood are exempt from military service and the related preparatory training, except in the event of general mobilization.

(b) In the event of general mobilization, the clergy who engaged in diocesan administration or in pastoral work are exempt from reporting for service. This applies to the bishops, the members of the diocesan courts, principals of seminaries and ecclesiastical hostels, professors in seminaries, the parish priests, curates, rectors, coadjutors, and the clergy who permanently preside over a church of public worship.

(c) The other clergy, in case they are declared fit, enter the armed forces of the State in order, under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Army Bishop, to devote themselves to pastoral work with the troops, unless they are induced into the medical service.

(d) The remaining clerics *in sacris* or in the Orders, who are not yet priests, are to be assigned to the medical service. The same is to be done, so far as possible with the candidates for the office of priest mentioned under (a), who have not yet taken the higher Orders.

At the Vatican City, July 20, 1933.

EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI
FRANZE VON PAPEN

APPENDIX III: MANIFESTO DELLA RAZZA (MANIFESTO OF RACE), 14 JULY 1938²⁸⁶

Un gruppo di studiosi fascisti docenti nelle Università italiane sotto l'egida del Ministro della Cultura Popolare ha fissato nei seguenti termini quella che è la posizione del Fascismo nei confronti del problema della razza:

1. LE RAZZE UMANE ESISTONO. – La esistenza delle razze umane non è già una astrazione del nostro spirito, ma corrisponde a una realtà fenomenica, materiale, percepibile con i nostri sensi. Questa realtà è rappresentata da masse, quasi sempre imponenti, di milioni di uomini, simili per caratteri fisici e psicologici che furono ereditati e che continuano ad ereditarsi. Dire che esistono le razze umane non vuol dire a priori che esistono razze umane superiori o inferiori, ma soltanto che esistono razze umane differenti.
2. ESISTONO GRANDI RAZZE E PICCOLE RAZZE. – Non bisogna soltanto ammettere che esistano i gruppi sistematici maggiori, che comunemente sono chiamati razze e che sono individualizzati solo da alcuni caratteri, ma bisogna anche ammettere che esistano gruppi sistematici minori (come per es, i nordici, i mediterranei, i dinarici, ecc.) individualizzati da un maggior numero di caratteri comuni. Questi gruppi costituiscono dal punto di vista biologico le vere razze, la esistenza delle quali è una verità evidente.
3. IL CONCETTO DI RAZZA E' CONCETTO PURAMENTE BIOLOGICO. – Esso è quindi basato su altre considerazioni che non i concetti di Popolo e di nazione, fondati essenzialmente su considerazioni storiche, linguistiche, religiose. Però alla base delle differenze di Popolo e di nazione stanno delle differenze di razza. Se gli Italiani sono differenti dai Francesi, dai Tedeschi, dai Turchi, dai Greci, ecc., non è solo perchè essi hanno una lingua diversa e una storia diversa, ma perchè la costituzione razziale di questi popoli è diversa. Sono state proporzioni diverse di razze differenti che da tempo molto il dominio assoluto sulle altre, sia che tutte risultino fuse armonicamente, sia, infine, che persistano ancora inassimilate una alle altre le diverse razze.
4. LA POPOLAZIONE DELL'ITALIA ATTUALE E' DI ORIGINE ARIANA E LA SUA CIVILTÀ E' ARIANA – Questa popolazione a civiltà Ariana abita da diversi millenni la nostra penisola; ben poco è attuale parte essenzialmente da elementi di

²⁸⁶ Società Anonima Istituto Romano di Arti Grafiche di Tumminelli, "Razzismo Italiano," *La Difesa della Raza*, Anno 1, No. 1 (5 Agosto 1938), p. 1.

quelle stesse razze che costituiscono e costituirono il tessuto perennemente vivo dell'Europa.

5. E' UNA LEGGENDA L'APPORTO DI MASSE INGENTI DI UOMINI IN TEMPI STORICI. – Dopo l'invasione dei Longobardi non ci sono stati in Italia altri notevoli movimenti di popoli capaci di influenzare la fisionomia razziale della nazione. Da ciò deriva che, mentre per altre nazioni europee la composizione razziale è variata notevolmente in tempi anche moderni, per l'Italia, nelle sue grandi linee, la composizione razziale di oggi è la stessa di quella che era mille anni fa: I quarantaquattro milioni d'Italiani di oggi rimontano quindi nell'assoluta maggioranza a famiglie che abitano l'Italia da un millennio.
6. ESISTE ORMAI UNA PURA "RAZZA ITALIANA". – Questo enunciato non è basato sulla confusione del concetto biologico di razza con il concetto storico-linguistico di Popolo e di nazione, ma sulla purissima parentela di sangue che unisce gli Italiani di oggi alle generazioni che da millenni popolano l'Italia. Questa antica purezza di sangue è il più grande titolo di nobiltà della Nazione italiana.
7. E' TEMPO CHE GLI ITALIANI SI PROCLAMINO FRANCAMENTE RAZZISTI. – Tutta l'opera che finora ha fatto il Regime in Italia è in fondo del razzismo. Frequentissimo è stato sempre nei discorsi del Capo il richiamo ai concetti di razza.
La questione del razzismo in Italia deve essere trattata da un punto di vista puramente biologico, senza intenzioni filosofiche o religiose.
La concezione del razzismo in Italia deve essere essenzialmente italiana e indirizzata ariano-nordica. Questo non vuole dire però introdurre in Italia le teorie del razzismo tedesco come sono o affermare che gli Italiani e gli Scandinavi sono la stessa cosa. Ma vuole soltanto additare agli Italiani un modello fisico e soprattutto psicologico di razza umana che per i suoi caratteri puramente europei si stacca completamente da tutte le razze extra europee, questo vuol dire elevare l'Italiano ad un ideale di superiore coscienza di se stesso e di Maggiore responsabilità.
8. E' NECESSARIO FARE UNA NETTA DISTINZIONE TRA I MEDITERRANEI D'EUROPA (OCCIDENTALI) DA UNA PARTE GLI ORIENTALI E GLI AFRICANI DALL'ALTRA. – Sono perciò da considerarsi pericolose le teorie che sostengono l'origine Africana di alcuni popoli europei e comprendono in una comune razza mediterranea anche le popolazioni semitiche e camitiche stabilendo relazioni e simpatie ideologiche assolutamente inammissibili.
9. GLI EBREI NON APPARTENGONO ALLA RAZZA ITALIANA. – Dei semiti che nel corso dei secoli sono approdati sul suolo della nostra Patria nulla in generale è rimasto. Anche l'occupazione araba della Sicilia nulla ha lasciato all'infuori del

ricordo di qualche nome; e del resto il processo di assimilazione fu sempre rapidissimo in Italia.

Gli ebrei rappresentano l'unica popolazione che non si è mai assimilata in Italia perchè essa è costituita da elementi razziali non europei, diversi in modo assoluto dagli elementi che hanno dato origine agli Italiani.

10. I CARATTERI FISICI E PSIOLOGICI PURAMENTE EUROPEI DEGLI ITALIANO NON DEVONO ESSERE ALTERATI IN NESSUN MODO. – L'unione è ammissibile solo nell'ambito delle razze europee, nel quale caso non si deve parlare di vero e proprio ibridismo, dato che queste razze appartengono ad un corpo commune e differiscono solo per alcuni caratteri, mentre sono uguali per moltissimi altri. Il carattere puramente europeo dagli Italiani viene alterato dall'incrocio con qualsiasi razza extra-europea e portatrice di una civiltà diversa dalla millenarian civiltà dagli ariani.

Translation²⁸⁷

A group of fascist scholars teaching at the Italian Universities under the aegis of the Minister of Popular Culture has set out the position of fascism with regard to the problems of race as follows:

1. HUMAN RACES EXIST. – The existence of human races is not an abstraction of our spirit, but corresponds to a phenomenal, material reality, perceptible with our senses. This reality is represented by masses, almost always imposing, of millions of men, similar in physical and psychological characteristics that were inherited and continue to be inherited. Saying that human races exist does not mean a priori that superior or inferior human races exist, but only that different human races exist.
2. THERE ARE LARGE RACES AND SMALL RACES. – It is not only necessary to admit that there are major systematic groups, which are commonly called races and which are individualized only by some characters, but it is also necessary to admit that there are minor systematic groups (such as, for example, the Nordics, the Mediterraneans, the Dinarics, etc.) individualized by a greater number of common characters. From a biological point of view, these groups constitute the true races, the existence of which is an evident truth.
3. THE CONCEPT OF RACE IS A PURELY BIOLOGICAL CONCEPT. – It is therefore based on considerations other than the concepts of People and nation, essentially founded on historical, linguistic and religious considerations. However,

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This is an unofficial translation of the Manifesto through Google Translate.

at the basis of the differences between people and nations are racial differences. If Italians are different from the French, Germans, Turks, Greeks, etc., it is not only because they have a different language and a different history, but because the racial constitution of these peoples is different. There have been different proportions of different races that have had absolute dominion over the others for a long time, whether all of them are harmoniously fused, or, finally, whether the different races still persist unassimilated one to the other.

4. THE POPULATION OF CURRENT ITALY IS OF ARYAN ORIGIN AND ITS CIVILIZATION IS ARYAN – This population of Aryan civilization has inhabited our peninsula for several millennia; very little that is current essentially starts from elements of those same races that constitute and constituted the perennially living fabric of Europe.
5. THE CONTRIBUTION OF HUGE MASSES OF MEN IN HISTORICAL TIMES IS A LEGEND. – After the invasion of the Lombards there were no other notable movements of Carpathian peoples in Italy to influence the racial physiognomy of the nation. From this it follows that, while for other European nations the racial composition has varied considerably in even modern times, for Italy, in its broad lines, the racial composition today is the same as what it was a thousand years ago: The forty-four million Italians today are therefore in the absolute majority of families who have inhabited Italy for a millennium.
6. THERE NOW EXISTS A PURE “ITALIAN RACE”. – This statement is not based on the confusion of the biological concept of race with the historical-linguistic concept of People and nation, but on the pure blood kinship that unites today’s Italians to the generations that have populated Italy for millennia. This ancient purity of blood is the greatest title of nobility of the Italian nation.
7. IT’S TIME FOR ITALIANS TO OPENLY PROCLAIM THEMSELVES RACIST. – All the work that the Regime has done in Italy so far is fundamentally racist. The reference to the concepts of race has always been very frequent in the Chief’s speeches.

The issue of racism in Italy must be treated from a purely biological point of view, without philosophical or religious intentions.

The conception of racism in Italy must be essentially Italian and the direction Aryan-Nordic. However, this does not mean introducing the theories of German racism into Italy as they are or stating that Italians and Scandinavians are the same thing. But it only wants to point out to Italians a physical and above all psychological model of the human race which, due to its purely European

characteristics, is completely detached from all non-European races. This means elevating the Italian to an ideal of superior self-awareness and greater responsibility.

8. IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MEDITERRANEANS OF (WESTERN) EUROPE ON THE ONE HAND AND THE EASTERN AND AFRICANS ON THE OTHER. – Theories that support the African origin of some European peoples and include the Semitic and Hamitic populations in a common Mediterranean race must therefore be considered dangerous, establishing absolutely unacceptable ideological relationships and sympathies.
9. JEWS DO NOT BELONG TO THE ITALIAN RACE. – Of the Semitics who over the centuries have landed on the sacred of our homeland nothing in general remains. Even the Arab occupation of Sicily left nothing other than the memory of a few names; and moreover the process of assimilation was always very rapid in Italy. The Jews represent the only population that has never assimilated into Italy because it is made up of non-European racial elements, absolutely different from the elements that gave rise to the Italians.
10. THE PURELY EUROPEAN PHYSICAL AND PSIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ITALIANS MUST NOT BE ALTERED IN ANY WAY. – The union is admissible only within the European breeds, in which case we must not speak of true hybridism, given that these breeds belong to a common body and differ only in some characteristics, while they are the same in many others. The purely European character of the Italians is altered by crossing with any extra-European race and bearer of a civilization different from the millenarian civilization of the Aryans.