

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO ISLAMOPHOBIA DISCOURSE
AND ITS IMPACT: AN INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF
MACRON'S 2020 SPEECH ON ISLAM

BY

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the
degree of Master of Arts in Islamic Thought and Civilisation

International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization
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International Islamic University Malaysia

MAY 2024

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the Muslim online response to Macron's 2020 speech on Islam in a bid to deconstruct the Islamophobic discourse prevalent in Western mainstream media. In October 2020, French President Macron made an incendiary speech where he claimed Islam was a religion 'in crisis'. The global media subsequently portrayed Muslims as reacting to Macron's speech in a violent fashion, with many media outlets streaming video clips of violent protests by Muslims in Africa and the Indian subcontinent, amongst other places. This study charts an original methodology to the study of Muslim global opinion by incorporating big data analysis within an Islamic civilizational framework. Macron's 2020 speech is placed into the historical background of France's complicated relation with the Muslim world. This is followed by an analysis of major mainstream news outlets and how they portrayed the *ummatic* backlash against Macron. This will be supplemented by a multilingual big data analysis of selected Muslim responses and a topography of global Muslim opinion. By contrasting the thematics that the Western Media associate with Muslim response, and the actual data of Muslim respondents, it will be demonstrated how radically different both presentations are. This research aims to show how greater accuracy in detailing the *ummatic* discourse can deconstruct stereotypes about the Muslim world in the media. This research can contribute to a more robust dialogue and debate between the Muslim world and the Western world. Also, the novel methodology used will support an increased awareness on the importance of using big data on issues traditionally discussed within Islamic studies.

ملخص البحث

تتناول هذه الدراسة بالتحليل استجابة المسلمين وتفاعلهم- عبر شبكة الإنترنت- مع خطاب ماكرون عام 2020 حول الإسلام بزعم تفكيك خطاب الإسلاموفوبيا (الإرهاب الإسلامي- الخوف من الإسلام) السائد في وسائل الإعلام الغربية الرئيسية. في أكتوبر 2020، ألقى الرئيس الفرنسي ماكرون خطابًا مثيّرًا ادعى فيه أن الإسلام دين "في حالة أزمة". وبسبب رد فعل المسلمين، ذكرت وسائل الإعلام العالمية بأن المسلمين يتفاعلون بعنف شديد مع خطاب ماكرون؛ حيث بثت العديد من وسائل الإعلام مقاطع مرئية لاحتجاجات عنيفة من قبل المسلمين في إفريقيا وشبه القارة الهندية، وأماكن أخرى. تستخدم هذه الدراسة منهجًا أمتكاملاً لدراسة الرأي العام الإسلامي العالمي من خلال دمج تحليل البيانات الكبيرة ضمن إطار حضاري إسلامي أشمل يصنف خطاب ماكرون الذي أجري عام 2020 في الخلفية التاريخية للعلاقة المعقدة بين فرنسا والعالم الإسلامي. يلي ذلك تحليل لأهم وسائل الإعلام الرئيسية وكيف عكست ردود الأمة ضد ماكرون. وتم تعزيز هذا بتحليل للبيانات الكبيرة متعددة اللغات لاختيار ردود المسلمين، ورسم لمحة عن الرأي العام الإسلامي العالمي. من خلال مقارنة المواضيع التي تربطها وسائل الإعلام الغربية برد فعل المسلمين، والبيانات الفعلية للمستجوبين المسلمين، ومن ثم بيان مدى اختلاف العرضين. وهدف هذا البحث إلى إظهار كيف يمكن للدقة الأكبر في تفصيل الحديث الأممي أن تفكك الصور النمطية حول العالم الإسلامي في وسائل الإعلام. وخلص البحث إلى أن تعزيز الحوار والنقاش بين العالم الإسلامي والعالم الغربي مدخل مهم لتقديم الصورة الحقيقية حول الإسلام والمسلمين، وتصحيح صورة الإسلام المستنيرة. كما أن الطريقة الجديدة المستخدمة في التحليل ستدعم زيادة الوعي بأهمية استخدام البيانات الكبيرة في المسائل التي تناقش تقليدياً في الدراسات الإسلامية.

APPROVAL PAGE

I certify that I have supervised and read this study and that in my opinion, it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Master of Arts in Islamic Thought and Civilization.

.....
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
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I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as a whole for any other degrees at IIUM or other institutions.

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To those who prefer dialog instead of clash of civilization



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

With the rapid developments of new techniques in Big Data, the prevalent stereotypes about the Muslim world in the media, and matters analysed by traditional methods in Islamic studies, I decided to embark in the journey of this multidisciplinary research that incorporates Big Data analysis into Islamic studies. This new approach also embarked me minoring in Information Technology since my undergraduate program and taking extra courses specialized in Big Data during my master's at the Kulliah of Information Tehcnology, IIUM, that set the basis for my further exploration on the newest developments in data science.

This journey however wouldn't be possible without the help of my supervisor and mentor, Datuk Prof. Dr. Abdelaziz Berghout, who since the first day of my masters encouraged me to explore new ways of thinking, learning, and exploring groundbreaking developments that world is witnessing today. He went above and beyond any normal supervisor could do, and I am very grateful for that. He guides students from his vast experience. With time, he is very generous. He has a great etiquette, and his patience gives space for students to explore. He intellectually stimulates students. He has helped me to clarify ambiguity in my thoughts.

My appreciation also goes to professor Emeritus Dr. Osman Bakar, head of Al-Ghazali Chair of Epistemology and Civilizational Studies and Renewal at ISTAC, for his immense kindness that helped me in moments of crisis, extending a guiding hand. His extensive knowledge helped to explore Chinese civilization, and Confucian philosophy. A book he gifted me, 'Islam and Confucianism', helped me to understand that lost camel of knowledge can be found in the far east.

My special thanks to the staff of Syed Naqib al-Attas library of ISTAC for providing a calm and inspiring space to do research. Its special and vast collection of books helped me to explore the rich Islamic heritage.

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Following the Gulf war, Rushdie affair and the 9/11 events, representation of Islam in Western media have grown; research have shown that these representations are negative and stereotyped.¹ Western media portrayal of minorities over the years have been limited and negative in content, this is especially with Muslims. ²The Western media also uses Islam and Muslim interchangeably and generalises the Muslim populations as prone to violence and terrorism.³ This has led to the idea that Muslims can't integrate in Western societies and that can't have a civilisational dialogue with the West⁴ . These negative representations have set the basis of Islamophobia in modern times.

This research examines the response to Islamophobia discourse and its impacts through analysing Macron's 2020 speech on Islam. On October 2, 2020, French President Macron made an incendiary speech in the town of Les Mureaux, as part of his re-election campaign, where he proposed a series of measures to rid of radical Muslims in France, strengthen Laïcité secularism and claimed that Islam was a religion 'in crisis'.⁵

The global media subsequently portrayed Muslims as reacting to Macron's speech in a violent fashion, with many media outlets streaming video clips of violent protests by Muslims in Africa and Pakistan, amongst other places. This research aims to be a corrective to such Islamophobia stereotyping. The main objective of this research is to come up with

¹ Amir Saeed, "Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media", *Sociology Compass* 2,1 (2007): 2.

² Saeed, 'Media, Racism, Islamophobia', 6.

³ Ibid, 12.

⁴ Ibid,17.

⁵ Daisy Lester, "President Macron says Islam 'in crisis all over the world', prompting backlash", *The Independent*, 2020, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/macron-france-islam-speech-seperatism-religion-b746835.html?r=12175>

an integrated framework to analyse and respond objectively to Islamophobia discourse considering Macron's speech.

Considering the generational shift where most of Muslim discourse is online, the proposed integrated framework combines between the current international political context, Muslim worldview, and the use of social media Big Data to analyse the discourse. By integrating these aspects together, we will be able to see the bigger picture and understand the discourse of Islamophobia and provide an integrated framework. Political context and discourse analysis allows for qualitative research, while social media Big Data Analytics allows for quantitative examination of the phenomenon, especially on online Muslim viral campaigns. Muslim worldview helps to calibrate and fine-tune the search parameters and data collected.

This research will prove in a qualitative, quantitative, and very specific (rather than abstract and vague manner) that the global Muslim response to Macron's 2020 speech was focused less on violent actions and more on dialogic criticism. The research will also help to map out in a detailed manner the way the Muslim world interacted with the Western world in a global pivotal moment, which will allow for a better understanding on civilisational interaction. It is hoped this research will open the door to a new interdisciplinary approach to tackling civilisational dialogue, especially in this age of social media dominance, where the voices of Muslims are being expressed in a public manner, but where the analytical tools for deciphering their digital expressions have yet to be fully developed.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The civilisational relations between the West and the Muslim world had been complex. During the Golden Age of Islam, much of medieval Europe had benefitted from the

scientific discoveries of Muslims.⁶ In fact, much of Aristotle's work survived thanks to the translations made into Arabic by Muslim scholars.⁷

By the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved; Western Europe started to establish colonies; by the end of the 19th century, much of the Muslim world was in the colony status. This was possible with the rise of the Industrial revolution. Colonialism and Orientalism came along with imperialistic ideology and racial superiority.⁸ Christian missionaries tried to spread the Bible and took up the task of civilising barbaric people⁹. All of these set the basis of Islamophobia in the West.

After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Samuel Huntington's theory of 'Clash of Civilizations' had shifted the focus of the American politicians to a new enemy: Islam and the West are set to be in conflict because of its conflicting cultural and religious values.¹⁰ Since the 9/11, the Clash of Civilizations theory outlined the Western US policy towards Muslims.

The rise of political Islamophobia was clearly visible during the Iraq and Afghanistan invasion which involved intelligence, diplomatic, legal and political maneuvers to construct the Islamophobia narrative.¹¹ With the rise of ISIS, the Syrian Civil war which served as a proxy war between the Western states on one hand, and Russia and China on the other hand, had led to refugee crisis that resulted in massive influx of refugees to Europe. In response the European Union had adopted strict policies to stop refugees entering.

In response of the racist treatment of the West towards Muslims, some stand-alone Muslims have committed attacks in the West, especially in France, due its involvement in the Syrian civil war. These events were viralised by the Western media more than the

⁶ John W. Livingston, *The Rise of Science in Islam and the West: From Shared Heritage to Parting of The Ways, 8th to 19th Centuries* (UK: Routledge, 2017), 140.

⁷ Ibid, 154.

⁸ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (UK: Penguin Classics, 2003), 349.

⁹ Ibid, 100.

¹⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (US: Simon & Schuster, 2011).

¹¹ Todd H. Green, "9/11, the War on Terror, and the Rise of Political Islamophobia", in *The Fear of Islam*, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015).

attacks of far right-wing and ethnonationalist (Neo-Nazis) terrorist attacks which comprises most of the attacks in EU.¹² At the same time, these stand-alone attacks of Muslims are the basis of right-wing Islamophobia which fuels their firm believe in the Eurabia conspiracy theory.

With the rise of social media, a generational shift occurred, and much of Islamophobia discourse has shifted online, i.e social media. Any event that involves speeches like of Macron when he claimed that ‘Islam was in crisis’, demonisation of the prophet and Western support of dictatorial regimes, Muslims express their concerns also online. Despite Muslims condemning violence and the availability of variety of moderate opinions, the Western Media purposely portrays the actions of some Muslims violently protesting on the streets as the only discourse.

Although, there has been many qualitative studies on Islamophobia, there is lack of quantitative study of the discourse of Muslims on social media using big data. Almost all research done now on Islam and islamophobia is interpretive (heuristic or otherwise) which is weak, considering how subjective is. Quantitative proof are hard facts in figures that speak for themselves.

This research is multidisciplinary¹³ which combines social media Big Data analytics (Natural Language processing), political science(political history), and Islamic worldview. This will give a clear picture of major features that characterise the Muslim online discourse. As a test case, this study will make a time-lapse analysis of the Muslim online reaction to the discrete events that took place in the Macron affair. Then, these features are compared with how the Western Media portray the Muslim reaction to Macron. In this way, I will provide a quantitative counterpoint challenging proof that shows Western Media stereotypes towards Muslims.

¹² “The EU’s work to tackle terrorism”, *Council of the European Union*, last updated: 17 November 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/eu-response-to-terrorism/>

¹³ Multidisciplinary research is when different disciplines work on the same research question. The findings of each discipline are supplementary. This type of research is to answer complex research questions. See more on Emily Holmes et. Al, “Multidisciplinary research priorities for the COVID-19 pandemic: a call for action for mental health science,” *The Lancet* 7, no. 6 (2020).

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This multidisciplinary research aims to answer:

- 1) What was the political context of Macron's speech in 2020?
- 2) What were the immediate events that resulted from Macron's speech?
- 3) How did the Western media portray Muslims' response to Macron's speech?
- 4) How did Muslims respond to Macron's speech in social media?
- 5) To what extent Macron's speech escalated an Islamophobic discourse in the Muslim world.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this multidisciplinary study are:

- 1) to critically analyse the political context in which Macron made a speech claiming that Islam was a religion in crisis.
- 2) to investigate the immediate events that resulted from Macron's speech.
- 3) to evaluate the Western media portrayal of Muslims' response to Macron's speech.
- 4) to quantitatively evaluate how Muslims responded in social media to Macron's speech.
- 5) To critically investigate the escalation of Islamophobia discourse in the Muslim world as a result of Macron's speech.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

This research is a multidisciplinary study. It uses Discourse Analysis, social media Big Data Analytics, and political history and Islamic worldview frameworks. Macron's speech is analysed with Discourse Analysis which is qualitative in nature. It explores the political context of Macron statement along with most important Ummatic Viral Events.

Social media Big Data Analytics which is quantitative in nature mines data from social media with precise search tools to scramble specific user posts or vast trendy posts from users. This part also maps out the portrayal of Muslims by top Western media by scrambling data from their webpages. To avoid miscellaneous data, Islamic worldview helps to calibrate the search parameters.

Political history offers a look at the civilisational historical relations between Muslims and France since the enlightenment till contemporary France. Finally, this also allows to place this test case of Macron's statement in a civilisational perspective which broadens the results from the analysis to wider trends in Western and Muslim interaction.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This multidisciplinary research uses the following theories to explain the consequences of Macron's speech, the way Muslim reacted on social media, and the media portrayal of Muslims.

1.6.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theory

The origins of Critical Discourse Analysis are based on theory of critical language which see language as social practice. CDA analyses how language is used to exercise power¹⁴ The most authoritative theory of CDA is done by Norman Fairclough in his book 'Discourse and Social Change'. For Fairclough, linguistic text is the object of analysis, and its interpretation is equivalent to its analysis.¹⁵ In that sense, discourses are to be studied historically that reflect social change, which comprises of ideologies, social relations, systems

¹⁴ Hilary Janks, "Critical Discourse Analysis as a Research Tool", *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 18, no. 3 (1997): 329.

¹⁵ Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (UK: Polity Press, 1992), 35.

of believe and knowledge.¹⁶ Discourses also analyse the way power relations shape society or institutions' discourses, and the transformation of ideologies.¹⁷

Fairclough's model provides three dimensions of discourse. First, the object of analysis which includes verbal, visual or both. Second, the way the object is received and constructed which includes writing, speaking, listening, designing, and watching. Third, the context that rule these processes. For each of these dimensions, either descriptive or interpretative or explanatory are needed.¹⁸

CDA relevant topics of application are for political discourse, ideology, racism (which covers immigration), institutional discourse and recently in social media. For social media and the cyberspace, Delia (2019, 318) points out that if text and spoken words from videos and livestreams are extracted to find patterns (data mining), then they can be considered part of CDA. The processes to find pattern through data mining methods are part of Big Analytics which are going to be discuss in detail.

1.6.2 Theoretical Framework for Anti-Muslim Prejudice

1.6.2.1 Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT)

Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT) was developed by Walter G. Stephan in 2009 based on social psychology theory that deals with perception of threat. The definition of threat under the Social Identity Theory proposes, that ingroups feel threaten because of the actions of the outgroups.¹⁹ Intergroup Threat theory argues that since the beginning of humanity, humans perceived threat even if did not exist. This perception is less costly option rather than perceiving when the threat exists, therefore ingroups are to perceive treat from other outgroups by default.²⁰

¹⁶ Ibid, 36.

¹⁷ Ibid,36.

¹⁸ Ibid, 137-161.

¹⁹ Walter Stephan, Oscar Ybarra, & Kimberly Rios, "Intergroup threat theory", in *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination*, ed. Todd D. Nelson (New York: Psychology Press, 2009): 5.

²⁰ Ibid, 3.

He then divided threat into 4 types:

Realistic group threats are threats to a group's power, resources, and general welfare. Symbolic group threats are threats to a group's religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview. Realistic individual threats concern actual physical or material harm to an individual group member such as pain, torture, or death, as well as economic loss, deprivation of valued resources, and threats to health or personal security. Symbolic individual threats concern loss of face or honour and the undermining of an individual's self-identity or self-esteem.²¹

Stephan (2009,7) demonstrates that ethnic and racial groups with low power perceive high levels of threat from groups of high power; however high-power groups reaction is stronger when they feel threatened because they risk of losing the resources they control. A second reason for perceiving threat is when a group has long history of inflicting conflict, especially if they are small like the Israeli-Palestinian case. Stephan (2009, 9) also points out the threat perception is when the ingroup's cultural traits are different from the outgroup, this explains why a host country desires immigrants to assimilate. Stephan (2009,15) also adds that ingroup members who have less contact with outgroup members are predisposed to perceive threat.

In order to measure group-based inequity and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) the ITT have included Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) theory. The SDO argues that outgroups are origin of competition for ingroups which is a type of realistic threat while RWA forecast that outgroups are a threat to lifestyle of ingroups, a type of symbolic threat.²²

Finally, Stephan (2009) concludes that the consequences of threat perception are of three types: cognitive, emotional, and behavioural. Intergroups cognitive response are shown in the form of intolerance, hatred, dehumanisation, ethnocentrism and stereotyping towards the outgroup.²³ Emotional responses are usually negative and are manifested in

²¹ Ibid, 5.

²² Ibid, 16.

²³ Ibid, 17-18.

resentment, fear, anxiety, and angry form.²⁴ Behavioural response are in the form of discrimination, stealing, sabotage, lying, protest, cheating, warfare, retaliation, strikes, negotiation to aggression, etc in specific situations, these threat lead to direct outgroup harassment.²⁵

1.6.3 Theoretical Framework for Big Data Analysis

Finding patterns through data mining or Knowledge Discovery in Datasets (KDD) is not a single process rather it is a set of processes and tasks. KDD emphasises that knowledge is the result of data-driven approaches and the KDD is the overall process of knowledge discovery while data mining is one step in KDD.²⁶ For other scholars KDD is a form of advanced statistics combined with Information Technology that focuses in finding interesting patterns from huge historical datasets.

The KDD process as shown in Figure 1 shows the overall unified and iterative process for Knowledge Discovery. Fayyad O. (1996, 84) explains that the pre-step consists in integrating data to a datawarehouse either from a single database or different databases. Then the first step consists of selecting a sample data or specific variables (columns) from the datawarehouse. The second step requires cleaning, preprocessing and filling up the missing fields in the sample data. Third, data is transformed through dimension reduction and projection to reduce the number of variables which depend on the project target. Fourth, transformed data is matched to a specific data mining method. These methods are classification, regression, clustering, summarisation, dependency model and deviation detection. Fifth, appropriate algorithm and parameters are applied. Sixth, data mining is performed aided by the data mining methods. Seventh, patterns found are interpreted and visualised. Eighth, results are reviewed with experts in the field or write a report for the respected end user.

²⁴ Ibid, 19-21.

²⁵ Ibid, 21-22.

²⁶ Usama Fayyad, Gregory Piatetsky-Shapiro and Padhraic Smyth, "Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining: Towards a Unifying Framework," (in KDD-96 Proceedings at the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 1996) vol. 96: 82.




Figure 1. Overall processes of Knowledge Discovery in Datasets. Note: Adapted from *Review on the application of machine learning algorithms in the sequence data mining of DNA* (p. 5), by Y. Aimin et al, 2020, *Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology*.

According to Yuli Vasiliev (2020), Natural Language Processing (NLP), is the authoritative interdisciplinary field for the study of linguistics aided by computer science. He defines NLP as “a branch of artificial intelligence that helps machines understand and respond to human language”²⁷. Vasiliev demonstrates that the most common NLP algorithms are Keyword Extraction, Sentiment Analysis, Text Classification, Name Entity Recognition, and Automatic Summarization.

For social media mining, MohammadNoor Injadat et al (2016, 6) conducted an article survey using Systematic Literature Review (SLR) and has demonstrated that Support Vector Machine (SVM) (20%), Bayesian Networks (BN), Decision Trees (DT) and Novel algorithms are the most used techniques used for mining in social media as seen in Figure 2.

²⁷ Yuli Vasiliev, *Natural Language Processing with Python and Spacy* (San Francisco, USA: No Starch Press, 2020): 1.




Figure 2. Most applied algorithms in social media data mining. Note: Adapted from *Data mining techniques in social media: A survey* (p.6), by MohammadNoor Injadat et al, 2016, *Neurocomputing* 214.

This research will use J.L. Jimenez-Marquez et al. (2019) Big Data analytics framework (see Figure 3). For data mining methods clustering, keyword extraction and Sentiment Analysis from Natural Language Processing algorithms are used.




Figure 3. Big Data analytics framework for social media mining. Note: Adapted from *Towards a big data framework for analysing social media content* (p. 6), by J.L. Jimenez-Marquez et al, 2019, *International Journal of Information Management*.

1.6.4 Theoretical Framework for Media Framing

According to Lichter (2017) the rise of social media has changed the way journalism works, and therefore their bias as well. There is no consensus on the definition of media bias whoever within the academic circle, it is defined as premises that explains new coverage patterns. Criticism to media starts with the assumption that media is objective and unbiased, for that reason watchdog and investigative journalism was placed to restrain bias. Lichter (2017, 2) further argues that the adoption of objectivity as part of professionalisation is just an ideal in theory and not achievable in practice. For him, media bias has negative connotation as it lacks partiality, fairness and balance; and displays closed-minded views, favoritism and distortion of truth. Since news have become user-driven and interactive due to social media, he proposes three sets of theory regarding media bias.

1.6.4.1 Structural bias Theory

Lichter (2017, 3) demonstrates that structural bias in media is traced in government regulations, bureaucratic processes, market fluctuations, professional practices and criticism to news gatekeepers. For example, in an experiment, it was found that television reports made in parts led to see the social problems as individuals's responsibility rather than society's problem.

1.6.4.2 Conservative Bias Theory

Part of Critical Theory, conservative bias argues that news are a result of ideological outcome that forms society's opinion in favor of the ruling elite best interest. This criticism includes the proprietorship of news corporation and news organisations control that monopolised the market, specially in the United States. Lichter (2017, 4) mentions that Robert McChesney demonstrated that media are government certified oligopoly whose function is to serve corporations best interests. Lichter (2017, 5) concludes that any claim of objectivity is just a smokescreen that hides that news is an aspect of economic interest or who is sponsoring.

1.6.4.3 The Economic model of bias

Technological advances has led economic changes in journalism. Currently, users interact more with news and filter news that support their views therefore news agencies would match consumers demand. Lichter (2017, 8) also points out that some scholars have argue that competition in the world of news should lead to less biass, whoever there are other scholars who argue that competition would segment the market because it would feed customers own bias. Lichter concludes that media would prefer to report sensational news because it engages more people and therefore more profits.

1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study has chosen Twitter social network to mine and analyse data for the following reasons: first, according to Twitter, 80% of millennial Twitter users access Twitter through a mobile device and 81% visit twitter at least once a day.²⁸ Second, Twitter has a word limit of 280 characters, which forces users to write content straight to the point. Third, most of Twitter accounts are in public because millennials and Twitter users are not shy to share their thoughts. Fourth, Twitter analytics and IP tools for developers offer amply ways of searching and analysing data.

For the reasons stated above, this study analyses the Muslim discourse on Twitter on Macron's speech using key words and hashtags that are calibrated by the political context and Islamic discourse. Additionally, the study mines content from top mainstream Western media that discusses Macron's speech and the aftermath events. The results of Muslim discourse on Twitter will be compared with the top Western media discourse to quantitatively show whether the Western media is biased and engages in Islamophobia.

²⁸ Aaron Moy, "Four insights about millennials on Twitter", *Twitter Blog*, 2014, https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/a/2014/four-insights-about-millennials-on-twitter

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE

Currently, there is a crisis in the Muslim world. With virtual reality becoming more dominant, huge swathes of research must, by necessity, take into consideration analysis of Big Data from social media usage. Fields as diverse as sociology and even education need to be able to tap into Big Data to get meaningful results. But in regards of the Muslim world, this means that any search tools imported from the West and the far East into the Muslim cyber-sphere will be theoretically undermined and practically dubious.

What is needed is Islamic diagnostic tools that are sensitive to the Islamic environment and culture, while at the same time having the efficiency and effectiveness of the best Big Data analytics. If Muslims could generate such tools, even Western and Sino companies would vie with each other to procure it; since, business with the Muslim world provides huge profits for all involved.

According to the MENA-OECD Working Group on Investment and Trade, the MENA region is an open investment area and lately its trading trend has shifted to Asia (which comprises 55% of total trade of world trade).²⁹ According to the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), members main external trade partners for import are China, United States of America, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, France, Spain and India which reached \$17,639 billion in 2017.³⁰ This implies that external companies would have to adapt searching and e-marketing tools to the Islamic environment of Muslim societies.

More importantly, such tools can be used by Muslim governments to detect, for instance, the levels of education among the populace, which will help the governments in improving its education programs. It can also be used by security forces to understand accurately the online discourse that may or may not stoke fears of potential radicalism to Muslim youth. Such tools will be essential for Muslim governments to spread a more peaceful and tolerant understanding of Islam amongst its citizens.

²⁹ Nasser Saidi and Aathira Prasad, *Trends in trade and investment policies in the MENA region*, (Dead Sea: MENA-OECD Competitiveness Program, 2018), 9.

³⁰ United Nations, *External Trade Bulletin of the Arab Region*, (Beirut: United Nations Publications, 2019), 23-127.

1.9 LITERATURE REVIEW

The term Islamophobia was coined in late 1980s and first ever printed in a periodical in the United States in 1991.³¹ In the 1990s, the word was used to define the discrimination and racism that Muslims were facing in Western Europe.³² According to Jocelyne Cesari, Islamophobia has intensified after 9/11 and the word had been used ceaselessly in the political arena, the media and organisations.³³ She defines Islamophobia as irrational fear of Islam but she points out that racism, anti-Muslim, antisemitism and anti-Islamism fall within the same category.

In the Runnymede Report 1997, Islamophobia is defined as unfounded hostility towards Islam which leads to an unfair discrimination and seclusion towards Muslim individuals, and communities from the political and social mainstream.³⁴ The report makes a clear difference that legitimate criticism of Islam should not be used to condemn Muslims. Legitimate criticism of Islam, as defined in the report, is the criticism towards Muslim states and regimes' policies and practices; and radical groups that use Islam.³⁵ For example, when Muslim states don't sign international treaties for human rights.

Islamophobia in the West also often masquerades with racial discrimination like political debates, anti-immigration policies, non-acceptance of cultural differences and xenophobia.³⁶ Cesary (2011) argues that there are many levels of discrimination that Muslims face in Europe that falls within the domain of Islamophobia. Cesary (2011) recognises that it is difficult to distinguish Islamophobia and discrimination in Europe because European Muslims are mainly immigrants or have immigrant background and they are socioeconomically marginalised.

³¹ Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997), 7.

³² Jocelyne Cesari, "Islamophobia in the West: A Comparison between Europe and the United States," in *Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 21.

³³ *Ibid*, 21.

³⁴ Commission, British, Muslims, *Islamophobia*, 10.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 10

³⁶ Cesary, *Islamophobia, West*, 24.

For the Runnymede Report 1997, Islamophobia most of the time merges with racism and anti-immigrant policies. In the European context, Islamophobia prevents Muslims to participate in society's moral debates. For example, when Muslims criticise secularism, liberalism, and limits of freedom of speech, their arguments are rejected, however when Western scholars debate on the same issues, they are amply celebrated. In the same line of logic, under the inviolable freedom of speech, the anti-Muslim discourse is seen as natural and even celebrated.³⁷

However, for Bruckner (2018), the term Islamophobia becomes a tool to silence criticism of Islam. Bruckner (2018) argues that stopping criticism stops reformation of Islam, and this is reflected in the stagnation of Muslim culture. According to the Runnymede Report 1997, Bruckner's argument would fall within the closed view that Islam is monolithic, static and unresponsive to new realities.³⁸

Bruckner (2018) further argues that Western defenders of Islam are hypocrites that restrict criticism to Islam while advocating criticism to other religions. This tendency is counterproductive for the West as they struggle with immigration and refugee crisis and terrorism. The right to profess any religion should be equal to freedom of expression, rejection of extremism and open criticism.³⁹

Bruckner seems not to be aware that the influx of refugees to Europe is largely caused by EU states engaged in proxy wars in the Middle East⁴⁰. These refugees flee the invasion and proxy wars backed by Western powers under the mission of offsetting terrorist groups and for a 'new Middle East'.⁴¹

Western governments have argued that during this refugee crisis and influx, terrorists have camouflaged among the refugees which presented a security threat to Europe. From 2014-2018, a total of 140 Islamist extremists entered Europe and conducted attacks killing

³⁷ Commission, British, Muslims, *Islamophobia*, 18.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 11.

³⁹ Pascal Bruckner, *An Imaginary Racism: Islamophobia and Guilt*, (UK: Polity, 2018).

⁴⁰ Tim Anderson, "The War in Syria and Europe's Refugee Crisis", paper presented at Crossing Borders, Greece, 2017, 3.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 5.

170 people.⁴² Right-wing parties had taken advantage of the situation and used it to influence the electoral elections. Consequently, any politician who campaigned against Islamist terrorism and immigration gained voters and media support.⁴³ The mainstream media turned public opinion against the migration of people from Muslim-majority countries which was manifested through xenophobia and racial bias.⁴⁴

Far-right movements and Islamophobia

Comparing the ratio of attacks of far-right Western extreme groups with Muslim extreme groups, it is clear that far-right group attacks go undetected on the media and policy makers based their decisions only on the smallest ratio of foreign attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Database, from January 2014- December 2018, right-wing attacks have killed 69 and wounded more than 105 civilians and from January 2019 to December 2020, they have killed 104 and wounded more than 242 people⁴⁵. This shows that the number of attacks doubled in a year. Yet the change of political course of Europeans was because of the killing of 170 people by Muslim extremist specifically and not because of right-wing terrorist attacks.⁴⁶

According to the Pew Research Spring 2016, it showed, top surveyed European's countries like Hungary (76%), Poland (71%), Netherlands (61%), Germany (61%), Italy (60%), Sweden (57%), Greece (55%), UK (52%), France (46%), Spain (40%) admit that refugees will increase terrorism in their countries.⁴⁷ When it comes to refugee economic burden, Hungary (82%), Poland (75%), Greece (72%), Italy (65%), France (53%), UK (46%), Netherlands (44%), Spain (40%), Sweden (32%) and Germany (31%) believe that

⁴² Todd Bensman, "Data: Terrorist Migration Over European Borders (2014-2018)", *Center for Immigration Studies*, 2019, 1.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 10.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 10.

⁴⁵ Erin Miller, Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, "Global Terrorism Database (GTD)", *Study of Terrorism and Responses to terrorism-START* University of Maryland, accessed on February 2022.

⁴⁶ Todd Bensman, "Data: Terrorist Migration Over European Borders (2014-2018)", *Center for Immigration Studies*, 2019.

⁴⁷ Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs", *Pew Research Center*, July 2016.

refugees will take their jobs and social benefits.⁴⁸ However, Italy (47%), Sweden (46%) and Hungary (43%) believe that refugees are to blame for crimes in their country.⁴⁹

However, the Pew Research Center and other well know Western Think Tanks have not surveyed whether Europeans are afraid of new waves of lethal right-wing, nationalist and Neo-Nazis attacks. Interestingly, the Council of the European Union have published terrorism trends from 2010-2020 which shows that jihadist terrorism is only one side of all domestic terrorism. The ethno-nationalist and separatist; the non-specified, the left-wing and separatist, right-wing and single issues terrorists consist of the main groups of home-made terrorism (see Figure 4).⁵⁰ Despite religiously inspired attacks are the penultimate minority, the report highlights jihad terrorist in the key findings.




Figure 4. Terrorist attacks (completed, failed, and foiled) in the EU and the UK. (2010-2020). Note: Adapted from *The EU's work to tackle terrorism*, by Europol Authors, 2011-2021, EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE-SAT).

Spence (2020) notes that although there are no more jihadist attacks, the right-wing, left-wing, ethnonationalist and non-specified terrorist groups ideologies vary but are rooted on Islamophobia, antisemitism, and racism. According to the UN Security Council

⁴⁸ Wike et al, Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees.

⁴⁹ Wike et al, Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees.

⁵⁰ "The EU's work to tackle terrorism", *Council of the European Union*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/eu-response-to-terrorism/>

Counterterrorism Committee, there has been a 320% increase of extreme right-wing terrorism over the past 5 years.⁵¹

Historically, since the end of the end Cold War, right-wing extremism caused the deadliest terrorist acts in many Western countries.⁵² The main ideological groups are first, the Neo-Nazi movements with Siege Culture like Blood & Honour and Sonnenkrieg Division in the United Kingdom with presence in all European Union states; Feuerkrieg Division in the Balkans.⁵³ The second group is the anti-Islam and anti-migration movements which aim to safeguard the European and Christian identity from the Islamisation of Europe. Groups like PEGIDA and Soldiers of Odin have emerged in 2015.⁵⁴ The third group is Marxist Identitarian movement which claim that ethnic groups should not mix and live together and that European are being replaced by Muslims. The Génération Identitaire since 2012 has presence in all EU states.⁵⁵

The fourth group is the ultranationalist and neofascist movements that advocate for a pure ethnic totalitarian nationalist state. Groups Italian Casa Pound, the French Bastion Social, the Hungarian Légión Hungária and the Polish National Radical Camp and All-Polish Youth have anti-Islam agendas. Fifth, Far-right sovereign citizen movements which don't accept the legitimacy of their governments. Finally, lone-wolf terrorist like Baruch Goldstein who killed 29 Muslims in a mosque in Hebron⁵⁶, Anders Breivik who massacre

⁵¹ "Member States by the Growing and increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism", *UN Security Council Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate*, 2020.

⁵² Daniel Koehler, "Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future", in *European Security in the 21st Century*, PRISM National Defense University 6, nr. 2 (2016), 84.

⁵³ Annelies Pauwels, "Contemporary manifestations of violent right-wing extremism in the EU: An overview of P/CVE practices", *European Commission*, 2021, pg. 4.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 5.

⁵⁶ Edwin Bakker & Beatrice de Graaf, *Lone Wolves How to Prevent This Phenomenon? (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-terrorism, 2010)*, pg. 1.

77 people in Norway⁵⁷, Brenton Tarrant who shot 50 people in a New Zealand Mosque⁵⁸, are highly linked with far-right extremists and anti-Muslim extreme discourse.

Daniel Koehler, Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS), gives a small sample of terrorist attacks by the far-right wing. For example, the Italian terrorist group New Order bombed a train station in 1980 killing 85 and wounding 200 people; another bombing of the Munich Oktoberfest by a neo-Nazi leaving 13 dead and 2011 wounded; In the US, Timothy McVeigh bombed a building that killed 168 and wounded more than 600 in 1995. In 2009, a white supremacist British Neo-Nazi part of the Arian Strike Force, Ian Davison was arrested for manufacturing chemical weapons.⁵⁹

The most recent terrorist attack was the Christchurch Mosque shootings in New Zealand in 2019. Brenton Tarrant, a white supremacist had shot and killed 51 Muslims in a Friday prayer and livestreamed on Facebook.⁶⁰ Despite Tarrant being convicted with terrorism in August 2020 by the New Zealand High Court⁶¹ the media had only mention him as ‘gunman’⁶², ‘accused shooter’, ‘mosque attacker’, ‘murdered’, ‘white supremacist’, ‘killer’, ‘suspect’ and ‘Australian man’. TRT World had mention the adjective of ‘terrorist’ days after the massacre⁶³ and the Guardian News had mention as ‘mosque terrorist’ only in April 2021.⁶⁴

⁵⁷ “Norway’s far-right mass killer Breivik sues state over prison isolation,” *Al-Jazeera*, 19 August 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/19/norways-far-right-mass-killer-breivik-sues-state-over-prison-isolation>

⁵⁸ “Christchurch mosque attack: Brenton Tarrant sentenced to life without parole,” BBC News, 27 August 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53919624>

⁵⁹ Koehler, Right-Wing, Extremism, *European*, 90.

⁶⁰ The Queen v. Brenton Harrison Tarrant, CRI-2019-009-2468 [2020] NZHC 2192, 43, <https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/assets/cases/R-v-Tarrant-sentencing-remarks-20200827.pdf>

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 43.

⁶² BBC news authors, “Christchurch shooting: Gunman Tarrant wanted to kill 'as many as possible'”, *BBC News*, August 24, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53861456>

⁶³ “Perpetrator of New Zealand terrorist attack visited Turkey 'twice'”, *TRT World*, March 2019, <https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/perpetrator-of-new-zealand-terrorist-attack-visited-turkey-twice-24985>.

⁶⁴ “Christchurch mosque terrorist to launch legal challenge in New Zealand high court”, *The Guardian*, April 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/14/christchurch-mosque-terrorist-to-launch-legal-challenge-in-new-zealand-high-court>

Recent right-wing terror attacks in 2019 like of the Escondido Mosque in the USA,⁶⁵ Boerum Mosque shooting in Norway⁶⁶, and the Bayonne Mosque shooting⁶⁷ were manifestation of hate crime inspired by the white terrorist Brenton Tarrant. In 2020, five terrorist attacks were conducted in which Ontario truck attack was part of.

9/11, War on Terror and Islamophobia

Many scholars agree that Islamophobia was triggered under the War on Terror or battle against Islamic terrorism that started under the Bush Administration after the 9/11 attacks.⁶⁸ Western states have tightened their immigration policies and updated their anti-terrorism laws but only focused for Muslim majority countries. Cesary (2011) argues that there is no evidence for Islamophobes' false premises that if terrorist based on other countries are recruiting the most affected Muslim in Europe, then Muslim citizens also become an internal threat.

Surprisingly, because of this unsubstantiated threat, Western states see their Muslims citizens as a security threat.⁶⁹ This classification undermines the legal and civil rights that a citizen has. This had led bills to be passed giving more powers to the police, military, and intelligence service.⁷⁰ For example, in Germany, the authorities and military intelligence had access to use Grid-Search for data mining, and the police office could access financial and transportations records of a person.⁷¹ In the United States it is even worse where surveillance restriction were minimised. The situation compared to Europe is much worse for Muslims.

⁶⁵ Andrew Johnson, "suspect of Possible Arson Attack at Escondido Mosque Leaves Note Referencing New Zealand Terrorist Attacks", *NBC news*, <https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/islamic-center-escondido-mosque-epd-efd-sdso-reported-arson-unit/81831/>

⁶⁶ Jason Burke, "Norway mosque attack suspect 'inspired by Christchurch and El Paso shootings'", *The Guardian*, 11 August 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/norway-mosque-attack-suspect-may-have-been-inspired-by-christchurch-and-el-paso-shootings>

⁶⁷ Angelique Chrisafis, "Bayonne mosque attack was terrorism, says survivors' lawyer," *The Guardian*, 31 Oct 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/profile/angeliquechrisafis>

⁶⁸ Cesary, *Islamophobia, West*, 27.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 28.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 28.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 31.

The Western states' policies towards religious minorities suspected of terrorism are interesting when looking at the domestic far right-wing, ethnonationalist, anarchist and left-wing terrorism figures. The War on Terror had cost US \$6 trillion and more than 900,000 lives⁷² however there is no clear data that shows that the exact budget was spent in fighting right-wing terrorist groups and changing domestic law to specifically fight right-wing terrorist in the West.

Anti-semitism and Islamophobia: two faces of the same coin

Europe has a long history of excluding and targeting religious minorities.⁷³ In this case, Jews and Muslims are the foremost communities targeted. The most horrific examples are the holocaust of Jews in Germany and Austria and the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1990s.

In modern Europe, antisemitism and Islamophobia served for different functions, the former was used to secure a pure nation which excluded Jews.⁷⁴ In the name of nationalism, champions of antisemitism saw themselves as warden of a pure nation-state. Jews, no matter if they assimilate in the European society, they could never become German, French, etc.⁷⁵ Bunzl (2005) also analyses that Islamophobia is not based on religious differences rather on civilisational aspects, where most of Islamophobic discourse portrays that Islam is incompatible with Western Culture.

Modern antisemitism questioned Jew's fitness (race) to be included in the community. Islamophobes don't question if Muslims can fit to be Germans, French, etc, rather they question if Muslims can be good Europeans. For Bunzl (2005), Islamophobia serves to save the future of European civilisation rather than to protect the race of nation-state. Islamophobia is mainly part of debate of the Muslim presence in Europe, which is a political issue.⁷⁶ The anxieties whether to admit Turkey, a Muslim majority country, into the European Union (EU) is even greater.

⁷² Dylan Matthews, "20 years, \$6 trillion, 900,000 lives", *Vox news*, Sept 2021, <https://www.vox.com/22654167/cost-deaths-war-on-terror-afghanistan-iraq-911>

⁷³ Todd Green, "What is Islamophobia", in *Fear of Islam*, (US: Fortress Press, 2015), 46

⁷⁴ Matti Bunzl, "Between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some thoughts on the new Europe", *American Ethnologies* 32, no. 4 (2005): 4.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 4.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 8.

Bunzl (2005) concludes that the debate on antisemitism is no longer present because Europe is politically united on the safeguard of Jews in Europe. In simple words, Jews are well politically represented therefore Europeans can no longer target them. However, Bunzl agrees that both antisemitism and Islamophobia are similar exclusionary ideologies used for collective engineering.⁷⁷ For Bunzl, Islamophobia is just a new form of antisemitism that far right-wing groups use as a scape goat from financial crisis that EU states face.

However, for Green (2015), Islamophobia in Europe is to preserve the national and European identity. Political parties of the right-wing manipulate the electorate with fears that Muslims are threat to the German, French, Swiss, etc. identity. Green agrees with Bunzl (2005) that admitting Turkey to the EU brings anxieties for the preservation of European identity.⁷⁸

Green (2015) further argues that in Western history, Muslims and Jews had been the aliens or “others” and been targeted on religious and secular basis. For Green, the arguments that reflect deep anxiety, can be applied to any other nation.⁷⁹ For example, when the Covid-19 spread from Wuhan province, many Chinese migrants and descendants experienced racist treatment in the West especially when more cases were reported in the US, France, Australia, and UK.⁸⁰ Experts raise concern whether Sinophobia is Europe’s new anxiety, this is especially true with the rise of China in world politics.⁸¹

Eurabia and Islamophobia

Conspiracy theories that flame Islamophobia are one part of the sources of right-wing extremist and other Western terrorist groups. Bat Yeor is an example of such. Bat Yeor popularised the conspiracy theory of Eurabia in her book ‘Eurabia, The Euro-Arab axis’. In her book, Yeor argues that Europe becomes Eurabia due to the Euro-Arab Dialog that

⁷⁷ Ibid, 8.

⁷⁸ Todd H. Green, *The Fear of Islam: An Introduction to Islamophobia in the West*, (US: Fortress Press, 2015), 46.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 47.

⁸⁰ Samuel Stolton, “COVID-19 crisis triggers EU racism against Asians, rights agency says”, *Euractive News Agency*, 2020, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/covid-19-crisis-triggers-eu-racism-against-asians-rights-agency-says/>

⁸¹ Tessa Wong, “Sinophobia: How a virus reveals the many ways China is feared”, *BBC news*, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51456056>

has served to transform Europe with the help of influx of immigrants from Arab-Muslim states. Instead of immigrants adapting to the European customs, it is Europeans that need to adapt to immigrant customs.

European governments submit and fund Arab states due to self-guilt in the name of building peace and maintaining friendly relations. As a result, the European becomes a *dhimmi* and calls the international community to combat terrorism: Israel. The war against the West is manifested through the presence of Islamization of Knowledge in European books. The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) founded by Ismail Raji al-Faruqi is the chief of Islamization of Knowledge that has spread over Europe, Canada, and the US. The school curriculums are reformed to take un-Islamic topic and Muslims ask for Arabic to be taught like any other European language.

Because of Europe's Islamisation, antisemitism increases, politicians are not interested in defending the war against Israel. Churches to protect themselves, they must proclaim anti-Israeli policies. To end the discrimination in the Mediterranean area, European officials will integrate the EU to unite, and antidiscrimination programs will only work inside the EU and not in Arab states. Yeor, concludes that Islamism is deeply rooting in Europe's nerves with shariah rules, the socio-political, educational, behaviour and gender relations.⁸²

According to Brown (2019), the Eurabia conspiracy theory has been exploited by far right-wing extremist through online blogs and it is the base of contemporary Islamophobia. The conspiracy theory of Eurabia is present in the everyday politics of the US, Australia, and the EU.⁸³ During the 2019 European elections, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a German far-right party, put posters in the streets showing the painting of the French Jean-Léon Gerome, 'The Slave Market' (1866). The caption asked "Europeans, vote for AfD, so that Europe will never become 'Eurabia'".⁸⁴

⁸² Bat Yeor, *Eurabia, the Euro-Arab axis*, (Madison, US: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005), seventh edition.

⁸³ Andrew Brown, "The myth of Eurabia: how a far-right conspiracy theory went mainstream", *The Guardian*, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/16/the-myth-of-eurabia-how-a-far-right-conspiracy-theory-went-mainstream>

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Eurabia conspiracy theory has also influenced the most dangerous far-right stand-alone terrorists. For example, On July 22, 2011, the Norwegian Andres Breivik had committed two terrorist attacks in Oslo and the Island of Utoya respectively. The first attack was near the prime minister's office by car bomb, killing 8 people. After two hours, Breivik killed 67 pupils who were in a summer camp in Utoya.⁸⁵ He admitted that he was influenced by the Eurabia theory and fantasised that Muslims were a threat to European Civilisation.⁸⁶ Breivik has authored his manifesto '2083, A European Declaration of Independence' which was sent before he committed the massacres. In his book, he argues:

Time is of the essence. We have only a few decades to consolidate a sufficient level of resistance before our major cities are completely demographically overwhelmed by Muslims. Ensuring the successful distribution of this compendium to as many Europeans as humanly possible will significantly contribute to our success. It may be the only way to avoid our present and future dhimmitude (enslavement) under Islamic majority rule in our own countries.⁸⁷

He further adds that Islam will force non-believers into dhimmitude and wage a new form of jihad (weapons of mass destruction). Interestingly, he explains the pillars of Islam, quotes the sunnah, summarises the battles in Islamic history to justify that Islam is a religion of war.⁸⁸ After infidels are subjected, the *jizya* is imposed to humiliate the dhimmi that give a sense of superiority of Islam.

The dhimmitude future of Europe is just a repetition of history of what dhimmis in Spain faced between 8th century -14th century.⁸⁹ This historical evidence shows that Andalusia represented the land of jihad per excellence.⁹⁰ Breivik (2011) asks if Islam is violent then why Muslims are peaceful? for him this is because majority of Muslims don't understand their own religion as is in the case of Christians and most of them prefer to sit

⁸⁵ Cora Engelbrecht and Henrik Pryser Libell, "Anders Behring Breivik, Killer in 2011 Norway Massacre, Is Denied Parole", *The New York Times*, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/world/europe/anders-behring-breivik-norway-parole.html>

⁸⁶ Andrew Brown, *Myth Eurabia*, 2019

⁸⁷ Anders Breivik, *2083, A European Declaration of Independence*, (London: Public Intelligence, 2011), 16.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 93.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 94.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 95.

at home rather to engage in jihad. He correlates that Muslims in the West are less violent because they embraced Western values, however when Muslims outnumber Westerners, the real tenants of Islam will show which is the problem Europe is facing.⁹¹

Finally, he concludes citing most analysis of Islam by Robert Spencer (director of JihadWatch.org), Serge Trifkovic, Walid Shoebat and Bat Yeor. Their conclusion is that Islam with its doctrines, is prompt to violence and teaches its adherents to spread Islam around the world with jihad.

French *Laïcité* and French Muslims

Laïcité or French secularism, adopted by the French republic in 1905, sets the separation between the state and religion. According to Daly (2012), *laïcité* considers culture, religion and ethnicity as part of the private matter. Daly explains although *laïcité* was established by the anticlericalists to free the citizens from irrational systems, in modern France, it is unsuitable to compromise religious identities into the private life which goes against the concept of Rawlsian ‘reasonable pluralism’.⁹² For Daly, *laïcité* is used by the Far Right to ‘unwelcome cultural diversity’, and Muslim practices such like praying in the streets, halal meat, hijab, and the burka.⁹³ Mayanthi Fernando in her ethnographic study points out the contradictions in *laïcité* based on the experiences of French Muslims. Fernando starts by defining ‘Muslim French’ as ‘practicing Islam as French citizens and to practicing French citizenship as pious Muslims’ challenging the arguments of Muslims inability to integrate to secular societies.⁹⁴ Fernando argues that the French state continually defines the Frenchness of its citizens and that French Muslims by “pluralizing difference”, “understanding Muslim French destabilize the fixedness of identity as French and the overdetermination of Muslimness as difference”.⁹⁵ Using Tala Asad’s observation of familiarizing native concepts across other systems, Fernando takes Muslim French agents

⁹¹ Ibid, 106.

⁹² Eoin Daly, “The Ambiguous Reach of Constitutional Secularism in Republican France: Revisiting the Idea of *Laïcité* and Political Liberalism as Alternatives,” *Orford Journal of Legal Studies* 32, no. 3 (2012): 583-601.

⁹³ Daly, Ambiguous Constitutional, secularism, 592.

⁹⁴ Mayanthi L. Fernando, *The Republic Unsettled: Muslim French and the Contradictions of Secularism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014): 13.

⁹⁵ Fernando, Republic Unsettled Muslim French, 98.

as “sources of knowledge and as theorists” as part of her reassessing of definitions found in native discourse.⁹⁶

Tensions between Muslimness in secular are not whoever new. In the 1960s, with the migration of Muslims from French former colonies and new generations of French Muslims, the debate centred on religious symbols.⁹⁷ Politicians from right- and left-wing debated in detail whether women should be allowed to wear religious symbols in public spaces like schools.⁹⁸ Recently, tensions heightened since the killing of Charlie Hebdo journalist in 2015⁹⁹ and the Paris Attacks which had links with ISIS, since then, the French government have tightened its immigration policies and generally consider Muslims as separatist and fundamentalist who are a threat to the basic values of French society.¹⁰⁰

Slavoj Zizek, a postmodernist Slovenian philosopher, gave his peculiar comments in his book, *Blasphemous Thoughts: Islam and Modernity* about the situation of Muslims in France and the West. He calls the European head to states as hypocrites who had demonstrated unity after the Paris attacks but have not demonstrated the same union against the US imperialism in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Zizek points out that France should not play victim as France’s imperialism was present in Muslim regions and countries and involvement in the proxy war in Syria.

In the second part of his book, Zizek criticises left-wing liberals for their bias and fear charged with racism towards the Paris attacks. At the same time, he criticises them for tagging any criticism of Islam as Islamophobic. He adds that those who don’t want to criticise liberalism, should not also criticise fundamentalism. He then divides the world into two: the hypocrite and imperial West and fundamentalist Islam.

Tariq Ramadan, an Oxford University professor, has criticised the Islamophobia discourse in France, and treatment of Muslims in the West; his criticism also encompasses

⁹⁶ Ibid, 24.

⁹⁷ The economist editors, “What is French laïcité?”, *The Economist*, 2020, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2020/11/23/what-is-french-laicite>

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ian Langdon, “For French Muslims, every terror attack brings questions about their loyalty to the republic”, *The Conversation*, 2020, <https://theconversation.com/for-french-muslims-every-terror-attack-brings-questions-about-their-loyalty-to-the-republic-149151>

Muslims and Muslim societies. Professor T. Ramadan argues that Muslims can be good Europeans or Westerners. “For, as soon as their Religion is respected and their freedom assured, they become part of society and are asked to act in accordance with the host countries’ constitution and law”¹⁰¹ However, two years after, Luis Aliot, the vice-president of the National rally (before National front), claimed “If they don't have a model, what are they? Are they French? Children of the Republic? They don't care about the Republic”¹⁰²

Professor Ramadan pointed out that Muslims in Europe are allowed to build mosques and practice their religion in peace; that there is no European country that has Anti-Islamic constitution and that the way of life in Europe make difficult to practice religion as this is the same for Jews and Christians.¹⁰³ Despite these facts, to improve their situation, Muslims don’t carry out their duties.¹⁰⁴

Debates regarding halal meat, cemeteries and headscarves are in true intense however they don’t stop daily practice and the freedom of worship.¹⁰⁵ Ramadan (2010) summarises that the laws in Europe protect Muslims as citizens, they are free to speak about Islam and justice would be in their favour is they are not negligent of the legal tools.¹⁰⁶ Laicity of public spaces is very important and sensitive for secular and industrialised societies, therefore Muslims should practice their religion withing the framework of the country’s constitution.¹⁰⁷

Finally, regarding Muslim identity in Europe and the West, Ramadan (2010) points that when Muslims come to Europe or the West, they acknowledge through contract or visa the authority of the constitution, their children who born in Europe are “bound by the agreement previously made by their parents.”¹⁰⁸ In conclusion, Muslim identity is by

¹⁰¹ Tariq Ramadan, *To be a European Muslim*, (UK: The Islamic Foundation, 2010), 133.

¹⁰² Nicolas Lebourg, “Marine Le Pen, l'extrême-droite et l'islamophobie”, *L'Obs*, 2012, <https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/l-observateur-du-lepenisme/20120329.OBS5016/marine-le-pen-l-extreme-droite-et-l-islamophobie.html>

¹⁰³ Ramadan, *To be European Muslim*, 118.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 118.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 136.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 138.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 139.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 164.

bringing the Western context and Islamic teachings at once, however this should not be confused with assimilation, acculturation nor isolation.

For Caroline Fourest, a harsh critic of Tariq Ramadan, although T. Ramadan has defined in balancing religious and civic identities, he does not make clear whether it is beneficial for Islam or only the society¹⁰⁹. When T. Ramadan argues that Islam is the sea and citizenship the swimming pool, Fourest concludes that this way of setting the divine law above the law of men is “characteristic of fundamentalists”¹¹⁰. For Fourest, this would equal if a fundamentalist Christian took the Bible superior to the Declaration of Human Rights. However, Fourest have not included in her criticism that Tariq Ramadan also criticises Muslims and that he is an original thinker. Rather, she emphasises that T. Ramadan is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood just because he is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna. Fourest then criticises T. Ramadan for criticising young Muslims for going to nightclubs and adoring rap artist.¹¹¹ She then concludes that T. Ramadan is not 1000 percent secular but at least he is 100 percent which is not enough to be a French citizen.

In the beginning of C. Fourest carrier, she was egalitarian and antiracist activist. However, in the beginning of 2000s, she changed her discourse, started to talk amore about Islam as she became famous for it.¹¹² Since then C. Fourest became obsessed with Islam and is one of the media personalities that legitimised Islamophobia.¹¹³ As an employee of Charlie Hebdo in 2006, she defended the publications and did not consider as an act of humiliation rather as an act of equality.¹¹⁴

One of C. Fourest main adversaries who appear in all her books is Tariq Ramadan. M. Magnaudeix points out that she hardly provides proofs of double talk by T. Ramadan rather the book is filled with generalisation and statement out of context¹¹⁵. Nothing points

¹⁰⁹ Caroline Fourest, *Brother Tariq, the Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan*, trans. by Ioana Wieder and John Atherton (New York: Encounter Books, 2007), 212.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 214.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 121-124.

¹¹² Mathieu Magnaudeix, “The Crusades of Caroline Fourest. The misguided trajectory of a “left” propagandist”, *Revue du Crieur*, 1, N°6 (2017), p. 74-89.

¹¹³ Ibid, 7.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 8.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 11.

that T. Ramadan had a mega plan for Islamisation of Europe¹¹⁶(Eurabia theory). In 2017, T. Ramadan was accused by two women for sexual assault who had contact with Caroline Fourest¹¹⁷. He was then incarcerated in 2018 and the French and global media showed baseless facts without the curt final investigation. In May 2023, the Swiss court found him innocent of the rape charges¹¹⁸, and in November 30, 2023, T. Ramadan has win the defamation case against Ian Hamil, a journalist in Le Point who claimed that T. Ramadan had sexual relationship with students during his tenure as a teacher.¹¹⁹ Ian Hamil claimed his statement was proven in Geneva report, however the report did not include such statements. Professor Ramadan further explained in his Twitter account that:

Hamel is condemned for having "misled readers". His article was picked up by 60 media outlets around the world, without caution or verification. It was translated the same day in the #UnitedArabEmirates (UAE), which paid more than 8 million dollars to a Geneva company (Alp Services), to smear the reputation of several Muslim leaders. Ian Hamel is one of the journalists who worked with Alp Services. In an audio recording given to a media consortium, the director of Alp Services can be heard telling Ian Hamel: "the target is Ramadan and Qatar." It was in July 2017, 3 months before the first complaint...¹²⁰

Subsequently, the global mainstream Western media, has not paid attention to the last case that Professor Ramadan won. Nor it has publicised the winning cases as it did in

¹¹⁶ Mathieu Magnaudeix, "Tariq Ramadan, l'homme aux «mille discours»", *Mediapart*, 2016, <https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/200416/tariq-ramadan-l-homme-aux-mille-discours-25>

¹¹⁷ Angelique Chrisafis, "Tariq Ramadan admission sparks fresh row over rape claims", *The Guardian*, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/31/tariq-ramadan-admission-sparks-fresh-row-over-claims>

¹¹⁸ "Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan acquitted in Swiss rape trial," *France 24 News*, 24 May 2023, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230524-islamic-scholar-tariq-ramadan-acquitted-in-swiss-rape-trial>

¹¹⁹ Fedele Mendicino, "Un journaliste condamné pour diffamation contre Tariq Ramadan," *Tribune de Geneve*, 30 November 2023, <https://www.tdg.ch/chambre-penale-dappel-et-de-revision-un-journaliste-condamne-pour-diffamation-contre-tariq-ramadan-981228203912>

¹²⁰ Tariq Ramadan (@TariqRamadan), « IAN HAMEL CONDAMNÉ Il avait affirmé, dans un article du @LePoint, que l'enquête et le rapport du Conseil d'Etat genevois confirmaient que j'aurais entretenu des relations avec des élèves. Or, ledit rapport concluait, au contraire, qu'il ne s'agissait que de rumeurs. Hamel est condamné pour avoir "trompé les lecteurs". » X (Twitter), November 30, 2023, 10:22 p.m, <https://twitter.com/TariqRamadan/status/1730230784248717362>

the beginning of the accusations. For Dr. Chandra Muzaffa, President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST) Malaysia, the French media and judicial system are reflection of a society who does not tolerate someone who criticises the discrimination towards Muslims which T. Ramadan was doing for long time ago. ¹²¹For him, his persecution in France is mainly politically motivated with the help of Islamophobes. For other scholars, France has silenced Professor Ramadan in a bit to give a subtle message to the Muslim community in Europe, especially in France for anyone criticizing discrimination of Muslims, would be treated in the same way as professor Tariq.

Social Media and Islamophobia

During the presidential campaigns of 2010, 2014, 2017 and 2020 in France, the extreme right political parties like National Front have had used Islam and Islamism exchangeably in their manifestos aimed to ban headscarves and construction of Mosques to gain voters. ¹²² With the generational shift and the rise of usage of social media, naturally political parties also campaigned online yet their manifestos had same promise: fight Islamism¹²³, reduce immigration¹²⁴, and promote assimilation¹²⁵.

#Idéo2017, a project of the CY Cergy Paris University, has analysed Twitter posts of the eleven presidential candidates of the 2017 French elections. After the Twitter posts were extracted and stored in database that is link with Tweeter, they were analysed in real time based on the 13 words that are mainly used by politicians. These 13 words are

¹²¹ Chandra Muzaffar, “The Incarceration of Tariq Ramadan --- A Travesty of Justice”, *Islamic Renaissance Front*, 2018, https://irfront.net/print_version/7722.html

¹²² Catherine Fieschi, “Muslims and The Secular City: How Right-Wing Populists Shape the French Debate Over Islam”, *Brookings Institute*, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/muslims-and-the-secular-city-how-right-wing-populists-shape-the-french-debate-over-islam/>

¹²³ Marine Le Pen, *Proiect pour la France de Marine Le Pen: La Securite*, (France: Mlafrance.fr,2022), 20.

¹²⁴ Marine Le Pen, *Proiect pour la France de Marine Le Pen: contrôler l'immigration*, (France: Mlafrance.fr,2022), 33.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 33.

“France, state, Republic, people, law, work, freedom, democracy, security, immigration, terrorism, Islam, and secularism¹²⁶.

When the word of interest is chosen, it gives three types of analysis. First, it shows the word frequency used by all the candidates showing the results in the form of histogram. Second, it detects words like the chosen word and shows it in a graph form. Third, it creates a world cloud¹²⁷. As a test case, Figure 5 shows that the candidates Jacques Cheminade, Benoît Hamon, E. Macron and Dupont-Aignan respectively have used the word ‘Islam’ more frequently in their political campaigns.¹²⁸




Figure 5. Analysis for the word *Islam*: under- / over- use. Note: Adapted from *Elasticsearch Used at the Center of the #Idéo2017 citizen application*, by Julien Long, 2017, Elastic software Company.

When looking at the similar words related to Islam, Figure 6 shows that ‘Islamism, fundamentalism and immigration’¹²⁹ are found in the speeches of the French politicians.

¹²⁶ Julien Longhi, Claudia Marinica, Nader Hassine, Abdulhafiz Alkhouli, Boris Borzic. “The #Idéo2017 Platform”, (paper presented at the Conference on Computer-Mediated Communication and Social Media Corpora for the Humanities, Bolzano, Italy, Oct 2017), 3.

¹²⁷ Ibid,3

¹²⁸ Julien Long, “Elasticsearch Used at the Center of the #Idéo2017 citizen application”, *Elastic software Company*, 2017, <https://www.elastic.co/fr/blog/elasticsearch-utilise-au-centre-de-l-application-citoyenne?blade=tw>

¹²⁹ Ibid

the US should directly strikes on Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities. Regarding whether the US should declare formally war on ISIS, with an accuracy of 90.04 %, both parties agree on the same issue.

Issue	STANCE (RESULTS OF PRO PREDICTION)					AGREEMENT (SAMESTANCE PREDICTION)				
	SVM	LB	M 1	M 2	M 3	SVM	LB	M 1	M 2	M 3
ABORTION	61.25	81.25	96.88	96.88	96.88	44.34	49.31	93.75	93.75	95.36
ACA	87.5	96.88	100	100	100	79.7	51.61	100	100	100
CONFEDERATE	16.56	34.38	78.12	84.38	87.5	0	51.31	69.6	77.7	80.18
DRUGS	48.13	87.5	78.12	88.88	96.88	44.34	50.42	63.6	84.07	84.07
ENVIRONMENT	69.06	53.12	78.12	78.13	81.08	65.86	45.16	65.59	68.75	71.37
GUNS	84.38	93.75	93.75	93.75	93.75	57.33	48.59	68.54	99.5	99.59
IMMIGRATION	73.44	37.5	81.25	81.25	86.36	51.82	53.62	68.55	69.06	69.56
IRAN	74.56	84.38	65.62	65.63	84.38	69.25	35.57	79.73	100	100
ISIS	80.0	40.32	76.28	93.75	94.44	74.19	59.68	76.28	76.28	90.04
MARRIAGE	33.44	62.5	90.62	90.62	90.9	12.5	50.57	87.12	87.13	87.43
NSA	21.25	37.5	53.12	53.12	61.54	2.61	34.15	49.2	56.66	60.08
PAY	34.38	84.38	84.38	89.47	90.62	29.59	64.30	72.92	74.31	80.31
RELIGION	42.81	75	68.75	81.25	81.25	56.89	47.62	76.24	76.46	79.44
SOCIAL SECURITY	35.31	28.12	78.12	78.13	78.13	0.91	53.76	73.25	90.03	90.88
STUDENT	0	93.75	96.88	96.88	96.88	0	51.61	100	100	100
TPP	0	62.5	62.5	62.5	62.5	0	45.43	48.39	54.64	65.32

Figure 7. Stance and Agreement Accuracy by Issue. SVM shows tweet-based results, M1 shows party line agreement, M2= M1+ twitter activity, M3=M1+M2+ high Twitter behaviours. Note: Adapted from *All I know about politics is what I read in Twitter: Weakly Supervised Models for Extracting Politicians’ Stances from Twitter*, (p.2974), by K. Johnson & D. Goldwasser, 2016, 26th International Conference on Computational Linguistics.

To match the sentiment predictions with realpolitik, Donald Trump reinforced in 2018 the previous economic sanctions against Iran to reduce its nuclear program which badly affected nuclear medicine and the economy of Iran.¹³² Regarding ISIS, although the United states were supplying weapons to the rebel groups during the Syrian civil war since 2011 which lead to civil war and destruction of many Syrian cities, it was on 2013 that led an air campaign to restrict ISIS, since then its presence grew with military bases prevent the rise of ISIS 2.0.¹³³

¹³² Julian Borger and Patrick Wintour, “Trump administration unveils full extent of US sanctions on Iran”, *The Guardian*, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/05/iran-launches-military-drill-response-return-us-sanctions>

¹³³ Cameron Glenn, “Timeline: US Policy on ISIS”, Wilson Center, 2016, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-us-policy-isis>

In the United Kingdom context, Bertie Vidgen & Taha Yasseri (2019) have created a classifier to differentiate weak and strong Islamophobia posts on twitter. To create the classifiers, it was first created a list of 50,000 Twitter users which follows at least on political party in United Kingdom, subsequently, their tweets were collected from January 2017 and June 2018¹³⁴. From it, a sample of 4000 tweets were manually assigned by experts to the classifiers: 3,106 tweets were classified as non-Islamophobic, 484 tweets as weak Islamophobic, and 410 tweets as strong Islamophobic.¹³⁵ These same data were taught in the machine learning for a real application: 73,311 unseen tweets from 45 far right accounts were analysed.¹³⁶ Figure 8 shows the classifications of unseen tweets results with an accuracy of 77.3%.




Figure 8. Classification of unseen tweets and their prevalence (right). Note: Adapted from *Detecting weak and strong Islamophobic hate speech on social media* (p. 11), by B. Vidgen & T. Yasseri, 2019, *Journal of Information Technology and Politics*.

¹³⁴ Bertie Vidgen & Taha Yasseri, “Detecting weak and strong Islamophobic hate speech on social media”, *Journal of Information Technology and Politics* 17, Issue 1, (2019): 7.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, 8.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 10

Imran Awan’s research conclusions supplement Videgen & Yasseri’s work by developing social media offenders that have different approaches in cyber-bullying Muslims. He proposes a classifier based on offenders’ characteristics after analysing 500 tweets ¹³⁷ as shown in Figure 9.

Type	Characteristics	No. of Cases
The trawler	Someone who has gone through other people’s twitter accounts to specifically target people with a Muslim connection	57
The apprentice	A person who is fairly new to Twitter but nonetheless has begun to target people with the help of more experienced online abusers	39
The disseminator	Someone who has tweeted about and retweeted messages, pictures, and documents of online hate that are specifically targeting Muslims	75
The impersonator	A person who is using a fake profile, account, and images to target individuals	76
The accessory	A person who is joining in with other peoples conversations via Twitter to target vulnerable people	82
The reactive	A person who following a major incident, such as Woolwich, or issues on immigration, will begin an online campaign targeting that specific group and individual	95
The mover	Someone who regularly changes their Twitter account in order to continue targeting someone from a different profile	46
The professional	A person who has a huge following on Twitter and regardless of consequences has and will launch a major campaign of hate against an individual or group of people because they are Muslim. This person will also have multiple Twitter accounts all aimed at targeting Muslim communities	30

Figure 9. Typology of offender’s characteristics. Note: Adapted from *Islamophobia and Twitter: A Typology of Online Hate against Muslims on social media* (143), by I. Awan, 2014, Policy and Internet.

¹³⁷ Imran Awan, “Islamophobia and Twitter: A Typology of Online Hate against Muslims on social media”, *Policy and Internet* 6, Issue 2(2014): 133-150.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF FRENCH DISCOURSE ON ISLAM AND MUSLIMS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the French discourse on Islam and Muslims surveying historical facts from the Enlightenment, French revolution, Napoleonic era, colonial era, and contemporary era. The emphasis of the chapter is to understand what notions of Islam and Muslims impacted in French history and vice versa. Such examination and exploration are important because of the expression of public views of Islam and Muslims, which do not occur in a vacuum. Historical context sets the meanings of what Islam and Muslims are in the French discourse. By taking the historical context, later analysis in this study, would be able to take into consideration the nuances and diversities inherent in the history of French discourse. Such survey also allows to compare the limitations of the French discourse regarding Islam and Muslims with the more globalized discourse.

2.2 ENLIGHTENMENT AND ISLAM

The enlightenment (late 17th century-18th century) was an epoch in Europe, especially in France, where empirical evidence, rationalism and skepticism had a strong place in politics, philosophy, and economics.¹³⁸ The main intellectuals of this ‘Age of Reason’ were Voltaire, D’Alembert, Diderot, Montesquieu, and Rousseau who are considered as the *philosophes*.¹³⁹ The *philosophes* and other a hundred thirty contributors collaborated in the *Encyclopédie* project which consisted of more than seventy thousand articles, its content is purely secular and anti-authoritarian, and it was written over a span of 21 years (1751–1772).¹⁴⁰ The *Encyclopédie* included articles about Islam, Turks and the prophet Muhammad. Regarding religion, the enlightenment had been critical of it and had a more

¹³⁸ Wilian Bristow, “Enlightment,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2010, modified in 2017, Metaphysics Research Lab: 1.

¹³⁹ Wilian Bristow, ‘Enlightment’, 1.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 9.

secular stance. It highly criticized religious features like fanaticism, superstition and blind following as well as the institutionalized establishment of the catholic Church.¹⁴¹ The enlightenment presented religion in the form of deism, atheism, fideism, and religion of the heart, from which the first two forms were mainly interconnected with the Enlightenment.¹⁴²

When it comes to Islam, it is assumed that the enlightenment secular scholars condemned or ignore Islam, whoever they had many positions. Early positions included that Islam was the alternative to Trinity, a religion which emphasised the use of reason, a civilization which achieved in arts and science, and its prophet as legislator.¹⁴³ Some writers like Montesquieu, David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith in order to defend their interest, depended on Islam's knowledge, making generalizations and did not explore Islam empirically.¹⁴⁴ Other writers like Voltaire, and Gibbon did explore Islam historically. Montesquieu's portrayal of Islam was mainly expressed in his *De l'esprit des lois* (The Spirit of the Laws) and *Lettres persanes* (Persian Letters). The former sought to study the laws, their spirit, and its relationship with the geographical attributes of the country, the religion, and customs of people.¹⁴⁵ Montesquieu argues that despotic rulers govern by fear and threat and that religion plays a key in it because pious people respected their rulers unquestionably.¹⁴⁶ Despite citing Rome, Persia and Russia as despotic states, Montesquieu's focuses on the Ottoman Empire correlating that governments of despotic forms are suited to Islam.¹⁴⁷ Overall, Montesquieu preferred travel counts about the orient that supported his argument; he never traveled to the Orient nor knew Arabic fluently. He only cited the Quran as historical evidence when studying the about pre-Islamic Arabs and the establishment of Islam.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 16

¹⁴² Ibid,17-19.

¹⁴³ Alexander Bevilacqua, "Islam and the Enlightenment," in *The Republic of Arabic Letters: Islam and the European Enlightenment* (London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018),168.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid,168

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 169

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 173

¹⁴⁷ Ana J. Samuel, "The Design of Montesquieu's 'The Spirit of the Laws': The Triumph of Freedom over Determinism," *The American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2 (2009), 317.

Voltaire heavily criticized Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* and the way he ignored sources that did not fit his arguments. Voltaire sustained that traveler's account were not empirical sources, therefore there was not enough evidence of the true political nature of the Ottoman Empire and that any conclusion about its religion was false¹⁴⁸. Despite the availability of counterarguments towards Montesquieu, his book had impacted the European perception towards Islam in the 19th century, a shift from admiration to dislike. In 1756, Voltaire wrote an *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (Essay on the manners and the spirit of nations) as a continuation on the essay of Bishop Bossuet, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (Speech of Universal History) which covered universal history till 9th century describing Arabs as barbarians.¹⁴⁹ Voltaire shows that Asia in the 9th century was more culturally advanced than Europe of 19th century. He studies the religion and culture of China, India, Persia, Arabia.

Earlier, in his play *Mahomet*, Voltaire portrayed Muhammad as a fanatic and Machiavellian.¹⁵⁰ Whoever, he explained that this was part campaign against fanaticism and intolerance rather than entertainment.¹⁵¹ Later, in his writings, Voltaire represented Islam and the prophet in more positive way. For example, he defines the rise of Islam as the greatest revolution in human history.¹⁵² Overall, Voltaire postraits the prophet Muhammad in his writings as a charlatan no matter how genius is in his actions.¹⁵³ Ziad Elmarsafy records that Voltaire used *Mahomet* to attack the church, using Islam's rituals to denounce Christian wrongdoing.¹⁵⁴ Voltaire's views on Islam were then summarized by Chevalier de Jancourt in the *Encyclopédie* which enjoyed popularity in French society.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁸ Bevilacqua, *Islam and the Enlightenment*,176

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 178

¹⁵⁰ Susanna de Vries, "Voltaire," in *Christian-Muslim Relations. A Bibliographical History Volume 13 Western Europe (1700-1800)*, ed. David Thomas and John A. Chesworth (Boston: Brill, 2019): 700.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 704

¹⁵² Bevilacqua, *Islam and the Enlightenment*,180

¹⁵³ Thomas, *Christian-Muslim Relations 1700-1800*, 706

¹⁵⁴ Zaid Elmarsafy, "Voltaire: Muhammad and Moses, opposition and identification" in *The Enlightenment Qur'an: the politics of translation and the construction of Islam* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 82-83.

¹⁵⁵ Bevilacqua, *Islam and the Enlightenment*, 187

Edward Gibbon in his *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* touched the rise of Islam considering it as one of the revolutions that will be forever in the minds of nations.¹⁵⁶ During his youth, he read *The Thousand and One Nights*, raking it as the classic of Homer. Gibbon lamented for not learning Arabic and expressed it by thanking the interpreters. His citations are well-equipped compared to Voltaire and Montesquieu. In his writings, he focused more on the difference of opinion among Muslim scholars, depicting the prophet Muhammad as humane and genius.¹⁵⁷ Gibbon also pointed out the contributions Muslims made to various sciences specially astronomy, medicine, and the use of philosophy of Aristotle. However, he criticized harshly the Islamic civilization, denoting that Muslims lack the essence of tolerance.¹⁵⁸

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the son of the watchmaker who worked in Istanbul and returned to Geneva after 7 years.¹⁵⁹ Rousseau was a deist and for him Islam was a religion of logic closer to the ideal natural religion.¹⁶⁰ Ian Coller points that Condorcet, a French mathematician, and philosopher, concurred with Rousseau defining Islam as the most tolerant and the less ridiculous in religious practice.¹⁶¹ Rousseau further added that the beauty of Islam was also expressed in revelation of the Quran, its beautiful recitation makes anyone who listens smile, his ears are seduced and the heart touched.¹⁶² Elmarsafy argues that there is no sufficient information that points that Rousseau actually read the Quran in Arabic.¹⁶³ However, it is assumed that Rousseau read the works of *philosophes*, encyclopedistes and scholars of Arabic republic regarding Islam and the prophet.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 189

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 190-193

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 195-200

¹⁵⁹ Ian Coller, "Rousseau's Turban Entangled Encounters of Europe and Islam in the Age of Enlightenment", *Historical Reflections* 40, no.2 (Summer 2014): 61, Berghahn Journals.

¹⁶⁰ Ian Coller, "Islam in the Temple of Reason", in *Muslims and Citizens: Islam, Politics and the French Revolutions*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2020), 150.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 150

¹⁶² Thomas, *Christian-Muslim Relations 1700-1800*, 29

¹⁶³ Zaid Elmarsafy, "Rousseau and the Language of the Legislator" in *The Enlightenment Qur'an: the politics of translation and the construction of Islam* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 121.

Rousseau considers Muhammad as prophet and legislator who should not be called impostor just because people don't understand his message.¹⁶⁴ In Rousseau's Social Contract, the legislator is a prophet who rules with no cruelty, and compulsion, and since a society can't survive with no legislator, law is fundamental for a lasting political institution.¹⁶⁵ For Rousseau, only Islam and Judaism's laws and founders demonstrate time test. However, for him, as Islam became an advance civilization, Muslims became weak which was not the fault of the prophet.¹⁶⁶ As the legislator has to persuade without convincing, the Quran can persuade and legislate; Rousseau concludes that Western languages are not fit for revelation, only Persian or Arabic are the language for the legislator for speak wisdom¹⁶⁷

The *philosophes'* debates on religion, politics and Islam during the enlightenment, would path the way for French revolutionaries to advocate their cause across the Mediterranean which is discussed in the next section.

2.3 FRENCH REVOLUTION (1789-1794) AND ISLAM

The French Revolution was considered on the most significant in the history of Europe and France which fomented the end of feudal system, agitated revolutionary wars, and demarcated the definition of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. The causes of the French revolution were not only due to the financial crisis that France inherited due to the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) between England and France.¹⁶⁸ History professor Richard Heath Dabney (1888), explains that the privileges and lavish life of the noble family and the catholic Church, the self-interest of the priest, the absolutism and the poor state management by the king; direct and indirect taxes to the lower class, the influence of Enlightenment thought,

¹⁶⁴ Zaid Elmarsafy, "Rousseau and the Language of the Legislator", 123.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 124-126

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 126

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 130-136

¹⁶⁸ J. S. Hamilton, "The Hundred Years War: Volume II, Trial by Fire," *History: Reviews of New Books* 28, no. 4(2000): 169.

social inquiry as results of the feudal system and political and financial crisis in the 1780s were the major causes for the French Revolution.¹⁶⁹

At the beginning of the revolution, a variety of political factions rose to represent their communities and voice their demands during the financial crisis that led to a revolution that eventually replaced the monarchy for a new republic and separated that state from the catholic church. Two prominent political factions, the Girondins and the Jacobins fought to direct the revolution. The Girondins represented the high middle class, they were conservatives and were considered moderate revolutionist.¹⁷⁰ The Montagnard, latter known as the Jacobins, were radical leftist who claim to represent the poor class.¹⁷¹ Both groups' influence led the execution of king Louis XVI and replacing the monarchy with the Revolutionary Government French First Republic under the National Convention in 21 September 1792.¹⁷² The Girondins supported free market, and an egalitarian society while the Jacobins supported policies for the working class, however both groups supported the right to property with the difference that the Girondins believed in absolute property.¹⁷³ The main figures of the Girondin club were led by Jacques-Pierre Brissot, Pierre Vergniaud, Jean-Marie Roland and his wife madam Roland.¹⁷⁴ By 1793, the poor class after seeing no improvement in their situation, formed the Sans-Culotte militancy¹⁷⁵ led by Francois Hanriot¹⁷⁶. Although the Montagnard claimed to represent them, the Sans-Culotte were closer to the poor and had the ability to assemble thousands of armed people¹⁷⁷. The Jacobin

¹⁶⁹ Richard Heath Dabney, *The Causes of the French Revolution*, (New York: Henry Hold and Company, 1888):13-158.

¹⁷⁰ Ian Davidson, "The Convention" in *The French Revolution: from Enlightenment to Tyranny* (London: Profile books, 2016), 138.

¹⁷¹ Davidson, "The Convention" in *The French Revolution*, 139.

¹⁷² Ian Davidson, "The Commune Insurrectionnelle" in *The French Revolution*, 115.

¹⁷³ Marcel Dorigny, "Les Girondins et Jean-Jacques Rousseau," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 234 (1978): 569-572.

¹⁷⁴ Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution From its origins to 1793* (London: Routledge, 2001), 209.

¹⁷⁵ Simon Schama, *A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1989-2004): 497.

¹⁷⁶ Schama, *Citizens, A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, 597.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 597.

club represented by Maximilien Robespierre, Georges Danton, Jean-Paul Marat, and Jacques-Rene Hebert¹⁷⁸ naturally requested the Sans-Culotte's pledge.¹⁷⁹

The Girondins had dominated the revolution since 1791, however, the public view changed towards the Jacobins after the Girondins opposed the Maximum law for setting the price for wheat and flour and the arrest of Marat.¹⁸⁰ The Sans-Culotte surrounded with cannons the Convention meeting and forced the arrest of the Girondins for felony whom months later were executed by guillotine in 1793.¹⁸¹ Subsequently, the Jacobins secured power, but some departments loyal to the Girondins revolted and Marat was assassinated.¹⁸² From 1793- 1794, the Jacobins led a government of "terror" and tyranny¹⁸³ until Robespierre and his club team were executed in July 1794.¹⁸⁴ Regarding religion, the French Revolution set the grounds for *laïcité*, the separation of the Catholic Church and the State. For the revolutionaries, the church's immense wealth was in constant view.¹⁸⁵ On August 1789, the National Assembly after abolishing the feudal system and nobility started to reform the church by abolishing the tithes and declaring freedom of worship,¹⁸⁶ on November 2, the property of the church was placed to the 'disposition of the nation' to reduce budget deficit.¹⁸⁷ On February 13, 1790, the National Assembly prohibited the vow for new members and dissolved religious orders.¹⁸⁸ On 12 July 1790, the Assembly passed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy where priest would work for the state as any civil servant.¹⁸⁹ With the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' in 1789, religious tolerance was enforced which benefited protestants at first and then the Jews.¹⁹⁰

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 597

¹⁷⁹ Lefebvre, *The French Revolution Origins*, 259.

¹⁸⁰ Francois Furet, "The Fall of the Girondins" in *French Revolution 1770-1814* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 126.

¹⁸¹ Furet, "The Fall of the Girondins," 127-128

¹⁸² Ibid, 128-131

¹⁸³ Ian Davidson, "The Terreur" in *The French Revolution*, 207-222.

¹⁸⁴ Ian Davidson, "The Fall of Robespierre" in *The French Revolution*, 249-251.

¹⁸⁵ Ian Davidson, "The Revolutionaries reform the Church" in *The French Revolution*, 65.

¹⁸⁶ Lefebvre, *The French Revolution Origins*, 126.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 154.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 162.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, 162.

¹⁹⁰ Ian Davidson, "The Revolutionaries reform the Church" in *The French Revolution*, 66-67.

Recently, there has been raise the question whether these rights also encompassed to Muslims. Ian Coller cites a translation of the bill of 24 December 1789 that gives Muslims same rights as French citizens:

The National Assembly, considering the good understanding and friendship that has extended for more than a century between France and the Sublime Porte [ie. The Ottoman State], and desiring to continue its existence, has decreed and decrees that all Muslims, particularly the subjects of the Turkish Emperor, in Europe as in all other parts of the world, will enjoy all the rights, honours and advantages that French citizens enjoy in every part of the Empire of the French.¹⁹¹

Coller continues explaining that before the revolution, Muslims could not access to citizenship, however since French merchants and diplomats enjoyed freedom of worship and autonomy in the Ottoman empire by treaties, Muslims had also been given by reciprocity a place to bury their dead according to Islamic customs and a building to pray, especially in Marceille, France.¹⁹² The revolutionaries used the same feudal regime reciprocity to include Muslims as part of the French civil rights, however Jews in spite of living for centuries did not have the same reciprocity as they were not recognized as fully French.¹⁹³

Recent historical interpretation by Ian Coller, showed that Muslims were well informed about the French Revolution and that the revolutionaries aware of the universalism of the French Revolution's ideas, saw Muslim presence as a propaganda tool to spread their ideas specially across the Mediterranean. It was on 19 June 1790, a delegation of foreigners led by the Prussian Jean-Baptiste Clootz, known as Anacharsis Cloots¹⁹⁴ asked permission to the National Assembly to take part in the first celebration of the storming of Bastille, the "Festival of the Federation".¹⁹⁵ The delegation consisted of Arabs, English, Italians, Spanish, Americas, Russians, Germans, Indians, etc.¹⁹⁶ It was

¹⁹¹ Ian Coller, "Citizen Chawich: Arabs, Islam and Rights in the French Revolution," *French History and Civilization* 5,(2014): 49.

¹⁹² Ian Coller, "Citizen Chawich", 49.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 49.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, 42-43.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, 42.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, 45.

however the Arab delegation of Turkey, Siria, Tunis and Tripoli that took much of the attention of the Assembly due to their exotic clothes.¹⁹⁷ Mohamed D’Ghies, a distinguish merchant and stateman from Tripoli¹⁹⁸ known as Si Hamed of Tripoly, and Hage Monakmeti de Tounisie were among the two Muslims that signed the petition.¹⁹⁹ In 1795, Mohamed D’Ghies wrote to the deputy Cadroy swearing by the prophet Muhammad that his interest in the revolution had no commercial motivations, rather he loved the justice and rights of men that the revolution professed, despite the difference place they born and religion they profess, both are brothers.²⁰⁰

Al-Kahin Diyunysius Shawish, a catholic Arab from Palestine who arrived in France in 1783, spoke on behalf of the Arab representatives in half Arabic and half French expressing his admiration and respect for the revolutionary Constitution.²⁰¹ The head of the Assembly, Baron de Menou, received the deputation as ambassadors, however Anacharsis Cloots presented them as deputies of tyrannical kingdoms.²⁰² Menou gave an epic response affirming that it were Arabs who taught philosophy to Europe and it was time for France to give back in Liberty²⁰³ and asked the foreign deputies to back to their land and ask their leader to emulate King Luis XVI.²⁰⁴ It was at that moment, that the foreign deputation gave a mental map of the universality of the French Revolution and this led a deputy of the Assembly to propose the abolition of titles.²⁰⁵ Eight years later, during the French expedition to Egypt, Manou embraced Islam taking the name as Jacques-Abdallah Menou subsequently marrying an Egyptian lady.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 46.

¹⁹⁸ Ian Coller, “The French Revolution and the Islamic World of the Middle East and North Africa” in *The Routledge Companion to French Revolution in World History*, edited by Alan Forrest and Matthias Middell (London: Routledge, 2016): 117.

¹⁹⁹ Ian Coller, “Citizen Chawich”, 44.

²⁰⁰ Ian Coller, “The French Revolution and the Islamic World”, 130.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 42-44.

²⁰² Ibid, 46.

²⁰³ Ibid, 42

²⁰⁴ Ian Coller, “The Turbans of Liberty” in *Muslims and Citizens, Islam, Politics and the French Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University press, 2020) :85.

²⁰⁵ Ian Coller, “The Turbans of Liberty”, 83.

²⁰⁶ Didier Ferrand, “L’étrange Mariage D’abdallah Menou,” *Revue Des Deux Mondes (1829-1971)*,(1 May,1965):115-117.

To make a living, Shawish worked under Jacques Cazotte writing new editions of *One Thousand and One Night*; in 1789, the cooperation was over and Shawish joined the Jacobin club in December the same year.²⁰⁷ In 1790, the 30 April law allowed to obtain citizenship to foreigners who resided five years in France, additionally if they have married a French citizen, set-up a business or bought property.²⁰⁸ Shawish was entitle citizenship according to the law, he was married to a French woman and had three children²⁰⁹ but when the interior minister Jean-Marie Roland reorganized the National Library, Shawish lost his job as an interpreter in 1792.²¹⁰ In a series of letters, to regain his job, Shawish addressed the minister comparing how well French citizens were threated in the Ottoman empire, When the Jacobins took power, Shawish was arrested in 1793 for his link with the Girondin minister.²¹¹ To regain his liberty, Shawish appealed as a foreigner to be protected by reciprocity under the Ottoman Empire, even though he had French citizenship. He is considered to be the first Arab French citizen according to the author.²¹² He was release after eight months. In another case, an Indian Muslim arrived in France in 1793 as he was persecuted in India for his association with the revolution. Despite having arrive during the year of Terror and the suspicion toward foreigners which was sending innocents to the guillotine, Ahmed was given assistance by the Jacobins to reside in France. He was given support to learn the French language, which later he translated the Rights of Man into Persian but due to the fall of the Jacobins, Ahmed returned to Bombay in 1796 and was arrested by the British because he was considered a dangerous revolutionary.²¹³

Despite the revolution reaching and influencing different parts of the world, the Middle East and North Africa, the front part of the Mediterranean, are not consider in the historical interpretation of the French Revolution. George Lefebvre argued that the Islamic, Indian, Japanese and Chinese great civilizations were not aware of the French Revolution

²⁰⁷ Ian Coller, “The Turbans of Liberty”, 101.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 83.

²⁰⁹ Ian Coller, “The Muslim Jacobins” in *Muslims and Citizens, Islam, Politics and the French Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University press, 2020):185.

²¹⁰ Ian Coller, “The Muslim Jacobins”, 183.

²¹¹ Ibid, 184.

²¹² Ibid, 185.

²¹³ Ibid, 169-188.

and therefore not able to embrace the European values.²¹⁴ Coller adds Robert Palmer's explanation that revolution was not geographical but civilizational in nature that focused on the West and that each revolution are developed in its own context and have less links with other revolutions.²¹⁵ Other scholars like Serif Martin and Niyazi Berkes would argue that the French revolution was known only to minority of secular intellectuals in the Ottoman empire.²¹⁶ However for other scholars, Muslims in the Mediterranean side were well informed of the revolution in France²¹⁷ and were aware of the geographical distribution outside the Mediterranean, their response to the revolution may have been muted but not disconnected.²¹⁸ At the beginning of the revolution in 1789, while the Bastille fortress was being stormed by the revolutionaries in France, Selim III ascended the throne.²¹⁹ The new sultan carried his predecessor's reform Nizam-i-Djedid in order to match Western political and military advances.²²⁰ This led a series of revolutions within the empire²²¹, Arab leaders of Levant revolt to become autonomous, opposition from Muhammad Abdul Wahab in Arabia and the Russian Empire along with Austria declared war.²²² Other segments easily attracted to the revolution ideas were the Franks, Latin Christians which formed Jacobin clubs in Istanbul, Aleppo and Egypt.²²³ The Ottoman Christians whoever did not like the revolution in France as religion were being separated from public affair.²²⁴ Balkan Muslims in the other hand were attracted by the revolution's liberty and equality.²²⁵ In the province of Widin, pasha Passwan Oglou, though being a pious Muslim, held revolutionary ideas

²¹⁴ George Lefebvre, *The French Revolution, From its origins to 1793*, translated by Elizabeth Moss Evanson (London: Routledge, 2001): xix.

²¹⁵ Ian Coller, "The French Revolution and the Islamic World", 120.

²¹⁶ Ibid, 124.

²¹⁷ Rachida Tlii Sellaouti, "The Republic and the Muslim World, for a For a regenerated Mediterranean system" in *The Routledge Companion to French Revolution in World History*, edited by Alan Forrest and Matthias Middell (London: Routledge, 2016): 100.

²¹⁸ Ian Coller, "The French Revolution and the Islamic World, 119.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 118.

²²⁰ Rachida Tlii Sellaouti, "The Republic and the Muslim World", 106.

²²¹ Ian Coller, "The French Revolution and the Islamic World, 126.

²²² Rachida Tlii Sellaouti, "The Republic and the Muslim World", 119-129.

²²³ Ian Coller, "The French Revolution and the Islamic World, 128.

²²⁴ Ibid, 126.

²²⁵ Rachida Tlii Sellaouti, "The Republic and the Muslim World", 110.

like protecting property, liberty and tax reduction.²²⁶The revolution in France and the Ottoman Empire had a common ground: fight against tyranny.

The Republic intention of spreading the revolution ideals in the Muslim world changed when its expansionist policy led to the invasion of Egypt and broke peace with the Ottoman empire. While the revolutionaries were busy in the middle of the revolution, Tolon (Mediterranean coast) was sieged in 1793 by the counterrevolutionaries with the help of Spain and Britain, which make France realize the necessity of having peace with the Ottoman Empire²²⁷ to oppose British control over the sea and the Mediterranean Sea.²²⁸ The revolutionaries felt responsible for policing the Mediterranean and therefore consider it to be French lake.²²⁹ The Deputy Bertrand Barere proposed a navigation act through *La Liberte des Mers* and peace with the Ottomans.²³⁰ However, the foreign minister Talleyrand invoked the right to conquer, and in order to dominate the Mediterranean sea, Egypt had to be dismember from the Ottoman empire as it was no longer powerful.²³¹ Napoleon Bonaparte shared Talleyrand's project and he carried the Egyptian expedition in 1798 which was disastrous as it wiped French trade in the Ottoman domination.²³² This also led to the rejection of revolutionary ideals both in Egypt and the Ottoman empire.

The next section will discuss the endeavors of Napolean Bonaparte in Egypt and his relationship with Islam.

2.4 NAPOLEON AND ISLAM

Napoleon Bonaparte's lineage is traced to the Island of Corsica, France. Historians assert that Corsica was inhabited by Africans, Arabs, Italians, and Moors before it became part of France in 1789.²³³ During the 16th century, Francesco Bounaparte migrated to Corsica from

²²⁶ Ibid, 109-110.

²²⁷ Ibid, 97.

²²⁸ Ibid, 100.

²²⁹ Ibid, 99.

²³⁰ Ibid, 98.

²³¹ Ibid, 102-103.

²³² Ibid, 103-110.

²³³ Ian Coller, "Bonaparte's Burka" in *Muslims and Citizens, Islam, Politics and the French Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University press, 2020): 212.

Italy, where he was known as the “Moor of Sarzana”.²³⁴ Historians explain that Francesco was called Moor due to the mixture of his lineage.

During his adolescent, Napoleon have read many orientalist books about Islam which inspire him to write a fictional story *Le Masque Prophete*, where a handsome Muslim prince Hakem revolts in Baghdad against the caliph Mahadi declaring himself as prophet of Khorasan.²³⁵ Hakem is then affected by a disease that affected his beauty and started to wear a mask for which is he known as the Burkai (from Burka). When he is about to lose the battle, he orders his followers to dig a well, but he poisons them and burns them in the well where he jumps and dies.²³⁶

Bonaparte’s main understanding of Islam was influenced by the orientalist Claude-Étienne Savary.²³⁷ Savary visited Egypt from 1776-1779 where he learnt Arabic. He described Egypt in the orientalist exotic style: the land of pharaohs, palm trees, beautiful women, etc.²³⁸ He translated the Quran into French with a long introduction where he described the prophet Muhammad as legislator, demagogue, promethean and “the birth of Mahomed [...] was announced by miracles.”²³⁹ Savary further adds that the prophet was born with rare genius abilities, lived in a castle and came to the earth to bring change.²⁴⁰ Napoleon in the other hand, was impressed by the prophets’ marriage to a widow, the number of wives along his life, the migration of Medina, the fact that he was illiterate and the conquest of Mecca.²⁴¹ In a commentary to Voltaire’s *Mahomet*, Napoleon described Muhammad as a great man, commander and statesman; a man who built a civilization in Arabia.²⁴² In that sense, Napoleon identified himself also as a rare genius, a desire to conquer the world like Muhammad.²⁴³

²³⁴ Ian Coller, “Bonaparte’s Burka”, 112.

²³⁵ Ibid, 210.

²³⁶ Ibid, 210.

²³⁷ Zaid Elmarsafy, “Savary, Napoleon and Egypt: Visions of Prophecy and Conquest” in *The Enlightenment Qur’an: the politics of translation and the construction of Islam (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009)*, 145.

²³⁸ Ziad Elmarsafy, “Savary, Napoleon and Egypt”, 145.

²³⁹ Ibid, 146.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 147.

²⁴¹ Ian Coller, “Bonaparte’s Burka”, 214.

²⁴² Ziad Elmarsafy, “Savary, Napoleon and Egypt”, 150.

²⁴³ Ibid, 147.

Napoleon embarked from the Tulon port in the Mediterranean coast to Egypt in 1798, arriving in Alexandria he proclaimed that the French arrived to emancipate them from the Mamluk tyranny.²⁴⁴ He then presented himself as a Muslim using the Quran and Sunnah to legitimize himself as the predicted Mahdi to save the region:

Tell your people that since the beginning of time God has decreed the destruction of the enemies of Islam and the breaking of the crosses by my hand. Moreover, He decreed from eternity that I shall come from the West to the Land of Egypt for the purpose of destroying those who have acted tyrannically in it and to carry out the tasks which He set upon me. And no sensible man will doubt that all this is by virtue of God's decree and will. Also tell your people that the many verses of the glorious Qur'an announce the occurrence of events which have occurred and indicate others which are to occur in the future... Indeed, there are some of them who refrain from cursing me and showing me enmity out of fear of my weapons and great power and they do not know that God sees the secret thoughts, He "knoweth the deceitful of eye, and what men breaths' conceal. (Quran: 40:19)".²⁴⁵

In a letter to Madam Remusat, Napoleon confessed that when he arrived in Egypt, he imagined himself entering riding an elephant, wearing a Turban with a new Koran written by himself²⁴⁶ bringing truth to the oppressed people²⁴⁷ In his expedition he brought 151 scholars and scientist and established The Institute of Egypt to study the Egyptian economy, culture and history.²⁴⁸ Napoleon then created a council to reform tax system, security and sanitation but people discomfoted with French customs did not alienate to the reforms and riots erupted.²⁴⁹The Ottoman empire then turned to Britain for help to expel France out of Egypt. The Turkish army then arrived in Alexandria with the help of the British navy but Napoleon fought back earning victory.²⁵⁰ Meanwhile in France, the political situation was weak, Napoleon decided to return in secrecy along other important scholars and military to France leaving his army behind to Jean-Baptiste Kleber who was

²⁴⁴ Jackson Sigler, "Engaging the Middle East: Napoleon's invasion of Egypt," *History: Reviews of New Books* 38, no.2(2010): 41.

²⁴⁵ Ziad Elmarsafy, "Savary, Napoleon and Egypt", 154.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, 148.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, 143.

²⁴⁸ Jackson Sigler, "Engaging the Middle East", 40-41.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 42

²⁵⁰ Ibid, 42

later killed.²⁵¹ His successor, Jacques-Abdallah de Menou made deals with the British to bring back 27,000 French soldiers and scientist in their ships in 1801.²⁵² Thirty years later, the Bonapartist empire would subjugate the lands of Africa starting the a new era of colonization. The subsequent section will discuss about the French colonization in the Muslim world, especially in Algeria, and its relationship with Islam.

2.5 FRENCH COLONIAL ERA AND ISLAM (ALGERIA)

The second French colonial era started with the invasion of Algeria in 1830²⁵³ and continued through the 19th and 20th century which concentrated especially in the North and West Africa.²⁵⁴ Subsequently, Tunisia fell under French control in in April 1881²⁵⁵ and Morocco in 1912.²⁵⁶ Before the French colonizers set foot in Algeria, the French public opinion and parliamentarians believed in the conception that Islam was a deep-rooted fanatical religion and that Muslims were savage people²⁵⁷. These negative conceptions shaped the colonizers mentality which implemented cruel invasion and conquest.²⁵⁸ With different aims and intentions, political factions supported the colonization of Algeria. The liberal bourgeoisie believed that the colonization would spread the French language and help the population growth.²⁵⁹ For the radical left, the colonization was mystical, it would help the spiritual rebirth and allow peace with the Muslim world forming a new civilization.²⁶⁰ The French colonization, compared to the British empire, it focused on

²⁵¹ Ibid, 42

²⁵² Ibid, 42

²⁵³ Madeleine Dobie, *Trading Places, Colonization and Slavery in Eighteen-Century French Culture*, (London: Cornell University Press, 2010): 21.

²⁵⁴ Madeleine Dobie, *Trading Places, Colonization and Slavery*, 168.

²⁵⁵ Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881–1938* (London: University of California Press, 2013): 16.

²⁵⁶ Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule*, 99.

²⁵⁷ Jennifer Sessions, “Making Settlers Muslim Religion, Resistance and Everyday Life in Nineteenth-Century French Algeria,” *French History* 33, no.2 (2019): 163.

²⁵⁸ Jennifer Sessions, “Making Settlers Muslim Religion”, 163.

²⁵⁹ Michael Hefferman, “The Parisian Poor and the Colonization of Algeria during the Second Republic,” *French History* 3, no.4 (1989): 381.

²⁶⁰ Michael Hefferman, “The Parisian Poor Colonization Algeria”, 381.

assimilating indigenous inhabitants to French culture and norms under the ideology of ‘civilizing people’.²⁶¹

The French authorities would further disrespect Algerian Muslims by considering them subject and not citizens in their own land.²⁶² Citizenship was only given to Muslims who resign their religious identity and the Quranic laws for which only the elite and retired soldiers were able to access.²⁶³ Meanwhile in France, poor unemployed Parisian led an insurrection in 1848 which in response, the authorities sent them to Algeria as pioneer settlers.²⁶⁴ In Algeria, 57570 hectares of land were taken from the Arabs and Berber tribes to accommodate the colonies,²⁶⁵ displacing the indigenous population in order to solve domestic issues. As time passed, the European population started to grow. For example, in 1833, the population consisted of 7812 colons, in 1844, the population reached 76 668.²⁶⁶ As colons were given free land specially for agriculture, they became the center for commerce and subsequently consider symbol of French might.²⁶⁷

Historians argue that many of the revolts against the colons were because of the colonial violence and the poverty that local population were subjugated.²⁶⁸ In 1874, the Berber tribes under the leadership of Muhammad al-Hajj al-Muqrani revolted against the seizure of their land.²⁶⁹ In response, the French authorities fined 35 million Francs to all Algerians regardless of their tribe membership; executed the rebels and confiscating more land to be given to the colons.²⁷⁰ In 1901, the Righa tribe led by Yacoub Mohammed Hadj ben Ahmed revolted as resistance to French rule by forcing the males colons of Margueritte village to convert to Islam and wear local clothes.²⁷¹ Many French intellectual and historians at that time, tried to explain that the motivations of the revolt were indeed motivated by

²⁶¹ Jennifer Sessions, “Making Settlers Muslim Religion”, 172.

²⁶² Samuel Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism: The Extreme Right in Algeria 1919-1939* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 16.

²⁶³ Samuel Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism*, 16.

²⁶⁴ Michael Hefferman, “The Parisian Poor Colonization Algeria”, 380.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 392.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 380.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 403.

²⁶⁸ Jennifer Sessions, “Making Settlers Muslim Religion”, 261.

²⁶⁹ Samuel Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism*, 15.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 15.

²⁷¹ Jennifer Sessions, “Making Settlers Muslim Religion”, 260.

religious fanaticism instead of colonial violence and poverty.²⁷² By 1920, 2.6 million hectares of land in total were confiscated and give for free to the colons which left Algerians in poverty and displacement.²⁷³ In the 20th century, a wave of independence movements arose in order to liberate North Africa from the French colonization. Algeria, 130 years under subjugation, got its independence after eight years of independence wars.

To understand the centrality of French colonization to French thought, it is important to examine the intellectual works and worldviews of French intellectuals regarding Islam, Muslims and Arabs. Two original intellectuals who wrote vocally about France's colonization of Algeria are Albert Camus and Franz Fanon. According to S. John, Camu's inspiration in his novels and writings "derives almost entirely" from his experiences in North Africa.²⁷⁴ Camus wrote broadly on the politics of France's colonization in Algeria. He hoped that equality and justice could alleviate the poverty and suffering of the native Algerians under colonial control. He was emotionally absorbed with this issue to the point he wrote to Aziz Kessous, an Algerian nationalist, the following: "Believe me when I tell you that Algeria is where I hurt at this moment, as others feel pain in their lungs".²⁷⁵ Alec G. Hargreaves pointed out that Camus was attached to the "pied-noir community" (European born in Algeria) in Algeria, which was "notorious for opposing any moves towards political emancipation of Algeria's Muslims". This explains why in Camus' novels, despite being grounded in Algerian culture and experience, there is an "almost total absence of non-Europeans".²⁷⁶ Hargreaves cleverly notes that Camus failed to recognize the aspirations of Algerian Muslims. For Hargreaves, while Camus had good intentions to help Algerians, he was unable to go beyond the "racial divisiveness" of French colonial mentality.²⁷⁷

Alternative interpretations to Camus like of Neil Foxlee, highlights that Camus was the first to elaborate and support "Mediterranean humanism". This was a "pro-Muslim

²⁷² Ibid, 261.

²⁷³ Samuel Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism*, 15.

²⁷⁴ S. John, "Image and Symbol in the work of Albert Camus," *French Studies* 9, no.1 (1955): 42.

²⁷⁵ Albert Camus, *Algerian Chronicles* (Harvard University Press, 2013): 3.

²⁷⁶ Alec G. Hargreaves, "Camus and the Colonial Question in Algeria," *The Muslim World* 77, no.3-4 (1987): 164-5.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

policy” where Camus exhibits “his commitment to Muslim civil rights” placing “him among the most progressive European Algerian voices of his time.” This positive understanding of Camus was held by none other than Amar Ouzegane, whom the French arrested for his role in Algerian independence struggle, and who later became the minister in the newly independent Algerian government.²⁷⁸

The lasting relevance of Camus in understanding Islam and Muslims can be seen from contemporary applications of his thought. Anna Geifman utilises Camus’s ideas in his novel *Rebel* to analyse Muslim terrorism. Camus linked terror attacks with the deeper sense of tragic suicide. Subsequently, Geifman points out that many Muslim terrorists had a long history of attempting to commit suicide unrelated to any political activity. She cites, for instance, a study that showed 40% of Palestinian terrorists had suicidal tendencies and 13% had attempted to suicide without any political motive. Mohamad Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed, who committed the terror attacks on Exeter in 2008 was found to have previously attempted suicide by overdosing himself on drugs, stabbing himself in the stomach, and slitting his wrist.²⁷⁹ Antony T. Sullivan found that in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian Universities taught the literature of Albert Camus. Palestinian students found Camus’s themes to be relevant to their own daily life.²⁸⁰ This shows that Camus’s thoughts can help to shed light on the plight of Muslims even beyond Camus’s own lifespan.

Camus earned the Noble Prize in Literature in 1957. Most of his creativity and originality is from Algeria. Thus, French literature depends in a significant way on Algeria and its landscape and society. Camus opposed the French brutality of the native Algerians although he did so in muted tones. Some commentators see him as pro-Muslim while others see him as not interested in Muslims. The truth may be in the middle. In contrast to the dominant French view at the time, Camus can be defined as more pro-Muslim than French society. In absolute terms, however, his views had much goodwill but failed to go beyond

²⁷⁸ Neil Foxlee, “Mediterranean Humanism or Colonialism with a Human Face? Contextualizing Albert Camus’ *The New Mediterranean Culture*,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 21, no. 1 (2006): 91.

²⁷⁹ Anna Geifman, “Terrorism as Veiled Suicide: A Comparative Analysis,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 45, no.7(2022): 612-3.

²⁸⁰ A. T. Sullivan, “Palestinian Universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” *The Muslim World* 84, no. 1-2 (1994): 182.

certain stereotypes that dominated French public opinion. His ideas help explain contemporary Muslim violence in a way that humanizes the perpetrators by emphasizing their struggle with non-political suicide. His philosophy resonates with Palestinians who face a protracted conflict with Israel.

Franz Fanon is regarded as “the representative of the Algerian revolution” in the Anglophone world. In some of his writings, he includes himself amongst the Algerians by using the term “we Algerians”.²⁸¹ Fanon’s sensitivity to the racist and sexist assumptions of the colonial mentality is remarkable. In 1956, while he worked in Blida’s hospital in Algeria, he gave a lecture with the title “The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) among Muslim Women”. In this paper, Fanon refuted the medical science of the day that tried to portray Muslim women as mentally inferior. A test usually applied to Muslim women is to show them pictures and ask them to formulate a story from it. Most of the Muslim women in Algeria who took this test failed. French psychiatry saw this as proof of the “primitivism” of Muslim women. Fanon challenged the idea by saying that Muslim women kept silent because they were tested in a “hostile environment”. The silence of Muslim women is their way of revolting against the test used to subjugate them psychologically. In the same year, Fanon went further to argue that Muslims and Arabs had more empathy when dealing for cases of lunacy and mental deterioration than Europeans. In the Western world, when a person is classified as mentally sick, he is locked into a lunatic asylum similar to a prison. In contrast, in the Muslim world, mentally sick people were catered for in “care centres” that respect the patient’s autonomy.²⁸²

Fouzi Slisli has shown how Fanon had great respect for Islam. He quoted:

Circumstantial evidence indicates that Fanon related to Islam and its traditions in Algeria with respect. He pointedly describes Christianity in the colonies as a pesticide, but he doesn’t display similar sentiments about Islam. He changed his name to Ibrahim Fanon, and one comes occasionally across uncorroborated reports that he converted to Islam. His burial in the

²⁸¹ Brians T. Edwards, “Fanon's al-Jaza'ir, or Algeria Translated,” *Parallax* 8, no.2 (2002): 99-100.

²⁸² Lewis R. Gordon, *What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to his Life and Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015): xiv-xv.

cemetery of the Shuhada' (martyrs) on the Algerian-Tunisian border is also an indication, at least, that he was not opposed to the Islamic traditions.²⁸³

Fanon spoke of the “split ego” that colonialism forces itself upon the colonized. His discussion on this point overlaps what Muslim minorities in contemporary France feel. Fanon explains that for a non-French to fit in French society, he must act as if he is French. The problem arises that no matter how well he speaks French, how identical his behavior is to French norms, French society will always seem him a not-French. Such a psychological situation leads to the non-French having to accept his “inferiority”.²⁸⁴ Although Fanon officially worked for the French colonial regime in Algeria, in early 1955, he joined the *Front de Libération nationale*, which fought for the independence of Algeria from colonial rule. A year later, he resigned from his official position in the French regime after being disgusted by the “torture and oppression” he observed in Blida from the French government onto the natives.²⁸⁵ The ideas and theories that Fanon wrote have a much wider significance than just limited to Algeria. Randolph B. Persaud has explained of how Fanon’s ideas contribute to International Relations and can be applied on a global scale.²⁸⁶ Fanon was carefully placed within the French colonization that controlled Algeria. He witnessed first-hand the dehumanization of Muslims by French colonialists. In his writings, he expounds on how racism is utilized as an ideology for devaluing Algerian people, culture, heritage, and land. His voice is one condemning the status-quo in France.

Both Camus and Fanon show in their works the centrality of colonization to the French subjugation of Algeria. This colonization brought with it notions about Muslims and Islam that had a great impact on how French society viewed Arabs. Any discussion of contemporary conditions of the Muslim minority in France must take into consideration the writings of both Camus and Fanon. To not do so is to disregard important historical,

²⁸³ Fouzi Slisli, “The Idea that One Could Come to Terms with the Arabs”: How Frantz Fanon Found Common Ground with Islam in Algeria, *The Black Scholar* 42, no.3-4 (2012): 23.

²⁸⁴ Roxanna Curto, “Bourdieu and Fanon in Algeria,” in *Bourdieu and Postcolonial Studies*, edited by Raphael Dalleo, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016): 105.

²⁸⁵ Max Silverman, “Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and Violence,” in *Post-Colonial Thought in the French-speaking World*, edited by Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, (Liverpool University Press, 2009): 78.

²⁸⁶ Randolph Persaud, “Frantz Fanon, race and world order,” in *Innovation and transformation in International Studies*, edited by James H. Mittelman, Stephen Gill (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 170-184.

cultural, and intellectual developments in French thought that were important in the critique of French colonization. In short, any talk of Islam and Muslims in France today cannot whitewash the colonial impact on French discourse.

2.6 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH DISCOURSE ON ISLAM AND MUSLIMS

In the context of the recent economic crisis and the influx of Syrian refugees to Europe, a list of nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and right-wing parties, and movements have risen to offer populist policies to safeguard the indigenous population.²⁸⁷ Historians have explained the correlation between financial crisis and the rise of right-wing scapegoating.²⁸⁸ As a strategy, the right-wing populist would point the blame to other minority groups for the financial crisis.²⁸⁹ For example, Germany of 1930s, blame the Jews for their problems. It is not also surprising that the West involvement in the Syrian civil war led many Muslims to feel their country and being blame in the west for the economic crisis. Contemporary right-wing populist heavily criticize the elite and the liberal scholars for ignoring the ‘Other’ (Muslim, Jew, etc) threat propelling the ideological eloquence that the ‘Other’ is a threat to the way of life of the indigenous population.²⁹⁰ Not only that, the far-right racist ideology includes the irreconcilability of the ‘Other’ culture with Western values specially when it comes of Muslim woman.²⁹¹ It is clear that this new form of racism is not based on physical and biological difference rather on cultural differences.²⁹²

In the context of France, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s far-right *Front National* party (renamed as National Rally in 2018), now in charge by his daughter Marine Le Pen has considerably won votes in the last two presidential elections. According to Emmanuel Godin, to win votes the Front National has used Laicite. This principle that assures religious diversity and tolerance was used unfairly by Marine Le Pen in as a tool to promote

²⁸⁷ Ulrike M. Vieten and Scott Poynting, “Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37, no. 6 (2016): 533-534.

²⁸⁸ Vieten and Poynting, “Contemporary Far-Right Racist”, 535.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, 534.

²⁹⁰ Ibid, 535.

²⁹¹ Ibid, 539.

²⁹² Aurilien Mondon, “The French secular hypocrisy: the extreme right, the Republic and the battle for hegemony,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 49, no. 4 (2015):402.

Islamophobia, stigmatize Muslims, and correlate inaccurately immigration with Islam and Islam with fanaticism.²⁹³ Le Pen also promotes anti-integration policies specially with Muslims as she believes that they can't assimilate to French society due to their radical cultural and racial differences.²⁹⁴ This neo-racism that Le Pen promotes, requires the 'Other' to resign its religious and cultural identity in order to fit in progressive France.²⁹⁵

In 2011, regarding the massacre in Norway by Breivik, Jean-Marie Le Pen criticized the inability of the government to identify Breivik's plans. He did not condemn the attacks nor the rise of far-right wing.²⁹⁶ Marine and the party supported his claims and described it as not the action of 'madman', just an individual accident. Here Marine Le Pen expresses double standards as she condemned the March attack by Mohammed Merah in 2012 as a reflection of Islam.²⁹⁷ In the same year, during her campaign, Marine Le Pen claimed that all meat in France were halal²⁹⁸ and that Islam was colonizing France in daily life through Muslims prayers in the street and the building of mosques.²⁹⁹ In the 2017 campaign, Le pen also promised to ban halal meat if she was elected.³⁰⁰

According to Aurelien Mondon, the hypocrisy of the French secular government is expressed in the exploitation of *laïcité* 1905 Law to create precedence law in 2004 to ban religious symbols in schools which was aimed to Muslim girls.³⁰¹ In 2010, in times of financial crisis, high number of unemployment and protest, the government banned the Burka which was wore by only 367 women which was discussed and focused all over the media.³⁰² In 2022, the French court banned the Burkini on the claims that is against the

²⁹³Emmanuel Godin, "The Porosity between the Mainstream Right and Extreme Right in France: Les

Droites Décomplexées under Nicolas Sarkozy and Marine Le Pen's Leadership," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 21, no. 1(2013) :56.

²⁹⁴ Emmanuel Godin, "Porosity between Mainstream Right",56.

²⁹⁵ Aurilien Mondon, "The French secular hypocrisy", 403.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, 404.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, 404.

²⁹⁸ John Irish, "France's far-right returns to roots with halal claims," Reuters, February 19, 2012. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-france-election-lepen-idUKTRE81H06D20120219>.

²⁹⁹ Aurilien Mondon, "The French secular hypocrisy", 405.

³⁰⁰ "Marine Le Pen: Ban halal and all ritual slaughter," The Times of Israel, April 25, 2017, retrieved from <https://www.timesofisrael.com/marine-le-pen-ban-halal-and-all-ritual-slaughter/>.

³⁰¹ Aurilien Mondon, "The French secular hypocrisy", 407.

³⁰² Ibid, 408.

government religious neutrality.³⁰³ Worn by few, President Macron stated that the law protected Laïcité against religious fanaticism.³⁰⁴ Many academics have labelled the government treatment of French Muslims as part of Islamophobia.

However, the political mainstream and French intellectuals deny the existence of Islamophobia. Islamophobia denial is seen across the West as part of the elite of deny racism.³⁰⁵ Scholars of the study of race have argued that denial of racism was a strategy set by white majority to maintain racial social order.³⁰⁶ Thus racism denial encompasses the study of Islamophobia denial. In the French context, any scholar or advocate who uses the term Islamophobia is accused of helping to promote jihadism.³⁰⁷ The first activists of denying Islamophobia are LGBTQ promoters, Caroline Fourest and Fiammetta Vener who in 2003 claimed that the term originated in 1979 used by Iranian mullahs to target woman who resisted to wear hijab, pointing them as Islamophobes.³⁰⁸ However, it was demonstrated that the term did not originate in the Iranian Revolution. Overall, the French intellectuals argue that Islamophobia is a tool for stop criticism of Islam and weapon to destruct intellectual debate,³⁰⁹ in the words of Manuel Valls, ‘Trojan Horse of the Salafis’³¹⁰ which put the victims of Islamophobia at the same level of antisemitism. In 2006, Caroline Fourest, eleven scholars and Bernard-Henri Levy the (founder of the New Philosophers) articulated regarding the Danish cartoons issues that the new totalitarianism is Islamism.³¹¹ Bernard-Henri Levy regarding Muslims in France and their reaction towards the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad considered as ‘fanatics’ intimidation’.³¹²

³⁰³ “France rules against burkini swimwear for religious reasons,” *AP News*, June 22, 2022. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/religion-france-government-and-politics-3838c7a4166549b6721cd7cfd29a9a33>.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid*.

³⁰⁵ Reza Zia-Ebrahim, “The French origins of Islamophobia denial,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 54, no. 4 (2020):317.

³⁰⁶ Reza Zia-Ebrahim, “French origins Islamophobia denial,” 316-317.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 318.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 322.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 315.

³¹⁰ *Ibid*, 316.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, 337.

³¹² Bernard-Henry Levy, “Fascislamism” in *Left in Dark Times, a Stand against New Babarism* (US: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2008): 175.

Marine Le Pen and Bernard-Henri Levy are the main figures that dominate the discourse of Islam, Muslims in contemporary Islam. Any discussion on public statements made regarding Islam in France must be understood in the context of the contemporary discourse of Islam in France.

2.7 CONCLUSION

The historical survey found that the French discourse on Islam is diverse and complex. For example, Napoleon Bonaparte admires the prophet for his rare genius but the contemporary far-right wing attribute Islam as being inherently fanatic. However, there is a certain unified theme in the historical survey which is one of the limitations of French discourse: Islam is always viewed from the position of foreign policy and national security. Overall, the French discourse have been negative, which was translated in the brutal colonisation and new racism in contemporary France. Tolerant views towards Muslims like of Albert Camus were restricted by the French experience and denial of Islamophobia like of Caroline Fourest were highlighted.

Results of this survey shows the subsequent discussion of Islam in French society is an extension of development of previous French discourse and it shows that when Islam and Muslims are discussed in France, the discussion is narrowed to the French experience only with little regard to the global phenomena of Islam and Muslims. The overwhelming negative view of Islam is the majority view of French discourse and can be expected to continue in the future because as historical survey points that no turning point occurred to change the stereotypes persisting across historical ages. For example, it would be expected that tolerant views would be of majority French public opinion due to globalization however, the same colonial view on Muslims and Islam continue in contemporary France.

This historical overview can't be discussed in detail; however, the next chapter will focus on concrete and specific case study on Macron's speech, the death of Mr. Paty and the Western media portrayal of it. In the next chapter, although specific, it will show the historical stereotypes of Muslims. This is of no surprise given the latest developments in how French society deals with the Muslim minority.

CHAPTER THREE

WESTERN MEDIA DISCOURSE ON MACRON'S SPEECH ON ISLAM: MAPPING AND ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous chapter have discussed about the historical role of Muslims and Islam in France, from the Enlightenment to the contemporary issues that take debate in French society. This chapter seeks to investigate Western media discourse regarding Macron's speech on Islam. This allows to see specifically one part of debate on mass media to be later contrasted with the global debate that Muslims held regarding Macron's speech on Islam.

The first part of this chapter gives a media discourse overview of Macron's speech and Samuel Paty's dead. The second part discusses the specific methods of analysis such as frequency analysis, thematic analysis, co-occurrence frequency, and topic modeling. The third part explains the data collection, cleaning, and preparation. The fourth part displays the results based on the method of analysis. At the end, readers should have a good view of key themes in the discourse in Western media regarding Macron's speech on Islam.

3.2 MEDIA OVERVIEW OF THE CARTOONS, 2ND AND 16TH OCTOBER OF 2020

The issue of the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad had been causing outcry since 2005 when the Danish Jyllands-Posten newspaper published depictions associated with terrorism.³¹³ Subsequently, the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and other media outlets republished the cartoons in 2006.³¹⁴ The original publication and the reprintings

³¹³ "Questions and Answers on the Danish Cartoons and Freedom of Expression," *Human Rights Watch*, 24 February 2006, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/02/15/questions-and-answers-danish-cartoons-and-freedom-expression/when-speech-offends>

³¹⁴ Kim Willsher, "Charlie Hebdo reprints cartoons of prophet ahead of terror trial," *The Guardian*, 2 September 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/sep/01/charlie-hebdo-reprints-muhammad-cartoons-prophet-terror-trial#:~:text=The%20cover%20shows%20cartoons%20first,was%20killed%20in%20the%20attac>k.

sparked mass protest and calls for boycott of Danish products in the Muslim world. For example, in February 2006, the Danish consulate in Beirut and Syria were stormed and in Tehran, 400 protestors attempted to enter the embassy in Iran, and in the north of Nigeria, churches and shops are attacked that led to 45 people dead, in Lybia, the Italian embassy was stormed after the Italian minister proposed to wear t-shirt with the cartoons of the prophet.³¹⁵ Media outlets reported that more than 50 people died as part of the police repression during the protest in the Muslim world. In 2008, two Tunisians were deported and a Danish of Moroccan origine facing charges were detained for planning to kill Kurt Westergaard, a cartoonist of Jyllands-Posten.³¹⁶ However in January 2010, Kurt escapes an attempt of assassination by a Somali armed man in his home.³¹⁷

On January 2010, TT news agency received a threatening letter that condemned the presence of Swedish military troops in Afghanistan and the drawings of the prophet Muhammad.³¹⁸ Later, in the afternoon, two bombs blasted in a commercial area killing the bomber who was identified as Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, a Swedish-Iraqi.³¹⁹ On November 2, 2011, the Charlie Hebdo magazine office publishing items and computers were burnt after it printed “Sharia Hebdo” special edition with the cover of the prophet Muhammad.³²⁰ In September 2012, the satirical magazine published new cartoons of the

³¹⁵ “Protesters Besiege Danish Embassy In Tehran,” *Radio Free Europe*, 6 February 2006, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1065487.html>

³¹⁶ Robert Tait, “Three arrested in Denmark over plot to kill Muhammad cartoonist,” *The Guardian*, 13 February 2008, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/13/muhammedcartoonrow>

³¹⁷ “Timeline: Violence marks 15-year furore over cartoons of Prophet Mohammad,” *Reuters*, November 2, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-security-cartoons-timeline-idUSKBN27I1U3/>

³¹⁸ “Twin bombing in Stockholm a terrorist attack, say police,” *France 24*, 12 December 2010, <https://www.france24.com/en/20101211-stockholm-shopping-district-hit-double-bombing-explosions-car-sweden>

³¹⁹ John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya, “After Attack Hits Sweden, Focus Turns to Suspect,” *The New York Times*, 12 December 2010, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/world/europe/13sweden.html>

³²⁰ Angelique Chrisafis, “French magazine offices petrol-bombed after it prints Muhammad cartoon,” *The Guardian*, 2 Nov 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/02/french-magazine-bomb-muhammad-cartoon>

prophet with some of them portraying naked intensifying the protest in the Muslim world that were happening due to the Islamophobic movie “The Innocent of Muslims”.³²¹

In January 2015, the brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi attacked with guns the office of Charlie Hebdo as a retribution for the prophet’s cartons killing 12 people.³²² The incident known as Three Days of Terror was one of the bloodiest attacks by Islamist in the history of France. The gunmen were killed and a worldwide online hashtag #JeSuisCharlie trended in support of the cartoonist.³²³ The Charlie Hebdo magazine then evacuated the offices and work from undisclosed location.³²⁴ Ahead of the trial of suspected people involved in the killing of the 12 people, Charlie Hebdo reprints the prophet’s cartoons in September 2020.³²⁵ Despite Charlie Hebdo no longer working in the same location, two people were stabbed by a man of Pakistani origin on 25 September 2020.³²⁶

On the October 2, 2020, President Emmanuel Macron had delivered a speech in north-West Paris, in the town of Les Mureaux, a commune with substantial immigrant population.³²⁷ In his speech, Macron called that 'Islam is in crisis all over the world' and unveiled a bill draft with a series of measures to combat Islamist radicalism.³²⁸ Islam is the biggest minority in France which makes the largest population of Muslims in Western Europe.³²⁹ However, Macron announced that a minority of six million Muslims in France

³²¹ “French Weekly Publishes New Cartoons Mocking Prophet Mohammed,” *Haaretz*, 19 September 2012, <https://www.haaretz.com/2012-09-19/ty-article/french-weekly-mocks-mohammed/0000017f-f6c9-ddde-abff-feeda2c50000>

³²² Tangi Salaün, “Charlie Hebdo attackers killed to avenge Prophet Mohammad, French court hears,” *Reuters*, 3 September 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN25TODN/>

³²³ *Ibid*

³²⁴ “Paris attack: Two people stabbed near former Charlie Hebdo office,” *BBC news*, 25 September 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54296638>

³²⁵ “Charlie Hebdo: Magazine republishes controversial Mohammed cartoons,” *BBC News*, 1 September 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53985407>

³²⁶ “Paris attack, people stabbed,” *BBC News*.

³²⁷ Laurence Benhamou and Jérôme Rivet, “Macron calls Islam a religion ‘in crisis,’ unveils plan to fight radicalism,” *The Times of Israel*, October 2, 2020, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/macron-says-islam-a-religion-in-crisis-unveils-plan-to-fight-radicalism/>

³²⁸ Saven Saunt, “Macron says Islam 'is in crisis all over the world' as he unveils proposal to rid France of Islamic 'separatism' which has created a 'parallel society' living outside the country's values,” *Daily Mail*, October 2, 2020, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8797903/Macron-unveils-proposal-rid-France-Islamic-separatism.html>

³²⁹ Benhamou and Rivet, “Macron Islam crisis.”

poses a threat of separatism, creating a “counter-society.”³³⁰ Macron believes that Muslims in France want to take control and impose religion,³³¹ aiming to indoctrinate new converts.³³² This comes as radical Muslims have already taken control of local communities where the Republic has less presence.³³³

This ‘Islamist separatism’ is expressed in various forms like Muslim men refusal to shake women’s hands, swimming pool time separation for girls and boys, the increase of madrasah or religious schools and young girls pressured to wear ruband or *niqab*.³³⁴ The French leader said that children are kept out from school, sports, and cultural events in order to teach them principles that don’t conform with French values.³³⁵ The authorities believed that mosques and homeschooling were the only places that extremist ideas were taught, however, they have discovered that religious schools play a role on it as well.³³⁶ This is of no surprise as in 2019, French Interior minister, Christophe Castaner, linked the mundane life of Muslims to terrorism by listing signs of radicalization which included growing the beard, praying, fasting in Ramadan and not to kiss or team up with a woman.³³⁷

Macron further emphasized that *laïcité* or “secularism” was not the problem rather is the ideology of Islam which attests that its laws are superior to the Republic.³³⁸ In the French context, *laïcité* is a principle rooted in the French Revolution, 1789 and was put into legal terms in the law of 1905 in which prohibits the state from supporting or repressing

³³⁰ “France's Macron vows to fight 'Islamist separatism,’” *BBC News*, October 3, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54383173>

³³¹ Saunt, “Macron says Islam 'is in crisis.’”

³³² Benhamou and Rivet, “Macron Islam crisis.”

³³³ Peter Allen, “Tough Talk Emmanuel Macron warns Islam ‘is in crisis all over the world’ as he unveils law to rid France of ‘separatists’,” *The Sun*, October 2, 2020, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/12830059/macron-islam-crisis-france-new-laws-world/>

³³⁴ Michel Rose, “Macron launches crackdown on 'Islamist separatism' in Muslim communities,” *Reuters*, October 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-macron-separatism-idUSKBN26N213>

³³⁵ Benhamou and Rivet, “Macron Islam crisis.”

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ Myriam Francois, “France's Treatment of Its Muslim Citizens Is the True Measure of Its Republican Values,” *Time Magazine*, December 8, 2020, <https://time.com/5918657/frances-muslim-citizens-republican-values/>

³³⁸ “Notre République a laissé faire la ghettoïisation: extraits du discours de Macron,” *Le Monde*, October 2, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/10/02/notre-republique-a-laisse-faire-la-ghettoisation-extraits-du-discours-de-macron_6054575_823448.html

any religion.³³⁹ *Laïcité* ensures the separation of the state from the church and its implementation in public space.³⁴⁰ French *laïcité* in simple words would be freedom from religion rather than freedom of religion as in the American context.³⁴¹

For the reasons mentioned above, President Macron believes that Islam is a threat to the French republican values, especially freedom of expression.³⁴² He plans to eradicate radical Islam and extremist religious teachings³⁴³ by liberating Islam in France from foreign influences like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.³⁴⁴ The new proposed law by Macron will lay down the basis of Islam of the Enlightenment³⁴⁵ which will start by pushing religion from education and public sphere, ending homeschooling except for medical reasons.³⁴⁶ The list of measures includes imams to be trained and certified by the state, culmination of imams going abroad for training, cease of hosting foreign preachers and importing imams from Muslim countries.³⁴⁷

Additionally, the regulation of mosque funding and Muslim organizations will be stricter³⁴⁸ which includes dissolving them anytime if they are not in line with the values of the Republic.³⁴⁹ Local authorities will be given additional legal tools to combat radicalization.³⁵⁰ Imams, Muslim leaders and organizations will have to observe the Republican Charter.³⁵¹ Interestingly, Macron has recognized that Islamist separatism is also

³³⁹ Michael Barbaro, “France, Islam and ‘Laïcité’,” *The New York Times*, February 12, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/12/podcasts/the-daily/france-secularism-laicite-samuel-paty.html?>

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Benhamou and Rivet, “Macron Islam crisis.”

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Bill Bostock, “France pulled its ambassador from Turkey, and Arab states are boycotting French products, after Macron said he wanted to regulate Islam,” *Business Insider*, October 26, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/france-turkey-arab-states-anger-macron-regulate-islam-2020-10>

³⁴⁶ Saunt, “Macron says Islam 'is in crisis.'”

³⁴⁷ Benhamou and Rivet, “Macron Islam crisis.”

³⁴⁸ Bostock, “France pulled its ambassador from Turkey.”

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Kim Willsher, “Macron outlines new law to prevent 'Islamist separatism' in France,” *The Guardian*, October 2, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/emmanuel-macron-outlines-law-islamic-separatism-france>

³⁵¹ Francois, “France's Treatment Muslim Citizens.”

due to barbaric colonial past of France in North Africa³⁵² and the less economic diversification in areas of substantial migrant population.³⁵³

Macron's speech was delivered 18 months before the presidential elections. Many saw his speech as an attempt to gain voters for the 2022 elections.³⁵⁴ Yassar Louati, a notable French human right activist commented that Macron's project strengthens the discourse of far-right wing and Islamophobo-leftist.³⁵⁵ Francois (2020) comments that it is an irony that a secular leader defines the rules of religious practice. Regarding the training of imams, previously appointed imams by the state have already struggled to gain recognition by the Muslim community, due to the diversity of religious opinions that Muslims follow.³⁵⁶ Macron justifies that, part of the Muslim practices and beliefs contradict French values,³⁵⁷ however, the Centre for the Study of Conflict have shown the contrary. The quantitative study about the relationship between terrorism and discrimination found that Muslims trust French institutions same level as non-Muslims.³⁵⁸ At the same time, Muslims felt discriminated more than rest of population (58%-27%).³⁵⁹

The proposed measures shows that the Macron government is reluctant in distinguishing normal religious practice and signs of extremism which exposes millions of Muslims to be accused of extremism.³⁶⁰ The measures also aim to eradicate views contrary to Republican chapters which is self-contradicting because freedom of expression entitles to have views that contradict the Republican values.³⁶¹ The "Commander of the Faithful", king of Morocco, through the Ministry

³⁵² "Muslims call for French goods boycott to protest caricatures," *Fox News*, October 26, 2020, <https://www.foxnews.com/world/muslims-call-for-french-goods-boycott-to-protest-caricatures>

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ "France's Macron vows to fight 'Islamist separatism,'" *BBC News*, October 3, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54383173>

³⁵⁵ Peter Allen, "Tough Talk Emmanuel Macron warns Islam 'is in crisis all over the world' as he unveils law to rid France of 'separatists'," *The Sun*, October 2, 2020, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/12830059/macron-islam-crisis-france-new-laws-world/>

³⁵⁶ Francois, "France's Treatment Muslim Citizens."

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ "Séparatisme : et si la politique antiterroriste faisait fausse route," *The conversation*, November 8, 2020, https://theconversation.com/separatisme-et-si-la-politique-antiterroriste-faisait-fausse-route-149078?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=bylinetwitterbutton

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Francois, "France's Treatment Muslim Citizens."

³⁶¹ Ibid.

of Foreign Affairs has stated that Macron's statement towards Islam reflects his immaturity and that "freedom of some ends where the freedom and beliefs of others begin".³⁶² In the face of a more multicultural French society, the French system must decide whether to adjust *laïcité* to accommodate immigrants' religious practices or force them to assimilate, however, France has decided the later.³⁶³

On October 16, 2020, around 5 p.m., Samuel Paty, a history and geography secondary teacher at Bois-d'Aulne college was beheaded near the school by a Chechen refugee for showing pictures of prophet Muhammad in his class.³⁶⁴ Mr. Paty, 47 years old, was responsible for teaching freedom of expression course to exemplify the right to free speech, freedom of conscience and the right to blasphemy.³⁶⁵ In a televised speech, Macron has stated that the teacher was killed by an Islamist terrorist for teaching freedom of expression.³⁶⁶

A female student of 13 years old accused Mr. Paty for showing pictures of naked prophet Muhammad in his class, asking Muslim students to leave before shown.³⁶⁷ She claimed that she was suspended because she resisted.³⁶⁸ The pictures were cartoons from the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*³⁶⁹ which was reprinted in early September.³⁷⁰

³⁶² Robin Verner, "Caricatures, Separatism: What the Muslim world blames Macron for," *BFMTV*, October 26, 2020, https://www.bfmtv.com/international/caricatures-separatisme-ce-que-le-monde-musulman-reproche-a-macron_AV-202010260177.html

³⁶³ Michael Barbaro, "France, Islam and 'Laïcité'," *The New York Times*, February 12, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/12/podcasts/the-daily/france-secularism-laicite-samuel-paty.html?>

³⁶⁴ Nicolas Chapuis and Elise Vincent, "ttentat de Conflans: neuf personnes en garde à vue, dont des parents d'élèves et des proches du meurtrier," *Le Monde*, October 16, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/10/16/un-homme-decapite-dans-les-yvelines-le-parquet-antiterroriste-saisi-de-l-enquete_6056350_3224.html

³⁶⁵ Roger Cohen, "A Year Later, a Schoolteacher's Beheading Still Haunts France," *The New York Times*, October 15, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/world/europe/france-samuel-paty-beheading.html>

³⁶⁶ "Macron calls Paris beheading 'Islamist terrorist attack'," *BBC News*, October 17, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54579403>

³⁶⁷ "French student admits her lie got teacher Samuel Paty beheaded," *Fox News*, March 9, 2021, <https://www.foxnews.com/world/french-student-admits-her-lie-got-teacher-samuel-paty-beheaded>

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ "Infographic: France's cartoon controversy", *Al-Jazeera*, October 29, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/29/infographic-cartoon-controversy>

Subsequently, the father of the pupil filed a complaint, and started a social media campaign against the teacher.³⁷¹ On October 8, the father posted a video on Facebook calling him a ‘thug’.³⁷² asking unity for the teacher to be expelled.³⁷³ In another video, the father appeared with an Islamist radical in which he left his phone to be contacted and the teacher’s name and business address.³⁷⁴ In response, Mr. Paty had gone with the head of school to the local police station³⁷⁵ to file a complaint for defamation.³⁷⁶ The teacher reported that daughter of the father who complained, was not present the day he showed the cartoons.³⁷⁷ To calm the situation, the school organized a meeting between Mr. Paty, the headteacher and a representative from the education authority.³⁷⁸

A local mosque in Seine-Saint-Denis disseminated the video of the father,³⁷⁹ from which is believed the attacker, contacted the father who launched the campaign.³⁸⁰ The killer exchanged WhatsApp messages with father before the attack.³⁸¹ Other media outlet suggested that it was not clear if the father had responded to the text.³⁸² The French authorities identified the attacker as Abdullakh Anzorov, an 18 years old refugee of

³⁷¹ “French student admits her lie,” *Fox News*.

³⁷² Chapuis and Vincent, “ttentat de Conflans: neuf personnes.”

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Kim Willsher, “Teacher decapitated in Paris named as Samuel Paty, 47,” *The Guardian*, October 17, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/17/teacher-decapitated-in-paris-named-as-samuel-paty-47>

³⁷⁶ Pierre Bairin, et all, “Teenager of Chechen origin suspected of decapitating teacher in ‘Islamist attack’ in Paris suburb,” *CNN News*, October 20, 2020, <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/17/europe/paris-suburb-man-decapitated-intl/index.html>

³⁷⁷ Kim Willsher, “Teacher decapitated in Paris.”

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Vivienne Walt, “The Beheading of a Teacher in France Exposes a Cultural Schism That Threatens President Macron's Future,” *Times Magazine*, October 21, 2020, <https://time.com/5902121/samuel-paty-france-macron-muslim/>

³⁸⁰ Yaron Steinbuch, “Suspect in French teacher beheading messaged parent who wanted to fire him,” *New York Post*, October 20, 2020, <https://nypost.com/2020/10/20/suspect-in-french-teacher-beheading-messaged-parent-who-wanted-to-fire-him/>

³⁸¹ “French student admits her lie,” *Fox News*.

³⁸² Joe Duggan, “Deadly deceit Girl, 13, whose lies led to teacher Samuel Paty being beheaded admits she made up claim he mocked Prophet Muhammad,” *The Sun*, March 9, 2021, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/14282004/girl-prophet-muhammad-samuel-paty/>

Chechen origin born in Moscow, who was in court before for minor wrongdoings.³⁸³ Anzorov was given 10 years residency recently.³⁸⁴

Anzorov wanted to force Mr. Paty an apology for showing the cartoon of prophet Muhammad.³⁸⁵ The killer asked two of his friends for help, one to buy the knife and the other to drive him to the school.³⁸⁶ Both friends were on the list of suspects at the time of preliminary investigation,³⁸⁷ whom now are charged with complicity in terrorist murder.³⁸⁸ Once Anzorov arrived at the school, he asked students to point Mr. Paty in exchange of cash.³⁸⁹ Two children agreed, however they pointed out that had no idea of Anzorov's plan.³⁹⁰ For pointing the teacher, the two children are charged with conspiracy to commit a terrorist murder.³⁹¹

Mr. Paty was beheaded near the school where he worked.³⁹² Witnesses heard Anzorov saying "Allahu Akbar".³⁹³ Le Monde describes that the killer threatened the police

³⁸³ "France teacher attack: Suspect 'asked pupils to point Samuel Paty out'," *BBC News*, October 17, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54581827>

³⁸⁴ Paulina Dedaj, "Ex-UFC fighter Zelim Imadaev uses social media to praise Chechen refugee for beheading: report," *Fox News*, October 20, 2020, <https://www.foxnews.com/sports/ex-ufc-fighter-zelim-imadaev-chechen-refugee-beheading>

³⁸⁵ Sudip Kar-Gupta and Richard Lough, "Beheaded teacher was 'quiet hero' who incarnated French values, Macron says," *Reuters*, October 21, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-france-security-idUKKBN2760JK>

³⁸⁶ Ryan Fahei, "France will not give up cartoons': Defiant Macron makes a passionate defence of freedom of speech at memorial for teacher Samuel Paty who was beheaded by Islamic terrorist for showing Charlie Hebdo cartoon," *Daily Mail*, October 22, 2020, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8865237/President-Macron-pays-respects-coffin-beheaded-teacher-Samuel-Paty.html>

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ "Judges to try 14 over French teacher's beheading," *Le Monde*, April 7, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/04/07/judges-to-trial-14-over-french-teacher-s-beheading_6022030_7.html

³⁸⁹ "French student admits her lie," *Fox News*.

³⁹⁰ David Chazan, "France to create new social media offence following beheading of teacher," *The Telegraph*, 20 October 2020, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/10/20/france-closes-paris-mosque-clampdown-teachers-beheading/>

³⁹¹ "French student admits her lie," *Fox News*.

³⁹² Nicolas Chapuis and Elise Vincent, "ttentat de Conflans: neuf personnes en garde à vue, dont des parents d'élèves et des proches du meurtrier," *Le Monde*, October 16, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/10/16/un-homme-decapite-dans-les-yvelines-le-parquet-antiterroriste-saisi-de-l-enquete_6056350_3224.html

³⁹³ "France teacher attack," *BBC News*.

with a gun screaming “Allahu Akbar”.³⁹⁴ He was shot ten times before he fled.³⁹⁵ The bomb disposal unit have not found any explosives in his body after it was checked.³⁹⁶ The investigators found in his phone that Anzorov posted in Twitter under @Tchetchene_270 account the teacher’s decapitated head³⁹⁷ with a caption insulting Macron:

In the name of Allah, the all-merciful, the very merciful, (...) to Macron, the leader of the infidels, I executed one of your hellhounds who dared to belittle Muhammad, calm his fellows before you are meted with a harsh punishment.³⁹⁸

In social media, a video of Mr. Paty showing in class the cartoons were circulating already before his death.³⁹⁹ Prosecutors found a “direct causal link” between the teacher’s brutal decapitation and the online hate campaign.⁴⁰⁰ The French government called representatives of social media giants for a meeting on “cyber-Islamism” and for more scrutiny of content on their platforms.⁴⁰¹ The interior minister Gerald Darmanin informed that investigations were into those extremists who spread online hate.⁴⁰² The minister of education commented that the killer, enemy of freedom, his hatred for the Republic’s principles are the source of the problem.⁴⁰³ The anti-terrorism state prosecutor, Jean-Francois Ricard, indicated that an “ongoing extremely high level of terrorism threat”⁴⁰⁴ is taking place in France. Authorities have taken the killer’s grandparent, parents, and brother

³⁹⁴ Chapuis and Vincent, “ttentat de Conflans: neuf personnes.”

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ James Crisp, “Social media bosses summoned by French government after terrorist beheads teacher.” *The Telegraph*, October, 17, 2020, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/10/17/french-police-arrest-9-18-year-old-chechen-decapitates-teacher/>

³⁹⁷ Chapuis and Vincent, “ttentat de Conflans: neuf personnes.”

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Kate Duffy, “The French government vowed to bring social media giants 'under control' following the role of online platforms in the beheading of a teacher in Paris,” *Business Insider*, October 21, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/paris-beheading-samuel-paty-death-social-media-blamed-2020-10>

⁴⁰⁰ Duggan, “Deadly deceit Girl, 13.

⁴⁰¹ Duffy, “French government to bring social media.”

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ “France teacher attack,” *BBC News*.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

for questioning, including the father who launched a campaign and his daughter.⁴⁰⁵ Richard added that the father's half-sister had "had joined the Islamic State Organization in 2014 in Syria."⁴⁰⁶

Investigations showed that girl who launched a campaign against Paty, was suspended day before the attack.⁴⁰⁷ She admitted she had lied to her father which led to the teacher's beheading.⁴⁰⁸ She will be tried for slanderous denunciation.⁴⁰⁹ In total, 14 people, consisting of 8 adults and 6 teenagers, will be tried by the French judge for complicity of terrorist assassination, a crime punishable for at least 5 years sentence.⁴¹⁰ Mickaëlle Paty, sister of Mr. Paty, sent letters to President of the Senate and the president of Law Commission to urge investigations on civil servants for mismanagement of case of Mr. Paty that led to his death.⁴¹¹ The commission will hear the testimonies in a time frame of 6 months.⁴¹² Authorities have also closed the mosque in Seine-Saint-Denis for disseminating the video of the father who launch the slanderous campaign.⁴¹³ The government also took quick steps to dissolve the Sheikh Yassin Collective and other 50 organizations for presumably having links with Islamists.⁴¹⁴ According to the Times of Israel, Abdelhakim Sefrioui, head of the Islamist pro-Hamas Sheikh Yassin Collective, urged along with the father, the killing of the teacher.⁴¹⁵

⁴⁰⁵ Pierre Bairin, et all, "Teenager of Chechen origin suspected of decapitating teacher in 'Islamist attack' in Paris suburb," *CNN News*, October 20, 2020, <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/17/europe/paris-suburb-man-decapitated-intl/index.html>

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ "French student admits her lie," *Fox News*.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Mélanie Vecchio, "Assassinat de Samuel Paty: 14 personnes renvoyées devant la justice," *BFMTV*, May 16, 2023, https://www.bfmtv.com/police-justice/assassinat-de-samuel-paty-14-personnes-renvoyees-devant-la-justice_AN-202305160482.html

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ John Timsit, "Assassinat de Samuel Paty: le Sénat va lancer une commission d'enquête parlementaire," *Le Figaro*, June 14, 2023, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/assassinat-de-samuel-paty-le-senat-va-lancer-une-commission-d-enquete-parlementaire-20230614>

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Steinbuch, "Suspect in French teacher beheading".

⁴¹⁴ Fahei, "France will not give up cartoons".

⁴¹⁵ "Head of pro-Hamas group and parent put fatwa on beheaded French teacher," *The Times of Israel*, October 19, 2020, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/head-of-pro-hamas-group-and-school-parent-said-behind-fatwa-on-beheaded-teacher/>

President Macron held a national memorial event on October 22 for Mr. Paty who was given the Legion of Honour, the highest civilian award in France.⁴¹⁶ In the speech, Macron defended Paty's use of the cartoons⁴¹⁷ and vowed that will not "give up" to them.⁴¹⁸ The president of the Occitanie region, Carole Delga offered tributes by projecting the cartoons that Mr. Paty used in his class.⁴¹⁹ In an interview she said that projecting the cartoons are signs of "no weakness in the face of the enemies of democracy."⁴²⁰ On social media, #JeSuisSamuel (I am Samuel) trended as a public condemnation of the teacher's killing.⁴²¹ However other public personalities like Ex-UFC fighter Zelim Imadaev, posted in his Instagram story praising the Chechen killer as "hero of Islam" and asking "Allah approve your jihad."⁴²² Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic of Russia, claimed that Macron was "forcing people into terrorism by not giving them any choice."⁴²³ Anzorov's body was returned to Chechnya after two months, his body was buried with chants of "Alahu Akbar" and "Lion of Islam" as hundreds turned to his funeral in heavy snowy conditions.⁴²⁴

⁴¹⁶ Ryan Fahei, "France will not give up cartoons': Defiant Macron makes a passionate defence of freedom of speech at memorial for teacher Samuel Paty who was beheaded by Islamic terrorist for showing Charlie Hebdo cartoon," *Daily Mail*, October 22, 2020, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8865237/President-Macron-pays-respects-coffin-beheaded-teacher-Samuel-Paty.html>

⁴¹⁷ Joe Roberts, "Teacher was beheaded after girl lied that he'd asked Muslims to leave class," *Metro*, March 9, 2021, <https://metro.co.uk/2021/03/09/samuel-paty-girl-admits-lying-about-teacher-who-was-beheaded-14211449>

⁴¹⁸ Ryan Fahei, "France will not give up cartoons."

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Sam Corbishley, "First picture of teacher beheaded after showing class cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad," *Metro*, October 17, 2020, <https://metro.co.uk/2020/10/17/first-picture-of-teacher-beheaded-after-showing-class-cartoon-of-the-prophet-muhammad-13437265/>

⁴²² Paulina Dedaj, "Ex-UFC fighter Zelim Imadaev uses social media to praise Chechen refugee for beheading: report," *Fox News*, October 20, 2020, <https://www.foxnews.com/sports/ex-ufc-fighter-zelim-imadaev-chechen-refugee-beheading>

⁴²³ Will Stewardt, "Teenager who beheaded a French teacher is given a hero's funeral in his native Chechnya, with mourners chanting 'Allahu Akbar' as hundreds turn out to see the killer buried," *Daily Mail*, December 7, 2020, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9025443/Terrorist-beheaded-French-teacher-buried-Chechnya.html>

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

The French Muslim community were horrified of Paty's killing.⁴²⁵ The imam of a mosque in Bordeaux, Tareq Oubrou said that the killing was devastating for the Muslim community, and the attacks harm the Republic and the essence of a religion.⁴²⁶ Moderate Muslims across France have condemned the attack, they have voiced that terrorists use the name of religion.⁴²⁷ A mother of a Muslim pupil, Paty's student, came to pay respects to show that they don't resemble Anzorov's action and other extremists.⁴²⁸ She added that Mr. Paty did the right thing and fulfilled his duty, her kids ask her why Anzorov as a Muslim attacked the professor.⁴²⁹ Teachers across the country also have voiced concern over their security as they may be killed for teaching secular values.⁴³⁰ Prime minister Jean Castex, however has unveiled that he is working on a better plan to protect teachers.⁴³¹

Authorities have reported that three pupils, in northern France, have been detained for making threats during the national tribute to Mr. Paty.⁴³² They been charge for apologia to terrorism.⁴³³ An Algerian was sentenced to 6 months prison for exalting the killer as a martyr on social media, he is banned for 10 years from France and will be deported after serving.⁴³⁴ Across the country, schools offered a minute of silence to Mr. Paty,⁴³⁵ about 400

⁴²⁵ Vivienne Walt, "The Beheading of a Teacher in France Exposes a Cultural Schism That Threatens President Macron's Future," *Times Magazine*, October 21, 2020, <https://time.com/5902121/samuel-paty-france-macron-muslim/>

⁴²⁶ Corbishley, "First picture of teacher beheaded."

⁴²⁷ "I realized that you can die because of teaching," *DER SPIEGEL*, October 18, 2020, <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/samuel-paty-franzosen-gedenken-enthaupteten-lehrers-a-29cff285-7b13-45b8-8bee-51ff4bbaca0b>

⁴²⁸ James Crisp, "Social media bosses summoned by French government after terrorist beheads teacher," *The Telegraph*, October, 17, 2020, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/10/17/french-police-arrest-9-18-year-old-chechen-decapitates-teacher/>

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ "I realized that you can die because of teaching," *DER SPIEGEL*, October 18, 2020, <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/samuel-paty-franzosen-gedenken-enthaupteten-lehrers-a-29cff285-7b13-45b8-8bee-51ff4bbaca0b>

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Ross Ibbetson, "Three teenagers including a 17-year-old girl are charged over the murder of French history teacher Samuel Paty who was beheaded after showing Mohammed cartoons in a free speech lesson," *Daily Mail*, November 6, 2020, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8922581/Three-teens-charged-Samuel-Patys-murder.html>

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

incidents were reported where school pupils “suggested Mr Paty had got what he deserved for showing the cartoons”.⁴³⁶ Hassen Chalghoumi, the well-known most moderate French imam commented that many pupils haven’t observe the minute of silence in 2015 for the Charlie Hebdo attack and it may be the same for Mr. Paty.⁴³⁷ Chalghoumi visited Mr. Paty’s school and delivered an emotional speech on “generation of hate”.⁴³⁸ He added that in schools where there are many Muslim pupils, it is difficult for teachers to teach about the holocaust and Charlie Hebdo.⁴³⁹ Mr. Chalghoumi spoke uncomfortably the harsh truth that angers the Muslim community, his life was reduced to living with two bodyguards, he quoted: “Without protection, I would have been dead long ago”.⁴⁴⁰ Finally, it was expected that Hezbollah and Hamas condemn Paty’s killing, as they did for Charlie Hebdo, however no official statement was released.⁴⁴¹

On October 25, 2020, to reiterate at Paty’s memorial, president Macron tweeted in Arabic and English, that France “will not give in, ever” the cartoons of Prophet Muhammad.⁴⁴² On Twitter, many have criticized the stance as two-facedness, while depictions of Jews are crimes, depictions of Muslims are protected under freedom of speech.⁴⁴³ For some immigrants and French Muslims, the Republic’s blueprint of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* are mere hypocrisy for discrimination.⁴⁴⁴ For David Feutry, a professor of history, it is not surprise that Muslims turned towards their traditions since the government abandoned them in poverty in specific regions of the Republic.⁴⁴⁵ He added that the far-right National Rally has majority votes in regions with big Muslim community.⁴⁴⁶ For right wing

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Walt, “The Beheading of a Teacher in France,” *Times Magazine*.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Robin Verner, “Caricatures, Separatism: What the Muslim world blames Macron for,” *BFMTV*, October 26, 2020, https://www.bfmtv.com/international/caricatures-separatisme-ce-que-le-monde-musulman-reproche-a-macron_AV-202010260177.html

⁴⁴² “Muslims call for French goods boycott to protest caricatures,” *Fox News*, October 26, 2020, <https://www.foxnews.com/world/muslims-call-for-french-goods-boycott-to-protest-caricatures>

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Roger Cohen, “A Year Later, a Schoolteacher’s Beheading Still Haunts France,” *The New York Times*, October 15, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/world/europe/france-samuel-paty-beheading.html>

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

parties, Macron was not harsh enough to not allow religious extremist and radicals in these communities.⁴⁴⁷ Professor Feutry is of the opinion that Mr. “Paty was not a hero; he was a victim”⁴⁴⁸ of social media rumour spreading.⁴⁴⁹

In the Muslim world, leaders and common people condemned the cartoons. A writer of Daraj news, Diana Moukalled, commented that some Muslims were aggrieved by the depictions of prophet Muhammad more than the decapitation of Mr. Paty.⁴⁵⁰ President Erdogan criticized president Macron’s comment on Islam and support of cartoons of the prophet by saying that he “needs mental treatment.”⁴⁵¹ France responded by pulling out his ambassador from Turkey.⁴⁵² Former prime minister Imran Khan accused Macron of “attacking Islam” by supporting the publication of the cartoons.⁴⁵³ Western leaders were very surprised that Erdogan and Khan did not decry the beheading of Mr. Paty.⁴⁵⁴ In the other hand, Sheikh Mohammed al-Issa, head of the Muslim World League, advised Muslims to not react to provocation,⁴⁵⁵ as protests and boycotts resume in the Muslim world over the prophets depiction. On October 31, 2020, president Macron gave an interview for Al-Jazeera where he explained that his words were taken out of context due to the translation and that his “support for the cartoons” are lies and distortions.⁴⁵⁶ The interview set a wave of criticism and praise on social media.⁴⁵⁷ A set of users criticized Macron for not apologizing Muslims after offending them, others criticized him for choosing an Arab channel which gives space

⁴⁴⁷ Walt, “The Beheading of a Teacher in France,” *Times Magazine*.

⁴⁴⁸ Cohen, “A Year Later, a Schoolteacher’s Beheading,” *The New York Times*.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ “Muslims call for French goods boycott,” *Fox News*.

⁴⁵¹ Bill Bostock, “France pulled its ambassador from Turkey, and Arab states are boycotting French products, after Macron said he wanted to regulate Islam,” *Business Insider*, October 26, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/france-turkey-arab-states-anger-macron-regulate-islam-2020-10>

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ “Macron Vows to Defend Freedom of Speech as anti-France Protests Continue in Muslim World,” *The Haaretz*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/2020-11-02/ty-article/anti-france-protests-continue-as-macron-seeks-understanding/0000017f-db25-d3a5-af7f-fbaf0e890000>

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

to Islamist; for others it was a success that Macron addressed Muslims after protests and boycotts on French products for depicting the prophet.⁴⁵⁸

3.3 ANALYSIS

3.3.1 Methods

3.3.1.1 Frequency Analysis

At the rate electronic texts are produced and digitized on the internet and social media era, text analytics techniques have become essential to find unknown patterns in huge amounts of unstructured data. Therefore, securing data readability, integrity, accuracy, and confidentiality have persuade experts since ancient times into what is called these days as ‘cryptology.’⁴⁵⁹ This process involves encrypting (cryptography) by converting the text into unreadable codes named cyphertext; and by decrypting (cryptanalysis) which involves breaking the encrypted text.⁴⁶⁰

Frequency analysis is an instrument of cryptanalysis. According to Bruen & Forcinito (2011) frequency patterns in human language can be used to break ciphers.⁴⁶¹ Cryptology and frequency analysis was established by Abu Yusuf Ya'qub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi (800–873), a polymath expert in mathematics, literature, statistics, philosophy, astronomy, and medicine.⁴⁶² In his book, *Risala fi 'istikhrāj al-mu'amma* (‘A Manuscript on Deciphering Cryptographic Messages’) Al-Kindi developed the technique of frequency analysis to break encrypted messages,⁴⁶³ by listing all Arabic words using combinations and permutations.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Marius Iulian Mihailescu and Stefania Loredana Nita, *Pro Cryptography and Cryptanalysis with C++23*, (Romania: Apress, 2023), 5.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid, 5.

⁴⁶¹ Aiden A. Bruen and Mario A. Forcinito, *Cryptography, Information Theory, and Error Correction*, (New Jersey: Wiley, 2011), 26.

⁴⁶² Lyle D. Broemeling, “An Account of Early Statistical Inference in Arab Cryptology,” *The American Statistician* 65, no 4 (2011): 255.

⁴⁶³ Martin Lee, *The Cyber Threat Intelligence*, (Oxford UK: Wiley, 2023), 8.

⁴⁶⁴ Broemeling, “Account Early Statistical Inference in Arab Cryptology,” 255.

The benefit of studying of repetition of letters and frequencies of words in texts is that it offers insightful information and patterns about the text, and the author's word choice compared to other texts' authors.⁴⁶⁵ This is because authors rarely choose words randomly.⁴⁶⁶ Frequency analysis requires putting the most frequent words in the list need in context by concordancing, this is to ascertain their collocation and colligation.⁴⁶⁷ For example, according to the British National Corpus (BNC), the word 'hand' collocates with 'other', 'his' and 'in'(see Figure 10).⁴⁶⁸ With slight difference, colligation calls particular words to others to create a natural phrase structure, or word that keep company repetitively, for example, according to the BNC, the word 'deny' colligates with 'the charges', 'that the', etc. (see Figure 11)⁴⁶⁹ Collocation and colligation are both helpful methods to identify the relationship between words, near-synonym and clustering which are part of semantics.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁵ Dawn Archer, *What's in a Word-list?: Investigating Word Frequency and Keyword Extraction*, (England: Routledge, 2016), 1.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid, 2.

⁴⁶⁸ Hans Lindquist, "Checking Collocation and Colligations" in *Corpus Linguistics and the Description of English*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 81.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid, 88.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid, 60.

Table 4.10 Left collocates of the noun *hand* in the BNC

Collocation	N	POS tag
other hand	5,564	AJ0 NN1
his hand	3,859	DPS NN1
her hand	2,610	DPS NN1
one hand	2,536	CRD NN1
a hand	2,105	AT0 NN1
in hand	1,306	PRP NN1
the hand	1,246	AT0 NN1
's hand	1,135	POS NN1
right hand	1,102	AJ0 NN1
my hand	953	DPS NN1
left hand	896	AJ0 NN1
your hand	644	DPS NN1
to hand	540	PRP NN1
by hand	517	PRP NN1
at hand	482	PRP NN1
out_of hand	363	PRP NN1
on hand	361	PRP NN1

Figure 10. Example of left collocates based on the noun ‘hand’. Note: Adapted from Lindquist, “Checking Collocation and Colligations”, 81.

Table 4.13 Colligations of *deny* in the BNC

Phrase	N	POS-gram	Co-occurring grammatical class
deny that the	61	VVI CJT AT0	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that there	28	VVI CJT EX0	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that it	26	VVI CJT PNP	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that they	21	VVI CJT PNP	<i>that</i> -clause
deny the existence	20	VVI AT0 NN1	NP (transitive)
deny that he	15	VVI CJT PNP	<i>that</i> -clause
deny the charges	15	VVB AT0 NN2	NP (transitive)
deny the importance	13	VVI AT0 NN1	NP (transitive)
deny approval to	12	VVI NN1 PRP	NP (transitive)
deny approval to	11	VVB NN1 PRP	NP (transitive)
deny the reality	11	VVI AT0 NN1	NP (transitive)
deny that she	9	VVI CJT PNP	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that the	9	VVB CJT AT0	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that they	9	VVB CJT PNP	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that a	8	VVI CJT AT0	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that i	8	VVI CJT PNP	<i>that</i> -clause
deny attempting to	7	VVB VVG TO0	- <i>ing</i> clause
deny that some	7	VVI CJT DT0	<i>that</i> -clause
deny that we	7	VVI CJT PNP	<i>that</i> -clause
deny them the	7	VVI PNP AT0	NP (ditransitive)
deny her the	6	VVI PNP AT0	NP (ditransitive)

Figure 11. Example of colligation based on the word ‘deny’. Note: Adapted from Lindquist, “Checking Collocation and

To analyze the meaning of the word in context, Lindquist (2009) proposes that is not enough by looking into the relationship of collocation and colligation but into the hidden meaning which is called semantic prosody.⁴⁷¹ Semantic prosody is defined as the writer’s “communicative purpose” and writers use it to deliver positive or negative opinions without saying directly.⁴⁷² Partington (2004) defines semantic prosody as the writer’s feelings that is writing about, and classifies it as ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘neutral’ in terms of connotative(hidden) meaning.⁴⁷³ Xiao (2006) states that there are differences of opinion whether semantic prosody are connotational.⁴⁷⁴ For him, semantic prosodies are purely collocational while near-synonyms have denotative(literal) meaning.⁴⁷⁵ In the data mining

⁴⁷¹ Hans Lindquist, “Checking for Lexis” in *Corpus Linguistics and the Description of English*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 57.

⁴⁷² Ibid, 57-58.

⁴⁷³ Alan Partington, “Utterly Content in Each Other’s Company: Semantic Prosody and Semantic Preference,” *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics* 9, no 1, (2004): 131.

⁴⁷⁴ Richard Xiao, Tony McEnery, “Collocation, Semantic Prosody, and Near Synonymy: A Cross-Linguistic Perspective,” *Applied Linguistics* 27, no 1 (March 2006): 107.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid, 108.

field, much of the natural language ‘sentiment analysis’ is based on the measurement of the strength of semantic prosody.⁴⁷⁶

A close reading is preferred to extract the topics in the text corpus, whoever it would not be practical when the corpus contains huge amounts of data. In order to reduce the dimensionality of the corpus, language processing scholars extract the most frequent words in the corpus. Currently, the Term Frequency (TF) is the method that is most widely used. The TF method calculates the number of times a word frequents in a document.⁴⁷⁷ However, some documents may be larger than others, so the number of keywords would be bias⁴⁷⁸, to correct this, the formula calculates the TF by dividing the keywords frequency in a document by the total number of words in the document.⁴⁷⁹

$$TF(\text{Keyword}) = \frac{\text{The keyword frequency in document}}{\text{Total number of words in document}}$$

However, some terms like “the”, would have more frequency, which the TF methods does consider, for that, the Inverse Document Frequency method deletes irrelevant words in the corpus⁴⁸⁰ by the logarithm of dividing the total amount of documents by number of documents that a keyword appears in it.⁴⁸¹

$$IDF = LOG \frac{\text{number of documents in corpus}}{\text{Number of documents with keyword in it}}$$

⁴⁷⁶ Harika Abburi, et al., "Sentiment analysis using relative prosody features," (Paper presented at the 2017 Tenth International Conference on Contemporary Computing (IC3), Noida, India, 2017).

⁴⁷⁷Kai Hu, et al. "A domain keyword analysis approach extending Term Frequency-Keyword Active Index with Google Word2Vec model," *Scientometrics* 114 (2018), 1032.

⁴⁷⁸Kai Hu et al., "domain keyword analysis approach,"1032.

⁴⁷⁹Dongkuk Lee and Hyuksoo Kwon, "Keyword analysis of the mass media's news articles on maker education in South Korea," *International Journal of Technology and Design Education* 32, no 1 (2020), 340.

⁴⁸⁰ Kai Hu et al., "domain keyword analysis approach,"1034.

⁴⁸¹ Lukáš Havrlant and Vladik Kreinovich, "A simple probabilistic explanation of term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) heuristic (and variations motivated by this explanation)," *International Journal of General Systems* 46, no. 1 (2017), 28.

The last step to weight the word is by calculating the product of TF and IDF.⁴⁸² This method measures the importance of a keyword in the document or entire corpus.⁴⁸³ The interpretation of the TF-IDF is that when a word is important in a document, its value will be higher than 1 and when the word is less important or less relevant, its weight will reach to 0.⁴⁸⁴

$$TF - IDF = TF * IDF$$

3.3.1.2 Thematic Analysis (TA) for small text

TA is a qualitative method for data analysis which involves a series of steps to code data to develop themes.⁴⁸⁵ This method serves for pattern discovery in relatively small set of data.⁴⁸⁶ Braun & Clarke (2021) offer six phases to construct topic or themes which are not strictly linear:⁴⁸⁷

Phase 1: Immerse oneself with data by reading and re-reading.

Phase 2: Identify segments relevant to research questions and label(code) them.

Phase 3: Gather codes that share the same idea and assemble them to each theme.

Phase 4: Review the themes by looking into the dataset.

Phase 5: Name the theme and include a summary of each theme.

Phase 6: Writing a report about the dataset that addresses research questions.

⁴⁸² Kai Hu et al., “domain keyword analysis approach”,1036.

⁴⁸³ Dongkuk Lee & Hyuksoo Kwon, “Keyword analysis mass media,” 340.

⁴⁸⁴ Brandon M. Stewart, Justin Grimmer, and Margaret E. Roberts, *Text as Data: A New Framework for -Machine Learning and the Social Sciences* (Oxford: Princeton University press, 2022), 75-77.

⁴⁸⁵ Virginia Brown and Victoria Clarke, *Thematic Analysis, A Practical Guide* (London: SAGE Publications, 2021), 4.

⁴⁸⁶ Brown and Clarke, *Thematic Analysis, A Practical Guide*, 5

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid, 34-35.

3.3.1.3 Co-occurrence Frequency

The method of thematic analysis has been applied as well to cluster keywords into themes and subthemes. This type of analysis called Co-occurrence Frequency is widely utilized in network analysis and search engines to identify relationships among concepts. Co-occurrence or co-word is a method that analyses the word frequency that co-occur in documents, titles, abstract and keywords.⁴⁸⁸ The result of the analysis is a network of themes and semantic map.⁴⁸⁹ An example of co-occurrence frequency is when a paired data {A, B} arises once, and it can increase when another item is added {A, B}, {A, C}, {C, D}⁴⁹⁰. In other scenario, the data in between the braces could be keywords or words, in the first text, a set of keywords {A, B} occurs, in the second text, a pair of keywords {B, D} comes and the list could continue. The interpretation of co-occurrence depends on the dataset, however when it comes to keywords, the larger the frequency of paired data, the stronger the relationship.⁴⁹¹ The visualization of co-occurrence networks is mainly assisted by association algorithms,⁴⁹² where the network's node are the keyword, the edges are the frequency which is shown as wider and shorter line.

Archer (2016) insists that is it also important to pay attention to low frequency words as they become key in the analysis by pairing them with other similar words.⁴⁹³ Weibin Lin et.al (2022) demonstrated in his study of topic clustering by keywords, that keywords with high attention don't automatically represent the concepts in the cluster as the keywords around the center representative are more related to other keyword members.⁴⁹⁴ In other words, low frequency keywords may reflect the topic's center

⁴⁸⁸ Ivan Zupic and Tomaz Cater, "Bibliometric Methods in Management and Organization," *Organizational Research Methods* 18, no.3 (2014): 7.

⁴⁸⁹ Zupic and Cater, "Bibliometric Methods in Management and Organization", 7

⁴⁹⁰ Jan W. Buzydlowski, "Co-occurrence analysis as a framework for data mining," *Journal of Technology Research* 6, no 1 (2015): 1-19.

⁴⁹¹ Buzydlowski, "Co-occurrence analysis", 4.

⁴⁹² Ibid, 5.

⁴⁹³ Archer, *What's in a Word-list?*, 14.

⁴⁹⁴ Weibin Lin, et al., "Topic Network Analysis Based on Co-Occurrence Time Series Clustering," *Mathematics* 10, no. 16 (2022): 10.

representative.⁴⁹⁵ Finally, Weibin Lin et.al discovered that keywords inside a cluster change overtime, and therefore the relationship between topics evolve.⁴⁹⁶

3.3.1.4 Topic Modeling

While Thematic Analysis is for relatively small size of text involving human interpretation, it is also the basis for the development of topic modeling. According to Blei (2012,77) topic modeling is a series of statistical methods to discover: themes from large amounts of corpora, the relationship between themes and their evolution over time. Topic and clustering algorithms share the same concept that a document is part of a cluster, however, a document has many ideas.⁴⁹⁷ For this reason, topic models assign one document to different labels or themes.⁴⁹⁸ An example of this is when politicians address different topics in a speech. While Blei (2012, 78) defines topic to be ‘fixed vocabulary’, Villamor Martina et al. (2023, 82) explains that topics are also modeled based on a Co-occurrence Frequency.

The output of a topic modeling is matrix where each keyword has a weight for each topic⁴⁹⁹ To extract information from large corpora, there are two ways: representation and inference (see Figure 12). The representation approach models the text as a matrix of the number of words per document while the inference approach infers communities from network of texts.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁵ Weibin Lin et,al, "Topic Network Analysis," 10.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid, 10.

⁴⁹⁷ Steward, Grimmer and Roberts, *Text as Data*, 147

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid, 147.

⁴⁹⁹ Marta Villamor Martin, David A. Kirsch & Fabian Prieto-Nañez, “The promise of machine-learning- driven text analysis techniques for historical research: topic modelling and word embedding,” *Management & Organizational History* 18, no 1(2023):83.

⁵⁰⁰ Martin Gerlach, Tiago P. Peixoto, Eduardo G. Altmann, “A network approach to topic models,” *Science Advances* 4, no. 7 (2018): 2.




Figure 12. Two methods for extracting knowledge from large corpora. Note: Adapted from Gerlach et al. “A network approach to topic models,” 2.

There are several algorithms for topic modeling, however the basis of all variations is the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model. The concept behind this model is that documents have a variety of topics where each topic displays in distinct amount.⁵⁰¹ Steward, Grimmer and Roberts (2022) further explain that LDA framework is that documents are modelled as result of topic distribution (Topic prevalence) and topics are modelled as a result of distribution of words (topic content).⁵⁰² Blei(2012)explains that at the end, words in the document are the variables observed while the hidden variables are the structure of the topic (see Figure 13).⁵⁰³ As for labelling topics,

⁵⁰¹ David M. Blei, “Probabilistic topic models,” Communications of the ACM 55, no. 4 (2012): 78.

⁵⁰² Steward, Grimmer and Roberts, *Text as Data*,157-158.

⁵⁰³ Blei, “Probabilistic topic models,” 80.

Steward et. al (2022) offer two types of approach, the first consist by using the parameters of the topic itself (model-based) and the second consist of reading the documents at random (document-based).⁵⁰⁴




Figure 13. Latent Dirichlet Allocation statistical model overall view example.
 Note: Adapted from David M. Blei, “Probabilistic topic models,” 78.

Frequency analysis, thematic analysis, Co-occurrence Frequency and topic modeling have been previously applied to study media and political framing of minorities in different ways.⁵⁰⁵ For example, a study of US media portrayal of Muslim women, extracted from the LexisNexis database all articles that contained the word “women” between 1980 and 2014 restricted to the New York Times and Washinton Post newspapers only where each article was then allocated to only once country based on the relevance of country keyword above 85 percent.⁵⁰⁶ A total of 4,531 articles were analyzes with country-year, woman right index, Muslim percentage, democracy, instability, GDP, population and regional groupings variables.⁵⁰⁷ The study used Structural Topic Model (STM), a variant

⁵⁰⁴ Steward, Grimmer and Roberts, *Text as Data*, 160.

⁵⁰⁵ Dawn Archer, *What's in a Word-list*, 159.

⁵⁰⁶ Rochelle Terman, “Islamophobia and Media Portrayals of Muslim Women: A Computational Text Analysis of US News Coverage,” *Oxford International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 3 (2017): 492

⁵⁰⁷ Terman, “Islamophobia Media Portrayals Muslim Women,” 492-495.

model of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), which uses metadata covariant of the documents to reveal topic prevalence changes over time.⁵⁰⁸ The model identified fifteen topics as shown in Figure 14, where ‘Human Interest’, ‘women’s rights and gender equality’ and ‘sexual assault’ are the topic of relevance in US media.




Figure 14. Top 15 topic relevance among 4531 articles from between 1980 and 2014 from the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers regarding Muslim women excluding the US. Note: Adapted from Terman, “Islamophobia and Media Portrayals of Muslim Women,” 497.

Based on the theory of Gendered Orientalism, US media portrays Muslims societies as misogynistic, enforcing the stereotype of Muslims as others who are threat to Western values.⁵⁰⁹ Historically women’s oppression discourse served during colonialism as an excuse for Europeans to free women and civilized Muslims. Research results showed that US media reported Muslim women specially if they lived in authoritarian countries. When data is compared across regions, 73 percent coverage is focused on the MENA region specially on ‘women’s rights and gender equality’ compared to women in the

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid, 496.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid, 489-490.

West.⁵¹⁰Regarding ‘Sexual Assault’ showed low prevalence in MENA region, the topic was validated by gendered orientalism scholars stating that gender equality and violence against women are the obsess topic by US media in the Muslim world.⁵¹¹In sum, the research found bias in the number of coverage: Muslim women are more covered in news if they live in countries where there is low index of women’s rights, on the other side, non-Muslim women appear in societies with high index of women’s rights.

In another study of Islamophobia on Facebook, 100 pages along its comments were crawled from after the Woolwich attacks in 2013, Rotherham child abuse scandal, Trojan Horse and ISIS beheading of journalist which all occurred in the UK.⁵¹² From the 494 occasions of hate speech towards Muslims, 20 most frequent keywords were identified which included negative descriptive terms like Extremist (33), Scum (28), Paki (25), Rapists (24), Terrorists (22), dirty (44), bomb (27), paedo (22). Based on the data, the study was able to classify 5 types of offenders and their frequency of instances who engage with hate speech: Opportunistic (43), the Deceptive (32), Fantasists (36), Producers (47) and Distributors (42).⁵¹³Majority of the offenders were based on UK (43%), but also from the United States (37%) and Australia (20%).⁵¹⁴ In sum, the study found five cluster themes of anti-Muslim hate speech along its number of cases. The cluster topics are Muslims seem as terrorists (58), Muslims shown as rapists (54), Muslim women as security threat for their clothing (76), A ‘war’ with Muslims (53) and Muslims should be deported (62).⁵¹⁵

3.3.2 Data Preparation

This study has crawled digital articles from the BBC, Fox News, New York Post, CNN, Daily Mail, The Guardian, The Sun, Le Monde, The New York Times, The Times Magazine, Business Insider, Telegraph, The Metro, Le Figaro, BFMTV, Spiegel, Reuters

⁵¹⁰ Ibid, 497.

⁵¹¹ Ibid, 499.

⁵¹² Imran Awan, “Islamophobia on social media: A Qualitative Analysis of the Facebook’s Walls of Hate,” *International Journal of Cyber Criminology* 10, no. 1 (2016), 5.

⁵¹³ Imran Awan, “Islamophobia on Facebook,” 8.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid, 9.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid, 10.

and The Times of Israel which have wider international circulation according to the WAN-IFRA's World Press Trends 2016 report. The extraction parameters were limited to the two events of Macron's speech and the death of Samuel Paty. The time parameter was set from October 2, 2020, to October 16, 2020. The search keywords were set to 'Macron Islam crisis' or 'MACRON ISLAM CRISIS' or 'Islam crisis Macron', 'Macron separatism speech' and 'Samuel Paty' or 'SAMUEL PATY', 'death Mr. Paty', or 'beheading Samuel Paty', or 'death French teacher 2020' or 'Chechen attacker teacher 2020' or 'Paty hero secularism'. Articles published outside the time parameter, which was relevant to the events, were included as well due to the update of the court case of the death of Samuel Paty. The Near-synonym and synonyms words were grouped by a center representative keyword. For example, 'cartoon', 'depiction', 'drawing' and 'caricature' were grouped into 'cartoon'. The word grouping was also centered in the verbs and nouns. For example, *attack*, *attacked* and *attacker*, was merged into *attack*. After filtering the unrelated articles, a total of 39 articles were set for analysis.

3.3.3 Results

The frequency analysis enumerates the top 34 frequent keywords found in the corpus article reflecting the center topics and its equivalent Term Frequency percentage in the article corpus. (see Table 1) Top ten keywords are *France*, *teach*, *Samuel Paty*, *kill*, *Macron*, *Muslim*, *attacks*, *school*, *country*, and *cartoon*.

Table 1. Top 34 most frequent words in Western media articles and their Term Frequency (TF) percentage equivalence.


RAN K	KEYWORD	FREQ	% (TF*100)	RAN K	KEYWORD	FREQ	% (TF*100)
1	France	398	50.20	18	speech	70	8.50
2	teach	216	33.10	19	Charlie Hebdo	70	9.70
3	Samuel Paty	204	31.30	20	secular	68	6.10
4	kill	183	28.20	21	law	65	7.40
5	Emmanuel Macron	181	24.10	22	freedom speech	63	7.30
6	Muslim	175	19.30	23	separatism	61	7.30
7	attack	161	20.30	24	show	60	10.70
8	school	160	21.30	25	religion	55	4.90
9	country	147	15.20	26	religious	47	4.10
10	cartoon	135	19.70	27	threat	38	4.20
11	Islamist-ism	116	17.20	28	mosque	25	2.90
12	terror	96	12.40	29	crisis	20	2.20
13	Islam	88	10.50	30	hate	19	2.00
14	radical-ism	78	8.70	31	strict	17	2.50
15	prophet Muhammad	78	11.70	32	boycott	16	2.10
16	behead	78	14.20	33	security	14	1.50
17	class-room	76	12.20	34	refugee	14	2.20

Examining at the word relevance in the entire corpus, the Term-Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency variable (See Table 2) shows that keywords like *Samuel Paty*, *separatism*, *Islam*, *Macron*, *law*, *Muslim*, *lie*, *attack*, *country*, and *radical* have more relevance compared to other keywords in the entire corpus. Notice that the ranking changes compared to the Term frequency ranking.


Table 2. Top 34 most frequent words in Western media articles and their weight relevance according to the Term-Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency method.

RANK	KEYWORD	FREQ	TF-IDF	RANK	KEYWORD	FREQ	TF-IDF
1	Samuel Paty	204	0.036	18	religion	55	0.018
2	separatism	61	0.032	19	France	398	0.017
3	Islam	88	0.028	20	mosque	25	0.017
4	Emmanuel Macron	181	0.027	21	kill	183	0.017
5	law	65	0.027	22	strict	17	0.016
6	Muslim	175	0.025	23	teach	216	0.016
7	lie/lying	12	0.024	24	religious	47	0.015
8	attack	161	0.023	25	cartoon	135	0.014
9	country/republic	147	0.022	26	speech	70	0.014
10	radical	78	0.022	27	threat	38	0.013
11	show	60	0.021	28	crisis	20	0.013
12	laicite/secular	68	0.020	29	Islamist-ism	116	0.012
13	Charlie Hebdo	70	0.019	30	danger	11	0.012
14	boycott	16	0.018	31	prophet Muhammad	78	0.012
15	behead-ing-ed	78	0.018	32	hate	19	0.011
16	terror	96	0.018	33	freedom speech	63	0.011
17	class-room	76	0.018	34	refugee	14	0.010


The Co-occurrence Frequency method, which analyzes the frequency of paired keywords that frequent always together to detect themes, reveals interesting insights (see Chart 1). Paired keywords and its frequency like *Samuel Paty* (204), *Emmanuel Macron* (181), *prophet Muhammad* (78) and *Charlie Hebdo* (70) do always collocate in an unchanged order. In a case that the left collocate is not mentioned by the author, it is inferred by the context that the word is part of a personality. The remaining of the co-occurrence keywords are colligations which form a natural phrase structure.




Both Term Frequency analysis and TF-IDF analysis showed the issued of *Samuel Paty* were the main emphasis in the corpus content. This emphasis over the beheading of Samuel Paty is described as *terrorist attack/killing* (38), *Islamist terrorist* (23), *Islamist terrorist attack* (21). Within the corpus text, the keyword *Samuel Paty* also co-occurs often with co-words like *hate speech* (11), and *Charlie Hebdo* (70) while *Emmanuel Macron* is mostly related with *French president/leader* (57), *antiterrorism* (27), *Islamist separatism* (26), *French values* (20), *French products* (17), *secular values* (9) and *strict monitoring* (5). However, when looking into the root word *Islam* (88) and its linguistic derivatives like *Islamist* and/or *Islamism*, Chart 2 shows that *Islamist* (116) is the main keyword for other suffix words with negative connotation. In other words, the media portrays Islam as a religion of *separatism*, *radicalism*, and *terrorism*.



On the other side, the newspapers that focus the most on the issue *Samuel Paty* and *France* are the New York Times (top), Daily Mail, The Time Magazine, CNN, BBC, Le Monde, The Times of Israel, and Business Insider even if other variables are not considered (See Chart 3). Most newspapers in corpus would include keywords like *Macron*, *cartoon*, *Charlie Hebdo*, *secularism*, and *free expression* except for Le Monde whose content focus is mainly focused on Samuel Paty, cartoons, and freedom of expression. However, when newspapers mention *France*, *secularism* and *freedom of expression* would be mentioned as well in different degree counts.




The same mentioned newspapers that overfocussed on *Samuel Paty*, have also mention *Islam* and its derivatives with negative connotation. Chart 4 shows that while Daily Mail is second newspaper that mentioned most keywords like *France*, *Samuel Paty* and *Macron*, is the top newspaper that mentioned keywords like *Islam* and its derivatives like *Islamist*, *Muslim*, *Prophet Muhammad*, *radical Islamism* and *Islamist separatism*. The remaining newspapers have always mentioned the same keyword in less frequency counts with exception of Le Figaro, which focuses moderately only on Samuel Paty but has the lowest frequency count for Islam and its derivatives.



To understand the overall media portrayal of the issues, the Topic Modeling analysis result shows three major themes found in the corpus (See Figure 15). The first theme is about Islam associated and interconnected with negative terms. The second theme shows that despite Samuel Paty’s attack occurred in French soil and Macron’s address to French Muslim community, the media shows contradiction in addressing the issue. Islam is global religion while the incidents in France are local. The third theme focusses on Samuel Paty’s attack, one criminal activity that does not represent the trend among the French Muslim community.

The topic clustering method based on the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model (see Figure 16) shows nine main topic clusters, their relationships among them and their center

representative characterized with higher diameter and color shading. For example, *France* is the center representative, *country, law, values, leader, and product* are its co-occurrence. *Cartoon* is the center representative, *caricature, picture, depiction, and drawing* are its near synonym used to describe the cartoon of the prophet Muhammad. The relationship of cluster *cartoon* with cluster *Islam* is through *prophet Mohammad*, and the relationship *Samuel Paty* is through *shown*. From the sematic cloud, it can be derived Western media presumptive model of debate. The first presumption is the model of radicalization. According to the co-occurrence frequency, this model is of radicalization is ‘Islamist’ and ‘radical Islamism’ via its ‘Islamist teachings’ expressed as ‘Islamist separatism’, ‘Islamist terrorism’ and ‘Islamist terror attack’. The second presumption is that it assumes the mosques, Islamic schools, and homeschooling as center of radicalization, center of ‘Islamist teaching’.






Figure 15. Co-occurrence network of the three main themes of Western media discourse regarding Macron's speech on Islam. Analysis based according to the Topic Modeling method based on the Representation method extraction.




Figure 16. Nine clusters with respective center representative in Western media discourse on Macron's speech on Islam. Analysis based on the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) statistical model.

3.4 CONCLUSION

On October 2, 2020, president Macron gave a speech mentioning that Islam was a religion in ‘crisis’ all over the world. On October 16, 2020, a schoolteacher, Samuel Paty was beheaded near his school by Chechen Muslim for showing cartoon of the prophet Muhammad. President Macron defended the caricatures as part of freedom of expression. The study collected articles regarding both incidents from the main international newspapers. A total of 39 articles were sorted. The method of analysis was conducted using Frequency Analysis (Term Frequency, Inverse Document Frequency), Co-occurrence Frequency, Thematic Analysis and Topic Modeling.

The Frequency Analysis ranked top 34 keywords from which *France, teach, Samuel Paty, killing, and Emmanuel Macron* were the top 5 keywords. The product of Term Frequency and Inverse Documents showed that *Samuel Paty, separatism, Islam, Macron* and *Law* were the top 5 keyword with higher relevance in the corpus. The Co-occurrence Frequency showed 18 list of paired keywords that frequent in the corpus, the top 2 include Samuel Paty and Emmanuel Macron which pair by necessity. The other paired keywords are rooted in the word Islam and its derivatives *Islamist, Islamism* are paired with negative connotation like *separatism, radical, and terrorist attack*. The newspapers that had higher frequency count of *Samuel Paty, France, secularism and freedom of speech and Macron,* have also higher frequency mention of *Muslim, Islamist, Islam, Islamist separatism and Islamist terrorist* keywords.

Thematic analysis results classify the corpus into three main themes. The first theme associates Islam with negative terms; the second theme emphasizes the beheading of Samuel Paty as a national threat, however, Paty’s attack does not represent the trend in the French Muslim Community; the third theme shows a contradiction in the media portrayal, while the issues are mainly related to French Muslims, the media generalized to the Muslim world. Topic clustering shows 9 main clusters of Western media presumptive model of debate, that it is radicalization by Islamism, the second assumption is that mosques, Islamic schools and homeschooling as centers of radicalization. The media does not show the diversity of responses.

CHAPTER FOUR

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO MACRON’S SPEECH: MAPPING AND ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the real voices of Muslim response toward Macron’s statements and policies regarding Islam and Muslims. Data has been extracted from Twitter using Python and Twitter Developer tools. The analysis is divided in six parts. The first part will show the overall patterns data using descriptive statistics. The second, third and fourth part will analyse clusters of response in Arabic, French and English language respectively. The fifth part will show the online campaign that Muslims engaged in global debate using hashtags which were linked to the timeline of post in different languages. The sixth section will reveal through the lenses of Digital Activism and Online Communities framework, the most shared type of media that Muslims used to express their voices.

In other to picture any scenario, due to the principle of fairness, it is important to analyse both the Western media and Muslims discourse. As shown in the previous chapter, Western media response was analysed. Then the significance of analysing Muslim response would be to contrast, compare and see the overall discourse that both parties engage. This chapter would also shed light on the multilinguistic, heterogenous, multilayered response of Muslims compared to the monolithic view that all Muslim hold the same view.

4.2 METHODOLOGY

4.2.1 Data Selection

Using the developer tools of X (formerly known as Twitter) and “python-twitter” package, 2000 tweets were scraped. This was due to the new limitations on data scraping to 1500 post per month distributed on 25 request per day imposed by X in July 2023.⁵¹⁶ From the

⁵¹⁶ Tweeter Developer Platform, “About the Twitter API,” accessed on January 2024, <https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/twitter-api/getting-started/about-twitter-api/>

2000 tweets, 96 tweets were excluded as were not relevant to the search parameters from which 1904 were ready for final analysis. The search date parameter comprised since:2020-10-20 till 2022-10-20. This was because of the on-going boycott on French products in the Muslim world. The keyword search parameters included: 'Islam Macron speech' or 'Islam Crisis Macron' or 'speech Macron 2020' or 'prophet cartoons 2020' with the following hashtag: #boycottFrenchProducts or #NeverTheProphet or #إلا_رسول_الله [never the prophet] or #مقاطعة_منتجات_فرنسا [boycott French products] or #BoycottezLesProduitsFrançais. The scrapped data includes both posted tweets and replies in any language. A disclaimer is necessary, since X limited the number of replies to a tweet, only the top comments shown were scrapped.

4.2.2 Method of Analysis


This chapter will use Frequency Analysis (TF-IDF), Co-occurrence Frequency and the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic modelling method to extract patterns in the scrapped data. These methods have been explained in detail in the previous chapter (3). Whoever instead of focusing mainly on the tone of the response of Muslims towards Macron's, i.e positive, neutral, or negative, this chapter will delve deeply in the patterns and sub patterns of responses that emerges in each language. The reason for focusing on the language rather than the region the response was posted is because of the diverse languages spoken in the Muslim world. Additionally, due to globalization, many Muslims are proficient in many languages and reside in different regions where their native language are not widely spoken. For example, Muslims in the Maghreb and Africa region are proficient in Arabic and French and may post in Arabic while being in France or Europe. For the Arabic language, no Natural Language Processing algorithm was applied due to the complexity and sophistication of the language. The coding and keyword extraction for Arabic was made manually using the root verb (مصدر) to subsequently search for the near-synonym, plurals, singulars, and verb conjugations. The theme coding was revised by two native Arab speakers to validate the cultural sensitiveness and context.

4.3 RESULTS


4.3.1 General patterns

The responses of Muslims were recorded in approximately 10 languages. Chart 5. shows that top major languages used to convey responses were in English language (34%), French language (29%), Arabic language (25%) and media (9%). Although media is not considering a language (but contains certain linguistic expression), responses were also expressed in form of memes, posters, videos, animated stickers (GIF), this category, does not include any other additional text or description in the tweet posts. For classification purposes, media that is accompanied with text description are categorized in language posted, however the only media type is analysed in the last part on of this chapter. Finally other less utilized languages in the responses include Urdu (2%) and Turkish (1%).

Chart 5. Percentage of responses in their equivalent language in tweet corpus.




Looking at the geolocation of the responses, to avoid country list conglomeration, the countries were grouped by region, except for France, which was not grouped into the European region to see a detailed response of Muslims towards Macron’s statement. Chart 6 displays that majority of the responses come from France and Europe combined (683), the Middle East (457), Indian Subcontinent (385), Maghreb (179), Anatolia or Asia minor (118) and Southeast Asia-SEA (57).




Muslim responses in each region are characterized by the usage of many languages. Data patterns in Chart 7 shows that the English language was used in all regions. In the Indian Subcontinent, English has the highest record of responses (322) followed by Europe, the Middle East and SEA. However, it is in France and Europe combined that main 3 languages were used by Muslims. Despite the French language having the highest record of responses in France alone, it was used minimally in the Maghreb region. The Arabic language was used extensively across the regions where top responses came from the Middle East (299), Maghreb (131) and Anatolia (36). Regarding memes, animated stickers, posters and videos, the Middle East (76), the Indian Subcontinent (28) and France (26) have made most use of them extensively to express their responses. Finally, the Anatolia region showed an even distribution of languages used. In this region, Arabic was used more than the Turkish language itself.

Chart 7. Distribution of top ranked languages used in respective region



The timeline of Muslim responses started since October 2, 2020, till the last months of 2022. Overall, majority of the responses were expressed mainly in the year of 2020 and specifically in the months of October and November (see chart no 8). In the month of October 2020, there were four peaks of responses. The first peak's (2-4/10/2020) area recorded a total of 392 responses. The area in the second peak (21-23/10/2020) recorded 127 responses. In the third peak's area (25-31/10/2020), the highest responses were recorded, 847. In the month of November 2020, the only highest peak (1-4/11/2020) recorded 254 responses.

Chart 8. Timeline of Muslim responses for the month of October-November 2020.



4.3.2 Patterns of response in the Arabic language

Using the Frequency Analysis (TF-IDF), a total of 150 keywords were extracted. However, due to the Arabic language sophisticated grammatical rules, two sorting methods were applied to extract keywords. First consisted of taking the Arabic root letters (جذر /المصدر) as a starting point to search for its grammatical conjugations, noun (اسم) gender (مؤنث / مذك), and plurals in its two forms: sound plural (جمع السالم) and broken plural (جمع التكسير). All translations were based on the 4th edition of the Arabic-English Hans Wehr Dictionary, page citations are provided in the ‘Page’ column. An example for the search of grammatical variations of the root word is presented in table 3, where nine variations of سلم [to submit] were found in the Arabic tweet corpus. The count of each noun variation was then aggregated and allocated to the ‘TOTAL’ column. The ‘AR ROOT’ column then becomes the keyword representative.

Table 3. Random sample of Arabic root word its grammatical variations in the corpus of responses.

EN TRANS	AR ROOT	TOTAL	VAR 1	CT.	VAR 2	CT.	VAR 3	CT.
to submit [to God]	سلم	350	Submission اسلام	156	Islamic اسلامي	38	Islamization اسلمت	1
			M. Muslim مسلم	12	Muslims مسلمين	16	Muslims مسلمون	82
			F. مسلمات Muslims	3	F. مسلمة Muslim	5	He submits يسلم	1
to offend	سوء	39	offence إساءة	23	مسيئة Offensive	10	he offended سيء	3
to degrade	هون	14	Insult إهانة	7	insults يهين	5	insulting مهين	2

After taking the root word as representative for the grammatical variations, the second stage consists in merging the near synonyms into the root word/keyword that has the highest number of repetitions. For example, Arabic speakers used ten similar verbs to express the offensiveness of republication of the prophet's cartoons. Each verb is of similar degree in English, however in the Arabic language, each verb has a different degree of tone (see Table 4 and 5). In another example, Arabic speakers used ten verbs to express their support for the prophet Muhammad, be in the form of demonstrations or criticizing the cartoons. Similarly, keywords like نبي [prophet] and الحبيب [the beloved] were merged to رسول [messenger] and they all refer to the Prophet Muhammad; and keywords like بيد [اباد] (to exterminate), ذبح [to massacre] and حرق [to burn] were merged into قتل [to kill] as they refer to the killing of Muslims in Africa.

HANS WEHR DICTIONARY			
PAGE	ENGLISH	AR-ROOT	COUNT
512	to offend/insult	سوء	47
1218	to degrade	هون	14
1196	to attack	هجم	7
957	to lie	كذب	7
456	to insult	سب	4
1204	to mock	إسهزاء [هزاء]	2
833	to provoke	فز	2
1020	to curse	لعن	1
1178	to violate	أنتهك	1
226	to incite hatred	حقد	1
14	to hurt/insult	آذى	2
Total			88

Table 4. Near-synonyms to سوء [to offend/insult] used to describe the depictions of the prophet Muhammad.

HANS WEHR DICTIONARY			
PAGE	ENGLISH	AR-ROOT	COUNT
1138	to support	نصر	59
1157	to rise up	نفض	4
1160	to criticize	نقد	4
183	to protest/argue	حج	4
684	to demonstrate	تظاهر	3
521	to march/protest	سير	3
934	to resist	يقاوم	2
722	to protect	يعصم	2
353	to condemn	أدا	2
210	to rally/gather	إختشَد [حشد]	1
Total			84

Table 5. Near-synonyms to نصر [to support] used by Arabic speakers to protest the prophet Muhammad depictions.

As a result of merging of near-synonyms, top 46 keywords were identified. (see Table 6) From the sample, the most repeated keywords are الله [Allah], اسلام [submission/Islam], رسول [messenger], فرنسا [France], سلم [to summit to God], فرنسي [French], نصر [to support], سلم/سلام [peace], سوء [to offend/hurt] and دين [religion].

Table 6. Top 46 keywords (IDF-TF) for the responses in Arabic Language.

HANS WEHR DICTIONARY				HANS WEHR DICTIONARY			
PAGE	EN-TRANSLATION	AR-ROOT	COUNT	PAGE	EN-TRANSLATION	AR-ROOT	COUNT
30	Allah	الله	176	1132	to publish	نشر	26
497	submission/Islam	اسلام [سلم]	156	392	to draw	رسم	26
391	messenger	رسول	152	552	nation	شعب	24
832	France	فرنسا	130	195	war	حرب	23
495	to submit	سلم	127	309	to express	تعبير	23
832	French	فرنسي	97	497	Islamism	اسلاموية	23
512	to offend/hurt	سوء	88	743	to know/learn	علم	22
1138	to support	نصر	84	836	to fail	فشل	20
496	peace	سلام/سلم	80	628	opposed	ضد	20
353	religion	دين	77	760	racism	عنصرية	19
909	to cut off/boycott	قطع	74	147	Algeria	الجزائر	19
32	P. Muhammad	محمد	72	962	to be generous	كرم	17
87, 349	country	دولة / بلد	70	735	to believe	اعتقد	22
653	extremism	متطرف	67	201	to declare sacred	حرم	16
	E. Macron	ماكرون	53	659	to request [by a group of people]	طالب	15
194	freedom	حرية	49	703	the Arabs	العرب	14
420	terror	إرهاب	48	1218	to degrade	هون	14
745	world	عالم	38	367	heads	رؤوس	14
1105, 76	products	بضائع / منتجات	37	515	political	سياسية	13
1130, 130	women	مرأة / نساء	34	15	history	تاريخ	13
870	to kill	قتل	30	700	to act unjustly	عدا	14
367	head/leader	رئيس	27	1247	minister	وزير	12
391	message	رسال	27	24	Africa	أفريقيا	11

To develop a co-occurrence topic network, and to identify themes or cluster topics, it would be necessary to see paired words that frequent together. Using the Co-occurrence Frequency, frequently paired words are extracted by looking at the collocation and colligation of keywords listed in Table 6. For example, the keyword الله [God] is frequently paired with صلى [to bless someone] and عليه وسلم [upon him and peace], رسول [messenger], و [by, used to swear], عدو [enemy], أكبر [great]. However, to avoid a large list, co-occurrence frequencies are grouped into themes and subthemes.

In the Arabic grammar, a word has a variety of synonyms, and their meanings vary in degree. To describe an animated or inanimate object, and a concept, many words can be used. In the meantime, a word can carry numerous meanings and sometimes the opposite. Through the Arabic semantics, which looks the meaning of expressions, a series of low-frequency co-occurrence words were extracted to form themes. As Archer (2016) insisted, low-frequency words need to be paid attention as they are key in the process of pairing with other words. Weibin Lin et.al (2022) strengthens Archer position by arguing that high-frequency keywords don't automatically embody the main themes rather it is low-frequency words that strengthen the keyword center representative of the theme. Looking into the words that frequently cooccur the list of keywords and phrases that carry similar meaning, three main topics of responses were clustered: the first topic clusters terms that cooccur with France and categorizes into three subthemes: colonial history, domestic and foreign policy, and policy towards religion (Islam). The second topic clusters descriptive terms that are associate to Emmanuel Macron. The third topic clusters terms cooccurring with Muslims' reaction over prophet's cartoon. A disclaimer whoever is necessary, the statements and criticism shown whether endorsed or not, are not the author's point of view.

4.3.2.1 Topic clustering 1: Descriptive terms that co-occur frequently with 'France'.

4.3.2.1.1 Theme 1: Descriptive terms used for France's colonial past.

Overall, Muslim response was characterized for criticizing France's colonial past in Algeria as well as in the whole African continent. For instance, most frequent terms associated within this theme are حرب [war] and قتل [to kill] (see Figure 17). Another layer of the responses criticizes France's crimes [جرائم فرنسا] of killing of thousands of Algerian Muslims [قتل عشرات الالاف/ملايين الجزائريين] in cold blood [قتل بدم بارد] by cutting their heads [قطع رؤوس] and putting the cranes in museums [وضعت رؤوسهم/جامعنا في متاحف] in Paris. It is important to note that in the Arabic language عشرات الالاف/ملايين [tens of thousands/millions] are not exact numbers but a way to denote the huge quantities. A randomized anonymous sample of a tweet post of the first theme is provided in Arabic followed by its translation:

من يتكلم عن التطرف فرنسيا؟؟؟؟!!!!!! فلتراجع سياستها الداخلية والخارجية وتخبرنا لعنا
نصدق ان فرنسا لم تقتل الجزائريين بدم بارد ووضعت رؤوسهم في متاحف لكي تتفاخر بها
ولتخبرنا عن الذهب الذي سرقتة وخيرات افريقيا التي اغتصبتها

Who talks about extremism, France????!!!!!! Let's review its internal and foreign policy and inform us that we should believe that France did not kill the Algerians in cold blood and put their heads in museums to brag about them and tell us about the gold and goods of Africa that were stolen and usurped.

Keyword 'France': COLONIAL PAST

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
war	حرب	23
to kill	قتل	23
France's crimes	جرائم فرنسا	9
colonization	إستعمار	9
French facism	فاشييه الفرنسيه	5
occupation	احتلال	5
to destroy	دمر	4
destruction	الهلاك	2
to loot	نهب	2
to besiege	حصر	2
Hitler	هتلر	1
Inquisition	محاكم التفتيش	1
French massacres	المذابح الفرنسية	1

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
Killed ten of thousands/millions [Algerians]	قتل عشرات الالاف/ملايين [الجزائريين]	18
cut the heads	قطع رؤوس	14
black/bloody history Algeria	تاريخها أسود/دموي الجزائر	13
colonial history	التاريخ الاستعماري	10
stolen resources	سرقة/نهب الذهب والخيرات والأموال	8
killed in cold blood	قتل بدم بارد	7
built on our skulls	بنيت علي جماجمنا	6
put their heads in museum	عت رؤوسهم في متاحف	4
shed blood	سفكت الدماء	1
exhumation	تنشيش	1

Figure 17. Terms that co-occur the most with France regarding its colonial past.

4.3.2.1.2 Theme 2: Descriptive terms used for France's domestic and foreign policy.

Within this theme, top 4 keywords that co-occur frequently with France are: إرهابية [terrorism], [متطرفة] [extremist], [الإسلاموية] [Islamism] and [عنصرية] [racism]. (see Figure 18) Looking at the context in the corpus text of these keywords, France is described as a دولة إرهابية [terrorist state] for its colonial massacres and military interventions in the African continent. Muslims also criticize France's foreign policy for [بتمويل الارهاب] [financing terrorism] in Iraq, Syria and the Levant and their involvement in the Syrian civil proxy war in 2011. Another sect of criticism describes France for stealing natural resources from current African countries like of مالي [Mali]. Two random samples of a tweet post in Arabic followed by its English translation describes France as the following:

هم الإرهابيون فرنسا دولة ارهابية من الاستعمار الى الان دول المغرب وباقي الدول الافريقية
تعاني الى الان ومالي خير دليل

They are the terrorists. France is a terrorist state from colonialism until now. The Maghreb countries and the rest of the African countries are suffering until now, and Mali is the best proof.

and,

دين الإسلام ليس داعش والقاعدة وغيرها من الجماعات الإرهابية المتطرفة، دين هؤلاء صنعه
أنتم لتوظيفها في لعبة الصراعات السياسية والعسكرية لغرض تعزيز نفوذكم، هذا نهجكم وعقليتكم
التي تخفونها تحت لحاف العلمانية الزائفة

The religion of Islam is not ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other extremist terrorist groups. The religion of these people was created by you to be used in the game of political and military conflicts for the purpose of strengthening your influence. This is your approach and mentality that you hide under the veil of false secularism.

France version of secularism and [secular laws] بقوانين العلمانية are also criticized for being [racist] عنصري tools that discriminate Muslims in France. Terms like ازدواجية المعايير [double standards], [false freedom] حرية كاذبة, [fake secularism] العلمانية الزائفة and اليمين المتطرف [extreme right-wing] are terms that cooccur frequently with 'racism' which reflect Muslims' view of the Republic's values of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. A random tweet sample reflect this subtheme:

من يعيش الأزمة ليس دين الإسلام، بل هي النزعة الاستعمارية المعشعشة في عقولكم بقناع
علماني، هذا تاريخكم، اطلاق الشعارات البراقة سهل جداً، أين خرياتكم الدينية في فرض منع
الحجاب على المسلمات في فرنسا؟! لماذا عطّلت خرياتكم عند هذا الحد والذي يتعبّر حقاً
"شخصياً"؟!

Whoever lives the crisis is not the religion of Islam, but it is the colonial tendency nested in your minds with a secular mask, this is your history, launching bright slogans is very easy, where are your religious freedoms which imposes the hijab ban on Muslim women in France?! Why did you disrupt your freedoms at this point, which is truly "personal"?!

Muslims also criticize the terminologies that president Macron and its government use excessively linking Islam as a religion of terror and extremism. As shown in Chapter 3, the French government has attributed the acts of stand-alone Muslim terrorist to the whole French-Muslim community through draft bill on October 2, 2020. For example, the keyword [Islamist] الإسلاموي frequently cooccurs with [terrorism] الإرهاب [extremism] التطرف

in a tweet text. Never less, Muslims responded that most of terrorist attacks' victims in the Middle East are Muslims themselves and that extremist and terrorism have no religion rather it is religion being used in the name of these terror attacks. Two random samples of responses are provided for this subtheme:

التطرف ماله دين وانما عقلية مريضه ووصفه بالاسلامي هو عين التطرف

To describe extremism (which is a phenomenon not unique to any religion) as Islamism is the very essence of extremism itself.

and,

نحن (المسلمون) نرى تطرف داعش وتطرف شارلي ابيدو سوا في نشر الكراهية أنتم تحمون تطرف شارلي ابيدو نحن ندين تطرف داعش والجماعات الارهابية نحن ضحايا الجماعات الارهابية وايضا ضحايا تطرف شارلي ابيدو هذا الفرق بيننا وبينكم في التعاطي مع التطرف ونشر الكراهية

We (Muslims) see the extremism of ISIS and the extremism of Charlie Hebdo together in spreading hate. You're protecting Charlie Hebdo 's extremism. We condemn the extremism of Daesh and terrorist groups. We are victims of extremism of terrorist groups and of Charlie Hebdo's. This is the difference between us and you in dealing with extremism and spreading hate.

Another layer of response is directed at France call for ending the boycott of French products and companies in the Muslim world after president Macron supported the republishing of the prophet's cartoon. For example, an anonymous user expressed:

إذا كانت فرنسا تدعي ان الشعوب السلامة اقلية متطرفة فلماذا تخاف من حملات المقاطعة للمنتجات الفرنسية

If France claims that Muslims are an extremist minority, why are they afraid of boycott campaigns against French products.

Other lesser group criticize the French government for focusing on religious differences rather than looking after the economic and social situation of French women living in poverty. A random sample of response says:

في شوارع باريس نساء يعرضن اجسادهن مقابل مبالغ زهيدة. انتشلهن من الفقر ومن الانحطاط فأنت مسؤول عنهن

In the streets of Paris, women expose their bodies for small sums. Lift them out of poverty and degradation, you are responsible for them.

Finally, a small group of critics accuse French government to be in partnership with Jews and Zionist to diminish Muslims. Withing this set, users question why criticism towards Islam is valid under freedom of speech while criticism towards the Jews is, especially the holocaust, considered antisemitic. An anonymous user asks:

هل أستطيع نشر كاريكاتير يستهزئ بالهولوكوست في مجلة شارلي ابيدو

Can I publish a caricature mocking the Holocaust in Charlie Hebdo magazine?



Terms French domestic politics

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
terrorism	إرهابية	44
country	دول	39
extremism	متطرفة	28
Islamism	الإسلاموية	23
racism	عنصرية	15
political	سياسية	13
secular laws	بقوانين العلمانية	10
terrorist state	دولة ارهابية	8
double standards	زدواجية المعايير	2
with secular mask	بقناع علماني	1
false freedom	حرية كاذبة	1
fake secularism	العلمانية الزائفة	1
extreme right-wing	الييمين المتطرف	1

Terms French foreign policy

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
Minister of Foreign Affairs	وزير خارجية	12
Africa	أفريقيا	11
Mali	مالي	8
financing terrorism	بتمويل الارهاب	8
ISIS	داعش	6
Foreign policy	سياسة الخارجية	3
Christian	مسيحي	3
Al-Qaeda	القاعدة	3
Somalia	الصومال	3
Syria	سوريا	3
militarism	عسكرية	2

Keyword
'France':
POLICIES

Terms French economy

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
French	فرنسي	97
boycott products	مقاطعة البضائع/منتجات	37
French women	مرأة-نساء الفرنسية	14
economic	اقتصادية	6
France's failure	فشلت فرنسا	6
companies	شركات	4
losses/damage	الخسائر	3
domestic policy	سياسة الداخلية	1
economic collapse	انهيار الاقتصاد	1
[government] lost	خسنتم	1

Antisemitism, descriptive terms

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
to be Jew	هود	9
Freedom of expresion	حرية التعبير	6
Zionism	صهيونية	4
Holocaust	لهولوكوست	3
animals	حيوانات	2
despictable nations	ارذل الامم	1
Stinking tongues	ألسنتكم النتنة	1
state of thieves	دولة اللصوص	1
you semi-monkeys and pigs	يا اشباه القردة والخنازير	1
you sissies	يا مخنثين	1

Figure 18. Terms that co-occur frequently with France's domestic and foreign policies.

4.3.2.1.3 Theme 3: Descriptive terms used on France's policy towards religion: Islam.

When it comes to religion, French secular laws, especially regarding Islam, are described by Muslims with terms such as أعداء [animosity], الطغيان [tyrannical], منع الحجاب [ban on hijab] الحرمة/ المنع [prohibiting], نشر رسوم/ صور/ كاريكاتير [drew cartoons] and انشر رسوم/ صور/ كاريكاتير [publicized cartoons] (see Figure 19). The republication of the prophet Muhammad cartoons

and their display in government building after the beheading of Samuel Paty, are described by Muslims with terms such as الرسوم سيئة-ة/المسيئة/الإساءة لنبي-لرسول [offensive cartoons to the prophet/messenger], تنتهكون [insulting the sanctity of Muslims], and حرمت المسلمين [violating the sanctities of Muslims]. For example, a user exclaimed:

وهل محاربة التطرف تكون بنشر رسوم مسيئة لنبي الإسلام.. من هو المتطرف ومن الذي يحض على الكراهية والعنف إذن؟

Does fighting extremism involve publishing cartoons insulting to the Prophet of Islam? Who is the extremist and who incites hatred and violence then?

In another set of criticism, Muslims characterize Macron's speech and policies towards Islam with terms like النشر الكراهية [spreading hate], ضد الإسلام [against Islam], ضد مسلمين [against Muslims], اقلية متطرفة [extremist minority], etc. Withing this set, criticism is also given to the message of peace given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the republication of the prophet's cartoons. For example, a random sample post says:

تنتهكون حرمت المسلمين، وتؤذونهم في رسولهم ﷺ، وتستفزونهم بكل وقاحة، ثم تبعثون برسالة سلام

You violate the sanctity of Muslims, and you hurt them by insulting their prophet (peace be upon him), you provoke them brazenly, and then you send a message of peace.




Figure 19. Terms that frequently cooccur with France regarding religion (Islam).

4.3.2.2 Topic Clustering 2: Descriptive terms associated with president Macron.

When criticizing president Macron, a four-set type of descriptive terms were attributed to him. (see Figure 20). The first set of terms demand for an apology for backing the republication of the cartoons. The rest of the descriptive terms, although not appropriate, none of them call for Macron's killing nor jihad in France. A tweet sample of describing president Macron says the following:

الرئيس الفرنسي الفاشل يسعى لتغطية فشله بتأجيج الصراعات بين النصارى والمسلمين في بلاده

The failed French president seeks to cover up his failure by fueling conflicts between Christians and Muslims in his country.

Keyword: **Macron**

Descriptive terms for E. Macron's politics

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
The French president	الرئيس الفرنسي	24
to apologize	عذّر	11
speech	خطاب	4
statement	البيان	3
to translate	ترجم	3
electoral propaganda	دعاية انتخابيه	2
Win elections	تفوزوا بالانتخابات	1

Descriptive terms for E. Macron's mental

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
you are in crisis	انت من تعيش ازمة	7
contradictory	متناقض	2
psychopath	مريض نفسي،	1
needs mental test	يحتاج اختبار عقلي	1
intellectually disturbed	مختل فكرياً	1
Need urgent treatment	بحاجة إلى العلاج الأجل	1
talks nonsense	يتكلم الترهات	1
have no ideas	لا يملك افكار	1
jokes	النكت	1

General descriptive terms to E. Macron

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
extremist	متطرف	39
looser	ماكرون الفاشل	16
to be insolent	تطاول	6
animosity/enemy	أعداء	6
ignorant	جاهل	5
terrorist	ارهابي	4
racist	عنصري	4
cunning man	ماكر	3
dirty	الوسخ	3
hypocrite	منافق	3
liar	كاذب	2
imprudent	الوقح	1
hasn't learn manners	لم يتعلم الأدب	1
disrespectful	غير محترم	1
hateful person	شخص حاقد	1
corruption	الفساد	1

Religious terms attributed to E. Macron

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
enemy of God	عدوّ الله	6
to blaspheme	كفر	5
hot water in hell	جحيم	2
crusader	صليبي	1
thinks he is Templar	يظن أنه من فرسان المعبد	1
extremist infidel	الكافر المتطرف	1
the devil	الشیطان ماكرون	1
mother of evilness	ام الخبائث	1
God curse you	عليك لعنة الله	1
Freemasonry	الماسونية	1
extremist crusade	الصليبية المتطرفة	1

Degrading terms attributed to E. Macron

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
pig of France	خنزير فرنسا	2
dog	الكلب	1

EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
Cheetah's husband	زوج الشيتا	1
lives with an old woman	يعيش مع عجوز	1

Figure 20. Non-violent Descriptive terms attributed to president Macron.

4.3.2.3 Topic Clustering 3: Descriptive terms cooccurring with Muslims' reaction over the prophet's cartoon.

After reminding France's colonial past and attributing descriptive terms to president Macron. Muslims have voiced against the republication of the prophet's cartoons by the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine. Overall, Muslims who made responses in the Arabic language made calls to the العالم الإسلامي [Muslim world], الشعوب الإسلامية [Muslim nations] and العرب [the Arabs] for three purposes. The first was to طالب [request] president Macron and his government to respect the دين الإسلام [religion of Islam], المعتقدات الدينية [religious believes], حرية التعبير [freedom of worship], حرية المعتقدات [freedom of believe], حرية التعبير [freedom of expression], احترموا/احترموا غيركم [respect others] religious expressions. (see Figure 21) A random sample of a tweet for this theme includes the following:

من الخطأ أن تظنوا أننا كمسلمين نطالبكم بتغيير مبادئكم لكننا نطالبكم باحترام مبادئكم في حرية معتقداتنا كمسلمين وحرية تعبيرنا وكما تقف الحرية عندكم في معتقد اليهودية والمسيحية كذلك يجب أن تقف عند معتقدنا كمسلمين مساوياً بالبقية

It is wrong to think that we, as Muslims, demand that you change your principles, but we demand that you respect your principles regarding the freedom of our beliefs as Muslims and the freedom of our expression, and just as freedom stands for you in the belief of Judaism and Christianity, so you must stop at our belief as Muslims.

The second call is specifically regarding the cartoons of the prophet. Calls are made for نصرته لرسول النبي/الحبيب [supporting the prophet] by protesting, criticizing, demonstrating, and condemning the offensive cartoons. Salutations to the prophet like صل الله عليه وسلم [peace be upon him] always colligate whenever his name is mentioned. Other terms cooccurring for supporting the prophet are الا الرسول [not with the prophet] and خط أحمر [red line]. A sample tweet reflects Muslims response for this subtheme:

أردنيون يتظاهرون أمام السفارة الفرنسية في العاصمة عمان؛ نصرته لنبينا محمد ﷺ، والشرطة تمنعهم من الوصول إلى المبنى


Jordanians demonstrate in front of the French embassy in the capital Amman; in support of our Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, and the police prevent them from reaching the building.

The third call is for مقاطعة البضائع/منتجات [boycott products] boycotting French products and offering alternatives for consumers. Majority of post contained hashtags in Arabic and French. For more detail on hashtag, check on the section 'By hashtag'. A small

group of users also requested Muslims to boycott Chinese products for their treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China, however, no engagement was followed. A sample tweets for calls for boycotts says:

انا مسلمة لن اتوقف من مقاطعة منتجات فرنسا حتى اشاهد ماكرون يعتذر من جميع المسلمين،
ويقوم بأغلاق جريدة شارلي ابيدو ويقوم بسن قانون يمنع التعدي على المقدسات الدينية لاي دينة
وليس الاسلامية فقط

I am a Muslim, and I will not stop #boycotting_France_products until I see Macron apologizing to all Muslims, closing the Charlie Hebdo newspaper, and enacting a law that prevents the infringement of religious sanctities of any religion, not just Islamic.



Terms Muslims requesting respect			Terms co-occurring with the prophet.		
EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT	EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
religion of Islam	دين الإسلام	116	Muhammad	محمد	152
Islamic	إسلامي-ة	38	messenger of God	رسول/نبي/حبيب الله	91
Muslim world	العالم الإسلامي	24	peace be upon him	صل الله عليه وسلم	84
group of people	طالب	15	support the prophet	نصرة لرسول/للنبي/الحبيب	12
requesting			swear by God	والله	8
the Arabs	العرب	14	not with the prophet	الا الرسول	6
Muslim nations	الشعوب الإسلامية	14	humanity	انسانية	5
religious believes	المعتقدات الدينية	12	God is great	الله أكبر	2
respect others	احترم/احترموا غيركم	11	red line	خط أحمر	2
Freedom of expression	حرية التعبير	6	Mahdi	المهدي	2
Islam honours women	الإسلام كرم المرأة	6			
freedom of worship	حرية تعبير	3			
Muslim scholars	علماء المسلمين	2			
freedom of believe	حرية معتقدات	2			

Keyword: Prophet's cartoons

Terms Muslims calling for boycott		
EN-HANS WEHR	ARABIC	COUNT
boycott products	مقاطعة البضائع/منتجات	37
to express	تعبير	23
the West	الغرب	8
hashtags	الهشتاجات	2
China	الصين	2
Uighurs	إيغور	2
fight/struggle	صراعة	2
campaigns	حملات	2
continue	تستمر	2
word of criticism	كلمة نقد	1
dependency	التبعية	1
alternatives	بدائل	1
awareness	العي	1
against terrorism	ضد ارهاب	1
against extremist ideolog	ضد ايديولوجية التطرف	1
against Macron's insolence	ضد تطاول "ماكرون"	1

Figure 21. Descriptive terms associated with reactions over the prophet's cartoon.

4.3.3 Patterns of Response in the French Language

In the French text corpus, 38 keywords were extracted. The extraction focussed on the root form of the verb and the singular nouns. Table 7 shows that France, Islam, liberté [freedom], musulman [Muslim], boycotter [to boycott], religion, français [French], crise[crisis] and droit [right/law] are the most frequent keywords or the main topics that users are speaking of. Compared to the Arabic keyword list, it is *liberté* that most French-speaking Muslim focus on their responses.

Table 7. Top 38 keywords (IDF-TF) for the responses in French Language.

EN-TRANSLATION	FR-KEYWORD	COUNT	EN-TRANSLATION	FR-KEYWORD	COUNT
	France	105	to insult	insulter	27
	Islam	84	president	président	24
freedom	liberté	83	world	monde	20
Muslim	musulman	78	women	femme	19
to boycott	boycotter	74	Islamism	islamisme	16
religion	religion	70	police	police	16
French	français	47		Charlie Hebdo	14
crisis	crise	45	imam	l'imam	13
product	produit	42	to demand	demander	13
right(law)	droit	42	to criticize	critiquer	12
	Macron	37	Mister	Monsieur	12
caricature	caricature	36	politics	politique	12
to make/do	faire	33	never	jamais	12
country	pay	33	secularism	laïcité	11
hatred	haine	30	Islamophobia	islamophobie	11
prophet	prophète	29	compatible	compatible	11
against	contre	29	to apologize	excuser	11
Muhammad	Mahomet	28	terrorism	terrorisme	10
to respect	respecter	28	blasphemy	blasphème	10

French-speaking Muslims had shown three main patterns of response.

First, regarding President Macron's statement that "L'Islam est une religion qui vit une crise", "(Islam is a religion in crisis)", Muslims have argued that Islam is not a religion in crisis and instead it is France and Macron who are in crisis. French Muslims complained that the health (Covid-19) and economic crisis were of most priority. An Anonymous user voiced: "Vous n'avez pas réussi à régler la crise sanitaire et économique et vous voulez régler la crise religieuse[...]. Perso je ne vois aucune crise de l'islam juste des gens ignorants. C'est lui la crise de notre pays", "(You have failed to resolve the health and economic crisis and you want to resolve the religious crisis. Personally, I don't see any crisis in Islam, just ignorant people. He is the crisis of our country)." Other user voiced similarly: "et puisque vous avez échoué en politique c'est normal de s'enprendre à l'islam", "(and since you have failed in politics it is normal to attack Islam)". Another minor group claimed that Muslims who were in crisis and not Islam as a random sample user noted: "Les musulmans et pas l'islam.... L'islam est protégé par le ciel", "(Muslims and not Islam.... Islam is protected by heaven)". Other users mentioned that other religions such Catholicism, Judaism were also experiencing crisis.

Responses also were made thought the lenses of colonialism. Muslims rate Macron's statement as part of neo-colonial mindset. Two sample tweet post reflects this type of response: "L'islam ne vit pas une crise ! Les musulmans se réveillent et ne veulent plus d'un occident qui les colonise et leur vole leurs richesses", "(Islam is not experiencing a crisis! Muslims wake up and no longer want a West that colonizes them and steals their wealth)" ;and "Totalement faux . Juste que vous avez colonisez les pays a majorité musulmane et maintenant la nouvelle génération n'est plus un gentil petit mouton", "(Totally false. Just that you colonized Muslim-majority countries and now the new generation is no longer a nice little sheep)". A smaller group responded with logical analogies as for example: "Islam vit une crise!!!???si l'islam menaçait la France donc la France est en crise pas l'islam ;si macron croit que l'islam est en crise donc il va disparaître donc pourquoi s'inquiète", "(Islam is experiencing a crisis!? if Islam threatened France then France is in crisis not Islam; if Macron believes that Islam is in crisis then it will disappear so why is he worried)".

It is evident also that majority of Muslims have addressed E. Macron as ‘president’ and ‘Monsieur’ and only a minority have used inappropriate terms. (see Table 8).

Table 8. Cluster of co-occurring terms regarding Macron’s statement ‘Islam is in crisis’.

EN-TRANSLATION	FR-KEYWORD	COUNT
Mr. President Macron	Monsieur Président Macron	12
you are in crisis [Macron]	vous êtes en crise [Macron]	10
Islam is not experiencing a crisis	Islam ne vie pas une crise	9
colonial terrorism	terrorisme colonial	7
France is in crisis	France est en crise	7
Heath and economic crisis	crise sanitaire(Covid)/ économique	4
Catholicism is experiencing a crisis	La religion catholique vit une crise	4

The second pattern of response is clustered around Macron’s proposed measures to combat Islamism in France like of institutionalizing Islam by training imams loyal to the Republics values. Majority of the responses, consider that Macron’s bill proposal to go against French secular values, *liberté de religion* [freedom of religion], *liberté de conscience* [freedom of conscience], *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme* [Declaration of Human Rights], *liberté de croyance* [freedom of belief], *liberté de conviction* [freedom of conviction] and *liberté d’action* [freedom of action] (see Table 9). Regarding the institutionalization of Islam, a set of users have voice that *laïcité* separated the matters of the state and religion and guaranteed the noninterference of the state in religious matters. For example, a sample user indicated: “La laïcité c'est pas la séparation de l'église (mosquée) et de l'état normalement ?” , “(Isn't secularism the separation of church (mosque) and state normally?)” ; and “Et comment va t on appeler cette nouvelle religion crée par l État ? Et au fait cette ingérence de l État dans la religion c est fidèle aux valeurs de notre république ? Ça devient compliqué tout ça ...”, “ (And what are we going to call this new religion created by the State?. And in fact, is this state interference in religion faithful to the values of our republic? It's all getting complicated...)”.

The training of imams by the state have also grew concerns to Muslims and have refuted in the following: “Vaste projet ! Formons des français déjà. Après qu'ils soient chrétiens, musulmans, bouddhistes. ça relève de la sphère privée”,“(Vast project! Let's train French people then. After they become Christians, Muslims, Buddhists... it's a private

matter.)” and “A toutes les mauvaises langues, le jour où vous serez à la place d’un imam contraint de prêcher des choses avec lesquelles il n’est pas d’accord, auxquelles il ne croit pas, lorsque que vous n’êtes pas avec eux lorsque qu’ils se cachent dans les toilettes pour pleurer”,”(To all evil tongues, the day when you will be in the place of an imam forced to preach things with which he does not agree, which he does not believe, when you are not with them when that they hide in the toilets to cry)”.

Comparing boycott calls from the Arabic responses which used as a tool for economic punishment for republishing the prophet’s cartoons, French responses were supported under the notion of liberté d'expression [freedom of expression]. Many have voiced that boycotting was a form of freedom of expression, others argued that by parity of reasoning, if freedom of expression allowed the publication of cartoons, then it gave green light for boycotting French products. A randomized sample expresses the pattern of this response: “ Comment défendez-vous la liberté de religion et de croyance ?! Ils montrent des photos du prophète Mahomet. Et si vous défendez les libertés, je suis libre de boycotter vos produits ”, “ (How do you defend freedom of religion and belief?! They show photos of the Prophet Muhammad. And if you defend freedoms, I am free to boycott your products.)”; and “Le boycott aussi est une sorte de liberté d’expression pour vous dire que votre liberté s’arrête lorsque vous moquez de nos croyances et notre prophète”, “ (The boycott is also a kind of freedom of expression to tell you that your freedom ends when you mock our beliefs and our prophet)”.

Table 9. Cluster of co-occurring terms that frequent with ‘liberté d'expression’

EN-TRANSLATION	FR-KEYWORD	COUNT
freedom of expression	liberté d'expression	40
boycotting is freedom of expression	boycott c'est la liberté d'expression	17
boycott French products	boycott de produits français	14
French secularism	laïcité française	11
freedom of religion	liberté de religion	6
freedom of conscience	liberté de conscience	3
Declaration of Human Rights	Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme	3
freedom of belief	liberté de croyance	2
freedom of action	liberté d'action	1
freedom of conviction	liberté de conviction	1

Other set of responses have questioned the absolute right of freedom of expression which allows the right to criticize any religion, liberté d'insulter [freedom of insult] and the right to blaspheme. (see Table 10) Majority of users however agreed that the right to insult, blaspheme and criticism to religion does not encompass insulting the prophet and Islam, nor attacking religion. As some sample users voiced: “ Je n'en reviens toujours pas qu'en France on confonde à ce point liberté d'expression et insulte permanente envers une religion minoritaire (car là, on n'insulte pas l'islamisme, hein, mais bien Mahomet). Hier subversif, Charlie n'est plus qu'appel à la haine institutionnalisé.”, “(I still can't believe that in France we confuse freedom of expression and permanent insult to a minority religion to this extent (because there, we don't insult Islamism, eh, but rather Mohammed). Once subversive, Charlie is now nothing more than an institutionalized call to hatred.)” and “Insulter un musulmans c'est une liberté d'expression, mais insulter un juif c'est de l'antisémitisme, de quel liberté on parle?”, “(Insulting a Muslim is freedom of expression, but insulting a Jew is anti-Semitic, what freedom are we talking about?)”.

Table 10. Cluster of co-occurring terms that frequent with ‘insulter’ and ‘religion’.

EN-TRANSLATION	FR-KEYWORD	COUNT
against Islam	contre Islam	9
the right to blasphemy	le droit au blasphème	8
attack religion	attaquer religion	7
respect Islam	respecter Islam	7
criticism to religion	critiquer la religion	6
insulting the prophet of Islam	insulter Prophète de l'Islam	4
freedom to insult	liberté d'insulter	3
insulting Islam	insultant l'islam	3

4.3.4 Pattern of Responses in the English Language

In the total corpus of responses collected, majority of responses are in English, this is also means that the number responses are diverse. In this case, with the immensity and the uniqueness of responses, identifying and clustering patterns of responses became of a challenge. However, by looking at the most frequent keywords, it is possible to say that English-speaking Muslims are speaking of Muslims (160), France (107), Macron (98), Islam (98), country (84), religion (83), prophet (76), Muhammad (57), freedom (56),

boycott etc. (see Table 11). Compared to the Arabic and French most frequent keywords, Muslims include in their debate Imran Khan (former Prime Minister of Pakistan), China's treatment of Muslims and India's support towards France's policy towards Muslims.

Table 11. Top 50 keywords in the corpus for English responses.

KEYWORD	COUNT	KEYWORD	COUNT
Muslim	160	speech	28
France	107	belief	27
Macron	98	support	25
Islam	98	hate	24
country	84	oppose	24
religion	83	Europe	23
prophet	76	president	23
French	63	oppression	23
Muhammad	57	Islamophobia	21
freedom	56	respect	19
boycott	53	apology	19
insult	52	show	19
people	44	mental	18
leader	43	violence	17
extremism	43	colonialism	17
Pakistan	40	Christian	17
crisis	38	racism	16
products	38	Imran khan	16
terrorist	38	government	16
right	37	cartoons	13
peace	36	India	13
kill	35	China	12
stop	30	ambassador	12
talk	30	impose	12
humanity	29	Uighur	11

To see the context the keywords are used, it is necessary to see the colligations and collocations of the keywords, and cluster the terms according to the events. A total of four clusters were identified in the English language responses.

The first cluster of terms in Figure 22, in response to Macron's statement that 'Islam is in crisis all over the world' and fighting 'extremism' along with 'Islamist separatism' in France. The main response to first statement was by extending the statement of 'crisis' mainly to E. Macron and Muslims. The statement was also extended to other religions, and Western policies. For example, a random user expressed: "You [Macron] are in crisis not Islam", and "You must say Muslims in crisis not Islam. Islam is simply submission to the Will of the Almighty God of Abraham. So, if u[you] say Islam in crisis then it automatically covers Christianity & Judaism coz[because] they too hv[have] been asked to submit to the Almighty God of Abraham." As for the second statement, Muslims have argued that extremism is found also in degrading forms of speech, religion, political factions, and racism. For example, a user expressed regarding Macron's verbal extremism: "The French President is the biggest supporter of extremism through his statements which encouraging extremism against a certain religion. Verbal extremism will lead to other forms of extremism. Freedom is not about mocking others." Another user argued that extremism is found in any other religion: "Extremists don't represent any religion. Christians got extremists. They shoot up schools. Hindus got extremist Tamil tigers is one of the big terrorist organizations. Every religion got them but only Muslims are blamed for terrorism because of a bigger plan."

A minor set of responses criticized French colonial past in Algeria and Africa. In another subset of responses, France is associated with far-right ideology and neo-colonial policies.

Muslim criticism to extremism		Extension of statement ‘crisis’	
KEYWORD	COUNT	WHO IS IN CRISIS	COUNT
oppose extremism	4	Macron	9
religious extremism	4	Muslims	5
extremism in freedom of speech	2	Countries and people	1
Islamist Separatism.	2	Other Religions	1
verbal extremism	1	Muslims due to West policies	1
Far-right & Far-left extremists	1	Chengiz khan said the same	1
Christian extremists	1	anti-Islam policies and conspiracies	1
Hindu extremist	1	Mr. Macron and co supports	1
fanatic racism	1	secularism	1
Christian Radicalism	1	Christianity in Armenia	1
Islamophobia is terrorism	1		

Criticism to French colonial past	
KEYWORD	COUNT
killing during colony	9
history in Africa	7
far right	3

Figure 22. Response Clusters for ‘Islam is in crisis’ and ‘Islamist separatism’.

The second cluster of responses (see Figure 23) regarding the republication of the cartoons of the prophet, are tied to criticism to the notions of ‘freedom of speech’, ‘freedom of expression’, ‘freedom to blaspheme’ that allows for the ‘right to ridicule’ and ‘freedom to hurt’ religious symbols. Muslims in their responses considered that ‘insulting the prophet’ and disrespecting to the prophet’ through the publications of cartoons fall under the umbrella of ‘hate speech’. A public statement made by @chedetofficial commented on the restriction of freedom to insult: “The killing is not an act that as a Muslim I would approve. But while I believe in the freedom of expression, I do not think it includes insulting other people. You cannot go up to a man and curse him simply because you believe in freedom of speech.” Another public statement made by @anwaribrahim regarding demonization of Muslims using freedom of speech: “Monsieur Macron needs to be aware that freedom of speech is an essential value of Islam. France cows its own Muslim community with the dehumanizing and demonising effects of the kind of harangues Macron so easily lapses into.”

In a subset of the second cluster, few responses tided ‘freedom of choice’ with boycotting French products as one sample tweets says: “We will continue using our freedom of choice of boycotting French products. That's it!”. Other forms of protest specially from the Indian Subcontinent region included calls for expelling French ambassadors: “We call upon the Muslim world leaders to expel French ambassadors & announce the boycott of French products”. A smaller subset of responses also criticized the double standards of freedom of religion in France: “Freedom of religion? Freedom of choice? Thats why you banned hijab? That why you force them to remove veils? Shame on you for hypocrisy.”

Calls for boycott		Criticism to absolute freedoms	
KEYWORD	COUNT	KEYWORD	COUNT
boycott French products	15	freedom of speech	19
French products	15	insulting the prophet	12
Freedom of choice [to boycott]	3	freedom of expression	10
Expel French ambassador	9	hate speech	4
Notions of freedom		disrespecting the prophet	3
KEYWORD	COUNT	Freedom to hurt	2
Freedom of Religion	3	right to ridicule	1
human right	2	freedom to blaspheme	1
freedom of debate	1	freedom to be biased	1
freedom of believing	1		

Figure 23. Clusters of responses regarding the cartoons of the prophet.

The third cluster (Figure 24) extends the debates of the situation of Muslim minorities in India and China. Some Muslims questioned why Muslims leaders did not condemnatory statements on the situation of Uyghur Muslims, for example, a random user stated: “Yet Uighurs are imprisoned and sterilised in their own land but name me a Muslim country that has raised the matter with China?”. Muslims from Pakistan criticized the former prime minister Imran Khan for not condemning the situation of Uyghur Muslims in China in the same way he condemned the French policies. A user replied in Imran Khan’s post: “Kindly issue the same statement on the atrocities of Uighur Muslims in China,” and “China is actively persecuting its Uighur minority, yet Macron is the target for upholding the values of his own country, your silence speaks volumes, the hypocrisy is stark.”

Withing the responses to Imran’s Khan’s statement, there were a group of self-identified Hindu users that supported the proposed measures of Macron and France towards Muslims, for example, Hindu users stated: “India stands with France, We Indians are with you”. To put in context, Indian Muslim minorities have been experiencing severe forms of Islamophobia under the Modi Government. A user has even compared E. Macron with the current Indian president: “Stop behaving like Modi”. Other critics have compared Macron’s bill and Indian policies towards Muslim minorities equal to Nazi policies towards Jews: “Macron is doing to Muslims what the Nazis did to the Jews – Muslim children will get ID numbers (other children won't) just as Jews were forced to wear the yellow star on their clothing for identification;” and “Nazi Germany and modern-day France/India, no difference.”

KEYWORD	COUNT	KEYWORD	COUNT
Uyghur Muslims	11	India support France	12
Uyghur genocide	2	Shame Indian	2
Imran Khan silence	3		

Figure 24. Reply Term Clusters for Indian and Chinese policies towards Muslim minorities.

Finally, the fourth cluster (Figure 25) consist of descriptive terms towards president Macron. The first subset consists of general terms that describe his position as ‘French leader’, ‘president’, and ‘sir’. The second subset whoever consist of inappropriate negative terms which mainly describes the state of mind of E. Macron as a sample tweet post says: “Macron has lost his mind and needs an urgent mental health treatment.” No calls for jihad and killing were identified and the count number of both subsets are the equal.

Addressing E. Macron		Criticism on Macron's mental state	
TERMS	COUNT	TERMS	COUNT
president	22	has lots his mind	14
French leader	20	loser	8
sir	6	hates Muslims	8
Monsieur	3	Shame on you	7
		the devil	6
		behaves like animal	6
		He is very low	6
		idiot	5
		Mr. racist	4
		coward	4
		hypocrite	3
		Mr. ignorant	2
		learn Arabic?	2
		OVERRATED leader	1
		hell for him	1

Figure 25. Descriptive terms for president Macron in the English language.

4.3.5 Patterns in Hashtag Ummatic Campaigns.

According to Andreas Bernard (2019, 3), the function of hashtag symbol (#) followed by letters, makes Twitter or Instagram post publicly available and links them as a group. In other words, hashtags index and categorised user posts. Bernard further explains that keywords have been used long before hashtags to find specific content and they can also be used as hashtags by adding #, transforming them into networked keywords. Peter Wikström (2014) describes that any post containing the # tag, are integrated into other posts that has the same hashtag and helps the user to navigate. Lately, as Bernard pointed, hashtags have become a 'social symbol' and has been mainly used by political activists and marketing. Bernard showed that hashtags main function was to create social media campaigns and he gave the example of the #Metoo campaign in 2018 that created global debate about sexual abuse.

In 2020, Muslims engaged in a global debate or *ummic* debate about Macron's statements, the killing of Mr Paty and the republication of the prophet's cartoon using

hashtags. A total of 1580 hashtags were integrated in the timeline of Arabic, French and English tweets. Majority of the tweets mined contained in average 2 hashtags. However, in many tweets, the text and the hashtag would vary in the language posted. For example, Figure 1 shows a sample tweet in Arabic with hashtags in Arabic, English and French.



Figure 26. Sample tweet in Arabic and its hashtags in three different languages.

This section analyses the most used hashtags in the global debate by Muslims. The Matrix consists of the tweet language and the hashtag that was included in the tweet. This would show that Muslim response is multilingual, and it is linked to other timeline of tweets in different languages. To add, hashtags were not included in the keyword count analysis of Muslim responses.

Table 12 shows set of hashtags in Arabic, English and French, used in the ummatic debate on the prophet's cartoon. #إلا_رسول_الله [not with the prophet] was the hashtag most used in the tweets posted in Arabic [AR] (105), however, it was also included in tweets posted in English [EN] (37), media (26) and French [FR] (16). In the same way, #ProphetMuhammad was used mainly in tweets posted in Arabic (38) and English (38). Overall, hashtags regarding global debate on the prophet's cartoons were linked to the timeline of Arabic (215), English (140) and French (14) tweets.

Table 12. Tweet language and hashtags used in response to the prophet's cartoons.

Hashtag Label	AR	EN	FR	MEDIA	TOTAL
رسولنا خط احمر # [our prophet is red line]	4	6	1	1	12
محمد صلي الله عليه وسلم # [Muhammad, peace be upon him]	5			2	7
إلا رسول الله # [not with the prophet]	105	37	16	26	196
#OurProphetOurHonor	4	10		2	16
#WeLoveMohammadﷺ		9		2	11
#ProphetMuhammad	38	38	1	6	83
#StopAzerbaijaniAggression		8	3		11
#La_plus_grande_création_de_Dieu_Muhammad [The greatest creation of God is Muhammad]			2	1	3
#Notre_religion_est_la_religion_droite_de_la_vérité [Our religion is the religion of truth]	1			2	3
#Sauf_le_bien_aimé_d_Allah [except the beloved of God]	2		2	4	8
#Islam		7	4	1	12
#savemuslims		7			7
TOTAL	159	122	29	47	369

Hashtags regarding the ummatic debate on E. Macron were mainly in the English language and were used in the tweets posted in English. Table 13 shows that #MacronTheDevil (65) and #Macron (24) were the most used hashtag in English written posts. #ماكرون يسيء للنبي [Macron insults to the prophet] (26) was mainly used in the Arabic written tweets.

Table 13. Tweet language and hashtags used to describe E. Macron

Hashtag Label	ARABIC	ENGLISH	FRENCH	MEDIA	TOTAL
#MacronApologizeToMuslims		7			7
#MacronGoneMad		8			8
#MacronTheDevil		65		3	68
#ShameOnMacron		9	1		10
#StopMacron	1	4	1		6
#Macron		24	6	5	34
ماكرون_يسئ_للنبي# [Macron insults to the prophet]	26	3	0	4	33
TOTAL	27	120	8	12	166

In the ummatic debate about France, Muslims made online campaigns mainly using #France (28) in the English tweets, #Separatisme (5) [separatism] in the French tweets, #Islamophobia (7) in the English and Arabic written tweets and #فرنسا_سرطان_افريقيا# [France is Africa's cancer] (23) in the Arabic, media and French tweets respectively. Overall, hashtags regarding France were mainly linked into the English tweets (see Table 14).

Table 14. Tweet language and hashtags used in global debate about France.

Hashtag Label	ARABIC	ENGLISH	FRENCH	MEDIA	TOTAL
#FranceMustApologize		3			3
#FrancePromotingTerrorism		2			2
#FranceSupportingIslamophobia		3			3
#IStandWithFrance		3	1		4
#France		28	2		30
#FreedomOfSpeech		4			4
#Separatisme [separatism]			5		5
#blasphemy		2			2
#covid19		2			2
#SYPCountryWideProtest		7			7
#Islamophobia	2	4		1	7
#CharlieHebdo		3	2	2	7
#terror	2	2		1	5
فرنسا سرطان افريقيا [France is Africa's cancer]	9	1	2	7	23
#massacre_ded_coupes_coupes [cut-cut massacre]		2			2
TOTAL	13	66	12	11	106

Social media campaigns on boycott for French products contained the highest number (839) of hashtags compared to the other groups of campaigns. #مقاطعه_المنتجات_الفرنسيه [boycotting French products] (345) which has the highest number among the Arabic hashtag was linked into the timeline of tweets written in Arabic (213), English (82) and media (38). #boycottfranceproducts (360) whoever was integrated mainly into the English, Arabic, and media tweets respectively that triggered the debate. Lastly, the French hashtag #Boycottez_les_produits_français [Boycott the French products] (102) was surprisingly used more in English and Arabic tweets post rather than in French posts (see Table 15).

Table 15. Tweet language and hashtags used in global debate of boycotting French products.

Hashtag Label	AR	EN	FR	MEDIA	TURKISH	TOTAL
قاطعوا_المنتجات_الفرنسية# [Boycott French products]	8	10		1		19
مستمرون_بالمقاطعة_يافرنسا# [We continue boycotting France]	12			1		13
مقاطعه_المنتجات_الفرنسيه# [boycotting French products]	213	82	10	38	2	345
#Boycottez_les_produits_français [Boycott the French products]	26	56	8	9	2	102
#boycottfranceproducts	44	270	12	32	2	360
TOTAL	303	418	30	81	6	839

4.3.6 Pattern of Responses in Media Content.

As explained in the first section, media analysis will include, first, responses which only expressed inform of memes, photos, video, posters, animated stickers (GIF) with a total count of 163 responses; second, it also includes responses that contained combined text description and media type. A total of 364 photos and 54 videos were analysed and grouped in nine main clusters (see table 16) based on visual, topic and content similarity which followed the hashtag patterns and classification. Even though a main cluster is exhibit as one, each cluster manifest a series of sub clusters.

Table 16. Nine main clusters in media type of responses in the Muslim global debate.

No	CLUSTER	COUNT
1	Macron	96
2	boycott	90
3	Protest	79
4	Secular France	46
5	Muhammad	43
6	Colonial Past	23
7	Scholarly response	19
8	Charlie Hebdo	10
9	Pro-France	7

Although social media or web 2.0 is mainly used for informal activities such like sharing pictures of cute cats⁵¹⁷, Ethan Zukerman, coiner of the Cute Cat Theory of Digital Activism, claims that user generated platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube allows users, activists, and online communities to share and create “banal content” which is harder to be censored.⁵¹⁸ Other scholars argued that memes with politically and socially critical content are ways for activist and communities’ opinions bypass censorship by the government. However, the study of online communities and online users have been widely studied under the Social Movement Online Communities framework that seeks to understand online communities network, worldviews, and discourse.⁵¹⁹

The first cluster, which represents 23 percent of the total media content, online Muslim communities have expressed their opinions through memes, cartoons, and depiction of E. Macron under the notion of freedom of expression (see Figure 27). Majority of depictions of Macron are from users that self-declared to be from the Middle East. Each cluster is numbered in the order that the subcluster represents from the highest to the lowest. For example, the first subcluster contained 22 depictions of E. Macron’s wife. The second, third, fourth and fifth subcluster, share with same quantity (14) of depictions each. The

⁵¹⁷ Eliza Steinbock, “CATTIES ANDT-SELFIES on the “i” and the “we” intrans-animal cute aesthetics,” *Journal of Theoretical Humanities* 22, no. 2 (2017):164

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid*, 164.

⁵¹⁹ Neal Caren, Kay Jowers and Sarah Gaby, “A Social Movement Online Community: Stormfront and the White Nationalist Movement,” *Media, Movements, and Political Change* 33 (2015): 167.

illustrations although inappropriate and disrespectful, none of them are depictions of killing or contain extremist discourse.




Figure 27. Subclusters of most shared memes and depictions of E. Macron under the notion of freedom of expression. Each in the order numbered.

The second cluster, representing 22% of the total media, mainly from the Middle East region, exhibit the calls for boycotting French products. (see Figure 28) For example, the poster 1 which was shared the most among other posters, include hashtags in both Arabic and English. The poster 2 and 3 depicting the French flag, call for boycotting through hashtags in Arabic. The fourth poster depicts only French dairy products along with E. Macron face. The fifth poster (with the least number) explains the user that product made in France and their respective barcode.



Figure 28. Most shared depictions and posters calling for boycotting French products.

Protest has been the type of response that the media in general had shown the most. Except for the Gulf countries, protests had been a form of response that most Muslim countries resort to in support of the prophet Muhammad. However, when it comes to online dissemination, most video content of protest are from the Indian Subcontinent and Africa. The first image in Figure 29 shows mass of women in Pakistan, the second image shows a large crowd of protestor in Bangladesh. In Africa, specifically Somalia, Senegal, Egypt, Morocco, and Libya protestors marched and gathered in protest of the cartoon of the prophet. Protest also took place in Syria, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia), Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen. Incidents of burning the French flag were found only the Indian Subcontinent and Afghanistan which consist of a selective minority of media shared.



Figure 29. Protest in the Indian Subcontinent (1, 2), Africa (3), and Syria (4).

A unique pattern arises in the Indian subcontinent as depictions of E. Macron were pasted on the streets of Mumbai, India (see Figure 30). Others depictions of Macron were posted in public bathrooms (second picture). Many users recorded themselves stepping on French flag and Macron's depictions as seen in the third video capture.




Figure 30. Depictions of E. Macron in the streets of Mumbai, India.

French policies were not immune to criticism through depictions and memes. For example, in Figure 31, Macron's speech in October 2020 was depicted with a series of keywords in French language showing the negative terms attached to Islam. The second depiction describes the duality of freedom of speech in France. Many users also decided to share the photos when Hitler visited France to describe French policies towards minorities.




Figure 31. Depictions that users shared the most to describe French policies.

Regarding Macron’s support for the republication of the prophet’s cartoon, many Muslims protested by sharing a poster that says: “I protest against disrespect of our Beloved Prophet Muhammad”. Other users shared a poster containing verses of the Quran with E. Macron’s image included in it. In other posters, E. Macron’s image is often accompanied with the shoe step on it. See Figure 32.



Figure 32. Most shared posters against Macron’s defence of the republication of the prophet’s cartoon.

In the Middle East, as well as in the Maghreb region, many users resorted to share images of French massacres in Africa. For example, Figure 33 shows that from image 1 to 3, the beheading of men in the Maghreb region, their skulls are currently located in the Musée de l’homme, Paris. The online discourse also depicted (picture 6) French extraction of natural resources from the Africa countries while Africans risk their lives to cross the Mediterranean.



Figure 33. Most shared images of French colonial past in Africa and Algeria.

Finally, other pattern of responses included the scholarly response in speech and written form from Muslim scholars mainly in Arabic and English language. A minority of responses shared the Charlie Hebdo cartoons about the prophet and Judaism. More could be said about these topics, however due to the lack of space, the topics is left for other researchers to delve into more detailed pattern of response.

4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter explored in detail the real responses of Muslims towards Macron's statement and policies towards Islam and Muslims. Using Twitter Developer tools and Python programming language, a total of 1904 tweets were extracted. Using descriptive statistics, the main the languages Muslims used to express were English, French, Arabic, and media type respectively. Majority of the responses came from France and Europe combined, Middle East, Indian subcontinent, Maghreb, and Anatolia region.

The responses in Arabic language whoever contained the most varied of cluster of responses. The responses tapped more into the criticism on French colonial past, domestic and foreign policies, and secular laws towards religion, specifically towards Islam. In contrast, Muslim discourse in French language criticized more the notions of freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom to insult and blasphemy. Boycotting in Arabic and French responses were linked to the concepts of freedom of choice. Responses in the English language contained the most varied pattern of responses as each argument showed uniqueness that would not be fair to cluster in sets. However, majority of response extended the definition of crisis to president Macron, Muslims themselves and other religions. Interestingly, Muslims also questioned that Muslim leaders' statements should also be extended to Muslim minorities that suffer under the policies of Chinese and Indian government.

The global Muslim debate was multilingual and was channelled through hashtags, mainly in Arabic, French and English. Through it, Muslims also expressed their views in form of pictures, memes, animated stickers, and videos. Depictions of Emmanuel Macron under the notion of freedom of expression, posters boycotting French products, protest in the streets, support for the prophet and historical photos of colonial past were the most shared among the online Muslim communities. The online Muslim debate and response contained a variety of responses in difference languages.

CHAPTER 5: BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, A CONCLUSION

The civilisational relations between the West and the Muslim world had been always complex. The historical evolution of this relationship since the translation movement in the Golden age of Islam that led influx of knowledge to Medieval Europe, the French revolution influence in North Africa and the Ottoman empire, the dissolution of the Ottoman at the end of WWI, colonization of Muslim nations by European empires, clash of civilization theory that legitimized the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, the rise of ISIS caliphate in Syria along with a proxy war that led to influx of refugees to Europe and a generational shift towards social media during the Covid-19 pandemic have shaped the West-Muslim civilizational relations.

As literature review shows, in traditional mainstream media, Muslims have been mainly portrayed negatively; in the West, Islamophobia often masqueraded as racism, discriminate Muslims with immigrant background; right-wing political parties use immigration and Eurabia conspiracy theory for gaining popular support and votes. These at the same time has feed Islamophobia rhetoric among right-wing terrorist like Anders Breivik and Tarrant who killed innocent people in their hatred towards Muslims. In France, *laïcité*, although a law that guarantees the non-interference of the government in religious matters, it has been used as a tool to assimilate Muslims by banning religious expressions. With the rise of user generated content, online communities and activist challenged the traditional media by offering counterviews. Statements like Macron's speech in 2020 stating that 'Islam is a religion in crisis' and events that followed it, offered an opportunity for Muslims to voice their opinions. Through the Critical Discourse Analysis Theory, Intergroup Threat Theory (Islamophobia), Knowledge Discovery in Datasets in Big Data, Natural Language Processing algorithms, media bias theories, and political history, this multidisciplinary research provided a holistic view of Western media portrayal of Muslim response and the real responses captured on Twitter.

What was the political context of Macron's speech in 2020?

This research question was answered by looking at the historical survey since the Enlightenment till the contemporary French discourse on Islam and Muslims. During the Enlightenment, the ideal religion was presented as a form of deism. For the *philosophes*,

Islam was a religion near to deism and an alternative to criticize Catholicism. Their arguments towards Islam and the prophet paved the way for French revolutionaries to advocate the revolution across the Mediterranean. The French revolution set the grounds for *laïcité*, using the church immense wealth to alleviate the financial crisis. Declaration of the Rights of Man' and the bill of December 1789, Muslims subjects of the Ottoman empire were given rights as French citizens. New historical evidence by Ian Coller points that Muslims in the Mediterranean were informed of the French revolution. In 1790 a delegation of foreigners, attended the National Assembly were Al-Kahin Diyunysius Shawish, an Arab priest gave a speech in half Arabic and half French. Mohamed D'Ghies of Tripoly and Hage Monakmeti de Tounisie were among the Muslims who signed a petition to participate in the "Festival of the Federation". In the Ottoman empire, revolutionary ideas circulated mainly among the elite, Latin Christians, Ottoman Christian, and Balkan Muslims. The head of the Assembly, Baron de Menou, who appreciated the delegation of foreigners, 8 years later would embrace Islam in Egypt during expedition where Napoleon presented himself as a Muslim. Napoleon considered Muhammad as a rare genius and was inspired to conquer the world like Muhammad. His expedition failed as it wiped French trade in the Ottoman empire and led to rejection of revolutionary ideas.

During the 19th and 20th century, the French empire colonized North and West Africa which focused in assimilating indigenous habitants to French culture. Albert Camus and Franz Fanon wrote vocally about French colonization in Algeria to understand French colonization. Camus elaborated the concept of mediterranean humanism that supported Muslim civil rights and opposed the French brutality on Algerians. Fanon is considered as representative of the Algerian revolution, his writings focus on the racist and sexist assumptions of colonial mentality, the split ego and how racism is used as an ideology to dehumanize Algerian people and heritage. Contemporary French discourse on Islam is set around the discourses of nationalism, anti-immigration and far right-wing parties like of Le Pen that blame immigrants for the economic crisis. President Macron's government was characterized for banning the burkini in 2022 and plans to ban abayas in schools. Postmodern French intellectuals argue that Islamophobia is a tool to destroy civilized debate and criticism towards religion and that the reaction to cartoons are fanatic intimidation.

What were the immediate events that resulted from Macron's speech?

This research question was answered by looking at the media overview of key events after Macron's speech.

On October 2, 2020 Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech as part of his presidential campaign in a town with significant immigrant population where he stated that Islam was in crisis and revealed measurements to fight Islamist radicalism, and separatism; He added that imams would be trained in France loyal to the Republic principles instead of importing from Muslim countries. French Human Right activists claimed that Macron's speech feeds Islamophobia discourse and exposes millions of Muslims to be accused of extremism. On October 16, 2020, Samuel Paty, a French teacher was beheaded near the high school he worked by a Chechen refugee, Abdullakh Anzorov. Previously, a student accused Mr. Paty of showing the pictures of the prophet and claimed she was suspended for resisting. The father of the pupil launched an online campaign revealing the teacher's information. The investigation had shown that the girl was not in present the day he showed the cartoons. As the whole nation was shaken, Macron announced that teacher was killed by an Islamist terrorist and in a national memorial for Paty on October 22, he supported the use of the prophet's cartoons. Muslims in France condemned the attack; however, some have been taken to court for exalting the killer as a martyr. On October 25, Macron twitted reiterating the use of the prophet's cartoons. Subsequently the Muslim world condemned the cartoons, criticized president Macron and called for boycotting French products. On October 31, 2020, E. Macron gave an interview to Al-Jazeera where he explained that his support for the cartoons were taken out of context.

How did the Western media portray Muslims' response to Macron's speech?

This research question was answered by analysing 39 digital articles were crawled from 18 most prominent Western media outlets. Using the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) statistical model for Frequency Analysis, which extracts topics based on the distribution of words, and Co-occurrence Frequency for topic clustering, a total of 34 frequent keywords were selected. The keywords reflecting the relevance in the corpus include *Samuel Paty*, *separatism*, *Islam*, *Macron*, *law*, *Muslim*, *lie*, *attack*, *country*, and *radical*. The paired keywords that Western media uses the most are *freedom of expression*, *French leader*,

terrorist attack, radical Islamism, antiterrorism, Islamist terrorist, Islamist terrorist attack and French values each in order. Media also links Islam with negative terms like *Islamism, Islamist separatism, Islamist teaching, Islamist terrorist, Islamist attack and radical Islamism*. Newspapers that focus intensively on the issue of Samuel Paty, also mentioned Islam the most the negative co-occurring terms. They are Daily Mail, The Times Magazine, The New York Times, Le Monde and Reuters. Based on the co-occurrence network, three main topics were identified. The first with its center representative as France, Samuel Paty-cartoon, Islam. The network shows that Western media model of debate, first by linking Islam with radicalization and that mosques, homes, and schools as centers of for teaching radical ideas. The clustering network illustrates 9 topic clusters with France, Macron, Samuel, teaching, cartoon, Islam, Muslim, Islamist, attack, and separatism as the center representative. This model shows that the media shows issues that are mainly associated with French Muslims are generalized to the Muslim world as a civilization. Media has also shown Muslim response in form of protest with the main theme of burning flags and angry crowds.

How did Muslims respond to Macron's speech in social media?

The analysis of Muslim response towards Macron's statement and his support for the cartoons was crawled from Twitter using its developer tools and Python programming language. A total of 1904 tweets were used for final analysis. Data shows that the responses mainly were expressed in English language (34%), French language (29%), Arabic language (25%) and media (9%) and majority of them were posted in France and Europe combined, Middle East, Indian Subcontinent, Maghreb, and Anatolia region each in order. English was used in all the regions, but more than half in the Indian Subcontinent. Arabic was mainly used in the Middle East and the Maghreb. 90 percent of French language was used in France and the rest in the Maghreb. Media type was expressed mainly in the Middle East, France and Indian Subcontinent.

Responses in the Arabic language comprised of the most varied and complex. Top 10 keywords include *الله* [Allah], *اسلام* [submission/Islam], *رسول* [messenger], *فرنسا* [France], *سلم* [to summit to God], *فرنسي* [French], *نصر* [to support], *سلم/سلام* [peace], *سوء* [to offend/hurt] and *دين* [religion]. Three main topics of responses were identified. The first

topic clusters terms that co-occur with France. It is shown that Muslims criticized France for its colonial history in Algeria, racism embedded in domestic laws, foreign policy in Syria and Africa, and secular laws as tools to ban religious expression, specially aimed at Islam. The second topic clusters inappropriate descriptive terms used for president Macron, however none of the terms are calls for killing or jihad. The third topic clusters expressions Muslims used to support the prophet by using salutations, calls for protest and boycott.

Responses in the French language criticized the double standards of freedom of expression, freedom of speech, freedom to insult and freedom to blaspheme which were used to insult religious symbols of Muslims. Top keywords found in the French text corpus are *France, Islam, liberté [freedom], musulman [Muslim], boycotter [to boycott], religion, français [French], crise[crisis] droit [right/law]and Macron* in the given order. Muslims also extended the statement ‘in crisis’ to Monsieur Macron, France, health and economy and Catholicism. Other segment of responses considered that Macron’s measurements are against Declaration of Human Rights, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of belief, freedom of conviction and freedom of action. *Laïcité* ensured the separation of the state and religion, yet Macron was violating the same ideals he professed. Boycotting French products were linked to notions of freedom of expression.

Responses in the English language focussed more on calls for boycott and issues of Muslim minorities in other countries. The top ten keywords include *Muslim, France, Macron, Islam, country, religion, prophet, Muhammad, freedom, and boycott*. Here also Muslims extent the term ‘crisis’ mainly to Macron and Muslims. Other segment of arguments criticized the usage of freedom of speech to insult others but have used it to legitimize calls for boycott. Calls for expelling French ambassador mainly were expressed in the Indian Subcontinent, yet at the same time user have asked their leaders to condemn the situation of Uyghur Muslims in China and Indian Muslim minorities in India.

The global Muslim debate whoever was not isolated in each region and language. Majority of post contained hashtags in English, Arabic and French which shows the multilayered and multilingual complexities of the discourse. The main hashtags used in the *ummatic* social media campaign contained *إلا_رسوال_الله#* [not with the prophet], *#ProphetMuhammad, #MacronTheDevil, #France, #فرنسا_سرطان_افريقيا#* [France is Africa's

cancer], مقاطعة_المنتجات_الفرنسيه [boycotting French products], #Boycottez_les_produits_français [Boycott the French products] and #boycottfranceproducts. In the media type of responses, nine main theme clusters were identified which were grouped based on the hashtag themes and visual similarity. The first theme clusters illustrations of E. Macron based on the notions of freedom of speech. The second theme groups the most shared posters containing list of French products to be boycotted. The third theme shows pictures of protest in the Muslim world against the prophet's depictions. The fourth theme criticizes through memes French domestic policies. The fifth theme groups poster denouncing those who insult the prophet. Lastly, the sixth theme collects historical photos of French massacres in Algeria and Africa.

As shown above, the global Muslim response was multilingual and multilayered. Responses in Arabic, English, French and media type criticized Macron's policies by reminding French colonial past in Algeria and Africa. However, responses in the Arabic language criticised more French foreign policy in Syria and the extraction of natural resources in the African countries like of Mali. While criticism to freedom of expression for being used to insult the prophet was emphasized in the 4 mentioned languages, freedom of expression was used to legitimized calls for boycott, attribute negative descriptive terms to Macron and the right to criticized him through depictions. However, only a minor segment from the Middle East of the total sample decided to express their voices through depictions. Negative descriptive terms associated to E. Macron seemed to be more relevant in the Arabic and English responses than in the French language. Responses in Arabic also described French secular policies as tyrannical for banning and prohibiting religious expressions like the hijab and burka. French responses in the other hand criticized French policies through the notions of *laïcité* which guarantees the non-interference of the state in religious affairs. French speaking Muslim discourse compared to other languages, showed mastery of the concepts of freedom of belief, freedom to blaspheme, freedom of religion, and freedom of action. Despite that most French speaking Muslims' origine come from the Maghreb region, majority haven't criticized French colonial past, however, they have described their experience of discrimination and racism by the government policies.

To what extent Macron's speech escalated an Islamophobic discourse in the Muslim world?

Overall, majority of the responses are secular in nature. Criticism to the shortcomings of freedom of expression, right to blasphemy and insult, requesting for the respect of religious freedom, criticism to French colonial past, request to not insult the prophet Muhammad by drawing its cartoons, calls for boycott and protest are not signs of radicalism, fanaticism nor Islamism. Regarding the inappropriate descriptive terms attributed to E. Macron, it seems that users were in moment of anger. None of the responses calls for global jihad against France nor the killing of any French leader. Majority of the responses uses non-religious arguments or universal values to criticize Macron and France, only a minority (5 users) used a verse of the Quran where for insulting the prophet, there is a consequence (punishment).

The Western media only showed two types of responses, a portion of protest with angry masses burning the French flag and calls for boycott, despite of the large availability of moderate and secular responses as shown above. Not only that, Western media model of analysing and portraying Muslims and Islam is through a model of radicalization. It links Islam with negative terms such as Islamism, radical, separatism, terror attack. The killing of Samuel Paty, despite being a local issue, Western media portrays as an issue that the Muslim world is responsible for. Lone wolf terrorist like Anzorov do not represent the actions and beliefs of the Muslim world or French Muslims. In the same way, terrorist Anders Breivik whose actions do not represent Christians or the Norwegian nation.

Historical survey has shown that French view of Islam since the Enlightenment till the French revolution have been amicable. The philosophes considered Islam as the ideal religion close to deism. The French revolutionaries saw the Muslim foreign delegation as a universal map of the revolution and Muslims enjoyed same rights as French citizens. Napoleon considered Muhammad as a rare genius and was inspired to conquer the world. French brutal colonization of Muslim lands however dehumanized Muslims and stole their natural resources. Contemporary France is dominated by right wing discourse like of Le Pen whose proposals are considered anti-immigration, anti-Muslim which feeds Islamophobia discourse. French political parties(specially right wing) have used *laïcité* as

a tool to assimilate minorities and to ban any religious expression. Macron's government is not an exception of that. It seems that contemporary politicians are unaware of the influence that Islam and Muslim took part in the enlightenment, French Revolution and Napoleon's life. Laïcité which was implemented also to enforce religious tolerance and religious freedom with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, today contemporary France tries to deny by restricting religious symbols.

Regarding the cartoons of the prophet, Prof Amir Zekrgoo from the Faculty of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the Melbourne University, in his lecture titled "Islamic Arts and the Problem of Imagery: It's all About Context" explained that part of the Islamic heritage was the drawings of prophet Muhammad, some with the face exposed and some covered with light. Prof Zekrgoo showed some examples of the prophet's drawings like of 'Prophet Muhammad and the Muslim Army at the Battle of Uhud', c. 1594 in the 4 volume of Mustafa Al-Darir's *Siyar-i Nabi* (life of the prophet); 'Prophet Muhammad riding the Buraq 1820-1830, India; and 'Miraj' by Sultan Muhammad, 1539-1543, Safavid Iran. He then differentiated that religious art is not sacred art. In a separate interview with the author, prof Zekrgoo did not agree with the manner Charlie Hebdo portrayed the prophet as it links with forms of extremism, but also stressed that Muslims should not overreact over the depictions.

Recommendations

With the rise of social media and user generated content, online communities have the opportunity to voice their real concerns offering an alternative to media misrepresentation and government censorship. Muslim online communities in their global debate use extensively social media to voice their real responses. Social media big data has opened ways to study their concerns, voices, and responses to any events. This opens new avenues for research to understand what Muslims think of different topics such as terrorism, technology, global market trends, new ideologies etc. The following are the recommendations:

- A) The presentation of Muslim belief and behaviour should be done by seriously taking the views, opinions, and responses of actual Muslims of specific events. This is based on the notion of equal representation and parity of reasoning. For example,

Western media shows mainly the police justification for the brutal treatment on African Americans; when in fact, media should also show the views and conditions and African Americans.

- B) The use of big data analysis of ummatic responses can provide key insides that are not found in traditional media analysis. Western media companies are driven by economic profit by showing only sensational news to keep public engagement. As explained by Lichter (2017), Western media owners try to control public opinion which favours the political and economic elite. Social media challenges this traditional media position, by allowing users to interact with the news and expressing their real views.
- C) Issues such as Islamophobia are multidisciplinary in nature and can't be properly understood solely through the perspective of religion. Whatever is explained only through the lenses of religion is simplistic. Western media should understand the Muslims opinions and responses are influenced by many factors such as colonialism, social and economic struggles, technology, and global trends.
- D) It is vital to emphasize Muslim agency in criticizing hegemonic narratives against Islam which are part of Islamophobia discourse. For example, diversity of responses by Muslims debunks Islamophobia views that Muslims held the same view, and that Islam is unable to interact with other civilizations. Muslims had shown that they have a choice, and this choice was manifested in different ways which shows that there is agency among Muslims. This also shows that actions and behaviours from the West does affect the Muslim world.
- E) It seems there is a divide between Information Technology (IT) and Human Science, however both go hand in hand. Big data analysis on Muslim responses cannot be understood from solely IT perspective, rather a civilizational framework is needed to do the analysis. For example, a researcher needs to have considerable knowledge of Muslim thought and worldview in order to grasp themes and keyword search parameters among huge amounts of data, considering the that Muslim population are diverse in religious views, cultural backgrounds, history and language.

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